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Whan Hans Dr· топ Balthasar «aid In 1977 that th· eaehatologlcal shop 
waa eloaad for th· ti·· baine for alteration·, he maj not Ьат· realised how 
long it would Ьате to remain closed before it would be theologically preaan-
table again. Kore than fifteen year· hare paaeed, and although иапу Important 
thing· hare happened in eaehatological reaeareh sine· then, we cannot really 
aajr that the eaehatologlcal hou·· ia In order. We are hard a-buildlng and we 
are gradually forced to aak оигаеітев: when will eachatology be presentable? 
At thia point there is no вірі of a grand opening. 
The aetirity топ Balthasar refers to has been going on since the begin­
ning of the century in one sector or another and it has spawned a huge amount 
of literature. Unfortunately it i· difficult to come to any real eoncluaiona 
•bout th· nature of eschatology other than that it must be extremely Important 
to merit so much attention. Tor any of the many chronicle· of eaehatologlcal 
research will show how often opinions hare swung from one pole to the other. 
As one keeps reading,the feeling is inescapable that the research on eschatology 
end· up saying more about the researchers than about eschatology. And almoet 
out of desperation in trying to seek high ground in the welter of opinions, one 
think· perhapa alteration· will not be enough to put eschatology in order. 
Perhaps something more radical is needed. 
It was such a thought that first Inspired this study. It was more than 
•Tident that a little tinkering hare and a little tugging there would not 
be enough to bring new intelligibility Into eechatology, but that something 
would Ьате to be done with the тегу tools uaed for understanding and approaching 
eechatology. And погеотег, one simple set of tools would not be enough to 
put the entire eschatological shop Into shape. The area ie too complex, the 
questiona too intricate, the consequences too unforeseeable to permit ouch 
facile solutions. Nerertheleee, aome attempt had to be made toward building 
an apparatus that aight hsre a chance at discoTering the inner logic of eecha­
tology. 
This study is an attempt at such a construction. It is not a further 
reshuffling of date already accumulated, but rather a different approach to 
the data as such. It is an application of linguistic tools to the eschatological 
data with the hope that it might give a new look at what Ьате become rather 
eabarraeslngly old problems. It is believed that the application of such tools 
will not simply be another imposition of another worldTiew on eechatology, but 
may go some distance in clarifying the logic of eschatology. Language analysis, 
of course, coaes from a particular worldview and with particular interests, too; 
but its constant attention to linguistic data of the phenomenon itself can keep 
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th« intrusión of thie vorldTiav at a ainiaua. 
Becauae lingula tie шшіуаіа haa aeldoa Ъ*«п uaed in aaehatology, thie 
atudy will haarily «aphaaiE· aetbod. For aathod not only aaaaurea th« 
phancaanon, it alao eraataa it to a great extent. And while the data of 
eachatologj ia priaarily llnguiatie in character, it ia auch odd langnage 
that no llnguiatie analytic method will quickly or eaally aake aanae of it. 
Thua a large portion of the time will he apent on the prohlea of aethod to 
inaure careful work. Tor a good aethod will alleTlate the aoat difficult part 
of the analyaia. Noreorer, if the aethod can paaa the acid teat of eachatology, 
it will hare shown ita usefulness for other sectors of religious language aa 
well. 
Our cmcern, then, will be twofold. On the one hand, the larger propor­
tion of the tiae will be deroted to ahaping the tools of language analysis. 
It la a two-pronged approach that triea to catch the two important aoaents in 
language. It is directed in the first instance toward concrete usage of 
language in the contemporary aituation. To thia end, the ordinary language 
philosophy begun by J.L. Austin and furthered by John Searle has been chosen 
for this task. There will be a presentation of their work, a critique of it 
at Important pointa, and an extension and refineaent of it to assure us of 
tools capable of taking on the taak of analyzing eachatologieal language. Why 
Auatln and Searle were chosen will become évident in the course of the discussion. 
To mention some of the reasons briefly hare: they are moat keenly attentiTe of 
langnage as it exists in concrete situations and are least interested in explaining 
it before it has been exhauatiyely described (aomethlng common among many 
so-called Oxford philoaophera) or reforming it before it is understood (one Is 
reminded of Wittgenstein's therapeutic intentions). Their first interest is 
ordinary language In its richness of Tarietiea and not aiaply in the most 
sturdy Tariety (as is the case with ideal language philosophers). Austin saw 
his goal as an analyaia of "the total speech act In the total speech situation". 
And the point of this study is that nothing leas will help ua toward a better 
understanding of eachatology. 
In the second Instance, those linguistic deep structures that go Into 
constituting concrete usage as it is must be Investigated. It is at thia 
level that the logic of eachatologieal language will reveal itself. For this 
purpose, the structural aeaantics of A.J. Oreimas will be utiliaed. Oreimaa' 
approach haa the advantage of combining deep structure linguistic method with 
an equal concern for aemantica and the relation of the constituted concrete 
usage to the existing social conditiona. It avoids the Isolated, context-free 
aort of analyaia atill ao prevalent among Anglo-American linguists. By virtue 
of its sensitivity to the concrete situatbn, it forma a good marriage with 
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Auatin and Searle'в ordinary language philosophy. 
On the other hand, the tools of language analysis will then be applied 
to eachatological data. It nay seem strange that tools of "ordinary" language 
analysis could help elucidating a concrete language so "odd" as that of escha-
tology. But if religious experience and religious language are accessible to 
all men, then religious language — and a fortiori eachatological language — 
is fair game for ordinary language analysis. To construct some niche inaccesa-
ible for ordinary language analysis will at best only postpone the understanding 
of eschatology and its language. At worst it can mean the gradual isolation 
and eventual desiccation of eachatological language. 
Careful choice and preparation of the language tools is but half the 
task. The same care must be exercised with eschatology. The field is so broad 
and amorphous that it is difficult to see what ccostitutes eocla tological data. 
For this reason we have settled upon a narrow area, that provides a comprehensive 
view of eschatology while at the same time remaining within workable limits. 
We have chosen a single author from twentieth century research, Jürgen Moltmann, 
and have investigated his work on eschatology. It may seem, surprising that 
ordinary language analysis was not applied directly to the biblical data. 
This was not undertaken for a number of reasons. First of all, the author is 
not an exegete and is not trained to carry out the first-hand sort of research 
necessary for an ordinary language analysis at that level. Secondly, the wide-
ranging character of biblical data — and the separate problem of which of the 
biblical data will be called eachatological data — make it prohibitive to begin 
any ordinary language analysis of the corpus of biblical data. Third, in dealing 
with biblical data we find ourselves confronted with several different cultural 
situations all of which will demand separate ordinary language analyses, since 
the speech situations vary greatly. Fourth, dealing with the ЪіЪІісаІ data first­
hand imposes an additional haraeneutical problem for the actualieation of the 
results. It was felt that it would be better to let some theologian first 
resolve this problem within his own work to help clarify our investigation here 
and to safegurard against our unconsciously arranging the data ahead of time. 
Fifth, an investigation of an actualisation of the eachatological data made 
by some syateotic theologian may reveal certain models and constructs unnecessarily 
prejudicing the exegete who does deal with the data of the bible first-hand. 
He may recognise some of his own models that could lead to a possible analysis of 
the work of exegetes themselves at some future point. Sixth, to cooprcmiae 
between exegete and systematic theologian and choose a "biblical theology*' 
constructed by one or other of theae two partiea was alao excluded, since most 
biblical theologies reflect the very problem we are trying to overcome: they say 
more about their author than about the material treated. They are most often 
too slick in coordinating all the data. 
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Но втвг, when we are confronted with a deep structure analyaia of those 
patterns constituting concrete usage, resort to the biblical data will become 
Inвтіtable. The risk has to be taken, despite the oTerwhelming difficulties 
of directly applying ordinary language methods to the ОТ and HI text. Conse­
quently, there is a structural semantics analysis of selected WI paaaageswhich 
embody the logic in turn principally responsible for generating the possibilities 
Moltmann will utilize in his text. The application of structural semantics to the 
NT text is а тегу recent phenomenon and may prove new to some readers. It 
departs significantly from the now widely accepted philological-historical 
methods of exegesis, though connects up with it at important points. By such 
an analysis, the relation between the inherent logic of eschatology and its 
actualisation by twentieth century research and ecclesial praxis can be identified 
and located. 
The study of eschatological language, then, will proceed along the following 
lines: 
In Chapter One, a brief OTerriew of twentieth century research in escha­
tology will be glTan. Bather than chronicling ite history once again, the 
overriew will work thematically, trying to locate the various issues that 
have caused the most concern and difficulty in the history of the research. 
Further attention will be paid to the problem of method in eschatology and 
the need to develop a special heraeneutics for eschatology. Finally, the con-
frantation with language analysis will be introduced as the best way to handle 
the primarily linguistic phenomenon that eschatology is. 
Chapter Two begins the study of ordinary language analysis as developed by 
Austin, Searle and others. Thfc method will be called speech act theory because 
its concentration upon speech acts or utterances. Section 2.1. deals with the 
background of ordinary language philosophy in general and speech act theory in 
particular and presents speech act theory as worked out by Austin. Section 2.2. 
вишаагівев the research done on speech act theory in the period between the 
death of Austin and the publication of Searle's major work. Sectie« 2.3· shows 
how Searle'в work builds upon and extends speech act theory as it haa been 
developed up to that time. 
Chapter Three is in many ways the heart of the ordinary language study. 
It attempts two things. First of all, it gives an ordinary language analysis 
of the notions and ideas that are correlative to the central issues in escha­
tology. The complete ordinary language usage of the notions and ideas must be 
described before they can be confronted with the "odd" eschatological language. 
Section 3.5· deals with the second important part of this study: the expansion 
of speech act theory to enable its embracing the total speech situation. Section 
3.3. contains some of this intention as well: and the same can be said In 
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leaaar dagree aleo for the other eectione. When this taak la completed — the 
correlatir· ordinary language uaagee of central iaeuea In eachatology and the 
ezpanaion of apeech act theory — «e are In a position to carry out an ordinary 
language analyaia of the concrete uaage of eechatology. 
Chapter Four fora· a tranaition from the atudy of ordinary language to 
atructural aaaantice. It deala with three apee if ic areas both approachea ahare: 
eoDTentiona aa underlying conatitutixe rulea, structurée rfaeaning, and the 
definitions and criteriology of truth. All three of theae provide important 
links between surface structure (ordinary langnage) and deep structure analysis 
(atructural saaanties). 
Chapter Fivee takes up the principlea of atructural eemantice and applies 
thea to aanifeatations of the aost conprehenaire set of underlying constitutire 
roles for society, called here the ayabolic ипітегве. In particular, its nani-
festation aa myth is inTeetigated,vith reference to its aeaning and truth 
functions. 
Chapter Six applies ordinary language analysis to Holtaann's eechatology. 
It concentrates on the two key aspects of his presentation, the notion of promise 
and the sense of tine. The eaphasls lies not only on explicitating and criticising 
his understanding of eechatology, but also on placing his work within eschatological 
research. 
Chapter Seren turns to the deep structure underlying Holtaann'a concrete 
usage. A structural eenantic analysis leads to uneoyering the framework, code 
and aessage of eechatology within the WS text, as well as giving Indications of 
how meanings are generated to cope with problems within the NT sphere. This is 
applied to Holtaann's eechatology, as well as to other auient topics located by 
the overview in Chapter One. The chapter is coopleted by a short section on 
the role of structural semantics in theological herneneutics. 
And finally, an afterword brings together sone conclusions drawn from this 
study about eschatological language, some of the consequences and implications 
of these conclusions, and also aome apeculation about how such a study could be 
expanded further. 
Before beginning with the atudy proper, a word of thanka ia due to the 
many people in Nijmegen and in Oxford who provided inspiration, guidance, 
and material and technical assistance in the course of preparing this study. 
Without them this work would never have been brought to cornpTetion. Зчесі?! 
thanks is also due to Гг. Frank McHa"«·, vho through his generosity, ra-'e it 
possible for ne to Study ir. Ki^rregfn in the firpt тГасе, a-l t'-en r-.aoled re 
through his assistance to ••ersir in Euren* 'or the corr^etion o' '•m« rt-dy. 
Chapter 1: THE PBOBLEMS AMD POSSIBILITIES OF ТЮГПЕГН СНШГВТ ESCEATOLOOT. 
1.1. The Vagaries of Twentieth Century Eschatology. 
The twentieth century haa witneaeed a continuing growth in interest in the 
problem of eschatology. By paging through the theological lexica free the 
Bealencyklopâdie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche (l896ff.) through 
Sacraaantim Mundi (I968) one can, as Baat baa done, coepute the increased 
nuaber of coluana devoted to eschatology as the years progress. But auch acre 
interesting than the increaae in quantity ia a study of the shifting pointa of 
orientation and concern in those seventy years. To aention juat one of the more 
radical shifts, E. Troeltsch could say in the heyday of Kulturprotestantismus 
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"Die letzten Dinge haben zunächst ait der Zeit gar nichts zu tun." Eighteen 
years later, Althaus, in the second edition of the same lexicon, was able to 
apeak quite positively over the function of chiliaaa in Christian eschatology. 
One can, of couree, ascribe this shift to the advent of dialectical theology 
and the реввіліав that marked the jears after the First World Var, but that would 
be too simple. For if one looks more closely at less dramatic statements, it 
quickly bee caes evident that the Pandora'о box Veias and Schweitzer had opened 
could not be easily reckoned with. Schweitzer remarked at the end of his 
Qeschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung that "Die primitive, apätjudische Metaphysik, 
in der Jesus seine Weltanschauung ausspricht, erschwert die Übersetzung seiner 
Ideen in die Formeln unserer Zeit in ausserordentlicher Weise.11 And more than 
sixty years of work on the part of theologians have resulted mainly in elaborating 
the difficulties involved rather than making much headway toward bringing the 
problematic of eschatology into manageable proportions. Aa von Balthasar put it: 
"Die Eschatologie ist der 'Wetterwinkel' in der Theologie unserer Zeit.. Von ihr 
her steigen Jene Gewitter auf, die das ganze Land fruchtbar bedrohen: verhageln 
oder erfrischen." Bahner aumned up well the state of the situation in his 
article on eschatology in Sacramentum Mundi: "Der Traktat der Eschatologie ist 
noch sehr ia Anfang seiner Geschichte; das Geschichtlichste hat in der Theologie 
des Christentums noch am wenigsten Geschichte gehabt." 
How does one beet approach the hydra-headed eschatological problem? To 
chronicle once again the history of research and reflection on eschatology thus 
far in the century would at this point add little or nothing to the discussion; 
7 
this has been done sufficiently elsewhere. Methodologically one can sum up 
what is to be learned from such a chronicle by saying that an attempt to make 
sense of eschatological thought in the twentieth century will find itself on a 
continuum between the pole of radical historicity with an emphaais on the end of 
history on the one hand, and the pole of subjective personal decision with an 
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emphaeia on value on the other. Put аішріу: a dialectic between the end and the 
ultimate; or, in term« of the research, a dialectic between a radical 
D 
apocalTpticiam and a radical demTthologization. One can alnost chart a line of 
a regular shift tra* one pole to the other. 
But this of itaelf doea not bring ua further down the road to dealing with 
the matter at hand. Instead of adding one more chronicle to the nuaber already 
existing, perhaps it would be of help to attempt to group the issues that have 
been raised theaatically. Sish a brief classification — one with pretensions 
to being either exhaustive or wholly firm in the categorization — might provide 
a preliminary standpoint from which we could further embark on the question of 
method. Such a classification would have the advantage of recounting the con­
stellations of concern as they are seen at this point, and of providing a cata­
logue of the themes and issues that have to be dealt with 1л any study of escha-
tology that addreasea itaelf not only to what eachatology is, but also to its 
place within the Christian vision. 
1.2. Themes and Issues in Eachatology. 
As the name implies, eachatology is the doctrine of the Eschata, or last 
Things. Aa a systematic segment of Christian doctrine, eachatology, or De 
HOVÌBSÌBÌB as it was called, amounted to little more than an enumeration of the 
last Things and a certain amount of derivative reflection upon Ham. The 
renaissance wrought by the work of Veias and Schweitzer led to a broadening of 
the field to indide much beyond the end-happenings of individual and collective 
exiatence. This development of eachatology has occurred in both Protestant and 
о 
Catholic theology, although a good deal later in the latter. 
When one attempts to catalogue the theaea and isauea in current eachatology, 
this hiatorieal caesura of "before and after Veies-Schweitier" serves as a firat 
point of diviaion. To accept this division is more than aiaply acknowledging a 
fact in eachatology's chronology; it points out a certain relationship between 
the symbolic representation of central pointa in the Chriatian faith and how 
theaa are actualized under twentieth century eonditione. Earlier eachatological 
treatises remained content to enumerate the Last Thinga without showing their 
relationship to the other topics of Christian belief. There was undoubtedly a 
certain wisdom in this, for the last Things are by definition eomething we 
know very little about and they might best be left syabolically represented; a 
more discursive articulation can easily run awry. But thia resulted in 
eschatology becoming the stepchild of systematic theology, consigned to the 
end of dogmatic theology like acme appendage evolution failed to develop. 
Current eachatological theology is an attempt to overcome this, to take the risk 
of a discuasive treatment of the eachatological aymbola. It is this caesura we 
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wish to respect here. The first division in the catalogue, then, will be based 
on the traditional eschatological eyrabola; the second, on the current attempt 
to actualize theo. 
1.2.1. The Eacbatologieal Symbole. 
The traditional accounts of the lest Things divided the eymbole for the 
end into two groups: those pertaining to the end of individual existence, and 
those pertaining to the end of mankind as a whole. Under the individual eschata 
fall four: death, (particular) judgment, heaven and hell. A fifth, purgatory, 
usually received a place as well. 
Under the collective eschata were placed: the Second Coming of Christ, the 
resurrection of the dead, the general judgment, the end of the world, and the 
transformation or completion. Central among the collective eschata stands the 
symbol of the Kingdom of God (basileia tou theou). An entire group of lesser 
symbols also play a role here. These include the Antichrist, New Earth (with 
utopias, millennia, and Golden Ages), the apokatastasis tön pantOn, the glory of 
Qod and so on. 
The reflection upon these symbole as provided in the traditional treatises 
on the eschata can be grouped into three categories: 
(1) Reflection upon the isolated symbols. This speculation took the character of 
Imagining the nature of heaven, hell, the signs accompanying the end-happening, 
•tc. Also belonging here was the speculation on the state of the soul after 
death. There were tendencies here to extremes — extremes Bast cbaracterised 
as a "Physik der letzten Singe". 
(2) Attempts to harmonize the individual and the collective eschata. The original 
division between individual and collective eschata was a result of the delayed 
Second Coming. What was to happen to those Who died before the Parouaia? It was 
this milieu which played a big part in the development of the particular judgment, 
purgatory, and other eymbole of the "intermediate state". Once the intermediate 
state had been established, more and more problems would arise with hsnnonizing 
the two domains. Questions would arise about two possible Judgments for the 
deceased person and the like. 
(3) Interrelating the symbols. Here would come attempts to rhyme the various 
symbols from the NT and apocrypha into a meaningful whole or a scenario for the 
end-happening. 
Briefly, one can summarize the reflection on the eschatological symbols at 
this stage in the development of the doctrine of eschatology thus: the symbols 
are accepted as they stand. Reflection upon them amounts to elaborating and 
interrelating them as they are given. The symbole as such are not subjected to 
a critique as to their symbolic valency or intentionality. They are presented 
-A-
•в the Iaat Thing». Secondly, they are not related to the present of Christian 
conaeionaneaa nor to other aapeet· of Christian belief, such as ehristology, 
ecclesiology and the like. As such they are presented as the last Things. It 
is in regard to these two eaphases — eschatology as the last Things and escha-
tology as the Last Things -- that twentieth century eschatology departs trcm 
these fonulations. 
1.2.2. Actualisation of the Eschatological Symbole. 
The re-discoTcry of the eentrality of the eschatological motif in the 
thought and preaching of Jesus by Weiss and Schweitser and the exegetical 
research and refineaent that followed proapted a radical re-thinking of the 
meaning and place of eschatology In Christian theology. Along with the exegetical 
research, two other important elements played a significant role in shaping 
reflection: the growing appreciation for the role of history in theology as 
Ik 
proaoted by Troeltsch and the rethinking of the relationship of theology and 
culture initiated by Schleieraacher. 
Ve would like to present here a brief account of the iaeuea theological 
reflection has raised to this time, confronted as it is with the eschatologioal 
symbols on the one hand, and by the three derelopaents Just mentioned on the 
other. The most central issues raised are complexly interrelated and the sche-
aatisation presented hare, although orersimpllfied and sumary, attempts to 
highlight the principal foci within the problematic. This will be of utaost 
Importance for the reflection on method in the following section. For the 
method must be capable of addressing Itself to and encompassing the principal 
issues facing current theological reflection. The issues we have brought here 
under four headings: time, history, horiton, and relatedness to the other 
doctrinal constellations. These four headings exhibit a certain relatedness 
among theaselTes as well: the question of time flows into a consideration of 
history, the conception of history into a discussion of horison, of horizon to 
the relationships within the theological enterprise. 
1.2.2.1. The Question of Time. 
later exegetical research pointed out that the original formulation of 
Weiss of eschatology as a wholly future phenomenon was an oversimplification; 
something of the future was already realized in the present as well. In the 
course of reflection soae authors have given the future the primacy (sometimes to 
an overwhelming degree) — the "Konsequente Eschatologie" group, the early Barth, 
and Moltmann come readily to mind, and in a different fashion, nec-3cholastic 
Boaan Catholic authors as well ; while in other situations, the present received 
emphasis (sometimes to the almost complete exclusion of the future) -- the 
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Bultaaim school, C.H. Dodd, and Bitecblian theology are the moot clear exaoplea 
In this area. Here Ilea an laportant, if not the moat Important, probie« In 
reflection on eaehatologyt the onderetanding of tiœe and ita relation to man and 
culture. In terma of the theological debate, V. Xreck haa expreaeed the diffi-
culty aost cogently: "Wie Yerhilt aich daa 'Schon' und 'Jetât' dea la Erangeliua 
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una zugesagten Heils su aeinaa 'Noch Nicht', seiner Erwartung?" For until 
the theologian comes to terna with the problem of time, our eachatological 
reflection will continue to awing back and forth between the poles of futurist 
and preeentiet eschatology — a dichotony which« as Althaus baa rightly remarked, 
is ultimately я false one. 
To dwell for a moment on the problem: the moat convex element in the 
equation aeema to be the relationship of present and future. Future is giren a 
wide rariety of meanings and is ascribed two different sorts of Talidity within 
the larger underatanding of time. In meanings, it includes concepts such as not 
19 yet, wholly other, transcendent, the new. In terms of Talidity, it is a 
queetion of who has priority over whom: the present отег the future (eyolationiet-
teleologica!), or the future отег the present (eschatological-apocalyptic)? 
The meaning of future remaina aultiTalent, and the present-future relationship 
paradoxical. 
Attempts at coming to terma with the time problematic should receive mention 
here. Althaus' distinction of axiological and teleologica! eschatology was 
the first important attempt. By "axiological" Althaus understood the atemporel 
or the eternal aspect of eschatology, namely, that eternal life can be had in the 
present. "Der 'axLologische' Begriff der letzten Dinge...entsteht, wenn wir 
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inmitten des Lebens der Norm begegnen." The "teleologica!" aspect " wachst 
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aus der Erfassung der Zeit ala Geschichte." Although since abandoned in its 
explicit form, it remains an important attempt to come to terms with the problem. 
More comprehensive is the concept "promise", which baa been trmted exegetically 
PL· 
by Kummel, and systeoatically by Althaus, Pannenberg, and Holtmann. Not only 
ia it a biblical с incept, but by its structure it goes far toward integrating 
the peut, present, and future dimensions. A reflection on eschatology would do 
well to accord "promise" a central role in the early stages of its reflection. 
1.2.2.2. The Question of History. 
From the question of time it is but a ahca-t step to the queetion of history. 
Moving from time to history, two approaches, building upon what was said in the 
previous section, are possible. 
In the first place, one can move from the reflection upon the relation of 
time to man (the human consciousness) and to culture toward a study of the 
broader context in which such relations are created; and thus one arrives at the 
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problematic of history. In terme of the diecueeion on eechatology, the question 
directe itself toward the end period of history and beyond that to the end of 
24 
history itself. Within such a framework the problems and orientations of 
teleology, utopia, and apocalyptic present theaselves as interpretative possi­
bilities for the progression of history. The matter of Heilsgeschichte enters 
here too for the theologian. 
Secondly, the discussion can center on the question of thr end of time. 
And hare the key issue is located in the matter of history and eechatology. Does 
the end of time fall within the realm of time and history (and thus is the 
logical conclusion of the developnent of history)? Or does the end cene freo 
outside of history (and thus imply a fundamental criticism of history)? What is 
meant by the "completion" of history, given these options? This has been a 
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point where theological opinions divide. If one chooses the first option, 
history becomes eminently meaningful; the role of Jesus can be organically 
related to the future development of history; the church receives a prominent 
role in this developnent. The danger of ideology and a too facile legitimation 
of the activity of Christians and their church, however, looms mightily. If the 
second option is chosen, the transcendence of God is emphasized, eechatology 
am the intervention of God in history is given a central role, history bee anea 
much less trustworthy, and the role of Jesus and his church is one of judgment 
and critique of this world rather than an acceptance of it. The danger here is 
sectarianisa and a doomsday apocalypticin that leaves the field open for a 
praxis of unreflective extremion. 
The minimum on· can say in this matter has been well formulated by A. Cohen: 
"Sschatology is thus the mythological doctrine which undoubtedly beclouds and 
conceals a true symbolic assertion regard men's locus in history, God's relation 
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to history, and the community of man and Ood in the transformation of history." 
A derivative problem that emerges from this question of the end of history 
Is that of Ічаіііііи ii and transcendence. The continuity or discontinuity of 
history with its end is another way of expressing the immanence and transcendence 
probi«! with regard to man and history, history and God, and Ood and man. 
1.2.2.3· Eechatology as Horizon. 
The important role eechatology playa in the Christian understanding of 
history and especially of a Heilsgeschichte shows that not only does eechatolqjy 
need not be an appendix having little inner relation to the other themes of 
Christian doctrine, but also that any Christian reflection on history without a 
consideration of eechatology will fall short of a complete treatment of the 
problem. This throws new light on the sense and intention of eechatology: it 
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ahowa tb· central rola eechatolqgy playa is underataartIng our praaant situation, 
how it offers a locua for organizing our aense of being-in-the-world. Th· 
conaequencea of this insight prcopt consideration of two aeta of issues: the 
relation of eschatologieal ajmbola to protological ajmbola and the question of 
all of theology as being thought from an eschatologieal horizon. 
How are eschatolgical syabols related to those of protology? Are beginning 
and end іаошогрЫсаІІу structured? Is the end a return to the beginning (as the 
eschatologieal symbol of the anakephalaioaia tOn pantfln and the "new hearen 
TO 
and the new earth" sight aeam to indicate)?"^ Or is the and the final unfolding 
of the beginning? Are the aynbola and the mythology of the end to be subjected 
to the same manner of interpretation as those of the beginning? To what extent 
are protological and eachatological thought- and expression-structures parallel? 
Т Ш is an area still unreaearched, though aooe authors are aware of the importance 
of these questions. This point is likewise important for coalng to tarma with 
aschatology. The problematic it raiaea leada ua to the aecond set of issues: 
namely, theology as aschatology, with eschatology as the horizon for all 
Christian theology. 
Our concern here ia not theology as eachatology as was conceived by Schweitzer 
or етеп the famous statement of Barth in the Homerbrief. Bather, it ia this: 
might perhaps the twentieth century problem of understanding the sense of and 
intentionality of eschatologieal aynbola arise from the fact that they are forced 
into interpretive models that fail to catch their meanings and that the theologian 
might be better advised to understand eachatology fren its own standpoint or 
horizon and from this horizon the rest of theology? Perhaps more than anyone elae, 
Jürgen Holtmann has attempted to do this. For the problem remains that once 
eschatologieal symbols are approached from a protological framework or a 
hermeneutic that makea the past wholly normative to the exclusion of the future, 
eschatologieal symbols either pale and evaporate or are absorbed completely into 
a teleolgy. This is the case also with theological systems that pay a lip 
service to the future, but then to a future that holds no surprises. Regardless 
of where one stands on the question as to what extent eschatology should determine 
the formulation of the rest <f theology, it would seem to be of the utmost 
importance to allow a fuller deacription of an eschatologieal horizon; for under 
these conditions the structure of the eschatologieal symbole, the intentionality 
of ita language, and the hermeneutical possibilities of its relationship to 
other doctrines and to our present cultural situation will bee «me truly evident. 
The interest in eachatology in this century has created and waned several times, 
tut it keeps coming back and will undoubtedly continu«1 to do so until it has 
been treated in a more exhaustive manner than it has been to date. 
While the issue of theology as eschatology is under discussion, one smaller 
issue derivative from it should be mentioned. This is the relation of believing 
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and hoping. Hoping ie the pre-eninent attitude of an eechatological horieon. 
And a study of the relation of these two might provide an entry into that horizon. 
1.2.¿.h. Eechatology and the Other Doctrinal Conetellations. 
Eschatology needs to be brought into contact with the other Christian 
doctrines. Not only can eschatology he enriching for them, but they for 
eechatology as well. The latter is particularly the case for christology. While 
it is too extraie to reduce all eechatology to christology, eschatology cannot 
remain Christian eschatology without being closely related to christology. For 
not only is the death and raising of Jesus the central promise of our own future 
and guarantee of the coming Kingdom of God, but Jesus himself is the principal 
hermeneutical paradigm showing us the relation of present promise and future 
37 hope. Bahner sums up succinctly the areas in which eechatology must be 
related to other theological treatises: 
Die Eschatologie muss immer in ihrem Zusammenhang mit den übrigen 
Traktaten gesehen werden, da sie den Inhalt der anderen Traktate in 
ihrer Vollendung meint und so ein gegenseitigee Einechluee- und 
Erhellungeverhaltnie besteht. Das gilt nicht nur von der Protologie, 
der Qeschichtstheologie im allgeneinen, der Gnadentheologie (Gnade 
als 'in Hoffnung' besessen), sondern vor allem von der Christologie, 
Soteriologie (der definitiven Annahme der Welt in Christus), Bcklesio-
logie (der endzeitlichen, sich selbst in die Basileia Gottes aufheben 
wollenden Kirche der die Wiederkunft Christi erwartenden im Gegensatz 
zur Synagoge und zu den sich selbst als zeitlos verstehenden Religione-
organisationen) und der Lehre von den Sakramenten (als signa prognostica 
dee endgültigen Heilee).'" 
1.2.3· Preliminary Conclusione. 
From this еііиіііі j overview of the themee and iesues, certain points hare 
arisen which must be taken into account when embarking upon the thorny problem 
of method in eechatology. For the method chosen muet be one that can throw 
light on the ealient problème in the reflections while at the same time refining 
and reorganizing the material in question. A quick glance back aerose this 
overview yields the following pointe that are crucial within a development of a 
theology of eechatology: the symbole (and an elucidation and critique of their 
intentionality); the time problem ae the past-present-future relation; eechato-
logy and the earthly future; the concept of proaiee; the continuity and discon-
tinuity of history with its end and its meaning; the transcendence-immanence 
problem; the relation of eschatology and protology, and their respective symbols; 
eechatology as horizon for itself and for all of theology; eechatology and the 
other areas of Christian doctrine. Having distilled the central themee and 
issues fro· contemporary research and reflection on eschatolo^, we are now in 
a position to move on to the following problem — that of method and hermeneutic 
in eschatology. 
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1.3. Method and Eecbatology. 
"Es fehlt ein· OnoMologie und Hermeneutik, die вревіеіі dan eechetologlechen 
να 
Aueaagen sageordnet l*t....n The ргоЫаа of onderstandlng and aethod laada 
Bahner'a Hat of taaka etili to be don· In dereloplng a doctrina of aachatoloer. 
And in an area aa difficult aa eachatology, the queatioo of «bat aort of her-
aanantiea la inrolTed cannot reaaln miaakad. In fact, aererai qaestioia orge 
theme«1vee upon ue here, the principal ones being: (1) Is there a need for a ^ 
apodal haraaneutioa for the actualisation of aachatolqgy or can the аам her-
•anantical principia· be applied that hold for other areas in Christian dogaatiea? 
And (2) what is the relation of eaehatological hemeneutica to biblical haraan-
•utica? la biblical aachatologj the heraeneutical principle for the derelopaent 
of a doctrina of aaehatologT? 
1.3·!· Haraeaaatica in Sachatology and in Theology. 
Bahner stands squarely beind the notion of a special hermenéutica for 
eschatology. A general henneneutics is not enough for eschatology, hp says, 
becauae without such a special heraeneutics the treatise on eschatology Is like 
philosophy before the diaeorery of aplataaology. "Is BUSS also nach elnea 
apriorischen Ввив eachatologlscher Aussage gefragt werden, nach einen eigentlichen 
40 
Verstandulshorisont." This separata area for eaehatological etateaenta Is 
defined and constituted by the mystery-character of eschatology (Qehelanis), i.e. 
by the hiddannaas of the When and the How of the final fulfillaant that surpasses 
man's understanding; and by the historicity of aan, by his own sense of eilstential 
tiae, his capacity for anaaneela and prognosis. Sschatological knowledge Is 
not scaething suppleaentary to aan'a knowledge, but constitutes an inner focus 
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of hnaan self-understanding. Bahner ccnaidere the sanse of futurity and of 
futurity in the praaant aa one of the ezistentialla of Ban's being. And this In 
itself, aren without a considération of the complexity end unclaanaaa of sscha-
tological atataaeota, ia rea on enough for him to darelop a special hemeneutica 
for eaehatological etateaenta. 
Sren if one doea not coapletely accept the philosophical vision underlying 
Bahner'a laportant atteapt at a special haraeieutlca for eaehatological etate-
aenta, there are other ressons for ccnaiderlng it seriously. As Kahler pointed 
out, whereas other areas of dopai hare to do with reality (i.e., with that which 
ia already present), eschatology deals with the things hoped for, "weiche jenseits 
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aller einstweilen Beglichen Erfahrungen liegen." And aa auch, interpratst Ion 
of the things hoped for is not so eaaily aeceaaible тіа the heraeneutics of the 
Qeiateswiseenschaften aa are other etateaenta in theology, principally because 
the "New Henneneutics" as practiced by Fuchs and Ebeling and others is geared 
toward interpreting texts froa the past. While the eaehatological proaiees 
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wer· шшЛ» In th· paat, thatr aans· earrie· far beyond the peet and eran beyond 
the predenti and tbla eoreabllng of the teaporal aenae and intentionality Iceepa 
the aeanlng of eschatologleal statements more than partly closed to the efforts 
of the applloation of thla heiaenentlcel aethod. Olren thia altoation, m e auat 
either rethink and reetmetmct the Raw HerMeneutica for пае in eachatology, or 
ев· nnat веек another атаппа of approach, bolatered and ceoatituted by a diff­
erent theory of tine and of Interpretation. 
Althana, howerer, aaaa no need for a apodal haiaenentica for eachatology; 
bo feela that the aethod applied In the other areaa of Chrlatian doctrine holda 
kk -. 
•qoally for eachatology. "Vie die Theologie überhaupt, ao iet auch die Sacha-
tologie ein Denken im Qehoraam gegen die Offenbarung Gottes, gegen sein 'Wort', 
vi· «a n a darch dl· Schrift erreicht." ^ Althaue ia of courae not adrocatlng a 
slaviah bibliciam, as he indicates clearly enough elsewhere. But this hesi-
tation to reflect en philoaophicel aethod in ita application ia not an uncoaaon 
ano anaag l a t h m n theologian·, particularly thoae of aore conaarratiTe cast. 
One ia readaded of Bahner'e reaction to thoae who play domi the iaportance of 
reflocticn on aethod and praauppoaitlena whan approaching a biblical text: 
...ver netaphyalacho Oberlegungan und Prinzipien in der Theologie 
•ЗЖ nit dan Vort Oottea und seiner Sourerânitât unrereinbar Terwirft, 
befreit eich nicht für die reine Herrachaft dea Vortee Qottee, eondem 
gerät unter die Herrachaft unanageaprochener und ao тіеі gefahrlicher, 
•etapfayaiacher Vorurteile.*' 
ilthaoa' poaitien aakea aenae within a Vorttheologie, but the heraeneutlcal 
weaknaaa of auch a poaition rules it out for uae In a diecuaeion that wiahea to 
addroaa itaalf directly to the ргоЪІев of Interpretation and meaning in eacha­
tology. bpeoially in aitaatlona where an attenpt will be aade to understand 
eachatology fron ita own horizon doea auch a poaition becene untenable. 
1.3.2* Kachatological Heraeneutice and Biblical Theology. 
The aecond question in regard to eachatological hemeneutica ia the relaticm 
of the philosophical reflection upon the problea of interpretation to the 
eachatology preaented in the Scripluiea thenaelTea. To choose for a clear and 
conplete doni nation of biblical eachatology by the philoaophical hemeneutica 
would tak· ua back either to Bltachllan таіие theology or Bultaannian axiaten-
tialiat theology. And, aa we hare seen, to neglect the philosophical heraeneutio 
completely leads to even worse consequences for a doctrinal account of escha-
tology. How are biblical eachatology and philoaophical hemeneutica to be 
relntedt 
The eachatological etatoaente and ayabola in the Scriptures are the stuff 
of which the Chrlatian doctrine of eachatology la aade. And, aa in every 
heraeneutlcal situation, the task of the hermeneutical method applied is to in­
terpret th· atateatnta and symbols present, and not to replace then with its own 
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Inplicit, unreflected opon theory. Authors euch ал ІЫтвг, Berkhof, Althaue 
and Krack carry thla a etap further. Not only nuat the integrity of the 
biblical eschatology be maintained, but our first (and probably our best) accesa 
to the interpretation of the biblical eschatology is how the Scriptures — and 
especially the NT — deal with eschatological stateaents. As Bahner puts it, 
our method must be a biblical-theological one: "Das heisst, ее ware nachzugehen, 
welche hermenautischen Prinzipien die Schrift selbst dort uns nahelegt, wo sie 
eschatologische Aussagen macht." In other words, how doee the NT "do" theology? 
This includes not only how, e.g., Paul handles {he eschatological problem, but 
also how the entire NT reacts to the ОТ eschatology and to the late Jewish 
apocalyptic. The many answers given this question by ezegetes and by the system­
atic theologians depending upon them goes far beyond the scope of this work and 
cannot be treated here. One point, Ьс етег, that does find agreement among 
many systematic theologians is that Jesus died and risen is the central henmen-
50 
eutical principle in approaching the scriptural eschatological stateaenta. 
The already and the not yet in the death and glory of Jesus is the тегу paradigm 
that makes the eschatological question possible at all. 
But to Іеате the question at the atatement of this principle and not to 
further derelop what is intended in this statement amounts to begging the question. 
It is true that the first Christiana came to terms with their eschatological 
expectationa within their late Jewiah apocalyptic worldview by meana of the 
person of Jesus and what God did with him. And if the discussion remains standing 
at this point, the principle enunicated is true. But the moment we begin an 
elaboration upon the principle, or attempt to actualize the principle in a 
twentieth century situation complicated by the Biglightenaent and its radical 
restructuring of our sense of being-in-the-world, we realize that we have not 
located — or sufficiently defined — the central biblical-theological principle, 
but hare only changed the name of the problem. Then the dark ahadow of Schwei­
tzer's conclusions to his Leben-Jesu-Torschung again looms heavily: perhaps we 
cannot re-enter the world of Jesus. Perhaps it has become too odd for twentieth 
century man. 
B.H. Hiere and Q. Wanke, as NT and ОТ exegetes respectively, have both 
lamented the problems involved in coming to terms with eschatology in their 
areas of research. Hiere says that "...one could aptly characterize a signi­
ficant portion of the ezegetical and interpretive effort expended by NT acholar-
ahip since 1900 under such a heading as 'the struggle against eschatology'." 
Ha goes on to chronicle the different ways in which axegetes have tried either 
to avoid or to neutralize eschatological statements in the NT. He concludes by 
saying: "everyone forcea the kingdom of God violently into his own theological 
53 54 
tradition." Wanke reports basically the aaae problem in ОТ acholarahip. 
When one realizes that the systematic theologian reliea upon the formulation 
of the exegete for the "biblical-theological" entry into the problem of escha-
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tology, then ene can в·· how th· confUaion can eaeily be perpetuated. 
The BTateaatic theologian cannot lay the Ъіаше for hia difficnltiea with 
eachatology at the doorstep of the esegete, however, the difficulty usually 
resulta trom one of two different sources. Either the syatematio theologian 
seeks a unitary concept of eachatology in the NT that is not to be found there, 
or he has failed to clarify the raaifications of an interpretive sodel which the 
esegete in turn applica to the eaehatological data. The exegete does not work 
in а таешш and in hia interpretation of the scriptural data he eoploys aore than 
philological-historical criteria; the Interpretation is coapleted by the text 
being actualized 1л the contemporary situation. And it is in this last area 
where the systaaatic theologian plays an important role. His task is to be 
aware of the interpretive aodels in use, those models that best illuminate con­
temporary consciouanese on the one hand, and beat convey the sense of the biblical 
aeasage on the other. 
1.3·3· Systematic Theology and Eaehatological Eermeneutica. 
In the previous section the role of biblical theology, biblical hermeneutics, 
and the roles of the exegete and the syetematie theologian were briefly discussed. 
Any attempt to think through Christian eschatology without recourse to the 
source of our data, the Scripturea, Is of course doomed from the start. That 
goes without saying. But by the same token, the systematic theologian cannot 
pretend to do the work of hia colleague the exegete. He remains dependent upon 
hin for elaboration of the biblical data via his historical-philological methods. 
However, it was evident that a third element complicates the picture. The exegete 
employs, consciously or unconsciously, interpretive models from his own Site im 
Leben also. Given such an analysis of the situation, one can see that the metho­
dological circle threatens to become a vicious circle. 
What then can the systematic theologian contribute to breaking though 
this impasse? It is his task to reflect upon the model he brings to co-constitute 
the doctrine of eschatology, to know something of its sense, its intentional!ty, 
and its limits. The understanding of this model forms a necessary prolegomenon 
to a "biblical-theological" understanding of eschatology. That the eschatologcial 
symbols and statements of NT times are odd and even incomprehensible for poet-
modem man has become almost a truism. Tet they stand central In the biblical 
message. To borrow a mathematical phrase: if they remain an "x" in the equation, 
we can at least come to an understanding of which operations obtain in the 
equation and which operations will result in "x" yielding its meaiir.g. And the 
theologian can come to an understanding of what he brings to the problem. This 
gives a premonition of the limits of his conclusions and lessens the danger of 
reducing the eschatological symbols and statements to his own worldview. 
Put more simply: we need an investigation of the horizon that co-constitutes 
the Christian doctrine of eschatology in our present situation. But this 
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horizon cannot Ъе given in pure form, abstracted fron the confrontation with HT 
eechatology; for this would result in an analysis of a particular philosophical 
orientation before it is co-formed by the WT eschatological symbole and statements — 
and it is precisely this moment of co-conetitution we wish to learn more about. 
Hence we must investigate a program where eschatology is allowed to be its own 
horizon, for it is in this form that the salient difficulties best present 
themselves. This proposal was already discussed above and there it was noted 
that Moltmann's program was the most complete to date. It is for this reason — 
that of completeness — that Moltmann's eschatological theology will be subjected 
to investigation, that Holtoann's program has its defects and needs correctives 
57 is recognised ; nevertheless, the fact remains that he takes the future seriously 
and that he treats not only the НГ and ОТ symbole and statements, but also reflects 
upon the actualizations of them in current theological thought to the fullest 
degree of any contemporary theologian. As such, his program still remains the 
prime example <f allowing an eschatological horizon to constitute the doctrine of 
eschatology. 
The next step at this point is the choice of method: how can we best penetrate 
the eschatological horizon without reifying it — at which point it then ceases 
to be a horizon? It is to this question that we now turn. 
l.k. Eschatological Horizon and Horizon Analysis. 
l.'f.l. The Analysis of Horizons. 
The study of horizons differs from the study of concepts. If we understand 
horizon as the conditions of possibility for understanding, it is clear that one 
cannot apply the same method of analysis to the horizon as is applied to the 
phenomena constituted by the horizon. To put it in terms of Gestalt analysis, 
the whole (horizon) is greater than the sum of its parts (phenomena); and an 
exhaustive analysis of the parts will always fall short of the whole. He cannot 
equate the phenonana with the horizon that allows us to perceive them at all; to 
do so amounts to a crass sort of positivism. 
But by the same token this does not mean that the horizon is totally inacces­
sible. For if that were the case, one would be a prisoner of his own horizon and 
would be unable to understand, or even conceive the possibility of, another view­
point. Moreover, history and time would be impossible categories. But if the 
horizon does not yield its meaning in the same way that a concept does, how indeed 
then does the +ЬЧЯІГІИД subject севе closer to understanding the horizon? 
Hermenéutica since Schleiermacher and Dilthey speaks of "Horizontverschaels-
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ung" , or the melting together ofthe horizon of the understanding subject and 
the horizon constituting the phenomena he wishes to investigate. This approach 
to the problem of horizon is Indeed a helpful one, particulady in the study of 
history. 
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But the eschatological horizon presents a further difficulty that compli­
cates such a Horizontverschmelzung. By definition the significant thrust of the 
Intention of the ••cbatological horizon can only be perceived in anticipation; 
it ia the "Imovledg· of things hoped for", and aa the Epistle to the Bomans 
points out, if «a know what wa hopa for, it ia no longer hope (8, 2k). Thus 
«теп the objects thesselTos slip froa our grasp when we consider eschatology. 
The eschatological horison does not persit the aase sort at description as 
does the horison of the undesstanding subject. This greatly lessens the poten­
tial of HoriEontverschmelzung as an access point to the eschatological horison. 
We suet seek our point of entry elsewhere. 
1.4.2. Byabol and language. 
How than are we to gain access to a possible eschatological horison? If 
it can only be had in anticipation, how are we even able to discern the diff-
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erence between such a horizon and a projected horizon of our own wishes? And 
what counts as data to be understood within this horizon, i.e. which phenomena 
achieve their contours of aeaning within such a horison and which do not? 
These are highly coaplez problem areas that reveal the tip of the eschatological 
iceberg. To be able to fully answer these questions would resolved the escha-
tologiaal problematic in its entirety. 
Consequently, we cannot hope to give full answers to these questions. 
Bather, some options for answers will be taken and be developed within this 
study. These fundamental options should provide the framework for entry into 
a study of the eschatological horison, a framework that respects the horison as 
a mediation of objectivity without objectifying the horison itself. A sure 
knowledge of the framework will likewise provide us with the limits of our 
access to the eschatological horison, i.e. indicate where we can go no further 
with our construct. This latter is as important as the choice of options. 
Л point to begin a possible entry into the eschatological horison is the 
question: what are the phenomena which lead us to seek out the existence of a 
possible eschatological horison? And a second question flowing from that: 
what is the nature of these phenomena? These questions will help direct our 
search. The answer to the first question is: the group of symbols of the last 
Things discussed above. We find, then, that we are dealing with symbole, them­
selves as complex as horizons. And the answer to the second question: these 
symbols are linguistic phenoaena — they are not particularly visual, auditory 
or tactile symbols (except in a secondary, derived sense), but derive fron 
language and speech situations. The; are transmitted in written and oral 
tradition. 
The boundaries of the options are already beginning to contract. Our 
concern is linguistic phenomena, and more precisely, symbols presented 
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linguiatically. Certain poeeibilitiee are hereby excluded. On the one hand, 
we cannot simply speculate on the nature of thn horir.on. The horizon, as the 
conditions of poeaibility, is at least partially expressed in linguistic phe-
nomena. And on the other hand, that the linguistic phenomena are symbols 
excludes search for direct deposits of information. Ve are dealing with syn-
bolic representations. And finally, a hint about the nature of the horizon is 
given in that it expresses itself in symbols — the first hint of its inten-
tionality, its manner of the constitution of the conditions of possibility, is 
given. 
Concretely, this means that our investigation will take us in the following 
direction. We will have to follow a method that will be able to analyze language 
in such a fashion that not only is its use in the given situation clarified but 
also that it can lead us back to the larger configurations that constitute the 
language situation. Secondly, this method must not slavishly attend to extracting 
"meanings" from words or phrases, but be able to respect and illuminate the com-
plex character of symbols on the whole and symbols in this concrete situation. 
Moreover, in regard to the symbols, this method must help give us sene idea of 
why those symbols are present end not others. Thus, the method must not only be 
able to handle words and phrases, but contexts as well. If such a method can be 
had, then we should be able to travel froa the phenomena themselves to their 
constituting source, the horizon. 
1.^.3· Linguistic Approaches to the Eschatological Horizon. 
If we survey the various theories of liiguietic analysis available, we find 
that there will be difficulty in finding a method that will help us reach our 
twofold goal. Linguistics as such can provide us with a good deal of help, but 
it tends to be phrase-bound. It cannot help us back to the constituting context. 
Another possibility is philosophy of language. Here the problem is a too little 
attention to the detail of language in order to find the constituting context. 
The approach suited to our needs will have to include a sensitivity to the 
use of language in the concrete situation as well as reveal the horizon that 
constitutes this concrete situation. No one theory of language as yet combines 
the two. So, our approach will likewise be two-pronged. For the first aspect, 
we shall employ one sort of "ordinary language philosophy" that has developed 
in English- and Scandinavian-speaking countries since the Second World War. The 
advantage of this approach is its attention to language as it is used instead of 
language as it should be used. The latter was the concern of philosophy of 
language in the pre-World War II era. And to narrow this down more concretely, 
the method most suited to our needs is that developed by J.L. Austin and expanded 
upon by others taking their inspiration from him, notably J.H. Searle. The 
iaportant thrust of Austin's method is careful attention to language as it Is 
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actually uaed and trom there to let cljieeificatory acheaata arlae. Hia method 
coabinaa llnguiatic and phencaenological concerna. Eapeciaily Searle haa gone 
to great lengths In expanding the iaplicationa of Auatln'a work for much wider 
application than Austin waa. able to accomplish in hia lifetine. Thia whole body 
of work frca Aoatin to Searle we will call "speech act theory" becauae of ita 
«•phaaia opon speech acta — i.e. speech in the total concrete situation. 
Tor the second aspect, we shall turn to the structural seaantics of A.J. 
dreinaa. Hia work has centered upon the interrelation of the coaplexea of 
meaning at the surface level of the text (though not as exhaustively as in speech 
act theory) with the deep level of the conatitutive horison. The course of this 
presentation will also aia at integrating these two approaches of speech act 
theory and structural saaantics into a unified theory of language. 
The following two chapters will be an explication of speech act theory. 
Chapter Two will be a presentation of the work done trtm Austin to Searle. 
Chapter Three will be a critical expansion of their work to meet the needs of 
our study here, i.e., on the one hand expanding the theory frca the speech act 
to the horison of the speech act, and en the other hand working out the implica-
tions of the theory in those areas iaaediately gemane to our topic. Chapter 
Four takes up the problems where the link between speech act theory and structural 
saaantics will bare to be sought out — constitutive rules, meaning, and truth. 
Chapter Fire will sketch the method of Oreinas' structural semantics as a key to 
unlocking, horizons, or symbolic universes as they will be called there. Finally, 
Chapters Six and Seven apply all of thia to eschatologicalVngnage: Chapter Six 
uses speech act theory to explicate a cenerete use of eschatological language in 
the program of Moltmann; Chapter Seven tries to get at the constitutive horizon 
of this concrete use via a structural semantic analysis. 
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Chapter 2: SPEECH ACTS. 
2.1. From Linguistic Phencaenology to Speech Acts. 
J.I.. Auatin'· brilliant ineighte into the vmj language worka has spawned a 
huge amount of literature. Hie death in i960 at the height of hie powers 
robbed philoeophy of one of its greatest practitioners. And it also resulted in 
not a little confusion among those who have taken up hie ideas. They have struck 
out in ветегаі different directions, and it is at tines hard to see their con­
nections with what Austin hineelf might bare bad in mind. Nevertheleea, there 
are almost always elements present in their work that can be found somewhere in 
the essays Austin himself had written. This probably more than anything else 
attests to the seminal character of Austin's thought. But one can say that, 
methodologically speaking, the derelopment of speech act theory remained without 
real leadership until John Bearle published his Speech Acts in I969. 
To use speech act theory in a study of eschatology requires a few pro­
legomena. Sereral things neod explication and elaboration before such a step is 
possible. The most оЪтіоив is an introduction to the terminology involved. The 
term "performative" has become fairly well-known in certain theological circles, 
but most of the rest of the apparatila will be unfamiliar to most theologians. 
Secondly, a short history of the development of the terms is needed, for meanings 
of the terms and the areas of their deployment have shifted in the twenty years 
of their existence. Third, the method used in speech act theory has to be 
explained, for it differs in signif leant ways from that of logical empiricism and 
even from that of other kinds of ordinary language analysis. Moreover, there have 
been shifts of method within speech act theory itself. And finally, the inten-
tionality of the method has to be exposed, since the aim bere is to carry speech 
act theory a step farther toward a more comprehensive theory needed to penetrate 
the eschatological horizon. And such an extension of the theory requires that 
it remain consonant with the thrust that bore the theory along thus far. 
This chapter, then, will attempt to come to grips with these needs. It 
begins with a brief sketch of the ground from which the theory of ordinary 
language sprung. Then comes a presentation of what brought Austin's reaction, 
which in turn gave birth to his particular approach. This is accompanied by a 
discuseion of his method of approach and manner of work, for it is these two 
poles — the source of his reaction and his work method — that have provided the 
Intentionality in the development of the speech act theory. Having laid this 
sort of groundwork, it will be easier to give a coherent account of Austin's 
own work and what followed. This account will not only trace the development of 
the theory, but also provide an introduction to the important terms used in the 
following chapter. Along the way, by way of anticipation, some hints will be 
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given now and then ae to how the theory of speech acts neede to be developed 
further to give the type of account tí eechatology we are looking for. 
Ля can be aeen fron thia projection, three levels have to be recognized 
and accounted for in this section: (1) the chronology of the speech act theory 
developaent with an introduction to the terminology; (2) the methodological 
thrust that has guided thia developaient; (3) the methodological principle· that 
permit a further extension of the theory to a more general application at the 
level of horison analysis. 
2.1.1. Baclcgrounds and Origins. 
The first phase of the de^lopoent of language philosophy laid the ground­
work which, positively or negatively, has guided the further developaent of this 
branch of philosophy. The leading lights of this first period were Bertrand 
Buasell, Q.E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, all centered at Cambridge. The 
questions that underpinned their investigations have to be answered by any 
similar attempt today. There were basically three questions: (1) What is the 
nature and purpose of language? (2) What does, or can, language say (the problem 
of meaning)? (3) How does one determine what meaning is or is not present (the 
problem of method and verification)? 
The fact that Russell and Wittgenstein had been trained in mathematics 
(Moore was a claadcal philologist by training) had not a little to do with 
their answers to the questions. The background of mathematics, mathematical 
logic, and the natural sciences provided the framework for their answers. Their 
work was continued in the 1930'β by Schlick, Carnap, Frank, Neurath, Waiaunn and 
otha-s who became known as the "Wiener Kreis".' 
Their answers to these three queries can be amaarized as follows: (1) The 
purpose of Tangnage is to coommicate facts about the world and to determine 
definitions (» terms agreed upon that aid the comunication of facts about the 
world). The proper form of language, best suited for these two purpose«, is 
the statement or proposition. (2) As for the meaning question, "meaning" is 
the content of the propositions. In propositions that cesimi eate facts about 
the world, the referent of the fact coaounicated is the meaning. In propositions 
that are definitions, the two members of the proposition (as in: "People are 
humans" or "Dogs are canines") are logically equivalent and therefore there is a 
tautology — the proposition is its own meaning. These two kinds of propositions 
are called synthetic and analytic propositions, respectively. (3) Any sentence 
that has meaning can be translated into one of these two poaaible forms of 
propositions. Those sentences that cannot be so translated represent either 
meaningless uses of language (i.e., purely emotive) or improper uses of language. 
Cuce the proposition has been translated, one can examine the meaning of the 
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aentence вв to ita truth or falaity. For analytic propoaitiona, there is no 
problem — they verify or falsify themaelvea. Vérifieiation or falsification of 
synthetic propositions is more eonplicated. At first, one spoke of verification 
by ostensive signification. For ezanple: the proposition: "The cat is cm the 
•ut." If I go look and the cat is indeed on the mat, the proposition is veri-
fied as a true et*enent about the world. Later verification of synthetic 
propositions vas fonmlated in a principle of verifiability which states that the 
meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification. 
Of course, the first phase of analytic language philosophy had much more to 
say than this, but that falls outside the lunediate acope of this Andy. Our 
interest here are the points this group concentrated on, namely: the proper form 
of language is the statement or proposition: there are only two kinds of state-
ments and two corresponding kinds of meaning: and the meaning of a sentence is 
either true or false (meaningless). 
Wittgenstein, whose Tractatus had been the primary moving force in the first 
phase of analytical philosophy, was also instrumental in the second phase, which 
is given the name "ordinary language philoaopy" or "Oxford philosophy" (the 
latter because so many of ita early practitioners centered around Oxford). His 
reaction was directed at the points Just mentioned. To begin with, he felt that 
there were many other foras of legitimate language than the statement, and he 
made a short list to show the breadth of the possibilities. Secondly, his 
understanding of meaning shifted. Now, the meaning of a sentence by in its use, 
a rather enigmatic proposal that was vast in its possible implications. If the 
meaning lay in the use of sentences, then the verifiability principle needed 
drastic renovation as well. 
Austin cannot be said to have been directly influenced by Wittgenstein. 
His development of ordinary language philosophy occurred independently of that 
of Wittgenstein's. He was, of course, aware of developmenta in Cambridge and 
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in fact owed a great deal to Moore. Nevertheless, he sharea aome of the re-
actions of Wittgenstein, and in his later development of the concepts of perform-
atives, his reaction to the three central tenets of early analytic language 
philosophy will become clear. 
EXCURSUS: Ideal Language Philosophy and Ordinary Language Philosophy. 
о 
Richard Sorty has presented the best picture thus far of the problems 
underlying language philosophy's challenge to traditional philosophy. In par­
ticular, he has shown that the programs of those two groups of philosophers we 
have been discussing here are ultimately less contrasting than it may seem. 
The older generation of Russell, Wittgenstein, the Wiener Kreis and their 
successors in people such as Bergmann he brings together under the name of 
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"Ideal Language Philoeophy" (ILP); the later Wittgenstein, the Oxford Philosophers 
q 
and the like h« calla Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP). He makes his compar-
isons and contrasts at the level of their method and romes up with scT>e irteresti-iE 
conclusions. His picture is drawn in broad strokes and as such he must overlook 
many details. Moreover, he does not devote any attention to the historical 
developments but rather works from a synthesis he himself has constructed of 
both UP and Olí. But these considerations do little to vitiate hie argument. 
The underlying thrust of both H P and Olf was one not »ni ike that which 
moved Husserl in continental philoeophy, namely, the search for a method which 
would create clarity and a comnon ground in the mas» of divergent philosophical 
approaches and systems. If such a clearing in the philosophical jungle could be 
attained, it was felt that many of the debates within the history of philosophy 
would than be seen to be pseudo-problems and that many of the divergent views 
could be seen to be based on misunderstandings. The language philosophers felt 
that a closer attention to the language being used would provide the leverage 
to do away with many philosophical problems once and for all. 
But, as Borty notes, "to know what method to adopt, one mist already have 
arrived at soae metaphysical and some epistemologica! conclusions." He 
sunsrizes the options H P and Olf took in an amusing fashion: "As has often been 
(somewhat crudely, but fairly accurately) said, the only difference between 
Ideal Language Philoeophy and Ordinary language Philosophy is a disagreement 
about which language is ideal." H f feels that the only way out of the 
philosophical maze is to CŒistruct a problem-free language into which all other 
language can be translated or transcribed. In its original form, with the 
synthetic-analytic proposition distinction, U f could clearly establish certain 
kinds of sense by a test of material equivalence (verifiability by sense data) 
for synthetic propositions, and a test of logical equivalence (verification by 
tautology) for analytic propositions. All else was suspect usage. However, it 
became clear that there were other kinds of sense that did not readily fit 
into these two types of proposition. UP had to back off somewhat from its 
original claim, and instead of creating a problem-free language, it sought a 
"logical map" of how language works, or in other instances it «aintained that 
it was logically possible in principle to transcribe all language into its own 
problem-free one (thus admitting that, while logically possible, it was 
12 pragmatically impossible). 
Olf sought to bypass Ili" β pitfall by sticking to a "description of the 
logical behavior of the linguistic expressions of ordinary language." Olf 
maintained that the constructionist program of H f was doomed to failure because 
a construction of a new language was not enough. One must also show why the 
old unconatructed language was inadequate, since indirectly even the new 
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coDstructed language wae a product of the old one. But this analysis of the 
unconatructed language was precisely what OLP was doing. And if one could point 
out where the problems lay in the unconstructed language, there was no longer a 
need for Ili'β constructed one. Olf saw itself rescuing philosophy as a strict 
science frca U f e failure — for the attempts to construct a new language in Π ί 
resulted in so many new languages that the II? procedure looked like a repetition 
of the original proliferation of metaphysical universes that 112 wanted to 
dionantle! 
But the descriptionism that Olf pitted againut life conetructionien bad 
ite problems as well. First of all, just what was the method Olf was following? 
Did natural langmges that easily untangle themselves? Or did the Olf β prac­
titioner let his own presuppositions, unreflected upon as they were, show 
through? Seccndly, did Olf s descriptions get to the root of the philosophical 
problems or were they only applicable to difficulties that were ultimately 
trivial? And finally, was their "description11 as pure as it was intended to 
be, or did it have tacit reforming urges of ita own? One is reminded of F.H. 
Bradley's dictum: "It is a very common and most ruinous superstition to suppose 
IV that analysis is no alteration." 
The meaning of Borty's quip is borne oat. H P found its ideal language in 
one of its own construct ton; Olf purported to find it in ordinary language, 
though it did not end up leaving "everything as it is", to use Wittgenstein's 
phrase. 
Olf and H f have been able to find each other more in recent years, 
particularly as the realization has grown that the language problem within 
philosophy is not only a problem of languages, but one of language itself. In 
reflecting upon language itself, Olf has need of the logical apparatus of HP; 
and H f needs Olf's close connection to the natural languages to ground its 
logical maps in empirical, existent languages. Olf has reflected its need of 
H f principally in turning away from pure classification to a concern for the 
rules governing language, and Ilf, in its more modest program of mapping logical 
forms in language, shows its dependence upon the analysis of Olf. 
2.1.2. Sources and Directions of J.L. Austin's Method. 
2.1.2.1. Austin's Reaction. 
If Austin did not come to ordinary language via the route of Wittgenstein, 
what then led him to it? Although he was familiar with the Cambridge philosophy 
of Bussell, Moore, and the Early Wittgenstein, his interest in analysis came 
from a different overriding concern. (As we shall see later on, he nevertheless 
ended up having to relate his developing theory to the three queries of the 
Cantabrigians.) Like Moore, Austin was trained in classics, and his earliest 
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concern eeaae not to bar« bean «hat is the statue of language in the world, but 
rather «hat phlloaophers were doing to language. Hie firet concern waa clear 
ezpreaaion and thought, not phlloaophical problena. 
What urged Austin to a etudy of language and its relation to philosophical 
probleaa can be brougttunder three headings. In the first place, he distrusted 
Kanerallaations. Stuart Haapahire relates how Austin, as a young tutor at 
Magdalen not yet conitted to any particular prograa in philosophy, reacted 
тегу strongly to unclear usages of technical terms in philosophy: 
Ггош 1936 to 1939i Austin attended informal weekly discussions in 
Berlin's roces....On these occasions he challenged every technical 
term in the discussion, as part of a philosophical mythology, unless 
a plain example, or a set of examples, had first been made the focus 
of discuesion. AB the philosophical atmosphere was at that time 
full of the technical terms of the Vienna Circle, the effect was 
powerfully negative....Although he shared their hostility to the pre­
tensions of tradition (sic) metaphysics, he always attacked both 
the methods of argument, and tie spemary conclusions, of the Vienna 
Circle. Above all, he disliked the rapidity with which they arrived 
at their conclusions. 
This disdain of fuzzy thinking is, of course, now new; Socrates engaged in much 
the same enterprise. The dislike for fuzzy thinking and the emphasis on working 
from eaamples play a central role in his method. 
Connected with, or rather flowing from, this contempt for hasty generalíza-
la 
tion waa a distrust of universale as well. Austin was a great admirer of Ari-
jo 
atotle, and one of his early papers, from 1939, vas on Aristotle's Ethics. 
As Hampshire puts it, "If due allowance is made for the great difference of 
scale, Austin's strong reaction against the sweeping generalizations about 
language, which were the legacy of logical positivism, was not unlike Aristotle's 
19 patient pruning of the Plat mie philosophy." 
Secondly, he felt ordinary language was abused. Philosophers, he felt, 
were auch too hasty to either give new meanings to existing words, or to coin new 
words altogether. There were an abundance of subtle distinctions present in the 
words of ordinary language — distinctions that generations of people had found 
worth making in relating themselves and their talk to the world, distinctions 
that moreover had withstood the test of time, distinctions that probably had 
more to say about the world than those created ir. the philosopher's study. This 
misuse, or failure to use, the rich subtleties of ordinary speech was the reason 
for the proliferation of wispy theory within philosophy and also the cause of 
many disputes within philosophy. A good number of his own papers and his 
lectures were devoted to the investigation of a single word or expression. 
"One can't abuse ordinary language without paying for it," was a favorite 
expression of his. 
It is worthwhile to dwell for a moment on Just how Austin understood 
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ordinary language. What exactly te ordinary language? Quite often it ie taken 
to be an apotheosis of eoanonsenee or the folk vied« of the aan-in-the-street 
as opposed to the inflated pretensions of the academician. While some ordinary 
language philosophera (especially the leter Wittgenstein) often give this 
impression, Austin's own understanding of ordinary language was more complex-
Hie recurrent references to legal language alone are sufficient to place him 
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outside the сайр of those setting up the aan-in-the-street as the ideal. 
Two things characterise his understanding of the dimensions — and the 
liaits — of ordinary language. First of all, ordinary language is seemingly 
»TT language besides that of the philosophers. His objections to the language 
of philosophers hare already been presented. And secondly, ordinary language 
is also the opposite of ideal language. In this pole of his notion of ordi­
nary language, as the opposite of ideal language, his understanding of the 
limits of ordinary language are revealed and his attacks upon the philosophers 
are somewhat mitigated. In an essay freo 19Ίθ entitled "The Meaning of a Word", 
he goes into this problem of the inadequacy of ordinary language: 
Ordinary language breaks down in extraordinary cases....Now no doubt 
an ideal language would not break down, whatever happened. I_ 
doing physics, for example, where our language is tightened up in 
order to describe complicated and unusual cases concisely, we prepare 
linguistically for the worst. In ordinary language we do not: 
words fail us. If we talk as though an ordinary must be an ideal 
language, we shall misrepresent the facts. 
And the concluding paragraph of the same section is worth quoting in its entirety: 
I should like to say, in concluding thia section, that in the course 
of stressing that we must pay attention to the facts of actual 
language, what we can and cannot say, and precisely why, another 
and converse point takes shape. Although it will not do to force 
actual language to accord with some preconceived model: it equally 
will not do, having discovered the facts about 'ordinary usage' 
to rest сentent with that, as though there were nothing more to 
be discussed and discovered. There may be plenty that might 
happen and does happen which would need new and better language 
te describe it in. Very often philosophers are only engaged in 
this task, when they seem to be perversely using words in a way 
which makes no sense according to 'ordinary usage'. There may be 
extraordinary facts, even about our everyday experience, which plain 
men and plain language overlook. 5 
More interesting still is a comment in the introduction to "How to Talk — 
Some Simple Ways" from 1953: 
For onp thing, this is a mere essay at one section of what must be 
a very large thème; for another, essential though it is as a pre-
liminary to track down the detail of our ordinary uses of words, 
it seems that we shall ùfcthe end always be compelledto straighten 
them out to some extent. 
Thus, while Austin remained committed to the principle of description of 
ordinary language before beginning a'1'! else, neither ideal language as a separate 
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Icind of language nor linguistic legislation of how ordinary language should be 
used vere foreign to bis enterprise. Austin was no mindless idolizer of the 
cooaonsenae of ordinary language, though he was a great admirer of its vast 
range of subtleties. Bather than considering his urges to legislation as 
the argument that does ordinarj language in, it might be better conceived of as 
demonstrating how keenly aware Austin was of the limits of his program and how 
sharply he felt the boundary between descriptionism and constructionica, 
between ordinary and ideal language, between non-philosophical and philosophical 
language. 
A third point is logically connected with the foregoing two, namely, his 
reaction to the description fallacy. This fallacy is another legacy of the 
early analytic philosophers; it maintains that the only true function of sen-
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tances is a description of a state of affaire. The force of this point played 
a role in the derelopnent of the idea of performatiTes, especially in the first 
distinction of performatiTes тегвш constativee. As such, it will be treated 
in the following section. 
To summarize, then: Austin's dislike of hasty generalization and his 
respect for ordinary language prompted his own search for more responsible 
ways of talking in philosophy. This care for existent usages — and their 
limits — mark his approach. 
2.1.2.2. Austin's Method: A Linguistic Phenomenology. 
In "A Flea for Ercuses" Austin digressed on the method he used in his 
investigation·. After trying on different names, he came to the conclusion 
that perhaps the least misleading title for his work would be "'linguistic 
29 phenomenology', only that is rather a mouthful." How did he go about doing 
"linguistic phencaenology" and what was it to achieve? 
Starting with the last question first, we can say that Austin subscribed 
to a rather well-known and widely accepted hypothesis, namely, that 1 MÍ gauge 
mirrors our thought about the world. Thus a careful investigation of ordinary 
language, "that is, by examining what we should say when, and so why and what 
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we should mean by it", would not only reveal the richness of ordinary language 
(which Austin cmaidered an end in itself, apart from any philosophical con-
siderations which might follow), but also tell us something about how we see 
the world and live with it as well. He was modest enough about his alms, 
«•»THug hia method "at least one way of doing philosophy," though he felt sure 
that such an approach could throw Important light en many traditional problema 
in philoaophy. 
But how did he go about it? In the aforementioned essay, he takes as his 
example the study of excuses, or ways we go about circumventing responsibility. 
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The first important element was that he preferred that philosophers work in 
teams rather than alone. A group effort could have a heuristic effect upon the 
individual efforts. Dictionaries would be consulted to make a list of all the 
words that had anything to do with the topic to be studied. One simply went 
through the dictionary, page by page, picking up words and checking out cross-
references the definitions provided. Once the words and references started 
repeating themselves, Austin knew the circle was closing. Then the group 
would go to work on the word list, thinking up sentences in which these worde 
would be used. Then the sentences were studied and the patterns were allowed 
to emerge from the possibilities — e.g., in the case of excuses, that many 
adverbs occur or certain nouns keep recurring with certain prepositions, and 
the like. The patterns that result will usually reveal a wide range of possi­
bilities that a philosopher would have been less likely to discover had he 
simply begun with the word "excuse". 
That completes the first phase of the "field work", as he called it. Then 
Austin would turn to other sources. A favorite one for him was the law. For in 
law, so much hangs on the use of language. He would turn to different aspects 
of law, depending on the style of investigation — criminal law and the law of 
tort in the case of pleas and excuses, contract law for studying promises, etc. 
And of special interest in studying law is not the laws as stated in lawbooks, 
but rather the cases and actions, for it is in the latter that what the words 
maan, or come to mean, are most clearly expressed. 
Another area he reconended was psychology, especially those areas dealing 
with anthropology and -"<—ι behavlor. For hire actions are named and classified 
which may have escaped the eye of ordinary men, since they were of little 
practical importance. 
In such a manner, the philosopher is able to confront himself with large 
amounts of examples of how his topic is expressed. The idea of examples is very 
important, for Austin maintains that words are not facts and therefore cannot 
be treated as such. Wards must be allowed to deploy their various shades of use 
in sentences and in different contexts before we can start »«iUng about them. 
This then is the substance of his linguistic phenomenology. It is linguistic 
in its gathering techniques, in its respect for the multifaroua possibilities 
of language. It is phenomenoloig in its determination to observe words in their 
natural habitat — in sentences and not isolated from their с enterte. The 
descriptive element is of the utmost importance. 
But of course the process does not stop here; Austin is more than a linguis­
tic botanist or latter-day Linnaeus. Once he starts constructing the bones of a 
theory about how language works, or "what to say when", certain proclivities in 
his manner of approach show through. And these, together with his working from 
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examples, and hie inaiatence on clarity, will combine to show the methodological 
thruat of hia theory developient. 
Th· diatruet of generalization and the atrong nominaliet bent of hia 
thought ahow through in hia theory formation. Hie central concern waa how worda 
work in their context, and if he could come on an example that called the hypo-
theaia into queation, he had little qualm about aetting the hypotheaia aaide. 
He concentrated on the functioning in their examplea and this faacination 
reaulted in тегу little theory when all waa aaid and done, but that little 
amount of theory haa kept many other philoeophera occupied in the laat ten yeara. 
Of intereat, and conaonant with hie character, he did not wait for an 
example to interfere with hia budding hypotheaia; inatead, he went actively 
searching for it. And this produced the two aspects that propelled his theory 
forward from the performative-conatatlve distinction to the theory of illocu-
tionary acta: namely, the pursuit of the vaniahing distinction and the search 
for asymmetry. 
Austin did not rest once having made a distinction. He sought out counter­
examples and would try thus to undermine hia own distinction. If the distinction 
held under the barrage of examples, it waa a worthwhile one. If it wavered 
under the attack or started spawning numbers of exceptions, Austin would set 
upon it all the more until the distinction would evaporate as not worth being 
made. This waa hia "pursuit of the vaniahing distinction". This waa primarily 
responsible for the demise of the performative-conatative distinction and the 
emergence of the theory of illocutionary acts. In this instance, he had grad­
ually diacovered that cooatativea, too, have a performative character and that 
this distinction could not hold up in its given form. 
3Ί 
The search for asymmetry was built into the method. The moat important 
part of this approach was bow the sentence reacted under negation, and the 
kinds of oppoaitea that could be generated. In How to Do Things with Words, 
Austin devotee three of the twelve lectures exclusively to the problem of 
infelicities, i.e., what conditions make performatives fail. He felt that 
at the point of aayimnetry important things could be revealed that were n<± so 
obvious elsewhere and as such they deserved special attention. 
These pointa, then: an exhaustive as possible list of examples, the stress 
on function or use, the pursuit of the vanishing distinction, and the search 
for asymmetry were the tools he used to set about his linguistic phenomenology, 
the attempt to describe "the total speech act in the total situation". Taken 
together, they should provide the means for describing the conditions under 
which certain kinds of utterances, with certain meanings, emerge. Although 
different authors will stress different aspects of one or the other of these 
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pointa, theee tools will cbaracteriEe the research. They proride the methodo­
logical locoaotire that шсягев the theory along its way. In воае aspects, they 
have likewise determined preferred topics among Austinians: entailment, audience 
uptake, person, etc. But this is getting ahead of the discussion. It is now 
tiae to turn to the work that has been done free Austin to Searle. 
2.1.3· PerforaatiTea. 
"It was for too long the aasunption of philosophers," Austin writes, "that 
the business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, 
or to 'state some fact', which it must do either truely or falsely." But 
as he goes on to point out, philosophers found themeelvee diecovering ever 
fresh types of nonsense, which could not easily be pushed into the categories 
of true or false, of Terifiable or not verifiable. Take, for example, the 
so-called "ethical propositions" whose task seems to be evoking emotion, pre­
scribing conduct, or trying to influence behavior in one or other way. Austin then 
centers in on one group of utterances, which granaatically take the foni of 
statenents, though do not have the suspect "ethical" words present (such as 
"good", "ought", or "can") that would allow the philosopher to readily consign 
them to the dustbin of ethical propositions. Moreover, 
A. they do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, 
are not 'true or false'; and 
B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of. the doing of 
an action, which again would not normally be described as 
saying something.37 
A few ехашріев might help clarify these conditions: 
(1) "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth." 
(2) "I hereby adjourn this meeting." 
(3) "I promise to come tomorrow." 
(4) "I apologize for being so late." 
(5) "I bet you a guilder it will rain tomorrow." 
Such utterances Austin called performative utterances, or performatives for 
short. The name performative "indicates that the issuing of the utterance is 
the performing of an action — it is not normally thought of as just saying 
38 
something." 
Austin's next task was to describe the conditions which would allow us to 
readily discover performatives in any series of utterances. But first he dwells 
a moment on the difference between performatives and what the philosophers had 
been calling "statements" (Austin would later on introduce the term "constatives" 
for these "statements"). All the examples given above do not describe a state of 
affairs, or relate a mental state of affairs, but are actions — by saying this 
utterance, we indeed christen a ship, we close a meeting, we make a promise, 
and so on. Secondly, such utterances cannot be reduced to a true-or-false 
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teet without mental acrobatics that would condemn the test as sophistry: not 
following up one's bet with the guiltier if tomorrov turns out to be a bright, 
sunny day is welshing on one's bet, not a false bet. Saying "I apologize" and 
not meaning it is dishonest, not a false apology. Though in English we do 
speak of a false promise, "false" here does not have anything to do with 
truth conditions; rather, it means "false" in the sense of a wrong move in a 
39 game, or "false" in the sense of black-hearted or deceitful. 
Having made these preliminary remarks, Austin could move on to a clearer 
delineating of performatives. This occurs characteristically by distinguishing 
them from what were called "statements" by the early language analysts, and 
to involves three sets of criteria that he searches for: (1) grammatical 
conditions — i.e., is it possible to identify the performative on the basis of 
grammatical form?; (2) "truth" conditions (in the sense of when is a performative 
utterance successful as a performative, and when not) — i.e., the study of 
infelicities; (3) circumstantial conditions — i.e., what extra-linguistic and 
what other linguistic conditions are neeessary for successful performative 
utterances? As can be seen, the performative distinctfan is being developed in 
the shadow of the earlier linguistic philosophy. The conditions, if established, 
show how performative utterances are different from statements, and yet not part 
of the nonsense that is the outer darkness beyond these statements. Especially 
(2) plays a role central to this discussion; for it performatives are not true 
or false, what are they thai? 
2.1.3.1· Grammatical Conditions. 
All of the examples given above were in the "I" form — the first person 
singular present active indicative. Austin thought at first there might be a 
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clue here for an important audition. Like others, he too recognized that 
asymnetry present in utterances in the first person (one should note here that 
the plural "we" functions in the same fashion). "I" sentences are somehow 
different and less convertible into other forms than "you" or "he" sentences. 
But alaost as quickly as this distinction arose, it again vanished as a 
sufficient condition. For statements (or constatives, as he called them) could 
take this form, too. "I am sitting before my typewriter," "I like peanut butter" 
— are examples that clearly are not performatives, even though they have the 
gramatical form of "I x". Even if we make lists of verbs that are performative, 
as Austin of course did, we run into a group that brings diffinulties, too — 
"I state that this is the case" is an example of an utterance that fulfills both 
the conditions for a performative (I am performing quite explicitly the act of 
stating), and is at the same time the classic form of a constative statement. 
(As we shell see shortly, it is this point that led Austin to discard his 
perfomative-constative distinction altogether.) 
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Not only ie the "I" form not a sufficient condition, it is also not a 
necessary one. "You are reqursted to please take your seats." "Will the 
gentleman in the back row please stop snoring?" Or a jury that cries out: 
"Guilty1" These are all seemingly performatives as well, even though they take 
on widely varying grammatical forms. But interestingly enough, they can be 
translated into "I" forms. But then there is an entire group of performatives 
that are not linguistic at all — the judge hanging his gavel, the bishop 
placing his hands on the head of the ordinand, a couple effecting their marriage 
(in some cultures) by cohabiting. Especially in the last two cases, adding 
words to the act does not make these utterances performative — they are then 
merely reports of an action being performed; they are not the actions themselves. 
Thus, the grammatical distinction gets fuzzier and fuzzier, and seems to 
vanish at important points entirely. But, As Austin said, "If we never made 
mistakes how should we correct them?" For the mistakes reveal certain oddities 
about certain kinds of utterances. Moreover, the hard-headed exceptions 
fall into patterns and, while they cause the old distinctions to vanish, 
they open up new ones and do not necessarily lead us back to where we started. 
Certain new distinctions are emerging, though not yet clearly delimited. 
2.1.3.2. "Truth" Conditions. 
If performatives are not true or false, what are they then, if anything? 
Austin believed that they were indeed something besides true and false. 
Performative utterances can go wrong. In the case of the examples above, if I 
say "I паве this ship the Queen Elizabeth", but I em not the ship coopany'в 
director's wife, and I have snatched the champagne bottle out of her hands and 
broken it over the ship, the performative utterance has gone wrong. Or, I am 
indeed the individual indicated for christening the ship, but I slip at the 
last moment and aaj "I name this ship the Queen Margaret". Then the performance 
has gone wrong. Or I declare a meeting adjourned but I am not the chairman. 
Or I am indeed the chairman and instead of calling for the vote on 
the agenda I declare the meeting a drunken orgy. These are ways performatives, 
though true to grannatieal form, can go wrong. And this going wrong or going 
right Austin felt was the "true-and-false" of performatives: "The utterance is 
then, we nay say, not indeed false but in general unhappy. And for this reason 
we call the doctrine of the things that can be and go wrong on the occasion of 
such utterances, the doctrine of the Infelicities." 
Austin discovered six ways for performatives to go wrong and divided them 
into two groups: misfires and abuses. 
Misfires are performatives that do not come off — they are botched in one 
way or another. There are two main ways to misfire: misinvocations (where the 
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aet is diaallowed), and misexecutione (where the act is Tìtiated). Under 
mislnToeationa and misexecutione come two each of the six infelicities. Thus 
there are two kinds of misinvocations: (1) There may be "no conventional 
procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the 
uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances...." 
An example of this would be: I walk over to you and say "I insult you I" And you 
would probably stand there puzzled. Whereas I can say "I adore you; I thank 
you; etc.", there is no convention for saying "I insult youJ" If I wish to 
insult you, I have to do it in some other form — by calling you some demeaning 
паше, by slapping your face with my gauntlet, etc. In this case I have called 
upon a conventional procedure that does not exist for insulting, and thus 
cannot produce the necessary effect; hence there is no performative here. (2) 
"The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate 
for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked." As examples of this, 
see the two given above on the courtroom or meeting: I either try to adjourn the 
meeting without being the chairman (I am not the particular person appointed to 
do that) or I try to turn the meeting into something else that lies beyond my 
competence as chairman. Or at the wedding ceremony I hit my wife-to-be over the 
head with a bottle of champagne and say "I christen you the Queen Elizabeth" — 
clearly the case of the right words, but very much the wrong circumstancesi 
Misexecutione happen when all the circumstances and the persons are correct, 
but the procedure is not carried out properly. This produces the third and 
fourth kind of infelicity. (3) happens when the procedure is not carried out 
correctly by those involved. For exaraple, I say: "I ara sorry that I insulted 
you yesterday. You are not a liar; you are an ass!" I have not apologized a 
correctly in this form. (Ό The procedure is not carried out completely. 
Suppose I say "I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Son" — 
and stop there. I have not fully completed the procedure (though everything 
I did up to that point was correct) and thus you are not baptized. 
There are two kinds of "abuses" which complete the six kinds of Infelicities. 
Abuses occur when all the first four infelicities are avoided, and the act as 
such is achieved. But I was insincere in what I did, and this vitiates the 
felicity of the act. (5) occurs when I fail to have the thoughts, feelings, 
attitudes appropriate to the procedure I have performed. For example, I say 
"I apologize for having insulted you yesterday" but in шу heart I Etili think 
you are an ass. (6) occurs when I fail to ecoduct myself accordingly after I 
have successfully carried out a procedure. I say to a sick friend "I promise to 
visit you every afternoon this week" and he sees nothing of me after Monday. 
Austin's doctrine of infelicities goes a long way to establishing the 
conditions for a performative. When one or more of the six infelicities occur, 
the performative is unhappy. Moreover, this investigation of what a performative 
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ів not aleo telle us much about what a performative is. Particularly salient 
is how much performatives are dependent upon estabiehed convention and procedure 
and how often they go wrong by not adhering to that procedure, or by trying to 
invoke it when either it does not eifet or is not appropriate for this situation. 
Performatives are convention-bound. This leads to a discussion of the third 
set of conditions that define a performative. 
2.I.3.3. Circumstantial Conditions. 
If performative utterances have to do with doing something by saying 
something, then it is clear that more than a grammatical analysis will be necessary 
to penetrate their form and impact. The entire speech situation will need study 
— the speaker, the audience, the situation where they find themselves, what 
the speaker is trying to get across. 
By his study of how performances can go wrong, Austin came to the conclusion 
that "infelicity is an ill to which all acts are heir which have the general 
character of ritual or ceremonial, all conventional acts: not indeed that 
every ritual is liable to every foro of infelicity (but then nor is every per-
formative utterance)." The matter of convention was a theme Austin returned 
to often and he indicated it played a central role in the understanding of 
performatives. Though he never devoted direct attention to the problem of con­
ventions per se, it seems that he favored a "strong" sense of the word, i.e. 
convention as any circumstance or procedure having a strong ritual or ceremonial 
character. Whereas he was aware that convert ion in the weaker sense was 
much, much broader (including the possibility of language at all), in his dis-
cussions he preferred staying closer to more obvious conventions such as illus­
trated in law, etiquette, and ceremony. Hie insights here, though brief aid 
sporadic, were perhaps among his most important. 
This relation of performative utterance and convention has important 
implications for the philosophy of language which I would like to sketch out 
here (they will be handled in more detail in Chapter Four): 
(1) An understanding of the nature of convention and its relation to language 
gives a study of language its most important entry into the world. For in 
determining how language works, one has to answer the question of what 
canvutions come into play. By identifying these conventions, one can determine 
(a) the intent of the speaker, (b) the expected response of the audience, 
(e) certain characteristics of the camiunicatione — or at least certain things 
they cannot be, (d) the speaker's conception of the world or the universe of 
discourse in which he is engaged by his choice of conventions, and by those he 
does not use, (e) something of the thought structures of the universe of dis-
coorse being employed. The infelicities to which the conventions are subject 
give us a first entry into the conventions themselves. 
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(2) Th· OTerwhelalng iaportance of conventiona and their Influence on communica­
tion should once and for all spell the end to the theory of atomietie meaning — 
the "one word - one meaning" fallacy. While this tendency haa more or leas 
died as an eatahliahed dogma (except perhaps among the analysts of ethical 
propositions who are still looking for the meaning of "good" and the like), as 
an established method or uncanecious intentionality in research it remains. 
We will Ьатв occasion to refer to this later on when renewing the literature 
that has appeared since Austin. The presence of с cuventione show that words 
cannot he seen as solid nuggets of fact or univocal meaning, but rather that 
they resemble magnetic fields that react differently under rarioua situations. 
The implication· of this for the use of formal logical models in clarifying the 
functioning of language has not yet been fully exploited. 
(3) Conversely, the study of language cantead us to a certain clarification 
and perhaps even classification (Austin would have hoped for the latter) of 
conventions. The performative utterance phenomenon and the convention phenomenon 
seem to be interdependent. A further elaboration of the structures, conditions, 
and functions of conventions will not only reflexively benefit the philosophical 
study of language, but will also turn the other direction for understanding 
larger segments of the universe of discourse, the societies in which these 
universes appear, and even the conditions which make the societies possible. 
( Ό Approximate to (3) is the inportance of conventions for the further elabora­
tion of speech act theory itself. Searle has carried it further and in Chapter 
Four they will be treated in some detail. 
As we have seen, three large sets of partially iit erlocking conditions 
provide the field of operations for performative utterances. No single set of 
conditions — grammatical, "truth", or circumstantial — are both necessary and 
sufficient for the performative utterance's success. All three sets together 
are necessary and sufficient, it would seem, though Austin never got around to 
firming up the conditions for performative utterances, for the termite of the 
constative was already eating his way through the distinction. 
2.1.4. Performatives vs. Constatives. 
As we saw above, the whole schema of performatives was built up in reaction 
to the idea that to say something is to state something, an assumption which 
"is no doubt unconscious, no doubt is wrong, but it is wholly natural in philo-
aophy apparently." That kind of talk which stated that smething is or is not 
the case, Austin called "constative". In his ahortest definition of the diff­
erence between performatives and constatives, he says that performatives are 
50 
either happy or unhappy, whereas constatives are true or false. And this 
seems to have been a very important point, isolating a type of utterance that 
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ав more than the emiseion of undifferentiated emotion, but still was not 
subject to the canons of truth and falsity. But it soon became clear that the 
distinction, while it did clarify some important aspects of how language works, 
was less than an iron-clad one. 
On the one hand, there seemed to be constatives within performatives. In 
utterances such as "I pronounce you guilty of those things charged against you," 
"I warn you that the ice over there is тегу thin,™ "I ргошіае that I will be 
there tomorrow," one can readily extract a proposition from each of these 
utterances, namely, that you are guilty, that the ice is thin, that I will be 
at x-place tomorrow. All of these appear to be subject to the canons of 
verifiability. 
On the other hand, conatatires seemed to }>e performatives. If I take the 
statement "It is raining," I can as eaaily say: "I state (assert, posit, swear) 
that it is raining." To state, assert, postulate, and swear are, following what 
was outlined above, performatives. They adhere to the same grammatical rules, 
they are subject to certain kinds of infelicity (imagine making etateaarts in 
court), and they have particular circumstances surrounding them. As Austin 
investigated further, this kind of perfoonative, which he later was to call 
expositivas, formed a not insignificant group of performatives. In fact, there 
was a tençitation to say that all speech acts are somehow performative in that 
I am always doing eoraething by saying something. And then it was indeed the 
question whether the performative-constative distinction was all it was touted 
to be. And with the vanishing of the performative-constative distinction, the 
true-false distinction seemed to have regained ground. The happiness of an 
utterance seemed to recede to the same level as, say, the importance of speaking 
grammatically correctly. It was clear that an important revision of the theory 
was necessary. 
2.1.5· The Theory of Illocutionary Acta. 
Beginning with Lecture VIII of How to Do Things with Words, Austin starts 
constructing his solution to the problem. The result is a much broader theory 
of speech acts, able to catch much more of all that which goes into an utterance. 
He calls his new theory the "general theory" and his old performative-constative 
theory the "special theory". 
The speech act has three aspects which Austin also called acts, though 
reminding the reader that these "acts" are abstractions from the speech act:' 
the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. 
The locutionary act is the act of saying aomething in the full, normal 
sense which includes the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of 
certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them 
with a certain 'meaning' in the favourite philosophical sense of 
that terms, i.e. with a certain sense and with a certain reference. 
When one fulfills these three conditions one has performed a locutionary act. 
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These three conditions have names as well: 
The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering certain noises. 
The phatic act is the uttering of certain vocables or words, i.e. 
noises of certain types, belonging to and as belonging to, a 
certain vocabulary, conforming to and as conforming to a certain 
grammar. The rhetic act is the performance of an act of using 
those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and 
reference." 
Every phatic and rhetic act entails a phonetic act, for one can say that this 
is a prerequisite of language. Likowise every rhetic act entails a phatic act. 
But one cannot say that every phonetic act entails the last two (for example: 
"gmflp prnxez"), nor does a phatic act entail necessarily a rhetic act (for 
example: "Morbid tree-stumps gyrate philosophically"). Phonetic acts can 
only go wrong by being silent; phatic acts go wrong by being nonsense or meaning­
less; rhetic acts, the units of speech, go wrong by being vague, void, obscure, 
etc.55 
Austin devoted the most of his attention to the illocutionary act. Every 
illocutionary act will entail a successful locutionary act. The coupling point 
is that in the illocutionary act, how the locutionary ^ act is to be used is 
clarified. An illocutionary act is the "performance of an act in saying some-
thing as opposed to performance of an act of saying something...." Thus the 
name illocutionary act. To give examples: locutionary act = "The cat is on the 
mat." IHocutionary act = "I deny that the cat is on the mat." 
As the examples show, there is a good difference between a locutionary and 
illocutionary act. More clearly perhaps would be such a locutionary utterance 
as "I shall come tomorrow". Does this »iterance constátate a promise, a threat, a 
statement, or a judgment? When it is a successfully completed illocutionary 
act, we know. Then how the locutionary act "I shall come tomorrow" is to be 
understood (as a promise, statement, threat, etc.) is clarified. The different 
vays the illocutionary act functions are known as the illocutionary forces, 
because they give the force or direction of the locutionary act. 
Austin felt that this distinction had escaped many philosophers. Those 
philosophers who had fallen prey to the descriptive fallacy had spent their 
time analyzing the locutionary act, but had forgotten about the illocutionary 
act involved. 
In passing, one should note that Austin does not equate the force of an 
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utterance with its meaning. He (bee not place himself in the camp of those 
who can say that the meaning of an utterance is its use. Meaning, he says, is 
more proper to the locutionary act, in that it involves sense and reference. 
This is one of the vague points in Austin's doctrine that has generated a lot 
of discussion. 
The third aspect of the speech act is the perlocutionary act: 
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Saying aooethlng will often, or even normally, produce certain 
consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of 
the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may 
be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them 
....Ve shall call the performance of an act of this kind the 
performance of a perlocuticoary act or perlocution." 
Perlocutionary acts result from achiering a certain effect bj an utterance 
(hence perlocutionary act), i.e. using an utterance to evoke a particular 
action from the audience or to evince a certain emotion. The distinction between 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is not that clear, and Austin never 
succeeded in entirely delineating the difference. He briefly distinguished 
the three acts by saying that locutionary acts have a meaning, illocutionary 
59 
acts a force, and perlocutionary acts a certain effect by saying something.*^ 
He did, however, try to make some distinctions, without giving all the back­
ground to clarify just what he intended. One such distinction was that illo­
fio 
cutionary acts are conventional acts and that perlocutionary acts are not. 
As we shall see, the perlocutionary distinction has not been treated very exten­
sively since Austin, though it will play an important жіе for religious language 
and as such will be gone into in some detail in the following chapter. 
The discovery of the perlocutionary act forced Austin to return to re­
examine the illocutionary acta once more as to their effect. Illocutionary 
acts, to be suceesafully ccapleted, must "secure uptake", i.e. they must be 
understood by the audience to which they are directed. Since they are con­
ventional, one can determine what sort of uptake they are to secure and thus one 
aan in some fashion determine how they are constructed. 
If we compare the old performative-constative scheme with the theory of 
illocutionary acts, we can see that much of the former was taken over and 
incorporated into the latter. The content of a constative is incorporated 
into the locutionary act. The performative, along with the conditions of 
grammar, "truth", and circumstance, has been incorporated into the illocutionary 
act. The value of the new distinction locutionary-illocutionary is that it 
explains how performatives can have constative elements and how constatives can 
have performative elements. The perlocutionary act was new. And the new 
theory introduced things no present in the old one. The relation of the theory 
to speech and language as a whole was answered somewhat in the phonetic-phatic-
rhetic distinction. The problem of the meaning of propositions (in the locu­
tionary act) and meaning as use (the illocutionary forces) was confronted. The 
reaction of the audience, a hitherto neglected aspect of the speech situation, 
was touched upon. And a first attempt was made to classify different kinds of 
performatives. We would like to present this classification briefly before 
continuing on to the post-Auetinian research. 
By means of a dictionary search, Austin collected a large nui*er of 
performative verbs. In his discussion of illocutionary acts, he took the 
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opportunity to group some of them together in the hopes that this might throw 
light on the various kinds of illocutionary force. In the final lecture in 
How to Do Things with Words he presented five "classes of utterance, classified 
according to their illocutionary force...." They can be briefly described 
as follows: 
(1) Verdictives (such as acquitting, convicting, assessing, characterizing, 
ranking, valuating, estimating, etc.) "...consist in the delivering of a 
finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact, 
so far as these are distingnishable." They give one's verdict on something, 
as the name says. They have an obvious connection with truth and falsity, at 
least insofar as they reckon with soundness and unsoundness, fairness and 
unfairness. 
(2) Exercitives (such as appointing, ordering, granting, recommending, 
warning, proclaiming, etc.) are "...the giving of a decision in favour of or 
against a certain с ourse of action, or advocacy of it." As the name suggests, 
they are the decision of one who exercises the authority to make them. The 
consequences of exercitive acts are such that others may be compelled or (not) 
allowed to do certain acts. 
(3) Conmissives (such as prooising, intending, pledging, meaning to, 
•owing, favouring) "...commit the speaker to a certain course of action." 
They tend in the direction of descriptions, because stating that I have an in­
tention and intending are very much the same thing. 
(4) Behabitives (such as thanking, praising, cursing, worshipping, pro­
testing, etc.) "...include the notion of reaction toother people's behaviour and 
fortunes and of attitude and expressions of attitude to someone else's past 
conduct or inminent conduct." Behabitives are related to describing and 
expressing our feelings, though they are distinct from these. 
(5) Expositivea (such as affirming, denying, stating, agreeing, etc.) 
"...are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the 
conducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and references." 
Here is where the conetatives-ae-performatives have come to rest. It is a very 
vague class, and has a good deal of resemblance to the other four classes. 
It should be noted that Austin has not slipped back into an alternative of 
atomistic meaning (the "one word - one meaning" belief), which we might describe 
as a "one word - one force" belief. He freely admits thimghout this exposition 
that the same verb can have a variety of forces. 
This classification is of value lor relating different words together, and 
the classification has given us a preliminary basis for doing this. For example, 
what is the relation between promising, intending, planning, and predicting? i— 
a question important in our discuaaion of eschatology. 
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Т Ы в brief outline of the principal points in the theory of Austin has had 
to forego the rich detail that would only do him justice. There are many finer 
points and ideas he introduced that агр not of iimediate concern here. Our 
intent was to present the central ideas and theories and also to give some 
notion of what led to their development, since the latter is an important part 
of the meaning and thrust of the theory. In our own discussion of eschatological 
utterances, and in our development of an expanded theory of speech acts to 
permit a compréhension of the eschatological horizon, our attention will be 
directed not only (and not primarily) to Austin, but to the research that has 
followed his work and has refined it. Our own work there will rest principally 
on the synthesis of Searle. The following section will be devoted to the 
development of the research from Austin to Searle, with the emphasis on the 
reactions to and the refinements of the theory, and on the ideas that will 
play an important role in our discussion of eschatology. 
2.2. Besearch After Austin. 
Austin's death at the age of 46 cut short the further development of his 
promising thaory of speech acts. The posthumous publication of his various 
essays and lectures in 19^2 made his ideas available to a much larger audience 
than the group at Oxford, and the following tan years witnessed a huge turnout 
of publications on his thought. The publications were by and large articles in 
67 journals; to date only two book-length studies have appeared on his thought 
and neither of these have attempted to come to grips with the mass of literature 
Austin's work has generated. Such a brief presentation of the theory of speech 
acts as this cannot hope to give an overview of what has been done to this 
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time. Nevertheless, something must be said and some indication must be given 
of what has been done, since this research plays an important part in the analysis 
of eschatological talk that is to follow. 
The short overview of the literature that follows is a restricted one. It 
confines itself to the literature that has grown up around How to Do Things with 
Words and the discussions of those parts of the Philosophical Papers that treat 
either the problems of performatives and illocutionary acts, or deal with 
general methodological considerations in Austin's work. Nor will there be a 
detailed account of the controversies; and no side will be chosen in these 
discussions. This account intends to relate what directions the research has 
taken; namely, what pointa in Austin have unsettled other thinkers and given 
rise to controversy, what points in the theory Austin left undiscussed and others' 
felt needed developing, and how they go about solving these problems. In the 
following chapters, we will return to many of these controversies and take sides 
in them. For now, this general overview will have to suffice to show in which 
directions the theory developnent has gone. 
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2.2.1. Method. 
One important point that has heen criticized in Austin is his understanding 
and his use of oridnary language. Black, for one, doubts that ordinary language 
is up to all Austin wants it to do: "Appeal to ordinary language is very useful 
when the logical grammar of particular words and families of words is under 
investigation; it is likely to he less profitable when what is at stake is a 
69 general view of how language works." Others call attention to the fact that 
for someone who wanted to describe the workings of ordinary language and words 
within them, Austin engaged in a good deal of linguistic legislation. But 
more critical than this is how one can relate linguistic findings to the prob-
lems of philosophy. Goldstein states the problem most cogently: 
Any discourse requires a linguistic medium, but it is entirely 
mistaken to suggest that the analysis of issues of that discourse 
reduces itself to linguistic analysis. It may well be the task 
of linguistic phenomenology to discover the various meanings of 
a word which exist in a given language, but one certainly may not 
expect to 'refute' a claim to nonlinguistic knowledge of some sort 
or another by asserting that such-and-such a meaning of this-or-
that term does not exist.'^ 
Nor was Austin's method always received with open arms. On the one hand, 
Austin's way of finding meanings of words by using the dictionary and thinking 
up examples could be better replaced by a less intuitive manner of research, 
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namely, that of descriptive linguistics, or by a more direct Chomskyian 
73 
approach. Others ask the question whether Austin may be nothing more than 
a latter-day H. Jourdain with his classifications that do not really illuminate 
Among Austin's supporters,there has been a trend toward meeting the linguists 
75 half way: either by the introduction of modal and deontic logic or the concept 
of rules — i.e. lying down clearly the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
76 
achieving successful speech acts. 
Attempts have been made to relate Austin's work with other currents in 
philosophy. Besides the linguistic approach already mentioned, attempts have 
77 been made in the direction of phenomenology, nineteenth century continental 
epistemology, and continental hermenéutica. 
2.2.2. Performatives. 
Those who followed Austin were not so quick to drop the use of the term 
"performative" as Austin himself was. A large group have worked at rehabilitating 
it in one way or another. The usual manner was offering new definitions which 
were to resolve Austin's dilemmas or were to relate the "special theory" of 
performative-conatative to the "general theory" of illocutionary acts more 
adequately. In the first group of dilenma resolvere, attempts ran the way of 




questionable improvement. In the latter group, the tact most often taken was 
a distinction between "strict" performatives (performatives in the sense of the 
performative-constative theory) and "extended" perfommatives (in the sense of 
8l 
illocutionary acts of doing something in saying something). 
The position that Austin was very correct in dropping the "performative" 
idea ia also represented. 
Some authors returned to the performative-constative problem and offered 
general solutions. Most solutions zeroed in on Austin's confused notion of 
statement; Cohen distinghished three different uses of the word "statement" in 
linguistic philosophy, while others distinguished two senses of statement, one 
Qc 
performative and one constative, based on ordinary language analysis. 
The use of an analysis of the entailment problem between statements was 
also employed to clarify the performative-constative relation, but more a> 
concerning the entailment between promises and obligations, which will be 
treated below. 
A good deal of discussion has been devoted to the truth value of performa­
tives; seemingly Austin did not banish the true-or-false demon as he had hoped to, 
Some posit a special U n d of true-or-false function, i.'e. one unlike the true-
go 
or-false function for statements, for performatives. What seems clear at 
least, though, is that a much better circumscribed definition of truth value 
89 
and of description is needed. 
2.2.3· Locutionary Meaning and Illocutionary Force. 
Cne of the areas Austin left unclear was the distinction between locutionary 
and illocutionary acts. This problem manifested itself most clearly in the 
90 difficulty in distinguishing locutionary meaning and illocutionary force. 
Austin had summarily presented his definition of meaning as resting upon "the 
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strength of current views" which defined meaning as sense and reference. It 
seems that the current views he had in mind were those of Tregp. though this is 
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far from clear. Cohen saw no need for the idea of illocutionary force; 
locutionary meaning covered everything needed there. Performatives were still 
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necessary, but the idea of illocutionary forces had become superfluous. This 
stand has been criticized to such an extent that it can be said to no longer be 
tenable in this fon. Cohen may have been in the wrong pew, but he was certainly 
in the right church. Others have had need to rework the locutionary-illocutionary 
distinction as well, mainly in terms of the prickly, ambiguous term "meaning". 
Perhaps the reconstruction ofthe problem of meaning and force that has achieved 
95 the most widespread acceptance is one based on Grice's theory of meaning. 
The meaning and force problem expressed itself in yet another fashion, 
namely, do words and sentences take their meaning from their locutionary or 
87 
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illoeutionary chmracter? The quastions are directed primarily against the 
"•eaning as use" position that would assign words in a sentence meaning in 
light of what typ« of illocutionary force was involved. Such an extreme 
position has not appeared in recent literature, though that does not mean that the 
problem of word-meaning has been solved (though Grice's theory has received 
acceptance for larger speech units). Ve need to return to the stage Brown set 
in 1962: 'To ask for the meaning of a word is simply to ask for the rules 
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which regulate the meaning of the word." 
2.2.4. Conventions. 
Black clearly saw that one of the problems that made performatives so 
difficult to define and comprehend lay with the understanding of conventions. 
For if one took conventions in the strict sense, performatives could only be 
98 
taken in the strict sense as well. For a better understanding pi conventions, 
Black referred his readers to Strawson who bad developed the notion of с invention 
into a two-pronged concept similar to that which had been done with performatives: 
i.e. a "strict" sense of conventions as ritual and ceremonial acts, and an 
"extended" sense of conventions to cover less explicit notions. In Strawson'β 
own presentation, tere is but one concept of convention which forms a continuum 
99 from most ceremonial to least ceremonial. 
Alternate notions of convention have been developed by Cameron, Skinner 
and Furberg. Cameron distinguishes institutional acts and conventioml 
import. Skinner searches out which illocutionary acts are most strictly 
governed by convention. Furberg áistinguishes various conventions: vertical, 
horizontal, classificatory, and individuating. He uses the term to cover relatins 
of words to the world and words to each other. 
The notion of conventicn, as noted above in section 2.1.3.3«, will be 
of great importance in extending the speech act theory. 
2.2.5. Promising. 
Promising has always been a particularly popular topic among the poet-
Austinian group. Austin himself often used it in his examples of performatives, 
and in the later Ъеогу it formed one of theprime examples of commissives. 
Moreover, promising has had a long history in ethics. And promising has the 
advantage of being a relatively clear example of how non-ceremonial convention 
works, how saying something is doing something, and how canplieated the speech 
situation really is. 
The literature on promising falls into three groups. In the first group 
could be placed descriptions of the act of promising. Somewhat surprisingly, 
the literature on this aspect is surprisingly small. This is partially due to 
the fact that a good deal had been done on this area before Austin. Ardal 
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hae devoted a good bit of work to the different kinds of promisee and to their 
relation to intending and threatening. Further there have been studies on 
what the promisee is entitled to in a promise, and' the role of the promisee in 
the securing of the promise. 
The second group is those who have considered in what ways promises are 
statements and what sort of truth value promises have. Again, Ardal should be 
mentioned here, along with several Scandinavian writers, and also Harrison for 
his examination, etegning from Austin, of the parallels between "I know" and 
„_ . „ 104 
"I promise". 
By far the most attention has been devoted to the question of what does 
promising entail for the promiser, i.e. in what manner, if any, does promising 
oblige the person who promisee to keep the promise? This aspect of promising 
has a long history in ethics, reaching back to Hume. Using Austin's analysis 
of promise and of entailment, Searle purported to have found a way to derive an 
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"ought" from the "is" of promising. This resulted in a graat deal of discussion, 
107 
usually taking Searle as the point of departure. Searle responded to some of 
the critics in his book Speech Acts. 
2.2.6. Austin in Theological Literature. 
To date, Austin's insights have been applied only sparingly to theology. 
Donald Evans' The Logic of Self-Involvement is the most comprehensive that has 
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appeared to date. He reshapes and extends Austin's theory to his own needs 
and then applies the theory to the theological language of creation. Bejerholm 
and Hornig's Wort und Handlung applies Austin's theory (mainly performatives) to 
various aspects of religious language: causal formulae, credal statements, 
miracles, and the expression "wahrer Leib" in the Lutheran eucharistie formula. 
Smith and McClendon have announced a book on religious language using Austin and 
Searle's theory. Further, shorter sections of books and articles have been 
devoted to application of Austin's theory to religious language, though to date 
they have been few in number. 
2.2.7. Solving Problems. 
In the introduction to this section, we mentioned that it would also be 
intereetng to see hw the various individuals went about solving the problems 
in Austin's theory. In this final section, we would like to comment on this 
briefly. 
To a great extent, the various authors follow Austin's own method. This is 
especially the case with the use of the vanishing distinction and the use of 
examples. These two tools are almost always used in replies or challenges to 
other authors' contributions. The use of asymmetry occurs most often in 
arguments on entailment. And not infrequently lists of words occur in articles, 
showing that even Austin's dictionary research is still employed in some quarters. 
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Hovever, how many difficultiee in Austin's theory have indeed been solved 
to everyone'e satisfaction is an important question. Too much cannot be 
expected since most of the publications are in the form of articles and space 
is not allowed forthe extended discussions necessary to place attempted solu-
tions within the context of the entire theory. Certain difficulties have 
arisen in the research, however, that could have best been avoided. 
Among these problems is a wild proliferation of new terminology. It 
seems that everyone wishes to pin a name on every distinction he thinks he may 
have discovered. This has led to a good deal of confusion. It would be more 
profitable to wait and see if the distinction is an important one (many of them 
have not been) and as such constitutes an important contribution to the theory. 
The relation of the ordinary language of Austin's concerns with possible 
ideal languages has led some into the temptations of atomistic meaning and 
atomistic force searchings. These invariably neglect the context and content 
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entirely. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that the theory of speech 
acts received little serious reflection or devslopment after Austin until Searle. 
And it is at this point, the work of Searle, that we have now arrived. 
2.3' John Searle's Speech Acts. 
The publication in I969 of Searle's Speech Acts represented a significant 
step forward in the understanding of how language works. It is a tightly written, 
carefully argued book, based on the central ideas developed by Austin, but which 
carries them significantly further In both implementation, clarification, and 
elaboration. 
2.3.1. languages and Language. 
Searle begins with a discuesion of the central problem of defining just 
what philosophy of language is. He contrasts linguistic philosophy and philo-
sophy of language: 
Linguistic philosophy is the attempt to solve particular philosophical 
problems by attending to the ordinary use of particular words or other 
elements in a particular language. The philosophy of language is 
the attempt to give philosophically illuminating descriptions of certain 
general features of language, such as reference, truth, meaning, and 
necessity; and it is concerned only incidentally with particular elements 
in a particular language; though its method of investigation, where 
empirical and rational rather than ¿ priori and speculative will naturally 
force it to pay strict attention to the facts of actual natural language.H5 
Searle chooses for a philosophy of language in this book though one which 
nevertheless enploys linguistic philosophical methods. By doing so, he manages 
to keep faithful to the method of Austin while at the same time correcting the 
lack of a broader reflection on the rèlatinn of this method to its area of 
deployment. He clearly realizes that he is interested in the use of language 
not for its own sake, nor for solving problems by battering down delicately 
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built edifices of philosophical meaning with the brunt of ordinary usage. 
Bather, he directs his interest toward a broader investigation of how language 
functions when problems of reference, truth, etc., are being expressed. He is 
more ready to allow the philosophers their own meaning than Austin was. And 
while recognizing the distinction between languages and language (as Austin also 
did), he chooses in contrast to Austin to devote time to studying language as 
well, and does not сenfine himself to languages, as Austin did. He is aware 
that, even to be faithful to languages, one must take a position on language; 
however, this need not devolve into a neglect of the empirical aspects of 
languages. 
Searle continues his disuasion with reflections on language, focussing 
on what we can and cannot say about language and to iiat extent linguistic 
data determine our approach to language itself. In his study of speech acts 
or language acts, his description of these acts will fall into two categories: 
linguistic characterizations (i.e. calling this a description, that a reference, 
etc.) and linguistic explanations (i.e. the articulation of the rules that do or 
do not allow the use of certain expressions). The problem that dogs both 
linguistic characterizations and linguistic explanation and all the subclasses 
of both (like "analysis", "meaning", "verification", "description", etc.) is a 
lack of understanding both of the terms themselves and the criteria that obtain 
in their application. The presence of so many borderline cases cannot wholly 
be ascribed to the richness and subtlety of language; at least part of the 
problem is our failure to clarify our own concepts. A third part of the diffi­
culty is that we seem to have knowledge that stands beyond the manipulation of 
concepts. Although we have no operational criteria for synonymy, ambiguity, 
nounhood, and the like, we somehow know what these are and any concept we try to 
formulate that does not conform to this knowledge will have to give way for this 
knowledge. This third group is somehow tied up with those seemingly extralinguistic 
facts that in turn play a significant role in the formation of our criteria 
117 for linguistic characterizations and Unguis tic explanations. This is the 
problem of "correctly formulating knowledge that is prior to and independent of 
ll8 
any formulation; of converting knowing how into knowing that." The diffi­
culty of thinking about language becomes clearer; in characterizing and explaining 
it, one must be able to distinguish between talking, characterizing talk, and 
explaining talk. 
Having pointed out some of the considerations important for approaching 
language, Searle is now in a position to state the hypothesis he intende to 
investigate: 
The form that this hypothesis will take is that speaking a language is 
performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, 
asking questions, making promises, and so on; and more abstractly, acts 
such as referring and predicating; and, secondly, that these acts are 
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In general aade роавіЪІе by and are performed in accordance with certain 
rules for the uae of linguiatic elementa.120 
In thia hypotheaia, the firat part has to do with how language ehall be charac­
terised, and the aecond part with the articulation of rules. By characterising 
language aa speech acta, Searle doea not intend to say that all language can be 
thus characterised, but he does maintain that they are central to language« 
More interestingly in light of Austin, Searle maintains that (to use the terms 
of de Saussure), an adequate study of speech acts is a study of langue and not 
only (aa Austin once stated) a study of parole. Or, to put in in the terms 
we have been using here, speech acts is a study in languane and not only in 
l.nfpi.fres. How such a statement is possible ties in with the second part of the 
definition, namely, that language ia a rule-goremed form of behavior. The fact 
that language is not a fortuitous jumble of grunts and growls, but admita of a 
series of patterns which make communication possible, holds open the option that 
language has formal features that can be studied independently of particular 
instances of language use. Tet one cannot pretend to think he has studied 
language if he confines himself to these formal features. It would be like 
studying the rules of chesa without considering it as a form of game. And 
here the point of connection between characterizations and explanations, and 
the immanent circularity of the method reveals itself; namely, for the rule-
governed behavior to be about real (and not imagined) behavior a study of apeech 
acts must accompany the study of the rules; but the speech acts (as parole) can 
only be fully understood in light of the rules (langue). Within this circular 
interdependency, where the rules are prior but not primary and the speech acts 
are primary but not prior, the study of speech acta will take place. This 
circularity is reflected in Searle's expression of his modus operandi: 
The procedure which I shall follow is to state a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the performance of particular kinds 
of speech acta and then extract from these conditions sets of 
semantic rules for the use of the linguistic devices which mark the 
utterances as speech acts of those kinds.-"^3 
How Searle goes beyond Austin here, and how he solves Austin's dilemma 
of describing language and legislating at the same time what language should be, 
is now evident. Austin's distrust of concepts did not prevent his falling 
victim to them. His search for conditions to charadertize performatives, his 
attempts to distinguish locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts 
could not rest on pure description. There was a need to wander from the world 
of parole to the world of langue to get hold of this world of parole. 
2.3.2. Characterizing and Explaining Language. 
Having laid this groundwork and having stated his options, Searle can now 
get down to the work of characterizing and explaining language. In doing thia he 
tries to pull together various strands of discussion that have been going on 
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since Buaeell and Wittgenstein (especially in matters of referring, predicating, 
and describing), and also to remodel Austin's theory in light of those ideas 
Just stated. His discussion of reference and predication falls outside the 
scope of our presentation here; we will concentrate our efforts on his relation 
to Austin's theory. The remodelling does not occur independently of the 
intentionality of Austin's own theory; indeed, Searle's own work rests heavily 
upon it. Although Searle's theory can he presented as an independent contri­
bution to the philosophy of language, it can also be seen (and so we shall see 
it here) as directed at the weak points of Austin's own theory — at the weak 
points in the отег-all theorizing and at the weak points in detail. The 
weaknesses in the former we have just discussed to some extent; and we will returd 
to them inthe discussion of rules and conventions. But first a look at the 
latter weaknesses, the difficulty at distinctions within the three aspects 
of the speech act of loeutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. 
Searle distinguishes four kinds of acts involved in performing a speech 
act: (a) uttering words, (b) referring and predicating, (c) stating, questioning, 
commanding, etc., (d) consequences of (c) on the hearers. He calls (a) utter­
ance acts, (b) propositional acts, (c) illocutionary acts, (d) perlocutionary 
IS^ 
acts. The problem that plagued Austin (and much of the literature after 
Austin, as we saw in section 2.2.3.) was the distinction of (b) and (e). Searle 
maintains Austin's definition of (e), but offers a new one for (b), (b) being 
roughly equivalent either to Austin's loeutionary act as a whole, or to the 
rhetic act. A proposition, first of all, is what is asserted in the act of 
asserting. However, "the expression of a proposition is a propositional act," 
and "when a proposition is expressed, it is always expressed in the performance 
of an illocutionary act." Thus the distinction is made between the illocu­
tionary act and the proportional content of an illocutionary act. This was 
. already achieved by other authors, as we saw above in the discussions of loeu­
tionary meaning and illocutionary force and of the truth value of promising. 
This once again awakens the spectre of equating propositional content with 
meaning, but we will bypass that problem for the moment. Searle tries to find 
a criterion in syntactical structure by distinguishing an illocutionary force 
indicator and a propositional indicator. Illocutionary force indicators include 
at least "word order, stress, intonation, contour, punctuation, the tr.ood of the 
verb, and the so-called perforxative verbs." Location of the propositional 
indicator was less clear-cut. Sometimes (to use Chomsky's terms) it is to be 
found in the surface structure. For example, in the sentence "I promise that 
I will come", "that I will come" is the propositional indicator. But in the 
case of "I promise to come", the surface structure is not preaent and we have 
to go into the deep structure. Searle is more interested in locating illocutionary 
force indicators and thus he does not go further into the problem of prepositional 
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indicatora, a decision that is indeed regrettable. For it is important to 
be able to eatabliah a full series of syntactical indicators if it is indeed 
possible. The fact that they are not forthcoming casts a shadow on the effort. 
2.3-3· Bules and Conventions. 
In the discussion of rules and conxentione, Searle not only develops what 
he means by linguistic explanation, but also coaes to terns with the problem 
of "strict" and "extended" performatives, "strict" and "extended" conventions, 
and with the problem of meaning and convention to which, as we saw in sections 
2.2.2.-2.2.4., some attention had been devoted. He begins by distinguishing 
two kinds of rules: (1) regulative rules, which not only regulate but also 
create new forms of behavior, and (2) constitutive rules, which not only regulate 
128 
but also create new forme of behavior. Regulative rules usually take the 
form of imperatives, whereas coaatitutive rules usually take the form of "X 
counts as Τ in the context C". Regulative rules add nothing to a situation, but 
constitutive rules, by making new forms of behavior possible (X counts ав JÍ in 
the context C), describe or specify new possibilities which would not exist if 
there were no riles. An example of constitutive rules are those of a chess game: 
they specify what kinds of moves are valid and not valid, but the rules do not 
give all possible moves or combinations of moves. It should be noted that the 
individual rule cannot be constitutive, but only receives this character in 
connection with other like rules who then together can provide a context. If 
we recall Austin's discussion of performative and especially the discussion of 
infelicities, it becomes clear how important constitutive rules are for the 
success of illocutionary acts. Illocutionary acts are rule-governed and in the 
sense of constitutive rules. And these rules are what Austin called conventions. 
The problem of convention in illocutionary acts makes itself most acutely 
felt in the matter of meaning. This is particularly true of the situation of 
the "extended"eense of convention. Searle, like Strawson, uses a modified 
Qricean analysis of meaning but finds it wanting on several points: (1) while 
capturing the "intention" aspect of meaning, the Qricean model neglects the 
"convention" aspects of meaning; (2) it canfuses illocutionary and perlocutionary 
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acts; (3) it does not work at all for perlocutionary effects. Searle then goes 
on to develop his own notion of convention and how the comninication makes its 
way from the speaker S to the hearer H. The edire discussion of the Qricean 
analysis of meaning in the illocutionary situation, while interesting, is not 
i™ediately relevant to what is at hand here. Ve do, however, signal the presence 
of this discussion and will return to it when discussing the evocative sense of 
eschatological talk. There the problem of perlocutionary effect is of central 
Importance. 
A final point Searle takes up before putting his apparatus into motion is 
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the distinction between brute and inetitutional facts. The distinction is hard 
to articulate but easy to see. Brute facts can best be described as the results 
of a description of a situation in which one paradigm of knowledge is absolu­
tized as the only paradigm of knowledge. To draw onone such abeolufeed paradigm, 
brute facts can be the result of a system of knowledge that achieves its facts 
by empirical observation and the use of certain measuring systems. The facts 
of the natural sciences are the most likely candidates in this situation, mainly 
because their validity as giving an account of the state of affaire has most 
often been absolutized. But it is by the same token clear that there are other 
kinds of facts that, while equally accepted as valid and true by large segments 
of the population, cannot be arrived at nor can even fit in the empirical ob­
servation system of knowledge. Facts such as I am or am not married, this is a 
football game, you have Just been convicted of larceny, etc., do not fit into 
this pattern of knowledge. This group of facts Searle calls inetitutional facts, 
because their "facthood" depends upon an institutional framework. And insti­
tutions Searle defines as systems of constitutive rules. To show the difference, 
imagine a brute fact description of a football garnet The reason for the distinc­
tion is that the account of language and speech acts will be by and large an 
account of inetitutional facts, such as promises, beliefs, verdicts and the like. 
2.3.Ί'. The Structure of Illocutionary Acts. 
Searle then turns to an investigation of the structure of illocutionary acts. 
Our own investigation of certain illocutionary acts within eschatological talk, 
especially the analysis of promises, will be based on his analysis of their struc­
ture. To recall briefly his method here: one tries to set down the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the successful and nondefective performance of an 
illocutionary act. If this can be achieved, then one can extract the rules for 
how such a performance takes place. As we can see this is but a refinement upon 
the method Austin followed of investigating the conditi cue we called grammatical, 
"truth", and circumstantial and attemptiig to say something about what a per­
formative indeed was. The differoces between Austin and Searle lie inthe explicit 
reflection of Searle on some aspects of the conditions (languages and language, 
linguistic characterizations and explanations, regulative and constitutive rules, 
brute and institutional facts), a acre positive accent on a successful and non-
defective performance of the illocutionary act instead of the nonaaccessful and 
"unhappy" performance of the act, and Searle's ability to extract the rules 
that Austin himself was not able to achieve. 
132 Searle's presentation of conditions and rules is given in the Appendix. 
There is no need for particular comment upon them inthis section. They will 
play an important part in the next chapter, where we will modify his system some­
what to deal with the lees explicit and future-oriented statements of eschatological 
talk that interest us here. 
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Chapter 3: CHARACTERIZATIONS OF SPEECH ACT SITUATIONS. 
3·!· Introduction. 
The previous chapter introduced speech act theory as it had been developed 
from Austin to Searle. The emphasis there was upon an introduction to the 
terminology ала some of the basic concepts employed, and upon the basic inten-
tionality that has been responsible for the development of speech act theory 
in the directions it has taken. 
This chapter builds upon the work described in the previous chapter. Two 
interests guide what will be discussed here. In the first place, there is an 
interest in working out some of the further implications of speech act theory 
that hitherto have received little or no attention. This includes some unanswered 
questions left over from the previous chapter, and also other questions not 
discussed there which are oriented toward broadening the base of speech act 
theory in order to better achieve its task of describing the "total speech act 
in the total speech situation". Secondly, there is the task of applying the 
analysis derived from speech act theory to instances of ordinary language which 
will undergird eschatological talk. With an eye toward that development, choices 
have been made as to which of the many possibilities of speech act theory yet to 
be explored are to be considered here. 
Remarkably, these two interests meet in many places along the way. The 
first section is an exhaustive study of the speech act situation of promising 
and what constitutive rules obtain in the act of nondefective promising. Little 
by little, it becomes clear that, while the typical parameters of speech act 
analysis as developed by Austin do much to enlighten the situation, a host of 
other problems also arise that are not so easily elucidated by use of the 
Austinian parameters of exhaustive lists of usages, of grammatical, "truth", and 
circumstantial conditions, the search for the vanishing distinction, and the 
tests of asyeetry and negation. These other problems can indeed be discussed 
within the range of the fundamental intentionality of Austin's method, but 
different methods as such need to be employed. Only then can the total speech 
situation be euccessfully analyzed. 
Thus, a constant interweaving of concern for the speech act theory in itself 
and a concern for the analysis preparatory to unpacking eschatological talk 
takes place. The latter serves as a monitor on the theoretical development and 
helps maintain contact with the empirical situations with wKch speech act theory 
is to deal. And the theory itself will open up new ways of approaching escha­
tological talk not so readily evident from the phenomenal logic of eschatological 
talk itself. 
Some of the discussion that follows will seem schematic instead of completely 
fleshed out. This arises from two considerations: in the first place, an 
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exhaustive account of all the aspects touched upon here would require a book 
in itself — an option that falls outside the task of this study. And secondly, 
much of this fleshing out will indeed occur in Chapter Six with the direct 
application of the theory to eschatological problems. 
The first section will deal with promising in the total speech eikiation. 
It deals not only with the roles of the promiser, the promisee, and what is 
promised, but also with the borderline kinds of promising where either promises 
occur under other names or other acts occur under the name of promising. The 
relatione between promising and similar illocutionary acts is also discueeed. 
Then comes a section on time usages which will try to map the various kinds of 
time-awareness that together make up the time elements of our speech. This is 
followed by a brief section on negation, which will be of interest not only for 
eschatology, but the use of negation within other illocutionary acts as well. 
Then cones a final section that treats a much-neglected aspect of speech act 
theory, perlocutionary acts. Perlocutionary acts will aleo play a significant 
role in the discussion of eschatology. 
3.2. Promising. 
As we saw back in Chapter One, one of the central ideas in the current 
study of eschatology was the phenomenon of promise. And any attempt to investigate 
eschatology, either as one topic within Christian doctrine or as a horizon in 
its own right, will have to study the dimensions and topography of promise. In 
this section this study of promises and promising begins, concentrating here on 
the ordinary language use of promising without any immediate reference to the 
use of promising in eschatology. The latter will be presented in Chapter Six. 
The point of departure for an ordinary language analysis of promising will 
be the conditions and rules for successful and nondefective promising as 
developed by Searle and given in the Appendix. Beginning with these, we will 
see if they indeed provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for success­
fully performing the illocutionary act of promising. Such a description of the 
conditions involves a certain phenomenology of the promising ^nation as well — 
or to put it in Searle'β terms: a characterization of the promising situation. 
It is with such a linguistic characterization that we begin. Then follows a 
further delineation of promising by comparing and distinguishing it f re« other 
eoomissives. Especially by contrasting promising with these other illocutionary 
acts (one will recognize Austin's pursuit of the vanishing distinction and the 
search for asymmetry and the negative here) will the frontiers become as fin as 
can be hoped for in dealing with natural languages. Then a re-evaluation vili 
follow of the cenditions and rules Searle proposed with any necessary emendations. 
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3.2.1. Characterizing the Promieing Situation. 
Ae was noted in eection 2.2.5·> promising and how it is done has been a fa-
vorite topic among ordinary language philosophera. Surprisingly, though, little 
literature has been devoted to characterizing the promising situation in all 
its facets and accounting for the various ways of committing oneself to future 
action or states of affairs. Searle was the first to attend to the situation 
as such and formulated his findings in a series of conditions for the successful 
and nondefective performance of the iHocutionary act of promising from which 
he then extracted rules for that performance. His important contribution to 
characterizing the promising situation will serve as the point of departure here. 
However, we shall see that Searle underestimated and sometimes overlooked 
important variables in the promising situation. Without consideration of these 
variables certain kinds of promising and uses of the word "promise" cannot be 
accounted for. While his account treats mainstream promising rather well, 
idiosyncratic usages like promising oneself, vague and empty promises, deathbed 
promisee and so on are not adequately considered. And since critiques of 
Holtmann's use of promise hint that his use of the idea of promising may also 
be idiosyncratic, it behooves us to have as complete an account as possible of 
the use of promise in ordinary language. Then, having napped the terrain of 
promising within ordinary language, we can go about situating what promising 
means m eschatological usage. 
The inadequacy of Searle's list of conditions derives fron his concentration 
wholly on S_, the speaker in the promising situaton. He largely neglects both 
H, thehearer, and to a lesser extent, ¿>, the prepositional content of the 
promise. Without Η and £, the entire context is not present and without them 
the elaborate conventions surrounding promising cannot be characterized. Our 
presentation of the total promising situation will be given in a commentary on the 
weak points in Searle's list of conditions. 
3.2.1.1. The Promisee. 
Von Wright was the first to realize the importance of the promisee Η (for 
hearer; Searle's abbreviations will be used throughout here) in the promising 
situation. Previous to him, analyses of the promising situation directed 
their attention almost entirely to £ and to what was promised, £. Von Wright 
saw that Я plays a much larger role in the promising situation than merely 
someone to whom S can convey his promise. He discovered that H is not simply a 
third variable in the promising situation, but rather the most important con­
stituting element in the creation of the conditions for promising. 
Searle confines R's role to <mditions U and 8 as far ae II1 s active role 
is concerned. The leading role, the leveroge for acneving the effective 
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illocutionary act of promising, and the responsibility for doing k, remain 
with S. While, as Searle notes, the situation for promising must present 
itself, what he does not seen to be aware of is that it is primarily H who 
makes the promising situation possible. Three considerations will illustrate 
H's central role in promising: 
(1) The institution of promising exists for H's benefit. Я prompts £ to 
promise to do A. By considering this fact a bit more closely, certain features 
of the institution of promising become evident. The convention underlying 
proaising (beyond the one expressed in Searle'β condition 1 about understanding 
the language) is that Η can rely on ¿'s words. Without the existence of this 
convention there could be little communication. H has to be able to bank on 
S's meaning what he says. When £ is an utterance about a future act or state of 
affairs that Í3 proposes to undertake, II needs to be able to rely on ¿'s intention 
to do A in order to arrange his own plans accordingly. Depending upon how 
important A is to Η will determine what amount of assurance Η will need. To 
exact a promise of £, either directly by asking £, or indirectly by creating 
the conditions that make £ feel he needs to promise to make the seriousness of 
his intention clear, Η receives the highest possible assurance that ¿ will indeed 
do A. 
(2) If Я does not accept S's promise, the illocutionary effect of promising is 
not reached. Schneewind pointed out just how important it is that Η want the 
promise and accept it once it is made. (Searle has included this in his con­
dition k). As Schneewind puts it: 
The promisor must have good reason to believe that the promisee wants 
the promised act to be done, if the words spoken by the promisor are 
to serve to put hio under an obligation....One must have, and realise 
that one has, good reason for believing that the promisee wants the 
act done, and in case the good reason is not an explicit request one's , 
offer to do the act must be accepted or at least not explicitly rejected. 
Schneewind thus highlights how important Η is to successful promising; if Η 
does not want the promise, we cannot really speak of a promise having been made. 
At least, if II does not accept the promise of £ we ordinarily feel then that 
£ is no longer under the obligation of a promise to do K. But when S's premise 
is not accepted by H, what happens to the utterance? 
If Η does not accept S's promise, the illocutionary act becomes either an 
intention or a threat. Though the illocutionary force indicating device "I 
premise" nay remain, it will have lost its binding force as promise. As an 
example of an unaccepted promise becoming an intention, suppose a suitor 
prooiees a girl that he will come to see her tomorrow. But the girl has no 
interest in the suitor and could not care less whether he comes tomorrow or not. 
Although the suitor in his passion may consider himself bound by solemn promise 
to appear at the door tomorrow, neither the girl nor a third party would consider 
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the suitor bound by his promise. If the suitor becomes aware that the girl 
has no interest in him and because of this does not show up the following day, 
no one would eaj that he has broken a promise. And he himself may realize that 
nothing then demands that he be present — he will realize that the girl did 
not accept his promise and thus put him under no obligation. In terms of 
conTentione, the weight of his would-be promise becomes that of an intention. 
λ threat is an example of an utterance that can be couched in the terms of 
a promise though would not be taken as one. Supoose a man catches a boy picking 
apples in his orchard and Bays: "If I catch you picking my apples again, I 
promise you the spanking of your life!" The following day the boy is in the 
orchard again and the man catches him there. But in the meantime he has thought 
about how he, too, used to steal apples and comes to the conclusion that boys 
will be boys. So when he sees the boy there he doesn't give him the promised 
spanking. And no one (certainly not the boy!) will say he welshed on his 
It 
promise. Threat· are not promises, though they look тегу much like them. 
There is a difference between threats by £ and the acceptance of sanctions for not 
having fulfilled a promise. Threats are not ordinarily accepted as promises by 
H. He may accept the fact that ¿ is threatening him, and believe that £3 will 
very well carry out the threat if need be, and even expect it to be carried 
out if need be, but the expectations are different from the expectation Η 
harbors because of a promise made. 
What is it that makes Я such a powerful factor in this determining whether 
£ will become an intention or threat (or neither, it might be added ) rather 
than a promise? What makes a promise is that when Η accepts a promise from 
Í5, he becomes entitled to the fulfillment of that promise according to the 
conventions of promising. If Л does not accept ¿'s promise, he is not entitled 
per se to the fulfillment of the promise. This leads us to the third consideration, 
which reveals the heart of the promising situation and its conventions. 
(3)It is H who employs the sanctions against breaking promises if ¿ does not 
carry out his promise. The convention of promising is backed up by very 
strong sanctions against £ if he fails to fulfill his promise. Furberg 
explains the gravity of these sanctions: 
If you let me down,it may have serious consequences for me — but 
also for you. Hot only can I revenge myself, sometimes even by 
the aid of the law; but you may, by breaking your word, risk the 
penalty of never being trusted again. The excommunication frem 
participation in the institution of promising deprives you of the 
possibility of being trusted; and to nost individuals it is a 
severe punishment. It nay be made stil1 more severe by depriving 
you of the opportunity of receiving promisee; and for man, depen-
ding on his fellow-creatures, that would be unbearable. The 
promisee has therefore powerful weapons to force the promisor to 
keep his word.' 
With such sanctions looming — being cut off from a vital form of communication 
in society — it becomes easier to understand why promises have the high status 
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they enjoy. H wields these sanctions of cutting ¿ out of the use of the con-
vention, or "excoonmnication from participation in the institution of promising," 
as Furberg called it. And it is only H who wields them; В does not. This explains 
why H is crucial to, even constitutive of, the promising situation. For he 
must accept S's pronise, and he can apply the sanctions against welshing on 
prcnising if S does not live up to his premise. In fact, we can define 
promising as those situations where the applicability of these sanctions obtain. 
The definition is not as circular as it may seem, for there are many other 
speech acts that disguise themselves as promises. We just mentioned above 
intentions and threats. They are speech acts and illocutionary acts in their 
own right with their own particular conditions and sanctions obtaining. But if 
¿ failed to carry out an intention or to realize the threat, different sanctions 
would be in order. Perhaps H would consider him weak-willed (in the case of 
intentions), but H would not be warranted in excommunicating him from the use 
of the promising convention. And if the threat were not carried out, one may 
feel justified in excoomunicating him from the use of threats but not necessarily 
from mnHng promises. At this point, of whether those sanctions surrounding the 
promising convention apply, we have the clearest-cut single test for whether 
or not an utterance can be a promise. And we will use this later on in sorting 
out the variety of utterances that claim to be promises. 
Besides clarifying the role of В in the promising situation and giving us 
a simple definition of promising, the sanctions surrounding the promising 
situation also highlight how deeply imbedded prcnising is inthe social structure 
of communication and how much it is based on convention. For seen as a "brute 
fact", the sanction merely amounts to being shut out from using a certain 
form of social agreement. But Furberg points out how seriously this social 
agreement must be taken: 
If the philosopher still insists, 'Why do we have promises?', what 
are we to do? Let him imagine that we, weak human beings, relying 
for our very existence on cooperation with our fellows, could not 
give or receive promises, could not trust others to do what they said 
they would do, etc. Let him spell out the details of that life — 
uBly· brutish, and short; and he vould have the answer.8 
Realizing how much promising is a matter of social convention brings up a 
fourth point — how important it is to analyze the total speech situation 
when investigating an utterance. Restricting the study of £ and ¿ will not 
reveal this aspect of promising. And it turns out that this aspect is the 
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most important constituting factor in making promises what they are. 
3.2.1.2. The Promiser. 
Searle'β delineation of the role of ¿ in the promising situation, especially 
in his conditions 3, 5< 6, 7, and 8, is much more adequate than his discussion 
of H. We need here only to make a few comments to highlight certain important 
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points which might otherwise not be so readily seen. 
As to condition 3: two important aspects of the future act A_ which ÍS 
predicates of himself are not so clearly given here and need further elaboration. 
The future act Д which ¿ promises must be in his power to bring about. j3 
cannot promise any A at will. There must be reason to believe he can do A. 
Secondly, A must be such that ¿ could be held accountable for it. An example 
of the first qualification would be if £ were to say: "I promise you it will 
snow tomorrow." 5 simply cannot deliver on such a promise. An example of the 
second kind of qualification is what Ardal calls a salesman's promise. 
Suppose I buy a new washing machine and the dealer says: "I promise you will 
get ten years of good service out of this model." As a man who knows his 
washing machines, I know that the dealer is justified in making such a claim. 
But if my machine breaXs down seven years from now, I will not feel the dealer 
baa broken his promise. In fact I will probably realize that what the dealer 
said was not a premise at all, even though his use of the words "I promise" 
would seem to be the illocutionary force indiciating device for promising. 
Both of these qualifications point out how a different illocutionary act 
can disguise itself as a promise. The illocutionary act here is predicting. 
Since predictions, like promises, are statements about the future, H may 
feel Justified in lumping them together. But there are important differences, 
namely that ¿ may not be in ¿'s power or ¿ may not be able to be held respon-
sible for A^  even though he may be able to bring A about. 
As to condition 5' that £ cannot promise what will happen anyway is related 
to his not being able to promise what he cannot bring about. £ must be able 
to be held accountable. Our use of "I promise" for something that is going to 
happen anyway is more curious in its effects. It can often undermine the 
trust provided by the promising convention instead of building it up. As 
Searle notes: "A happily married man who promises his wife he will not desert 
her in the next week is likely to provide more anxiety than comfort." 
As to conditions б-θ: these deal with S's intention to do A. A couple of 
remarks can be made here. In S's intention to make clear to H that he will do 
k^, he must not only intend to produce К of his intention in H, he must have 
reasonable asssurance that H has understood him. Searle neglected emphasizing 
this last point, perhaps because he was more interested in clarifying S's 
intention than H's acceptance of ¿'s intention. And too, his desire to use 
a modified Grioean analysis of meaning prevented him from emphasizing this aspect. 
But if ñ is to be able to be justified in applying the sanctions surrounding 
the premising c'œvention ifJSdoes not do A, he must clearly understand what £ 
is; otherwise he has no way of knowing whether ¿ has lived up to his promise. If 
I promise to treat you to a tube steak tomorrow and then give you a hot dog, 
you may wonder whether I have carried out my promise. You knew I was promising, 
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you accepted шу promise, but you do not know whether a tube steak and a hot dog 
are the same thing and are thus left in a quandary as to whether I ao welshing 
or not. (In fact, I an not: the two are the sane.) Bad I been welshing, you 
could not invoke the sanctions against me. Thus, more than S's intention is 
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needed. H must understand what £ promises. 
The line between intentions and promises, however, remains a very fine one 
which is not always clear. Austin, for example, maintained that there is a 
difference between intending and promising, but no difference between fully 
intending and promising because "there is nothing' in that scale superior to 
fully intending." I would add to Austin's observation: if £ fully intends, 
and if H is present and nondefectively understands, then there is no difference, 
but ¿ must fully intend. 
An interesting point about £'s intention to produce К is whether we are 
dealing with an illocutionary or a perlocutionary effect. This will not be 
that easy to sort out, mainly because Austin himself was never clear as to the 
difference between the two and almost nothing has been written on the subject 
since then. I would explain it so: if the intention to produce knowledge is 
successful, the intention to produce knowledge is a peflocutionary effect, and 
the intention to produce knowledne is an illocutionary effect. I say this 
mainly because the desire to create a certain effect in H, i.e., to get a 
certain reaction froa him, is primarily a perlocutionary activity, where succeeding 
in doing something in saying something (K in E) would be primarily an illocutionary 
activity. But the distinction is not well made, primarily because the perlocu­
tionary act has remained an unexplored territory. 
One question that does arise and can be considered, however, is promdaing 
to achieve a perlocutionary effect. Can one promise to achieve an effect? Two 
particular kinds of promisee come to mind here: electoral promises and deathbed 
promisee. Electoral promises are those kinds of promises a politidan would 
make in an election campaign. They are meant to sway the voters in his direction. 
Such use of promises occur in other areas too (to comfort a distressed person, 
to quell a riot, etc.). On the whole we do not set much stock by such promises. 
We feel that promisee made solely to achieve a certain effect are not "real" 
promisee. Why is that? Perhaps because expediency will allow, and may even 
demand, that ¿ break his promise. To use our sanctions test: do the sanctions 
surrounding the promising convention apply? In the case of the elected repre-
sentative, if he fails to live up to his promises, we may sanction him by not 
voting for him at the next election. But interestingly enough, he cannot be 
removed fron office whan it is clear he has welshed on his promise. And in 
other cases of promising to achieve an effect, it might be argued from legal 
tradition that such promises are made under duress and as such need not be 
carried out. Nevertheless, electoral promises remain a borderline case and 
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whether or not they are considered full promisee subject to the full range of 
sanctions depends more on precedents and new conventions that have grown up 
around them than on anything else. 
Deathbed promises are a special case of promising to achieve a perlocutionary 
effect. In this case, someone praaises a dying person to do something. Quite 
often this is done to set the dying person's mind at ease. But is it a promise 
in the full sense of the word? Is ¿ required to keep it? In terms of our 
analysis of the promising situation, I think not. First of all, can Í3 promise 
something to H even though H will not be there to impose sanctions if £ does 
not live up to the promise? What sanctions obtain in this situation? There 
are sanctions for failing to keep deathbed promises but I think that they are 
camonly not those surrounding the convention of promising. If one fails to 
keep such a promise, it may be a sign of lack of respect for the deceased 
person and as such come under a different set of sanctions imposed by familial 
ties or membership of social group. The drift of these sanctions is: if £ 
does not respect the dead Я, does he respect us living U'BI While these 
sanctions of trust border on those surrounding the promising convention, they 
are different, mainly because respect and trust are not always the same thing. 
A second, perhaps more common, set of sanctions usually invoked is that the 
dead H will return from the grave and impose a set of sanctions more terrible 
than those at the disposal of the living Я iî S decides to welsh on his promise. 
Thus fear of the dead, not fear of "excommunication from the participation in 
the institution of promising'', plays a role here. All in all, deathbed promises 
17 do not seem to be promises in the strict sense of the word. The situation 
will determine whether they have the force of promises. 
Thus, promising is not always that clear. One problem for S Searle does 
not include in his conditions is related to that of S's intention. We saw 
that one of the differences between intending and promising is that H must be 
present for promising though for intending he need not be. What happens 
when £ and H are the same person? Or to put it another way: can I promise 
myself something? An example like telling someone I cannot come to his 
party because I promised myself I'd go to bed early tonight does not come into 
consideration here. These are seldom taken seriously as promises either by £ 
or the person to whom he reports it. It is simply a way of saying I won't come 
or that I'm too tired to come or that hie parties don't interest me or that they are 
maybe a danger to my health. Such promises are really excuses, not promisee. 
The promisee meant here are close to the regular form. Say I promise to quit 
smoking, or never to go to Greece so long as the colonels remain in power. These 
are serious intentions to commit oneself to do A. But H is myself. And they 
fall short of oaths (which would need a witness, thus supplying an H). Are 
they real promises? Again, to look at the sanctions involved: if I do take 
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up emokiiig again or do ahow up in Athena this sumner, I clearly hare gone back 
on ay stated intention. But the aanctiona inrolved for doing this are not 
thoee for breaking prooieee. Society may lose faith In my will power and I may 
loa« faith in ayaelf but this in itaelf will not ordinary exclude me from the 
use of the praiiaing convention. Thus moet prooieee to oneself are really 
тегу eeiioue atatementa of intention, and carry the aanctiome aurrounding 
intentiona in a given aoeiety rather than the sanctiona surround the proniaing 
18 
convention. One cannot apeak of a real promise here. An important insight 
into the promising convention arising from ccnaidering promises to oneself is the 
eminently social structure of promising — promising cannot be a private 
""""~" 19 
act. The conventions constituting promising require its public character. 
3.2.I.3. The Promise. 
Searle hardly goes into the problem of £ and A as such beyond their mention 
in conditions 2 and 3· If we recall S and II's contributions to the promising 
situations we can impose three conditions on JD: it oust be future, it must be 
realizable (S has to be able to bring it about), and it must be clear (both £ 
in uttering £, and S in accepting it). 
But beyond these largely formel conditions, can anything be said about 
what can, and what cannot, be promised? Can any boundaries be set as to what 
may or may not be subsumed under j} beyond the three conditions just mentioned? 
Three possibilities present themselves. 
The first one might be called the "Scandinavian Solution" because it is 
primarily represented in the literature by Scandinavians. They consider j> 
a "statement" or sometimes a description of a state of affaire and that every­
thing that applies to statements or states of affaire obtains in this situation 
as well. The principal problem with such an approach is that it runs fairly 
roughshod over the delicate institutional character of promising. It is 
reminiscent of the use of statement found in early analytic philosophy. W 
may have found shortcomings in Searle'β neglecting to take Η fully into account, 
but this solution neglects almost everything and hardly can be called Auetinian 
at all. It can only tell us what can be said about sentences that are state­
ments in general, without any regard for the total speech situation. 
A second solution would follow Searle'e refashioning of Austin's doctrine 
and would call fjr an analysis of propositional content. But this is easier 
said than done. Part of the problem is the general difficulty of language 
analysis of dealing with content rather than form, though in speech act theory 
this is less of a problem than elsewhere. If we follow Searle out, we would 
begin by asking how shall ¿ be characterized andhow shall it be then explained. 
And here we are already mired down in all sorts of difficulties. Searle has 
not given any further explanation of whathe understands under the propositional 
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content. Αβ we noticed in the previous chapter, it was possible to characterize 
the illocutionary force indicating device, but Searle restricted himself to 
rather vague comments on surface and deep structure grammar as far as 
propositional content was concerned. 
Moreover the simple confusion of terms presents a problem. Garner points 
out that Searle is at pains to distinguish assertions and propositions, whereas 
Austin will use assertion, propositions and statements rather interchangeably. 
This confusion would have to be cleared up before the problem could be handled 
along this route. Other, particularly Peetz and Harrison, have tried to work 
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with the cmcept of propositional content and have run into difficulties. 
Peetz, for instance, tries to distinguish two forms of д. When R is the illo­
cutionary force indicating device, one can distinguish "I It to ¿' and "I 11 
that ¿'. They are not always convertible from one to the other. And some 
illocutionary force indicating devices will work with only one or the other. 
However, promising works with both and translation from one to the other seems 
to create little difficulty. One gets the feeling here once again that the 
source of the difficulty does not necessarily lie in the subtlety of the 
distinction needed to characterize ¿, but rather in Searle's original idea 
of propositional content. 
A third approach I would like to tentatively put forward runs like this. 
If we grant that £ (where £ is that upon which the illocutionary force indi-
cating device deploys itself) has something to do with the world and as such 
can scoehow be recognized either as an action or a state of affairs, we could 
put one question about the status of j>: does it represent brute or institutional 
facts? Both can be promised. An example of brute £: "I promise to lose five 
pounds." Of institutional ¿: (at the beginning of a boxing match) "I promise 
to fight according to the WBA rules." Two things can be gained by distinguishing 
brute and institutional £: (1) the ambience of the content of promise can be 
described, at least in relation to other illocutionary acts. Promised brute ¿ 
will on its boundaries tend to become prediction. Promised institutional £ 
will on its boundaries tend to become more and more a ceremonial act of swearing. 
Those boundaries are not determined by promising so much as the nature of brute 
facts and Institutional facts. (2) The second thing to be gained is a 
realization that the verification of £ as "statement" will need to vary to the 
degree that £ is institutional or brute in character. This will add another 
variable in the equation determining what kind of "etatement" д is. 
Finally, something needs to be said about vague and empty promisee. These 
are proaises made solely to achieve a perlocutionary effect. There is no 
illocutionary effect involved. As such, they seem to be very idiosyncratic 
usages of the illocutionary force indicating device "I promise"; but they are 
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comrnonly used and therefore some account has to be given of then and some way 
of relating them to other usee of pronising must be found. 
There are two kinds of empty premises. In the first kind, I promise 
something I know I cannot deliver. For example, I love someone very much 
and I eay: "I promise you the moon and the stars". This sort of use of "I 
promise" is different from a similar sort of promise mentioned under prediction. 
There I promise £ will occur, though I have no power over the series of events 
that will make £ possible. Here I also promise something I cannot bring about, 
but it is perfrectly clear that no one expects me'to try. The promise is meant 
to achieve a particular perlocutionary effect — it is a way of expressing how 
much I love you. The second kind of empty promise involves no £ at all. Suppose 
a large piece is missing out of a cake I just baked. I ask you if you were 
responsible and you say: "I didn't take it, I promise!" Here "I prooise" is 
used like "I swear it", and really has nothing to do with premising £. As Searle 
points out, such idiosyncratic usages of "I promise" occur because they "are 
the strongest illocutionary force indicating devices for commitment provided 
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by the English language." 
Vague promises were already discussed above under 'deathbed and electoral 
promises. The only thing that need be added here is that especially in electoral 
promises ¿> is often very vague and as such usually is neither clear nor 
realizable. Both electoral and deathbed promises are examples of promising 
to achieve perlocutionary effect. Again, however, we bump against the problem 
of perlocutionaries. Until this aspect of speech acts is clarified little more 
can be said about them. 
3.2.2. Promising and Similar Illocutionary Acts. 
Austin called promising a type of commissive in How to Do Things with Words. 
As we noticed in the course of attempting to characterize promising situations 
in all their diversity, there were other illocutionary acts that were quite 
similar to promising and sometimes even used the same illocutionary force 
indicating device. These other acte were predicting, intending, threatening, 
and swearing. It would be good here to see how far we can go in defining the 
boundaries between promising and each of these other activities. By doing so, 
we can come still closer to discovering what promising is by seeing what it 
is not. This is true to Austin's searching out distinctions to see if they hold up 
when set upon seriously. Our procedure here calls for two steps: first, an 
actual comparing and contrasting of promising with predicting, intending, 
threatening and swearing; and second, group bases for identity and difference 
to see whay they add to the picture. 
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3.2.2.1. Promising, Predicting, Intending, Threatening, and Swearing. 
Promising and predicting share a common feature: both are predications of 
future acts or states of affaire by S. Two things distinguish predictions 
from promises: (1) ¿ is ordim rily not held responsible by Я 'for his prediction, 
since S cannot really bring it about. £'& prediction is more reportive than 
caaniesive in nature. One is reminded of the salesman's promise, which is 
similar to predictions. (2) Promises about a future state of affairs where £ = 
brute facts tend in the direction of prediction, especially where £ reaches the 
border of social structures, i.e., beeernes clear in a way institutional facts 
often are not. The criterion of difference here can be formulated thus: what 
makes promising different from predicting is that in the latter £> cannot be 
held responsible for the future state of affairs by Я because S^s utterance 
about a future state of affaire is more reportive or descriptive than commissive. 
And where there is no commitment, the sanctions surrounding the promising 
convention most surely do not obtain. 
For promising and intending, the common feature is that ¿ commits himself 
to ju The distinguishing feature is the absence of H. In intending, ¿ 
commits himself to do JD to or for ¿; he "promisee himself", as it were. (Cf. 
the discussion of self-promising above.) As Austin pointed out, there is an 
equivalence in strength of commitment between fully intending and promising, 
but, as we saw, for the sanctions of promising to apply, there must be an H 
other than ¿. The criterion of difference can be formulated simply: the differ-
ence between promising and intending is that іл the latter there is no E other 
than ¿ to whom ¿ commits himself to do £. And intending has various degrees of 
coBBitment whereas premising has but one. 
For promising and threatening, the common feature is that all three elements 
of the situation are present: £ commits himself to do ¿ to Я. Searle points out 
the basic distinction between promising and threatening: "One crucial distinction 
between promises on the one hand and threats on the other is that a promise is 
г'+а 
a pledge to do something for you, not to you." Thus while in threatening 
there is an E present, he does not accept S,'s д and consequently is not entitled 
to impose the sanctions surrounding the promising convention if ¿ does not do ¿. 
' The criterion of difference is: in threatening, К does not accept £ and thus 
cannot impose sanctions upon £ for not doing ¿. 
For promising and swearing, the common feature is that ¿ comnits himself to 
Я to do £ (note the subtle difference between this and the common features of 
promising and threatening). Distinguishing the two is very difficult. Two dis-
tinguishing features are present: (1) Swearing has a more ceremonial, ritual 
character than promising has, especially where £ = those institutional facts 
most unlike brute facts. Swearing can be a particular kind of promising, but 
it can also be a particular kind of threatening (as in the case of a vendetta). 
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(2) In swearing, Я need not be an individual or a circuraecribed audience. In 
r.iany acts of swearing, society at large or an institution representing society at 
large is H and imposes sanctions. (In fact, in most cases, the imposition of 
sanctions cannot be done by an individual H; one thinks of a breach of contract 
or divorce suits.) The criterion of difference is that swearing has a much 
more heavily institutional character than promising need have. Moreover, Я 
is less defined and often cannot be an individual as is seen by who is allowed 
to impose sanctions. And £ in swearing is almost always ал institutional fact. 
3.2.2.2. The Boundary Between Fromising and Similar Illocutionary Acts. 
After having delineated the similarities and the differences between 
promising on the one hand and predicting, intending, threatening and swearing 
on the other, we are in a position to ask: do the criteria that mark off 
promising from other illocutionary acts exhibit any pattern among themselves? 
Do they indicate where the centers of attraction lay in promising's magnetic 
field? 2 5 
If we examine the criteria for difference, we can come to the following 
conclusions about promising: 
(1) H is very important. His absence in intending and threatening and his 
vague role in swearing are importent differences. H seems indeed to be tie key 
to the promising situation. And E's presence and his ability to impose 
sanctions tell us we are dealing with a genuine promising situation (as opposed 
to the variety of idiosyncratic usages: electoral, empty, deathbed, and self-
promising). 
(2) In predicting £ had to be able to be held responsible for £ if it was 
a promise. But again: one of the surest ways for determining how responsible 
S can be is what sanctions are deemed appropriate and can be applied by H. 
(3) The criteria say veiy little about the content of the promise beyond 
that it must be beneficial to H and he must accept it. 
If we examine promising and the other acts as to their similarities, a 
little more can be said about the content of promises. All five of the illocu-
tionary acts in the forms presented here figure into subclasses of what Austin 
called commissives. All involve commitment, to a greater or lesser degree, to 
a future action or state of affaire. Promising is the most binding, complete, 
and wide-ranging sort of personal conmitment. Swearing may be considered more 
binding, but it is less personal and is only applicable in certain kinds of 
situations. One of the interesting discoveries is how predictions relate to 
promises and to other commissives. They have a low commitment level and the 
sanctions against them are different. For example, if the weatherman 
predicts sunshine for tomorrow and it rains, we doubt his capacity to predict; 
but if he promises to come tomorrow (rain or shinei) to see me, my expectations 
in terms of this commitment are not affected by his ineptitude as a meteoxlogist. 
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3.2.3· Searle'β Conditions and Rules — A Re-Examination. 
We can beet aum up our findings after this study of promising by seeing 
what additions need be made to Searle's list of conditions and rules. 
Four additions have to be made to the conditions; they will be fitted into 
his scheffle of nine conditions. 
3a. S is capable of doing A. (This is necessary to distinguish promising 
from predicting on the one hand and promising from empty promises on the other.) 
'fa. Ζ knows what ¿ is and is capable of employing sanctions against ¿ if ¿ 
proves to be insincere in promising A. (The first part of this condition 
refers to the problem of clarity in £, thus preventing vague promises; in the 
second part the very important notion of sanctions Я can impose is introduced. 
As we saw, this is the single most important test for determining whether or not 
£ is premising.) 
8a. U recogniees that ¿ intends (i,) to produce by T^  the К that ¿ is under the 
obligation to do A and accepts the obligation to employ sanctions if they 
become necessary. (This is directed against the tube steak example — Η must 
know what is promised if he is to be able to impose sanctions. The acceptance 
of the obligation to employ sanctions is necessary to distinguish promising 
from threatening and intending.) 
8b. S cannot at the same time be H. (Directed against self-promising which is 
really intending.) 
Changes in the conditions will entail changing the rules« too. The addi­
tions to rules 1, 2, k, and 5 will be emphasized to indicate what has been added: 
1. Pr is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of 
discourse) T, the utterance of which predicates some future act A^  of the 
speaker S of which S is capable of doing and being held responsible for. 
2. Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer К would prefer ¿'s doing Д to his 
not doing A, and ¿ believes II would prefer ¿'s doing A^  to his not doing Д and H 
knows what A is and is capable of івгровідк sanctions against S if S fails to do A. 
k. Pr is to be uttered only if £ intends to do A and H accepts the obligation to 
employ sanctions against S if necessary. 
5. The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A and 
Pr cannot be uttered if S and H are one and the same persons. 
3.3· Time Future and Time Past. 
3.3·1· Comprehending Time-Qestalten. 
There is no precedent within speech act theory for studying time and its 
various relations. This is probably due to the fact that time itself is not an 
illocutionary act and thus it is impossible to approach time in this fashion. 
Nevertheless our talk is riddled with temporal exprespions. For example, we 
saw that promises and other commissives are future-oriented. And so it should 
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be possible to say something about their uses. 
However innocently philosophical reflection on time might begin, it 
inevitably seems to attract a series of other issues such as causality, free 
will, truth, slides into an episteraology and finally demands a full-blown meta-
physics. And to engage in the latter certainly lies outside the range of this 
study. We wish to ccnfine ourselves here to approaching time within the limits 
of speech act intentionality, and then to concentrate on time past and especially 
time future. 
To achieve this, trie groundwork must be carefully laid to avoid the roller 
coaster which reflection on time has waiting for us. Three considerations will 
circumscribe our area of research: (1) a choice of options as to point of 
departure from the series of options available for a discussion of time. By 
choosing an already existent option, we can obviate discussing the metaphysics 
implied in the option by presuming that the choice will include accepting its 
metaphysical retainers as well. (2) Relating speech act method to the option 
chosen and (3) confronting whatever "ordinary language" research is available 
on the matter. In bringing about (1) three criteria will play an important role 
in our choice: the option's emphasis on linguistic phenomena; the option's capa-
bility of accounting for the widest range of (linguistic) phenomena; and its 
capability of placing "the total speech act in the total speech situation". 
The various options providing a point of departure for a discussion of 
time run the gamut from physicalist to psychologiatic conceptions. At one end, 
the physicalist option, tune is conceived of as an absolute one-directional 
succession within a container-like space. It is based on a measurement of 
regularity, with a lower observer-status. Many types of physics and other natural 
science conceptions cluster at this end of the spectrum, though few represent 
the physcialist view in its extreme form. At the other end of the option 
spectrum is the psychologistic view which holds that time is simply a mental 
reaction of the individual (as impression, perception, attention, memory). 
What is called time is really purely subjective accidents resulting from 
sensory stimuli. In such a model, everythingis reduced to the observer who 
becomes clearly a high-status participant. Some research in experimental 
psychology, and certain types of philosophical idealism cluster toward this 
end of the spectrum. 
Our choice of option in the spectrum will tend more in the direction of the 
latter thanthe former view, though it ie still a good distance from the 
psychologistic position. To try to catch the option in a term: the option is 
for time-awareness. The choice is motivated by several considerations that 
seem beet to mesh with the criteria mentioned above. First of all, an observer 
— or better, a participant — is of central importance since we are seeking 
the linguistic phenomena about time. Without them, speech act theory has no 
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grounds to work on. Secondly, the observer must comprehend time, i.e., it 
must be more than impressions and sensory stimuli — there must be some concep-
tualization. Without the latter, there is no language about time or use of 
time expressions. How time is comprehended does not play a big role at this 
moment; only that it is ccmprehended and expressed in language. If we were to 
embody this option in the philosophical tradition, an informed phenomenology 
would best suit our purposes here. Whiteoan articulates such an informed 
phenomenological position: 
In the phenomenological approach to time-awareness, on the other 
hand, we accept...that there is a possibility of explanation, and 
that explanation consists in the laying bare of particular concep-
tual structures as creations of the universal intelligible constitu-
tion of nature and life. Accordingly, we shall not feel any 
satisfaction that we have understood time or how we are responding 
to time, until we have discerned how the varieties of time-awareness 
do manifest an intelligible constitution.2' 
And finally, time-awareness^ directed on the one hand toward "nature" and on 
the other hand toward the "subject", must be located in the cultural situation. 
For the whole process of time-awareness, and the possible options open to it, 
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eure all determined by and grounded in the cultural situation. For it is 
this cultural circle which constitutes the "total speech situation". As we 
saw in promising, the nonlinguistic phenomenon of conventions surrounding 
promising was peculiarly constitutive of the illocutionary act of promising 
itself. Moreover, only within the cultural circle can we achieve acquaintance 
with the wide range of utterances having temporal elements. Neither a physi-
cal ist (which emphasizes mathematical models) nor a psychologistic model 
(which emphasizes a theory of sense-data and perception) nor a handy combination 
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of the two (such as McTaggart's paradox ) can provide the extent of data we 
need to investigate. Rather, the informed time-awareness within the cultural 
situation will be our point of departure. R.M. Gale sums up best what has to 
be done: 
What is called for is a study of the 'logical grammar', i.e. rules 
of use of temporal expressions. To accomplish this and thereby 
command a clear view of the role of time in our conceptual system 
we must not only see the logical connections between various types 
of temporal expressions but also note the way in which these 
expressions enter into our concepts.·^ 
3.3.2. The Asymmetry of Past and Fit ure Time. 
3.3.2.1. Gale's Analysis of Logical Asymmetries. 
A good deal of literature within ordinary language philosophy has been 
devoted to the question of the logical asymmetry between past and future. 
This pcsition holds 
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temporal becoming to be an objective property of all events and ... 
because of this the past and future differ ontologically, the future 
being open and the past closed. Since past events have become present 
they liave alrœdy won their ontological diplomas, unlike future events 
which still exist in a limbo of mere possibility.32 
Gale argues that this openness of the future and closedness of the past can 
be expressed in a series of three positions: (1) the past cannot be brought 
about in the present. To do so would cause such havoc in neighboring concept 
clusters such as causality, action, deliberation, choice, intention, memory, 
knowledge, truth, possibility and indentification'that we would bring the entire 
philosophical construct down on our heads. (2) Statements about the past are 
now either true or false, while some statements about the future are neither. 
This is to show that the future is open in that it contains possibilities or 
contingencies that are not yet realized, whereas the past is closed in that 
any statement made about it can be shown to be true or false. (3) Future 
individuals cannot now be identified while past ones can. This is another way 
of stating the "generality of predictions" thesis, also called the Ryle-Prior-
Peirce thesis', which posits that statements about the past can be either 
singular or general, whereas statements about the future can only be general. 
Gale sets out to prove (1) by showing that any counterexamples trying to 
make the present cause the past cannot succeed without changing many of the 
significant definitions in the argument. Thus, even if the counterexample 
can make the present cause the Oast, it turns out to be proving a different 
hypothesis. (2) is proven by showing that in some instances true and false 
cannot be applied to future statements. And what is neither true nor false cannot 
be realized, but must still be a possibility: thus the future has possi-
bilities. (3) accepts a modified generality-of-predictions thesis by agreeing 
that individuals cannot be demonstrated in the future by ostensive signification, 
but perhaps by names, titles, and so on it is possible. 
How valid is Gale's argumentation and what are the limits of applicability 
for his results? Gale has succeeded in proving the logical asymmetry of past and 
future for at least a certain kind of language, i.e., that language where 
his definitions of cause and effect obtain. He presumes that since this is 
the case, his proof holds for the entire range of ordinary language. 
But what does he mean by ordinary language and how does he use it? Surpris-
ingly, for someone intending to perform an ordinary language analysis of our 
usagas of time expressions (the goals projected in the quotation at the end of 
the previous section are his), very little examination of ordinary language 
takes place. And that examination that does take place occurs within artificial 
boundaries set up by analytical truths. And these analytic truths are the 
definitions of past and future! When giving the reasons why the past is indeed 
closed and the future is open, he simply says: "Our ordinary concept of time 
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contains this view...." and he goes on to illustrate this with two sayings 
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írom folk wlodoB. Later, he postulâtes "a crucial analytical truth about our 
38 
concept of the past." And because of this definition all counterexamples of 
causation cannot obtain. What has happened is that he equates his analytical 
truth about the past with the ordinary use without any further investigation 
of how our sense of time is actually used. He simply equates a few proverbs 
with the essence of ordinary use. This is a "silent majority" approach to 
ordinary use: everybody knows what ordinary use is, therefore I am entitled to 
use my own definition. Gale's problem here is not an uncommon one in ordinary 
language philosophy, one which Austin attempted to correct. One simply cannot 
presume what ordinary usage is without some preliminary reconnaissance of the 
ordinary language domain. 
Gale's analysis does hold for certain ordinary language usages, though it 
is easy to find counterexamples for the series of three positions he set out 
to prove: (1) by commemorating, we do in a very special sense bring about the 
past in the present. The emotion, the atmosphere of the time past can be 
re-created in the present. This is especially the case in ceremonial remem-
brances. Further, certain kinds of verdictives and exercitives (acquitting, 
remitting guilt) are an institutional example of how the present can change 
the past — what happened is considered in a very real sense not to have happened. 
One could also include behabitives like apologising in this category. (2) 
Comissives can close the future Just as verdicitives can open it in the manner 
Just described. Coamiasives like promising, as we saw in section 3.2., take the 
range of possibilities out of our future action; the future becomes as closed 
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as the past in terms of what can happen and what will happen. (3) That sticky 
area of prediction, precognition, clairvoyance and the like serve as an important 
counterexample here. There is sufficient evidence that such things do occur 
but we have no model for accounting for them, thus most discussions of time, even 
ΊΟ in the ordinary use, prefer to ignore them discreetly. But in prediction and 
precognition, future individuals are identified. 
Thus, Gale has only accounted for one band on the spectrum of ordinary 
time usage, albeit an importât one. What he has done is account for brute fact 
time usage, but has failed to include the broader bands of institutional 
fact time usage in his analysis. This is nevertheless very important, since 
his method of work gives us an insight into how brute facts are constituted. 
Mayo has succinctly pointed out the underlying criteria constituting the open/ 
closed sort of aej-ttmetry in time diecussions: the open-and-closed distinction 
is a function of the availability and reliability of the date. If the data 
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are easily accessible, the system is closed; if not, the system is open. The 
difference is between observer-language and participant-language. Cause and effect 
is typical observer-language and something like means and goal would be 
Ί2 
an example of participant-language. Mayo's distinction, we could say, falls 
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roughly In line with the brute and institutional fact distinction. 
3.3.2.2. Institutional Fact Time Usage and Temporal Asymmetry. 
If Gale has accounted reasonably well for brute fact time usage, what can 
be said about institutional fact time usage? Is there any way of giving a 
linguistic characterization of institutional fact time usage and then extracting 
rules from it? Here once again we bump up against the problem discussed in 
the beginning of the section, that time cannot be defined and that any attempt 
to do so does not result in a defintion of time but in a full-blown metaphysics. 
Time, with space, are the very coordinates upon which our constructs are hung 
and the constructs cannot define their own coordinates. It was this problem 
that sent us trying to circumscribe a work area for discussing temporal usages. 
That circumscription resulted in an option for time-awareness (combining the 
"natural" and "subjective" elements) in the cultural situation, since it is the 
latter that will make any forms of time-awareness possible. 
To broach a linguistic characterization of all temporal usages in any 
natural language goes far beyond the task of this study. What will be attempted, 
though, is the following: to roughly map or catalogue the various time-aware­
nesses in a natural language (here:in Standard Average European) and see if 
any lingustic conclusions can be drawn from it. Such an attempt is confronted 
with a series of problems: (1) in natural languages as they are today, moie than 
one kind of time-awareness exists and these various kinds are not clear-cut or 
wholly distinguishable from each other; (2) most temporal usages will not tie 
themselves to exclusively one time-awareness, but each time-awareness will take 
the same words from the common stock available and use them differently; (3) 
how to classify the various kinds of time-awareness,presumes some underlying 
distinguishing factor; ( Ό classification also entails some limiting factor. 
The map given below tries to meet all these difficulties. It gives 
nine different kinds of time-awareness which together give us 'the mix we call 
the ordinary sense of time. No one of them exhausts our sense of time and our 
language reflects bits of them all. The distinguishing (and limiting) factor 
used here is given in the first two columns: the spatial and the measuring 
metaphors. Space is the other coordinate along with time upon which we chart 
our constructs. Philosophers have often bemoaned the fact that our definitions 
of time are inevitably riddled with spatial metaphors and that most of the 
discussions of time go astray when they wander beyond their metaphors or become 
imprisoned by them. If this is the case, then an identification of these 
metaphors might allow us to separate the kinds of time-awareness, find their 
limits, discover their concept-clusters, and identify other pertinent data. The 
first two columns in the table give the pertinent metaphors: the controlling 
spatial metaphor, and the metaphor which governs discussion of the spatial 























One directional line of 
infinite length 
A filling cup or measure 
Time being consumed 
Rising one directional 
finite line 
Infinite, one dimensional 
time directing cyclic time 
forward 
Time warps 





























Music, dream, ecstasy 
Technologized economy 
ASYMMETRIES 
Past) Present; Past is sacred, 
present is profane; an absolute 
past 
Past) Future; Past is closed; 
Future is open 
Future) Past or Present; an 
absolute future 
Futurei Past or Present; 
Future is more degenerate 
Future) Past 
An absolute future 
Past inaugurates a future) the 
past; an absolute future 
Each system closed relative to 
the observer; past = present = 
future 
Present) Past or Future 
Present and Future) 
Past 
LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE 
"Once upon a time" 
"long ago" 
"earlier than" 
"up to this point" 
"the appointed time" 
"the time is npe" 
"the good old days" 
"the Golden Age" 
"progress" "primitive" 
"civilized" 
"once and for all" 
"relative" 
"at the same t ime"« 
"forever" "now" "eternal" 
"having, wasting, killing, time" 
-69-
metaphor, usually a measuring metaphor. This metaphor hae e limiting character 
with respect to the range of the spatial metaphor. 
The third column presents summarily the resulting concept-cluster which 
represents the hierarchy of values, the limits of perception, etc., imposed 
Ъу the metaphors. The concept-cluster is indicated usually by the "-ism" it 
has developed into. The fourth column suggests one of the social forras of 
behavior or convention the cluster-concept either creates or finds its hour in. 
The fifth column takes up the questiona most interesting us here: the various 
symmetries and asymmetries within time-awareness.. The asymmetries are presented 
as answers to three questions: do any of the 'theee dimensions past, present 
and future have priority over any of the others? Нош is this priority expressed? 
Do other dimensions beyond these three (i.e., absolute past, absolute present, 
absolute future) play a constitutive role? Asymmetries are indicated by the 
traditional arithmetic symbol "> ", meaning "greater than". Thus, past> present 
means "the past has priority over the present". The use of the sign "=" will 
indicate that no priority is given among the three dimensions. Finally, in the 
last column, the question of linguistic evidence of time-awareness is con­
fronted. Included here are expressions that pertain particularly to each of these 
time-awarenesses. These expressions can, of course, appear elsewhere, but they 
are most particularly at home in the given sort of time-awareness. 
The map here is primitive. For example, for a complete topography of our 
talk about time, the interrelation of these various kinds of time-awareness 
would have to be isolated. This we will leave undiscussed until the question of 
eechatology and tine comes clearly to the fore. Some may also argue that the 
diagram is too complicated, that some of the types can be reduced to each other 
in a much neater pattern. This can, of course, be easily done, but then at 
the cost of the spatial and measuring metaphors; another principle would have 
to be employed and the results achieved would obscure some of the important 
data presented here. The metaphors are more clearly grounded in ordinary lang-
ugage and serve as a better guiding principle for the various time-awarenesses 
we find in Standard Average European. And rather than being too complicated, 
this overview here, like the moonscape seen from a satellite, could profit fron 
more detail rather than less. 
3.3.3. Bules for the Use of Temporal Expressions. 
Rules like those given for promising are not possible here, since time 
is not ал illocutionary act. The rules given here are constitutive rather than 
regulative. They explain under which conditions temporal expressions can be 
used; they do not explain how they are to be used. Rather than successful 
linguistic usage, they reflect more an interest in what the use of time-
•xpressione entails in the total speech situation. 
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1. The иве of the temporal expreaeion is relative to the kind(s) of time-
avareneaa(ee) present In the speech eituation. 
2. The time-avarenesa ia circumscribed (limited) by the linguistic breadth 
of the spatial and measuring metaphors. 
3· Resulting concept-clusters are not only measured by their logical inner 
consistency, but also by their articulation of the spatial and measuring 
metaphors, and by their respect for the boundaries of the linguistic breadth 
of these metaphors. (The point of this rule is to prevent the mixing of con­
cepta from different metaphors.) 
Ί. Symmetries and asynmetries between past, present, future, absolute past, 
absolute present, and absolute future are functions of definitions of symmetry 
and asymmetry within the kind of tune-awareness and to that extent also depen­
dent on the spatial and measuring metaphors. 
5. Definitions of past, present, future, absolute paat, absolute present, and 
absolute future are not entirely bound to the metaphors generating that par­
ticular time-awareness. Like time itself, they defy clear definition and may 
generate their own spatial metaphors. They must, however, if they exceed the 
spatial and measuring metaphors, still be able to be brought into relationship 
with these metaphors. 
6. There is no one-to-one relationship or correspondence between linguistic 
temporal expressions and a kind of time-awareness, although one kind of time-
awareness may favor certain temporal expressions. 
3.Ί· Negation. 
How negation works and what it entails has long fascinated philosophers. 
Twentieth century Anglo-American literature has been primarily interested in 
what negation does or dees not contribute to the understanding of truth and 
falsity of statements. Austin disliked this particular fascination with 
negation which claimed that "a negation is just a second order affirmation 
(to the effect that a certain first order affirmation is false), yet, when 
anxious to explain away falsity, maintain that to assert that a statement is 
false is just to assert its negation (contradictory)." Negation,he maintained, 
had importance in its own right: 
Affirmation and negation are exactly on a level, in this sense, 
that no language can exist which does not contain conventions for 
both and that both refer to the world equally directly, not to 
statenents about the world: whereas a language could quite veil exist 
without any device to do the work of 'true' and 'false'.5" 
The last part of this sentence about true and false strikes us as perhaps 
a little overdone, something that can be ascribed to his distaste for the 
description fallacy. But the fact that negation has its linguistic rights 
is certainly an important point. One of the important functions of negatives 
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in Austin's thought was discuseed in the previous chapter: how oppositee and 
negations function to bring авутгапеігіеБ to light which may be important for 
the understanding of how utterances function. 
In this section, two points will be considered: how negations of illo-
cutionary acts work and what they entail, and the asymmetries produced 
by negation. 
3·Ί.1· Illoautionary and Prepositional Negation. 
Searle gives as one of his reasons for adopting the distinction of the 
illocutionary force indicating device and the prepositional content that 
such a distinction enables us to deal with the important distinction of the 
two different kinds of utterance negation to be found in illocutionary acts. 
Negation of the illocutionary force indicating device he calls illocutionary 
negation and negation of the proposition, prepositional negation. Thus 
there are two ways to negate the sentence "I promise to come": the illocutionary 
negation would be "I do not promise to come" and the prepositional negation 
"I promise not' to come". While this idea of external and internal negation of 
the utterance is hardly new, Searle's point here is slightly different and 
also extremely important. The qaestion of propositional negation is of itself 
not problematic; to take the example of promising, I can readily promise nega-
tive things: not to come, not to leave early, not to smoke, etc. Care must 
be taken, however, to distinguish negative promises from threats, something 
which can only be done by an analysis of the total speech situation, since the 
difference between promising and threatening is a nonlinguistic one (cf. section 
3.2.2.). But illocutionary negation is not so unprobleraatic; what happens 
exactly to the illocutionary force indicating device, and a fortiori to the 
illocutionary act, when there is a negation? Searle replies: 
Illocutionary negations in general change the character of the 
illocutionary act. Thus, an utterance of 'I do not promise to 
come' is not a promise but a refusal to make a promise. An 
utterance of 'I am not asking you to do it' is a denial that a 
request is being made and is quite different from the negative 
request 'Don't do it'.55 
Thus what results is a lack of committal to performing that specific illocu­
tionary act. Sloman tries to pinpoint the lack of committal: "If F is a sign 
indicating performance of a certain speech act, then the effect of 'not' on 
that sign is to produce a new sign that indicates (but does not state) that 
the original speech act is under consideration but the speaker is not yet 
56 prepared to accept the commitments involved in performing it." He goes on, 
however, to draw some interesting conclusions, namely, that "not" is a word 
which can determine a speech act. And by this he is not referring to the fact 
that "not" can block the successful speech act, but that it creates a new one 
— an intention to perform a speech act. 
-72-
Wbile Sloman's explanation of the lack of committal may obtain in certain 
caaee« it is neTertheleae misguided. The negation of a sign need not produce 
a new sign other than the negation. This is the old case, often debated by 
57 philosophers! of whether not-blue entails another color. And it does not. 
But what exactly does this lack of committal entail, if anything? Are 
there opposites of illocutionary acts beyond their not being felicitous? And 
a second, more important point: do negations say something better than (other) 
illocutionary acts? These are questions to be taken up now. 
3.4.2. Aayimetry and Other Forms of Negation. 
Are the negations of illocutionary acts another, opposite kind of illocu-
tionary act? Austin cautions us on this point: 
In general, it will pay us to take nothing for granted or as 
obvious about negations and opposites. It does not pay to assume 
that a word must have an opposite, or one opposite, whether 
it is a 'positiveA word like 'wilfully' or a 'negative' word like 
* inadvertently ' . ^ 
Searle in the quote above seems to indicate that the negation of one illocutionary 
act entails another illocutionary act. He says there that not requesting is 
denying that a request is made. Do some illocutionary acte have opposites and 
does the negation of the one entail the presence of the other? Especially among 
exercitives and verdictives, there seem to be many illocutionary acts that do 
have opposites: excommunicating and not excommunicating, resigning and staying 
on, acquitting and convicting, passing and failing. The governing principles 
in these seem to be threefold: (1) they are all eminently institutional acti-
vities, (2) they are all the matter of making or giving a decision, and (3) 
in the decision, tertium non datur. When all three of these conditions are 
fulfilled, we have eymnetrical opposites in illocutionary acts. 
Searle's statement that not requesting is denying can be the case, but 
counterexamples are eaey enough to find. By saying that I did not request, I 
can also mean that I demanded you to do it. 
But what of commissives? The three conditions just mentioned for symmetry 
sometimes obtain for them as well, though in a much smaller number of occasions. 
An example where the symmetry does hold would be that I am required to support 
one of the two political parties in a country. If I say "I shall support 
Party B", that entails an equally binding commitment not to support Party A. 
But the class of illocutionary acts among the commissives where this is possible 
seems very small. In the case of pmmising, there is no symmetrical opposite, 
as is the case with some other illocutionary acts. Not to promise or intend or 
threaten is simply not coiranittin<j — not performing this kind oí illocutionary 
act. It is interesting to note as well tha'1' where there are symmetrical 
opposites, they remain in the same larcer class (if we follow Austin's fivefold 
classification) of illocutionary acts. 
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lo there something negation says better than any other illocutionary act? 
We have seen that, in the case of most commissives, they are asymmetrical and 
that the illocutionary negation of commissives simply produces a lack of 
committal to any illocutionary aat. Tet is there a particular function for 
illocutionary negation as such, something it can do which cannot be done in 
59 
any (other) illocutionary act, including that of negating? 
There is one odd sort of negation which may fit this function. In this 
sort of negation, the negation is not really directed toward the utterance 
itself which it negates, but toward some other utterance which is not evident 
in the speech situation. An example of this would be a wife who asks her 
husband what he would like to do this evening. She mentions possibility after 
possibility, to which he answers "No, I don't want to do that." After mentioning 
all the possibilities she can think of, she throws up her hands and says: "What 
do you want to do then?" Or say a father brings a gift home for his daughter and 
she tries to guess what it is. After repeated guesses and after her father has 
replied "That's not it" to each, she says: "I give up." Or less closely related 
to ordinary life, but exhibiting the same pattern in the series of utterances, 
there is the Zen koan or the via negativa of the mystics. All of these examples 
somehow reject a rule commonly held by logicians that a negation must remain 
60 in the same universe of discourse. Here the negativity is used to escape 
patterns cf expectation and even a particular universe of discourse. Negation 
in this fashion has nothing to do with affirmation or the problem of the 
symmetries and asyionetries attendant upon particular expressions, but is oppo­
site to objectivity and exteriority. 
Given such a use of the negative, we would be more inclined to call it a 
peculiarly perlocutionary rather than illocutionary act, since in saying some­
thing nothing is done (i.e., what is said linguistically is not directly also a 
doing that is reported in the saying), but rather an effect is achieved by 
saying something. 
3.5· Perlocutionary Acts. 
Time and again in the course of our investigation we have п ш into the pro­
blem of perlocutionary acts. The difficulties have always presented themselves 
on the fringes of other discussions, as it were. The reader will recall how 
the question was raised whether the pronising formulas could be used not to 
promise but to achieve a sheer perlocutionary effect. This was particularly the 
case with deathbed and electoral pronises. Also at the end of the discussion 
of negation, an odd sort of negating was treated which seemed to break all rules 
of logic for the use of negation. There too the question was asked if perhaps 
this night be a special perlocutionary use that had little or nothing to do 
with negation as such. Moreover, some philosophers of religion and theologians 
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(Ransey comes particularly to mind) describe the language of religion as 
"evocative". In the latter situation, there is more at stake than simple odd 
usages on the fringes of more conventional utterances; whole segments of lang-
uage are being grouped under a single nomer. Without a doubt, 
the perlocutionary act deserves a good deal of attention. 
Bather surprisingly, there is almost no litesture on the topic other than 
three lectures in How to Do Things With Words. Why this aspect of utterances 
has remained underdeveloped while a good deal of literature has been devoted to 
the locutionary and illocutionary acts is hard to understand. Perhaps the 
vagueness of perlocutionary acts has caused speech act theorists to shy away 
from it. Or perhaps it was a distinction that was better left unmade and quickly 
forgotten. The latter seems unlikely since mention of perlocutionary acts does 
pop up now and then, though not for a systematic treatment. 
Since perlocutionary acts play an important part in our understanding 
of eschatological talk, we will devote some attention to them here. We will 
begin by re-examining what Austin has to say on the subject and then center on 
two aspects: why perlocutionary acts are not illocutionary acts (the convention 
problem); and whether rules can be formulated for the use of perlocutionary acts. 
3·5·1· Austin on Perlocutionary Acts. 
In section 2.1.5·, we gave Austin's definition of perlocutionary acts: 
Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain 
consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of 
the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may. 
be dore with design, intention, or purpose of producing them.... 
He also defines the perlocutionary act more concretely as "what we bring about 
or achieve b£ saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and 
even, say, surprising or misleading." His discussion of just what perlocu-
tionary acts are grew out of trying to find a line of distinction (it kept 
vanishing!) between perlocutionary and illocutionary acts. It started out 
simply enough by maintaining that in illocutionary acts, _in saying x, I did ¿; 
and in perlocutionary acts, b£ saying χ I did ¿. But it was soon clear that 
this approach, while certainly containing some truth, was too arbitrary to carry 
the weight of such an important distinction. Two methods of attack were used 
to establish the distinction. 
The first attempt posited that perlocutionary acts had consequential 
effects, while illocutionary acts had conventional effects. The distinction of 
consequential and conventional was simply a negative one: consequential effects 
67 
were nonconventional effects. Austin saw conventional effects in an illo-
cutionary act like promising: there the promiser, having performed the illocutionary 
act, was bound to act in a certain way in the future. Whereas in a perlocutionary 
act like surprising, I may get a reaction, but there is no conventional pattern 
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for what the reaction may be as there is in promises: you may not be surprised 
at all (even though this trick has worked to surprise other people in the past), 
you may indeed be surprised, or may get angry, or have a heart attack, or any 
other number of possible reactions. The effect of a perlocutbnary act, Austin 
felt, was less circumscribed than in illocutionary acts. But a whole group of 
messy borderline cases reared their heads. First of all, it seemed that the 
consequence-convention distinction was rather vague. For some illocutionary acts 
have unclear effects, too (like intending). And some illocutionary acts seemed 
to aleo have perlocutionary effects as well. This led to hybrids like "by 
uttering an illocutionary act (like warning), he achieved a perlocutionary 
effect (I trembled)." This raised the question whether the perlocutionary 
effect was perhaps simply an odd sort of illocutionary effect. The question 
eventually centered in on what precisely the difference was between consequences 
and conventions. Austin tried to clear up what he meant by conventional (since 
consequential was the same as nonconventional): 
Speaking of the 'use of "language" for arguing or warning' looks 
just like speaking of 'the use of"language" for persuading, rousing, 
alarming'; yet the former may, for rough contrast, be said to be 
conventional, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit 
by the performative formula; but the letter could not.70 
What he means here is that one test for conventional is that the verb in 
question can be used performatively and make sense. Thus I can say "1 warn 
you" or "I dispute the point you're making", but I cannot say "I persuade you", 
"I alarm you", and the like. However, this is a very narrow test through which 
all illocutionary acts cannot pass (although performatives in the strict sense 
can). Austin's use of "convention" here is by now familiar from section 2.1.3.3· 
and 2.2.k. It coincides with the type of performative that appeared especially 
in the later theory. This did not solve the problem; as Austin was later on 
71 forced to admit, "but it is difficult to say where conventions begin and end." 
This distinction he later refined into the notions of perlocutionary objecta 
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and perlocutionary sequels. Although it is not entirely clear, it seems that 
illocutionary acts can have perlocutionary objects (I can warn you, I can alert 
you), though "some perlocutionary acts always have sequels rather than objects, 
namely those where there is no illocutionary formula...." The latter, the 
perlocutionary sequel, seems to have taken the place of the nonconventional 
effect mentionea above (i.e., that which cannot be made explicit in a performa­
tive formula). Part of the difficulty in n-aking all these distinctions, and 
making them really apply, was something Austin mentioned already early in his 
discussion of perlocutionary acts: 
For clearly any, or almoat any, perlocutionary act is liable to be 
brought off, in sufficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, 
with or without calculation, of any utterance whatsoever, and in 
"articular by ι straightfon.ard cqnstîtiVc .iterance (if there be 
such an aninal.7 
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Such a statement throve the door wide open; it seems then that perlocutionary 
acts can hardly be called "acts" in the sense that they can be isolated within 
an utterance and are rule-governed. 
A second mode of attack was to formulate rules that would give the distinc-
tion between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. We will summarize the 
rules here. 
(1) Distinguishing linguistic devices. One of these we touched upon already: 
illocutionary acts can be expressed in the performative formula while perlocu-
tionary acts cannot. Austin also tried to find a distinction between the two 
in the two formulae "In saying x, I did j^ " and "By saying x, I did £." After a 
tedious study of the possibilities, the only conclusions he could come to was 
that if the "by" form was to be perlocutionary, the "by" had to have an instru-
mental sense rather than a criterion sense, and the "saying" part of the "by" 
form had to be a full locutionary act and not a partial one (say, only a phatic 
75 
act). He had to admit, however, that these linguistic formulas will not give 
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a watertight test. 
(2) Distinguishing effects. Austin gives three effects peculbr to illocutionary 
acts: (i) that effect necessary for a happily performed illocutionary act — he 
called it "securing uptake"; (ii) illocutionary acts can quite clearly "take 
effect" — as a pronouncement of sentence in court; (iii) illocutionary acts 
can by convention invite a sequel — something we saw in promising, where Я 
has to accept S's promise. Austin maintained that perlocutionary acts do not 
77 have these effects: their effects are not circumscribed by anything like 
infelicities; where they begin and how they begin is not always clear; and the 
sequel they invite is hardly conventional (in reaction to your attempt to surprise 
me I may kiss you or hit you on the head) and can continue on beyond the number 
of exchanges prescribed by the convention. While it seems that this distinction 
certainly will hold for all perlocutionary acts, it only holds for some illo­
cutionary acts (those of the strict performative class). Intending is very 
fuzzy on (ii), for example. 
(3) Distinguishing the need for words. All perlocutionary acts can be performed 
without a locutionary act (an utterance), while some illocutionary acts cannot. 
Thus I can warn you away from an accident on the highway by waving my arms 
(perlocutionary) or I can ordain you to the ministry by laying ray hands on your 
head (illocutionary). "But the fact remains that many illocutionary acts cannot 
ou 
be performed without saying something." An important question here is whether 
those perlocutionary acts performed without the benefit of a locutionary act 
do not then employ some convention to achieve the same result. This is certainly 
the case for illocutionary acts. 
And so all in all, the attempts to distinguish illocutionary and perlocutionary 
acts were not that successful. Distinguishing strict performatives and per­
locutionary acts is more promising. We now turn to what role с inventions play 
-77-
in perlocntionary acts to see if perhaps that may throw some light on the 
situation. 
3.5.2. Perioditi diary Acts and Conventions. 
Austin asserted that perlocutionary acts were essentially nonconventional; 
and within the narrow definition of convention he held, he was probably correct. 
But the notion of convention is much wider and even Austin felt the need to 
admit his idea of convention could not apply to all cases. But what of these 
border cases? How do conventions fit into the perlocutionary picture, if at 
all? A clarification of the relation of convention and perlocutionary acts 
will also help in seeing how perlocutionary and illocutionary acts are related. 
Despite Austin, we must maintain that sane form of convention — such as 
Strawson's "extended" convention — plays a role in perlocutionary acts. The 
reason we keep searching for a convention is given in the very phenomenon of 
perlocution itself: if there are no conventions at all involved, what reason 
do I have to believe that my utterance or action might achieve the desired 
effect? If tere are no conventions, then why do I utter this sentence to make 
you laugh and not another becomes a purely arbitrary matter. Of course, Austin 
is correct in saying we never know for sure what the effect will be, but there 
must be some reasonable assurance that a given effect will occur or we would not 
undertake uttering what we do. 
What is the role of conventions in perlocutionary acts? There is a para­
sitical use of illocutionary act conventions which, instead of determine the 
felicity or infelicity of the utterance, results in their being used as defi­
nitions to give some form to the phenomenon at hand. The conventions are essen­
tially illocutionary, but they are employed in the perlocutionary situation 
to achieve a certain effect similar to that in the illocutionary situation, 
but yet different. Part of the difference lies in the fact that some of the 
conditions necessary for the succeesful illocutionary act either do not obtain 
or are absent, and part of the difference lies in the different intention of 
the individual performing the perlocutionary act. To put it simply: S wishes 
to achieve an effect in H like that created by an illocutionary act; but 
since an illocutionary act can only be defective in this situation, H tries to 
achieve the effect without the illocutionary act. This, then, is his perlocu­
tionary act. Such an explanation would account for deathbed and electoral 
promises and also the odd use of negation spoken of above. In the case of the 
deathbed promise, £ wishes to achieve the effects in H of a pronise (that Ά 
believes that ¡5 is committed to do ¿ in the future) but cannot perform the 
illocutionary act of ргоілівіпд (since Η will not ЬР here to check up and apply 
sanctions if necessary). Thus £'s use of the utterance "I promise to finish 
school" is perlocutionary; he wants to se*- H's nind at ease. The negation 
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example works in much the sane way. ¿ uses the illocutianary form of negating 
not really to negate, but to create in II the effect of i]locutionary negation 
without really engaging nondefective]y in negation. This would explain how the 
negation can fall outside the universe of discourse and still look like the 
illocutionary negation. 
That the perlocutionary act uses a defective illocutionary act to achieve 
its effect does not mean that perlocutionary acts are a kind of infelicity. 
In the perlocutionary act, S realizes that the illocutionary act he attempts 
will be defective and that as a result the effect of the illocutionary act 
will likewise be defective. Thus ¿ never intends to perform an illocutionary 
act at all. This does not mean that £ is insincere. Defective illocutionary 
acts are usually recognizable; and in the case of perlocutionary acts, it may 
not even be recognizable at first sight that illocutionary acts have anything 
to do with the situation at all. This knowing use of a defective illocutionary 
act also explains why the perlocutionary effect is so unmanageable and unpre-
dictable. For example in promising, those conventions that make a promise 
what it is, the checkup of H and his ability to apply sanctions, are absent. 
Two interesting developments flow from this possibility that perlocutionary 
acts are paradtical upon illocutionary acts for their conventions. First of all, 
if we can discern what defective illocutionary act hides behind the perlocutionary 
act, we can say much more about the structure of that particular perlocutionary 
act. For example, perhaps intimidating is parasitic upon illocutionary threat-
ening, or perhaps persuading is parasitic upon expositives. Whether this can 
be worked out into general rules is difficult to say; it certainly will apply 
in many cases. This will play an important role in determining the meaning of 
"evocative" language in eschatology. 
Secondly, it is interesting how perlocutionary acts can achieve an illocu-
tionary act as effect in H (advertising is based on this principle). Thus 
through my urging, I can get you to commit yourself to buys a set of encyclo-
pedias, or get you to promise to come tomorrow. But more than commissives can 
be "evoked" in this fashion; particularly, behabitives are susceptible to this 
procedure. The fact that perlocution is parasitical upon illocution would 
account for this phenomenon. 
3.5.3· Rules for the Performance of Perlocutionary Acts. 
We cannot codify constitutive rules for the successful performance of 
perlocutionary acts, since they are not subject to conditions of infelicity. 
We can, however, set down some of the constitutive rules to help identify and 
clarify perl оси ti шагу acts. 
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1. Perlocutionary acts can Ъе either locutionary or nonlocutionary. 
2. The structure of perlocutionary acta is parasitical upon that of illocutionary 
acts, though in the perlocutionary form they will always be defective as to 
their "truth" or circumstantial conditions. 
3. Locutionary perlocutionary acts (i.e., those using words) are parasitical 
upon locutionary illocutionary acts; nonlocutioiary perlocutionary acts are 
parasitical upon nonlocutionary illocutionary acts. 
k. The predictability of the perlocutionary effect will approach that of 
illocutionary conventional effect to the extent that the perlocutionary act 
approaches the nondefective form of the illocutionary act. 
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Chapter h: BEÏOND SPÍECH ACT THEORY. 
Time and again the discussion of speech acts has drawn us to the ed^e of 
other problems -that seem to play an important role in constituting the total 
speech act in the total speech situation. In the beeinning of Chapter Two 
it was noted how the development of speech act theory could be read as a 
reaction to problems posed to the philosophy of language by ideal language 
philosophy. Certain problems were responded to by Austin and those who followed 
him, while other, sometimes more central, problems were left untouched or 
were hurriedly passed over. And in the later sections it was noted how 
consideration of one matter often either entailed or somehow became related with 
seemingly weighty questions that could not be effectively dealt with inside 
the matrix of speech act theory. 
It is to some of these problems that this chapter will address itself. The 
point of discussing them is not so much to shore up speech act theory on some 
obviously weak points where it could possibly experience some sort of collapse. 
The apologetic point is really not ad rem. For speech act theory is not that 
tightly developed; it conforms somewhat to its subject matter, natural language, 
remaining highly flexible and cautiously preliminary in its judgments. The 
important point is extending the program, at least on some fronts, to better 
account for important aspects of speech acts heretofore left undiscussed. In 
this chapter three of these aspects will be considered in some detail: conventions, 
meaning, and truth. These three have not been chosen at random; for as shall be 
seen, they can together provide a supporting framework for speech act theory as 
a full theory of language. And it will be via this framework that speech act 
theory will make its contact with other theories of language and communication, 
and especially with that theory which will be discussed in Chapter Five, structural 
semantica. 
k.l. Conventions. 
A study of conventions carries us beyond the immediate analysis of speech 
acts themselves. Nevertheless, any attempt to fully understand speech acts as 
the total speech act in the total speech situation entails considering conven-
tions in some detail. For, as was intimated in section 2.1.3.3·ι conventions 
function at two interrelated levels in successful speech act performance. On 
the first level, they are the major part of the circumstantial conditions for 
the successful, nondefective performance of speech acts, especially certain 
classes of illocutionary acts. But on another, deeper level, conventions are 
the constitutive conditions for the possibility of speech acts at all. A 
few references were made to this point in the excursus in section 2.1.3.3., and 
now they will be elaborated upon. For, as we shall see, the first level — 
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that of conditions for nondefective speech act performance — is in fact an 
important subclass of the second, deeper level, explaining why the first level 
can be the case. And only through an exploration of this second level can we 
come to a full possession of the conventional structures supporting the speech 
act. Not only will this investigation further our grasp of speech acts them-
selves, Jit will also provide the means for a deeper study of how speech and 
language relate to the world. 
'».1.1. Furberg, Austin, and Searle on Conventions. 
One of the first difficulties to be overcome before serious investigation 
of conventions can begin is sorting out the various understandings of conven-
tions present within speech act theory. Only then can they be related into a 
more coherent understanding of conventions applicable to the problem here at 
hand. That will be the task of this first section. 
The various usages of the term "convention" in the speech act theory lit-
erature can be grouped into three conceptions represented by Furberg, Austin, 
and Searle. They represent the three principal approaches to this problem thus 
far and other positions are easily relatable to one of these. 
Furberg restricts the use of the term "convention" to those particular 
devices that relate vocables to the world. He distinguishes four kinds of 
conventions: horizontal, vertical, individuating, and classificatory. A vertical 
convention is one that ties a vocable to an item in the world and makes this 
vocable a word. Horizontal conventions are adjustments made upon vertical 
conventions, usually to either relate other vocables to the same item or the 
same vocable to a similar item. Individuating conventions have to do with the 
reference problem — constituting a vocable as a reference to an item in the 
world. And classificatory conventions constitute those vocables that say some-
thing about an item in the world (as opposed to referring to them or identifying 
them). For the broader sense of convention as particular social agreements that 
need not be linguistic, Furberg uses the term "institution" (as we saw in the 
section on promising, where he talked about the "institution of promising" ). 
From this it is evident that Furberg wants to use the term convention in 
a very narrow, though important sense; namely, how voaables relate to the world. 
This is a significant part of conventions, though one wonders if they can be 
euccessfuly dealt with at this level of the discussion. For one, Furberg is making 
a philosophical atterpt to do the work of linguistics if he wants to match 
vocables and objects in the world. And secondly, if done without the wider 
understanding of speech acts, such an approach easily falls into the trap of 
atomistic meaning, or, on a more sophisticated level, what Searle calls the 
"speech act fallacy".' The problem of bow individual vocablee relate to the 
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world needs answering, but philosophically and from the baek£Tound of speech 
act theory, it can only be approached within the wider context of a fully 
developed theory. Paradoxical though it nay seen, what Furberg wants to do 
can only be achieved at the end of an examination of the functioning of <E nven-
tions in language rather than at the beginning; for such an investigation 
cannot be the ground, but only the result of convention research. 
Austin's position as to using the term "convention" we have had occasion 
It 
to refer to above. He uses the term almost exclusively for those ritual acts 
he called performative, and later illocutionary acts. Part of the early defi­
nition was negative and was developed by his notion of infelicities. Infeli­
cities were possible in all speech acts "which have the general character of 
ritual or ceremonial, all ctnventional acts." He elaborated on what conven­
tional entailed as well:"There must exist an accepted conventional procedure 
having a certain conventional effect, the procedure to include the uttering of 
certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances." And these con­
ventions were not wholly verbal ones; thee existed nonlinguistic conventional acts 
η 
(like bowing to show obeisance) as well. He also used phrases such as 
8 q 
"conventional expressions of feeling" and "purely polite conventional phrases." 
In the second phase of his speech act theory where he introduced the notion of 
illocutionary acts, he returned to a discussion of conventions, this time to 
find a distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. This resulted 
in a less tightly constructed notion of convention. He maintained that illocu­
tionary acts were conventional and had conventional effects, whereas perlocution­
ary acts had consequential effects, but not conventional ones. He did allow, 
however, for "conventional acts" which could be made use of to bring off a 
perlocutionary act. The notion of conventional that emerged from this consi­
deration was that any use in illocutionary acts was conventional "in the sense 
12 
that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula". 
In Austin's understanding of convention we see little of Furberg's position. 
In How to Do Things With Words Austin was more interested in those conditions 
in the world that make certain speech acts possible and make them go awry than lï in relating isolated vocables to objects or actions in the world. And although 
through his consideration of perlocutionary acts he was forced to broaden his 
notion of convention, it remained principally involved with what We called 
"conventions in the strict sense" in section 2.2.^. The question remains, 
however, whether "conventions in the strict sense" are conventions in their 
most rarefied form or whether they are simply subset in a class of conventions. 
Searle'e approach to conventions is directed by a different concern than 
Austin's. While Austin was interested in conventions mainly as discriminating 
factors in infelicities and as a distinguishing factor between illocutionary and 
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perlocutionary acts, Searle conceives of conventions as conetitutive rules 
"as opposed to strategy, technique, procedure or natural fact". Conventions 
are the realization of underlying rules, and languages and illocutionary acts 
17 
are for him rule-governed behavior. What Searle understands by underlying 
rules and rule-governed behavior was seen in section 2.3.1. and especially 
section 2.3.3. The twofold distinction of constitutive and regulative rules 
provided the immediate context for a discussion of conventions. Regulative rules 
were given in imperative form, whereas constitutive rules were seen as delimiting 
factors of the form "X counts as Y_ in the context £" which were capable of 
generating new forms of behavior. Searle believes that if one can identify 
these constitutive rules of which conventions are the manifestations, one has 
reached the core of what language is and how it functions. How far he is 
willing to take such an idea is unclear. He believes we can reach the constitu-
tive rules for languages, but whether we can reach them for language as such is 
hard to make out. Such statements as "different human languages, to the 
extent they are intertranslatable, can be regarded as different conventional 
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realizations of the same underlying rules" would seem to indicate he believes 
that we can identify rules that go beyond languages. And from what Searle said 
previous to his explicit discussion of rules, it is clear that we must somehow 
get beyond languages to language in order to fully come to grips with languages; 
or, in the terms borrowed from Saussure, parole can only be fully understood 
within langue, although langue can only be approached via parole. We noted as 
well that, while Searle chose to do philosophy of language rather than linguistic 
philosophy, he also realized that the former could only be achieved with help 
from the latter. The significance of these insights will become evident shortly. 
Furberg'e discussion of convention finds no place in Searle's account, 
although Searle does use the word institution as well (institutions are systems 
of constitutive rules ) . He does have, however, discussions of predication and 
reference, but they are not related to the convention discussion as such. In 
comparison with Austin, Searle tries to relate conventions to the larger problems 
of philosophy of language in a way Austin never did. 
Furberg, Austin, and Searle represent three positions needed for a 
coherent understanding of conventions. To characterize them briefly: Furberg 
represents an understanding of convention in the broadest, "eeakest" sense of the 
word — assigninc vocables, arbitrarily or otherwise, to configurations inthe 
world. Furberg's conventions are not, in the first instance, available in a 
significant manner for the philosophy of language. The process of understanding 
how vocables relate to and яге assigned to the vorüd, as phnneires and porphemes 
(to 'ise linguistic teminol og}), must first be developed into a comprebensive 
theory of syntactics before they can be integrated into speech act theory. Yet 
such an under-standing of how vocables relate to and aro jiven a place in the 
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world will sa;' in effect what liiißnistic conventions яге and how tne-y fuiiction. 
Furberj hae isolated one important notion of convention — at the fine point 
where vocables touch the world. 
Austin's notion of convention is likewise a restricted one in that he is 
concerned primarily not with what conventions are or even how they really 
function, but only with their role in particular speech acts, namely performatives 
and to a lesser extent all illocuticnary acta. Yet how conventions function in 
relation to speech (as opposed to isolated words) comes most clearly here to 
the fore. At this level, arbitrariness nust disappear and configurations must 
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emerge that are accessible, as he himself points out. In contrast to Furberg, 
Austin's conception of convention is the most narrow sense, which does not mean 
it is necessarily the most rarified form of convention. 
Finally, Searle attempts to include Austin's notion and extend it to cover 
all conventions as manifestations of underlying constitutive rules. His under­
standing of convention is the broadest, most encompassing and yet most delineated 
notion of convention. In principle, the other two notions of conventions should 
be able to be included in his. 
It should be noted that Searle'ε notion of rules produces a major break­
through for speech act theory, and, indeed, is his major contribution to it. 
For it takes the method of Austin beyond the pale of an amateurish arbitrariness 
that entrusts more to sudden flashes of insight than to aystematic application 
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of patterns of procedure. Such patterns have to be developed; otherwise 
attempts at classification remain ad hoc activities. The discussion of promising 
demonstrated the power constitutive rules can have for sorting out the semantic 
structure in an area of human speech. 
On another level, however, that of a "deep structure" beyond "surface 
structure" illocutionary force indicators and context-sensitive rules, Searle's 
discussion of conventions as the realization of underlying constitutive rules 
opens the grounds for a much more comprehensive theory not only of speech and 
language, but also of all systems of human communication embodying patterns 
homeomorphic to the structures of speech and its surrounding and underlying 
conventions. And, analogous to his discussion of languages and language and 
the dialectic involved in exploring thera both, a full understanding of con­
vention — even if we were to restrict the treatment to conventions surrounding 
and underlying speech — will entail a look at much larger patterns of human 
communication. For it is along this path that we see that speech act theory 
is not merely peripherally connected to language and context, but is deeply 
embedded within a more comprehensive theory of communication. It is precisely 
the notion of underlying constitutive rules that provides this embedding of 
speech act theory in a broader theory of human communication. The notions of 
conventions and rules, moreover, play a key role in laying bare the deep 
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structure of the connectedness of all systems of communication. And it is to 
a further examination of these prospects that we now turn. 
^.1.2. Problems Surrounding the Notion of Convention. 
Although we may accept Searle's definition of convention as the realization 
of underlying constitutive rules, a general uneasiness remains about assigning 
conventions any central task either in articulating the structure of speech 
acts or in β more general theory of communication. Before proceeding any 
further in the discussion then, it would seem important to give form to these 
feelings in order to deal with them more directly, lest they continue to impede 
our progress along the way. 
There are certain ideas about convention that inevitably spring up or 
soEiehow influence, consciously or unconsciously, nearly all treetments 
of it. These ideas have often been expressed in one way or another throughout 
the history of philosophy. One such idea is how conventions relate to the 
origin of language. The debate on this topic is at least as old as Plato's 
Cratylus: are the connections between bundles of sounds and objects purely 
arbitrary or is their some "natural" connection which acoounts for the origins 
and development of language? The search for the natural connection has taken 
two tacts within th<» history of philosophy. The first one is along the lines 
of a gradually ejpanding sense of onomatopoeia, where (to use Alexander Pone's 
phrase) "the sound echoes the sense". We find this recurring often in the 
history of philology and linguistics. ' A second tact is a negative one; namely, 
that language could not be the product of convention. This position has been 
represented most forthrightly by Russell. He argues that language cannot be 
conventional, since we can in no way imagine our ancestors meeting one sunny 
afternoon to decide in common henceforth a cow will be called cow, and a wolf 
wolf. The origins of language are still a mystery to us, but whatever they may 
be, they cannot be such. As others have also pointed out, our ancestors would 
have needed these very conventions to decide upon the convertions of langiage, 
which is clearly contradictory. ^ 
A second argument against the notion of language as convention comes from 
the linguiste« They maintain that, if language were pure convention, we could 
not account for how children manage to achieve such dramatic linguistic competence, 
being able to produce well-formed sentences in a natural language that they have 
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never heard or indeed may never before have been uttered. This argument is aimed 
only indirectly at the notion of the conventional origins of language; its main 
target is the notion of the conventional acquisition of language along the lines 
27 
of a theory of reference held by such diverse figures as Augustine and W.V. Quine, 
not its conventional orìgine, though we do find among these attackers theories 
ruling out any conventional origins of language. 
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But a second idea lies more central to the general uneaeineee surrounding 
any discussion of conventions. The notion of convention has become inextricably 
connected with the social contract theories of thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke. 
Such a social contract theory could be briefly characterized thus: a society 
is constituted by large numbers of face-to-face, arbitrary agreements arrived 
at by the population to follow certain patterns of behavior and not to follow 
others. The agreements are wholly arbitrary and guided by self-interest; they 
29 
may well have been otherwise and are always subject to review. And it is 
this uneasiness about no solid ground under one's feet that is the principal 
source of malaise in discussions of convention. We find Searle falling into 
this at one point as well. Insofar as language are rule-governed and conventions 
are the realisation of underlying rules, he says, we can call languages conven­
tional. However, a little further on, he feels the need to make the distinction 
between underlying rules and conventions for seemingly no particular reason 
TO 
other than this discomfort about the connotations of convention. 
Still a third idea weighs down convert ion discussions, although this one 
is seldom recognized. Searle calls it by name in Speech Acts when he notes 
that we have no operational criteria for establishing notions such as meaning-
fulness, synonymy, ambiguity and the like, though we feel we know what they 
mean. In recent discussions, it is particularly the status and undefinability 
of synonymy and analyticity that have made the following point most clear: that 
certain key concepts underpinning whole formalized systems of description 
and explanation are in themselves alogical a_u' thus seem to exist "by tacit 
agreement. Qodel's theorem on the undecidability of certain formulas supporting 
formal mathematical systems draws much the-same epistemologica! conclusions: 
that the very foundations of logical systems themselves escape logical analysis 
and foundation. Thus, not only does an unbridgeable gap yawn between natural 
and formal systems, we find also that no formal system can be wholly formalized; 
there remains at base axioms that are not self-evident or analytics, but are simply 
undecidable logically and thus, terrifyingly, "conventional". This point, which 
is usually rushed past in uneasy silence, plays an important role (perhaps 
unconsciously rather than consciously) in the Jitters surrounding conventions. 
To sum up, opponents of convention are usually guided by the feeling that 
the world simply cannot be that arbitrary, whether it be the crass asbitrariness 
of a Hobbesian view of society, or the coolly detached arbitrariness of the 
behaviorist, or the more subtle and profound arbitrariness of Godei·β theorem. 
4.1.3. Rules and Conventions. 
One tactic against creeping conventionalism is the search for rules in one 
form or another, where rules serve as a ceiling on the gradual unravelling 
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initiated by convention. In ite crudest form, God or ineffable natural laws 
are postulated to stop the process or prevent infinite regression Most forms, 
however, exhibit more subtlety than such stopgap measures. Roughly, one could 
characterize them thus: generally, an attempt is made to first find patterns of 
regularity within the phenomena to a greater or lesser degree. Such patterns 
may simply give an account of the patterns as they appear in the phenomena. 
Other patterns may E 0 further in eliciting causality (i.e., the provenance of 
the phenomena), predictability (what will happen when the phenomena occur), 
generality (why these phenomena keep appearing over and over again), and, most 
radically, necessity (why these phenomena occur and not others). It is for this 
moet radical level, that of necessary and sufficient conditions, that anti-
conventionalism aims; namely, the formulation of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the appearance of phenomena. The labels given these necessary 
and sufficient conditions usually mirror the research interest: they have been 
called everything from laws of Nature and Mind to rules of varying kinds to, 
simply, conditions and context. The intensity of the reseerch interest will 
determine to what extent a formalization of the conations as rules will be 
attempted. And the greater the degree of formalization, the greater the distance 
from the phenomena. The result can be a growing lack of contextual sensitivity 
proportional to the degree of formalization. This is not only caused by 
some inevitabilities of generalization, but also no doubt by the implication 
that conventions make their presence most keenly felt in context problems. An 
important advantage of formalization of the conditions as rules is that it makes 
a systematization and taxonomy of the phenomena possible to a greater degree 
than the more phenomenological approaches of the empiricist tradition which 
we will discuss shortly. And to the extent that an integrated sjstem is possible, 
opportunities for intersystem integration into larger, unified theories become 
evident. In our discussion of a possible integrated theory of communication 
the areas of generative and transformational grammars, general systems theory, 
structuralism and semiotics best exemplify varying degrees of formalization. As 
a matter of shorthand I shall call these various attempts the rules approach, 
since in one way or other they all attempt to systematize and formalize patterns 
in the phenomena in terms of rules. The notion of convention is nearly always 
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conspicuously absent. 
There are otheis, however, more able to live with the consequences of a 
notion of convention. Following the empiricist tradition of Locke and Hume, 
they too seek patterns in the phenomena, but their research interests show 
significant differences from those of the rules approache. Their conceptual 
ceiling lies at the level of the phenomenal situation as such. This produces 
both the advantages and disadvantages of their position. A signficant advantage 
is doubtlessly their sensitivity to the phenomena in their context. They can 
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relay sense of concreteness not always to be found by those of the rul es 
approach. They, too, seek out a foT-malization of the conventions underlying 
the phenonena, but with important differences. For one, the notion of causality 
seldon apnears. Бкресіаііу in the social sciences, most researchers wíl] gn 
no further than a correlation of the phenomena. At this level predictability 
of future correlations will be sought, though this will be expressed in terms 
of statistical probability. Only the sufficiency, hardly ever the necessity, 
of conditions will be discussed. The questioning is guided more by a what, or 
descriptive explanation, than a why, or causal exülanation. Although this 
approach, which I shalT. call the conventions approach, does seek quantification, 
it nevetheless still best expresses those phenomena that have resisted quanti-
37 fication. An important area would be semantics. The thrust of the research 
irterest, however, also h-is its inhibiting points, growing out of the low con-
ceptual ceiling. First of all, the reluctance to push beyond the surface 
structures of phenomena may impede understandinp; +he phenomena themselves, by 
establishing shibboleths that become almost impossible to get beyond, .le shall 
come upon examples of these in the discussion on meaning. Second, all phenomena 
have to be accepted as data because of the lack of discriminating criteria. 
This problem has been responsible for much of the history of venficationism 
and is evident even in more sopnisticated notions of confirmability, a question 
that will likewise be taken up below. Third, the limits imposed upon formaliza-
tion by the conventions approach, out of greater concern for the what than for 
the why, result in a lower degree of integratability of a system of phenomena 
and therefore of the possibility of integrating various systems. The taxonomies 
of convention will also remain cruder. Exairples of such research can be found 
in speech act theory, most Anglo-American social science and some descriptive 
linguistics. 
As can be seen even from this rough characterization, the search for rules 
by these two approaches is in many ways quite close together. Research interest 
and goals are the principal differences that in turn qualify and direct research 
efforts. The conventions approach, coming from the empiricist tradtion, is 
most concerned to discover the patterns at the level of the phenomena and might 
even doubt the possibility of integrating the various classes of phenomena into 
some more universal system within the foreseeable future, if ever. This comes 
from its acceptance of the phenomena as they appear and its lack of interest in 
origins. The world may be conventional, even m a Hobbesian sense; but it is 
the only world we have. The rules approach, influenced more by the rationalist 
tradition (and not a little by linguistics since Saussure, by theoretical biology 
since Bertalanffy and by postwar information theory) seeks the patterns "below" 
the level of phenomena, i.e., the rules that constitute the phenomena as 
phenonena. They are likewise more optimistic about discovering overarching 
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pyaterns of rules for varying and seeming]y disparate claesfs of phonoP'ena. This, 
again, can be argued fror» their ultimate rejectinn of a conventionaliet world. 
Thus there could be a possibility of communication between the two 
approBches, because of their common search for rules, despite their diverjencins 
in repearch interest and orientation. As we saw in Chapter Two, this has alre.-uly 
been recognized by those philosophers such as Vendler who have made t^e step 
from speech act theory to linguistics. Hany of the same tendencies can be 
found in Searle as well. In fact there has been some a+tecpts at integration, 
the most notable being D.K. Lewis' study of conventions. He attempts to show 
what kind of rules conventions are by using coordination problems fror" T.C. 
Schelling's game theory. Proceeding in such a fashion he is able to criticize 
and incorporate the social contract notion of convention, the problem of con­
ventionality in language, the role of precedents, and other kinds of regulari-
ties and agreements into his theory rather successfully. One of his most 
important contributions is to show how convention does not imply я prehistoric 
39 Rvumymede like Russell had in mind. 
To a lesser extent, the notion of convention has been dealt with expliMffy 
by the rules approach as well; in this case, the semioticians. However, the 
wide range of arbitrariness ic allowed only in phonemics (the study of sounds). 
But even here the arbitrariness is quickly bounded in by the development of a 
system of sounds· And further in its sign theory arbitrariness is restricted 
to the sign — anything can be a sign. But the rules for choosing a sign and 
setting UB a sign system and transforming it are much clearer and far from 
arbitrary. 
But it gradually becomes clear that even in the conventions approach the 
notion of convention tends to fall aside. For even Searle will define convention 
as the realization of underlying rules and thereafter that will be the point of 
concentration. The most the conventions approach can do in regard to conventions 
themselves is simply affirm their existence and resist too hasty attempts at 
system formation. But inevitably they, too, go in search for rules. And 
to the extent that both rules approaches and conventions approaches search for 
constitutive rules, one can detect little difference in research orientation 
and method. On the notion of regulative rules, however, the paths still seem 
to divide. 
Does this mean that the term convention should be discarded? Hot immediately, 
at least. For although especially semiotics attempts to cover all the various 
notions of rules from arbitrary agreements between two parties to universal 
structures in language and thus would seem to have superseded every notion of 
convention, there is cause to believe that the notion can serve at least a 
taxonomie function that mediates the approaches to the search for rules. For 
not even the most fervent semiotician or structuralist will assert that any of 
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the eysteme (or βτβη evbeyeteme) are nearing conpleteneee. 
let alone an integration of Systems on a larger scale. The notion of con­
vention can be of particular use at this point. It can serre as an indicator 
for a given area where a systen nay be seen to be energing or could eventually 
emerge, where such a systen might represent a class of signs or phenomena. 
The question of integratability of these systems, the point where our two groups 
of researchers most clearly part ways, is likewise safeguarded by a terms such 
as convention. It allays the fears of the conventions approach and reins in 
upon the enthusiaam of the rules approach. Along these lines, then, communica­
tion between the two groups will be made possible without the former feeling 
they are being dismembered and swallowed up by the latter, and the latter eaarting 
under broadsides from a narrow area of research undertaken by the former. 
This mediation becomes particulary acute in those areas where closure in a 
system of signs or a classification of phencoena seems ioainent. 
k.l.k. A Classification of Conventions. 
Following the lines of thé argument Just presented about the use 
of the notion of convention to denote areas of research where a system of eoo-
stitutive rules for a given class of phenomena could be or Is emerging, we can 
now look at research by the two approaches and attempt a scheme of classes of 
conventions. Each convention class constitutes, then, a bundling of research 
into a particular sort of phenomena where attempts are being made either to 
exhaustively describe the constitutive rules pertaining to the phenomena (con-
ventions approach) or to formalize the constitutive rules Into a cohesive 
system (rules approach). As I see it, the research can be divided Into four 
classes which could eventually merge into a unified theory of canunicatiom, 
though such a possibility is still far away. Theee four classes could be 
labelled thus: language conventiona, speech aonventions, social conventions, 
and symbolic universe Conventions. Each convention class will be described in 
the following manner: (1) which approach (convention or rules) predcalnatea, 
if any; (2) mention of important literature or researchers in the convention 
class; (3) salient points In the research and prospects for closure in a 
formalised system or for exhaustive description of the phenomena; ( Ό any 
connections or possible interfaces with either other classes of conventiona 
or other areas of research falling outside a rules or conventions approach. 
Research into language Conventions is dominated by the various approaches 
in linguistics, all of whom could be called subscribers to the rules approach. 
Particularly important research has been done by those following Saussure in one 
form or another (various continental schools of linguistics, the structuralists, 
Λ3 Mt 
the semioticlans) and those following Chomsky. Furberg's attempt to 
characterise language conventions, noted above, will not be considered here. It 
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ie too aketchily presented by Furberg hlaself to warrant attention; moreover, 
there Ьав been no follow-up of hie suggestion. It does exemplify, however, how 
• eonrentions approach to language might be undertaken. language conTentions 
research could be described as a search for those rules goTeming both ling­
uistic competence (our resources of language) and linguistic peArmance (how 
in fact language is used), ranging frca phonemics (sounds and their combinations) 
to syntactics (ho'w linguistic strings are constructed in a natural language). 
To assist its attempts at formalization of rules, language conventions research 
utilizes the artificial languages of formal logic and metamathematice, though 
this use tends to be eclectic. language conTentions share Important interfaces 
with speech conTentions (especially in regard to the rules of linguistic per­
formance) and any other semiotical systems utilizing a system of signs heavily 
Ί6 dependent upon a linguistic model of coomunication. Moreover, there are 
interesting parallels with research on symbolic universe conventions, a point 
to be examined when they are considered. 
Speech conventions, on the other hand, are moat researched by people of 
the conTentions approach. Here would be placed most of ordinary language philo­
sophy and certainly speech act theory. Research here can be described as a 
search for those rules that characterize speech, i.e., language In use, for the 
purpose of classifying the various usages and the sensitivity of these usages to 
varying contexts. Research Into speech conventions tends to be surface stnucture 
oriented — no attempt is made to develop a phonemics, and syntactics is studied 
only in a very general sense, one more conditioned by semantic and contextual 
considerations than those of linguistic competence. Speech conventions share a 
large Interface with language conventions and one might even foresee speech 
conTentions being eventually Integrated into language conventions. However, 
before such an Integration could take place, language conventions will have to 
47 develop a comprehensive semantics, a task neglected until quite recently. 
But this growing sense o* the part of language convention research of a need for 
a semantics and the ccnventiona approach's recognizing the need to investigate 
constitutive rules show the direction of the future". Но етец the difference 
between the two is still too large to warrant speaking of a single class of 
conventions here. 
Speech conTentions also share an Interface with social conventions, because 
of their context sensitivity. And insofar as one can construct a comprehensive 
sociology of language, the class of speech conventions could be absorbed into 
the class of social conventions with respect to this. 
Social conventions research has representatives in both groups, although 
the conventions approach still clearly dominates the convention class. Researchers 
of the conventions approach would be such sociologists and social theorists 
such as Sorokin, Parsons, Blau and Merton as well as the growing body of work 
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on the eociology of knowledge. Representing the rules approach would be 
senioticians such as Barthes and other studies inspired Ъу Ъіт in the struet-
uralist tradition. There is also a very smal} body of literature generated 
by the systems theory approach, inspired by the above named social theorists 
51 
and the general systems theory of Bertalanffy. Social conventions research 
could be best described as those attempts to characterize the underlying rules 
governing behavior patterns in society in all its forms. One might further 
characterize it as a formal sociology in search of the rules of social organiza­
tion. Vast amounts of work still have to be done on social conventions research 
and doubtless many subclasses of convention will have to be formulated befóse 
we have anything like a genuine class of social conventions. Social conventions 
as a class share interfaces with speech conventions (described above) and with 
the symbolic universe conventions insofar as the latter attempt to govern the 
convention options of social convention formation. 
The final class, symbolic universe conventions, is the most difficult to 
describe, since they deal with those rules that are the most sweeping and 
encompassing, and thus the hardest to localize and formulate, in human society. 
The term "symbolic universe" itself derives from Luckmann and Berger who define 
it as embodiaents "of theoretical tradtion that integrate different provinces 
of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a synbolic totality." 
They are universes in that a whole world is created that forms a frame of 
reference on an anthropological and cosmologica! level for the individuals and 
institutions. They are symbolic in that they can span spheres of reality (or 
classes of conventions) and in turn point beyond these classes to areas beyond 
the reach of the realities constituted by a given class of conventions. Thus 
symbolic universes have to do with those options underpinning the whole of 
society at a level deeper than those of social conventions. One finds the 
conventions of the symbolic universe expressed in myths, "absolute points of 
departure", symbols, unarticulated presuppositions, worldviews, and the like. 
Host research into this area of conventions has been one by the rules 
approach, especially the structuralists influenced by Lévi-Strauss, the semio-
ticians influenced by Russian research, and the structural semantics of Qreimas. 
They have concentrated on the linguistic evidence of these conventions: myths 
and narratives. To what extent the rules they are able to formulate on the basis 
of their research are universal ones, i.e., rules encompassing all other classes 
of converti one, they are very cautious in saying. On one level, too, the general 
systems theory people could be seen as an attempt from the former group to study 
conventions of the symbolic universe overarching our society. Research into 
the symbolic universe conventions is difficult, first of « n because of the 
difficulty of isolating the data. To date, primarily linguistic data have been 
studied, but one could imagine isolating other forms of data that undergird 
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th« Ъаяіс options of aociety, drawn fron art, architecture, psychology of the 
unconscious, and so on. Secondly, there is the difficulty of the slippery 
character of the data to be isolated. The symbolic universe by definition 
provides the conditions of possibility for phenomena, and tools for investigating 
symbolic universe conventions will find themselTes being constantly undermined 
by this fact. The idea of a hermenéutica! circle has to be kept constantly 
in mind by the researcher. 
Symbolic universe conventions research shares interfaces with language 
and with social conventions. Insofar as language tends to the formation of 
natural languages as self-enclosed, autonomous, self-generating systems, so 
too symbolic universe conventions tend toward closed, autonomous self-generating 
symteos. It is thus not eurpdsing that the tools of linguistics have made 
the most headway in elucidating symbolic universe conventions. The danger of 
linguisticizing the symbolic universe conventions is real; and the fact that 
the research is still in its infancy shows how little can yet be ascertained in 
the way of criteria for preventing this. But symbolic universes share an inter-
face with social conventions as well in that symbolic universe conventions tend 
to undergird certain options that develop into the various^sterns of social 
conventions. Symbolic universe conventions have the least ccsmon ground with 
speech conventions since symbolic universe conventions tend to be less context-
bound in that they thanselves are constitutive of the possibility of contexts. 
"However, strings of speech expressive of the symbolic universe are fair game 
for speech conventions insofar as these strings are sentences from speech end 
depend for their intelligibility upon speech in use. 
To go beyond this brief characterization of the four classes of conventions 
would inevitably lead to attempts to integrate them on a theoretical level, i.e., 
provide a system of metarules for the classes of rules. As we have seen, the 
symbolic universe conventions, in sharing more interfaces with the other classes 
than any other class, tends toward this function. But to go further into 
such a discussion would be to go beyond the research done to date and would be 
pure speculation. The notion of convention will be returned to in the following 
sections on meaning and truth problems. In the study of eschatology, our 
concern will concentrate upon speech conventions and symbolic universe conven-
tions. The next chapter will provide the neeeaaary background for those matters 
in eschatology pertaining to conventions of the symbolic universe class. 
k.Z. Meaning. 
Explicitatlng meaning has been a central, if not the central problematic 
of twentieth century language philosophy. The literature on the topic is vast, 
and the number of definitions, models, and proposed solutions could probably 
not be encoopassed within a single book. To give an example: in their cíaselo, 
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The Meaning of Meaning, Ogden and Bicharda liet no lees than sixteen défini-
tions of meaning. Alaton, who tried to list the •arioue vaya we ueed the 
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words "mean" and "meaning", gives nine different usages.•" In linguistics, the 
picture is no less disheartening. One can safely say that there is still no 
unified theory of semantica. The influence of Bloomfield has certainly re-
38 tarded consideration of meaning in those researchers he influenced, but 
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continental linguistics has fared little better. Interestingly enough, be 
field of meaning reminds one of what was found of eachatology research in 
Chapter One: all the shiftings from one position to another, without research 
interests being guided by any particular model. 
Even simply to cover what has been said in speech act theory would be 
difficult in this short space, because it must be seen within the larger 
context of the recent history of philosophy in order to make sense of it. 
For some of the positions taken are clearly in reaction to notions of meaning 
held within that tradition. Moreover, like the discussion on time, talk about 
meaning frays on its edges into other problems, notably those of knowledge, 
truth and convention. This will likewise have to be taken into consideration. 
Keeping these difficulties in mind, tien, the discussion here will proceed 
along the following lines. First of all, the principal positions in the re-
cent history of philosophy on the topic of meaning will be sketched. Quiding 
interest will be not so much full exportions of opinions but rather grouping 
together of principal positions and their implications for a theory of meaning. 
Interestingly, this kind of grouping is e»^и^πg scae recognition, which indicates 
an important advance in the research. Then meaning as presented in speech 
act theory, notably by Austin, Searle, and Alston, will be taken up, showing 
what this has meant for speech act theory itself and for the wider developaent 
of a philosophical theory of meaning. Next, a critique will be given of the 
research history, aimed mainly at pointing out lapasses due to the restricted 
use of some recurring models. Finally, an attempt will be aade to propose a 
broader base for a theory of meaning, baaed on the notion of rules and conven­
tion presesented in the previous section. The proposal will be sketched and 
scae implications for the philosophical understanding of meaning will be drawn. 
4.2.1. Four Approaches to Understanding Meaning. 
If one were to characterise the research into meaning theaatically, 
four different approaches to meaning could be distinguished: referential, idea­
tional, stimulus-response, and operational theories of meaning. 
The referential theory is perhaps the most coaaonly used and widely known 
theory; it is also the most straightforward and has, in a way, determined the 
growth of the other theories, either positively or negatively. There are two 
kinds of referential theory: meaning is either an object or a relation. 
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When meaning ie an object, referential theory defines meaning as that 
object in the world which a particular word is talking about. Meaning ia 
the identified primarily with a naming function, modelled on the notion of 
proper names. Thus, in the sentence "That is John", the word "John" refers 
to a particular individual who, in turn, is the meaning of the word "John". 
This approach to meaning corresponds most closely to the idea of definition 
and lexical or dictionary meaning, and as such continues to hold a prominent 
place in the literature, albeit in more sophisticated forms than the simple 
notion of description or proper names. This sophistication gradually developed 
due to a number of difficulties. First of all, meaning and reference cannot 
always be equated, something known since Frege, for two words or phrases can 
clearly refer to the same object but have a different "meaning": "the Queen 
of England" and "Prince Philip's spouse" both refer to Elizabeth Windsor, but 
the two phrases clearly have a different meaning. Secondly, and more seriously, 
not all words have a referent in the world: words like "if", "although", "or", 
"badly", "very", and so on are examples of this. Just as difficult is finding 
the referent of some sentences which people can clearly understand, but which 
64 have no referent and therefore must be "meaningless" or "nonsense". Russell's 
famous "The present king of France is bald" would be a good example. Thus 
while the referential theory of meaning-as-object may work for some kinds of 
nouns, it simply does not offer broad enough a base for a theory of meaning in 
language. 
A different approach is to make meaning a relation, i.e., that "meaning" 
is the relation between a word and the object in the world instead of the object 
itself. Ogden and Bichards are famous proponents of this approach in the 
Anglo-American world, and Saussure provided a similar account in continental 
theories of meaning. While this theory looks more promising and less crude 
than the referential theory of meaning-as-object, it runs into many of the same 
difficulties. Instead of searching for objects to match our words, relatione 
must be searched out between objects and words, and this has proved no less 
difficult. Such an approach can better account for meanings of verbs (one 
can talk of activities and the like), but it still cannot account for some 
other linguistic particles. In fact, cataloguing the relations brings the theory 
back to M. Jourdain: the meaning of "and" will be a conjunctive relation; of 
"Bleeping", a dormitive relation, and so on. 
The model behind the referential theory is based on one prominent kind of 
meaning, but a kind not broad enough to encompass all other kinds of meaning; 
it is a model based on description, on names and nouns, on ostaneive significa-
tion and identification of objects in the world. 
The ideational theory locates meaning in the mind or ideas of the speaker 
who connects words and objects. Thus meaning is not in the object, but in the 
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thought of the speaker. This theory can be found in Locke, Berkeley, and in 
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the "picture theoriea" of aeaning. Such a theory accounts for aone things 
not covered by the referential theories like connotative meanings, governing 
imagée (as we saw in theories of time), Oricean speaker-meaning, and the 
like. Meaning is achieved when the hearer has the same idea aroused in him 
as is in the thought of the speaker. The advantage of the ideational neaning 
theory is that it can handle more complex units than the referential variety 
(unless, of course, one insists on one idea for each morpheme, which would be 
a referential theory demand on ideational theory) and also assign meaning where 
no object in the world can be found, i.e., for that kind of non-object meaning 
the referential theorists will call "emotive meaning". But one very serious 
difficulty makes itself felt: there must in all cases be a perfect coanunity 
of ideas. Whereas sentences like "It may snow tomorrow" will be understood (even 
if it fails to snow), there are problems with sentences like "I feel a pain in 
my head". In short, it is the problem of "other minds": how far can one per-
son penetrate into the ideas of another? So, although ideational theory offers 
a base for certain kinds of complex meaning, it founders on the problem of 
ether minds and thus cannot provide the foundations for a general theory of 
meaning by itself. 
Stimulus-response theory (S-R theory) is an ingenious attempt to solve 
some of the problems inherent in the two approaches just mentioned. The 
principal influence on its formulation is American behaviorist psychology. 
In its simplest form, meaning is achieved if the stimulus provided by the 
speaker arouses the appropriate responses in the hearer. Although this may 
sound like ideational theory, there is an important difference. S-R theory 
externalizes the ideas; meaniig beccnes a matter of public, observable behavior. 
Then the problem of other minds is solved. S-R theory, by mnUng meaning a 
public event, also offers a solution to the referential theory problem of 
meaning-as-relation. With public behavior, we can meticulously record the 
interchanges between S and R (as, e.g., when R then beccaes a atimulus for S, 
thereby initiating a second-order S-R pattern) that build up the skein of 
meaning. And researchers in this area, such as Osgood, have even tried to fix 
connotative meaning with the use of semantic differentials. 
But the difficulties of this appramch, too, are formidable. S-R theory 
abares the conceptual ceiling of behaviorist psychology: only those indices 
physically or physiologically quantifiable by S-R paradigms are admissible. 
A counterexample would be an "intuition" of the speaker — a memory trace which 
cannot be public behavior. Thus S-R is really only a sophisticated version 
of the apples-and-oranges world of the referential theory of meaning-as-object. 
Anything resisting quantification is automatically problematic. 
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The operational theory of neanlng ie an attempt to ehift the problem to 
new ground. Wittgenstein'a aphorism "Don't look for the meaning, look for the 
use" is the inspiration for this. Meaning is thus not a question of codent 
(as in referential and ideational theory), but of operation: how a word or 
sentence is used determines its meaning. Sudi an approach has the advantage 
of freeing expressions from denotative straitjackets and allowing for a more 
varied sense of content than the other theories. Moreover, the emphasis on 
use goes a long way toward solving the other minds problem. Much ordinary 
71 language philosophy is built upon this approach, as might be expected sine«1 
such a theory seemingly does not force language into a predetermined paradigm. 
But operattonal theory, at least in some of its more enthusiastic and less 
sophisticated forms, also runs aground at important points. For in an odd 
way, it is ideational theory run amok: if the only criterion of meaning is 
use, then any word or sentence could be made to mean anything, depending upon 
the intention of the speaker. Moreover, there is the problem of one morpheme 
determining the meaning of an entire sentence, as in the case of negatives: 
"I like ice cream / I do not like ice cream" — clearly different meaning, and 
the temptation exists that "not" will be assigned that meaninc· Thus while 
operational meaning saves context and vafiety in a manner that referential 
theory cannot; while it better focuses on relation and away from private meaning; 
and while it offers a better paradigm for public meaning than S-R theory; it, 
too, is inadequate as a full base for a theory of meaning because of its loose 
generality. 
In sum, it can be seen that all four approaches have important advantages, 
but no one theory is in itself adequate for all the problems with which meaning 
is confronted. Some authors have rightfully suggested a combination of these 
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theories, but that does not in itself solve the difficulty: these suggestions 
do not say how the theories are to be conbined. 
4.2.2. Meaning in Speech Act Theory. 
Ve have had occasion in Chapter Two to discuss meaning in speech act 
theory (sections 2.1.5·, 2.2.3·, 2.3.2.), and so the account here will empha­
size the relation of speech act theory to the four approaches just sketched. 
The important contribution Austin made to the problem of meaning was the dis­
tinction of the locutlonary (or more precisely, the rhetic) and the illocutionary 
act, the distinction of the вnaning of a sentence and its force. Meaning, as 
we saw, he seemed to understand in a Fregean notion of sense and reference, 
which was just characteriEed above as part of the referential theory of meaning. 
The notion of forces owes much to the theory of meaning as use — the operational 
theory of meaning. What Austin seems to have had in mind was to сошЪіпе two 
such notions, with meaning providing the safeguard against the arbitrariness of 
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operational theory, and force assuring the safety of context and varied usages. 
Thus Austin's few comments on the matter of meaning pointed in the direction 
of combining two important approaches to a theory of meaning. 
However, the locutionary-illocutionary distinction continued to present 
difficulties (section 2.2.3·), not only in the matter of effectively disting­
uishing the locutionary and the illocutionary act, but more importantly, in 
the probiom of craning and force. Sone questioned the possibility of such a 
distinction at all. 
Searle, as we saw, tried to search out the factors distinguishing the 
illocutionary force indicating device and the propositional content indicator 
(section 2.3.2.), but this, too, was less than successful. Not only did 
notions such as propositional content undermine Austin's notion of illocutionary 
act, but also his failure to identify the syntactic indicators for propositional 
content weakened his argument. Particularly Richards has gone into the inherent 
73 difficulties in Searle'β approach. He points out that, ultimately, Searle'β 
approach founders on the search for rules for the semantic component (propo­
sitional content) which somehow must include force indicators as well. And 
except for a very small number of speech acts, this cannot be done. 
One other approach to speech act meaning might be mentioned, namely, that 
of Alston who speaks of meaning in terms of illocutionary act potential. 
Building on a notion of synonymy, he maintains that two words have the same 
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meaning if they make the ваше contribution tp illocutionary act potential. 
But this seems again to veer dangerously near to the speech act fallacy on the 
one hand (thereby putting one word in control of the force of a speech act) and 
вілріе meaning-as-use on the other. The problem of the boundaries of lexical 
meariag, the η number of ways a word can be used, is not sufficiently accounted 
for. Moreover, building a theory of meaning on the shoals of synonymy, itself 
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a highly problematic concept, is also questionable. 
And so, for all its vagueness, we need to return to Austin's basic insight 
into a distinction of meaning and force as speech act's contribution to a 
possible theory of meaning. 
4.2.3. Limiting Factors in the Four Approaches to Meaning. 
In the course of presenting various theories of meaning, we have had occa­
sion to offer implicitly and at time explicitly a critique of these approaches. 
Part of attempting to get beyond the respective difficulties will include showing 
how these difflculties conspire to provide a series of shibboleths and conceptual 
ceilings that prevent further development of the individual theories and their 
mutual integration into some more comprehensive theory of meaning covering nil 
those areas that each individual theory covers in part. 
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One euch Uniting factor is the notion of meaning as a naming function 
and that names (and therefore also nouns) are the primary bearers of meaning. 
Bernard Harrison haa forcefully demonstrated the difficulties of this position: 
Our objection to the ETL (empiricist theory of language) theorist's 
claim for the primacy of naming as the sole means of introducing 
meaning into a language is, then, that it entails the claim that the 
rules of a device...can do duty for the rules of every other 
linguistic device, a claim which distracts us from the actual 
complexity of language Ъ focusing our attention on a specious 
theoretical simplicity.'' 
And more decisively, he points out what sort of symbolic universe conventions 
underlie such an approach. For nsming as meaning works "only if we are con­
fronted in our experience with an array of intrinsically clearly differentiated 
nameables, as enumberable and logically discrete as the pebbles on a shingle 
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beach are enumerable and logically discrete." One need not search far; 
the Influence of Buasell'a theory of descriptions and his insistence on 
predication are supported by his logical atomism — a position since abandoned 
by most philosophers, but his understanding of meaning still exerts a tremendous 
influence. In Bussell's own difficulties with his theory of descriptions this 
problem was already evident (notably in how we could understand contradictory 
statements like "The present king of Trance is bald"), but there seems to have 
been little interest in exposing the basis of the problem, the low conceptual 
ceiling imposed by the naming function. 
A second limiting factor can be found in the referential notion of meaning 
as relation; most so much in the notion as such, but in its development as the 
reversal of Bussell's notion of the naming function. This is particularly 
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clear in Ogden and Richards' polemic against Hussell in The Meaning of Meaning, 
and the type of relation they developed to displace n«Hwg functions was in 
effect the reverse of Bussell's theory. For it makes the distinction of 
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symbolic and emotive meaning, a distinction that still dominates the literature. 
And symbolic meaning is, in effect, Bussell's meaning. Moreover, the notion of 
relation exhibits its own kind of atcmin here under influence of referential 
theory. There seems to be no systea of relatione, only relatione relating each 
linguistic bit to another. It is hard to see how this really improves on 
Bussell's meaning as naming. 
A third limiting factor Mated to the ямПид function is that real meaning 
is lexical meaning, the meaning of definition and lexicography. This holds 
for meaning-as-object and meaning-as-relation theories equally well. Meaning 
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par excellence im word-meaning. Time and time again, even In Auatlnian analysts, 
other notions of meaning (or the words "mean", "meaning") are sheared away 
and "linguistic meaning" is concentrated upon. As we shall see shortly, this 
even more than naming notions plays the most important rito in the impasse in 
meaning research. 
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Ideational theoriea preeent a fourth liaitlDg factor — that of intention. 
Eapecially Qriee and hie critica hare focused on thia problem. Ideational 
meaning becomee a problem of effeetirely focuaing on speaker's and hearer'в 
respective intentiona in endless regress that can only be stopped at some 
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point by outside factors such as Schiffer'ε "mutual knowledge"". Again, 
it is a problem of eatablishing criteria for intentions, demonstrating that 
they are not wholly arbitrary. Moreover, as Schiffer'a term mutual knowledge* 
indicates, there must be criteria for a cutoff point. Lewis had pointed out 
a similar difficulty in the coordination problema used to explain Conventions. 
The difficulty of criteria for intentions arises from their being considered in 
isolation, as Strawson had already indicated. Thia is certainly a slippery 
От» 
point, one Austin also referred to in his discusaion of securing uptake. 
k.Z.k. Toward a Coherence Theory of Meaning. 
To somehow reckon with these four limiting factors that in one way or 
another have impeded the growth of a unified theory of meaning, it is necessary 
6k to do more than simply introduce another taxonomy or yet another definition 85 
of meaning. The proUem is also one of method. 
k.ZA.l. An Austinian Analysis of "Mean, Meaning". 
One point one can use as a starting focus is Austin's method of inventarizing 
uses of the words mean and meaning. This does not imply that meaning must be a 
substantive of aome sert, but is simply one way of getting an overview of how 
we get on with the word. Alston has, in fact, done precisely this, listing 
nine different uses of the word: 
(1) That is no mean accooplishment. (insignificant) 
(2) He was so mean to me. (cruel) 
(3) I mean to help him if I can. (intend) 
(Ό The passage of thia bill will mean the end of second class 
citisenship for vast areas of the population, (result in) 
(5) Once again life has meaning for me (significance) 
(6) What is the meaning of this? (explanation) 
(7) He just lost his job. That means that he will have to start 
writing letters of application all over again, (implies) 
(8) Keep off the grass. This means you. (reference) 
(9) Lucky Strike means fine tobacco, (definition) 86 
Following Austin, we might also add negative, asyisetrical uses: 
(10) His death was a meaningless act of violence, (inccoprehensible) 
(11) We have Just had a meaningful axperiancet (full, rich) 
(12) Throw it away. It has no meaning for me anymore, (no value) 
(13) It would be meaningless to continue this discussion; I'm 
going homej (be without results) 
(1Ό He has uttered another meaningless statement, (empty) 
As can be seen, many "meanings" of meaning are possible, from a simple lexical 
point of view. Beferentlal meaning can be found in (6), (8), (9), and (1Ό. 
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Qricean meaning con be found іл (3). Cf), (7), and (13)· (1) and (2) are 
0*7 
homonymie uaee, atemning from a différant word root. In another category 
we can put the idioeyncratic (ideational?) uses (5)i (10), (11), (12). 
Interestingly, meaning research, including Alston's (the author of the first 
nine examples), concentrates on the first two groups, with speech act theorists 
preferring what we called Gricean meanings, and linguists and other philosophers 
the first group of referential kinds of meaning. The homonymie uses are quite 
rightly ignored. The four group is seldom ignored; it is often forthrightly 
said that this group simply will not be treated. I would like to suggest 
that concentrating on this fourth group may offer an important insight into 
an eventual theory of meaning. 
These four examples offer the least circumscribable use of the word, 
wheh seems to be the reason for their never being treated. They are doubtlessly 
the farthest removed from any notion of definitional or lexical meaning.' Is 
there any conmon thread holding these uses together other than their not belong-
ing elsewhere? First of all, (5) and (12) can be seen as a pair of symmetrical 
opposites. (5) and (10) have a certain symnetry as well, somewhat akin to 
"sense" and "senseless". (11) is an odd usage, akin to (5) in the sense of 
"significant". Can any coherent notion be give of this idiosyncratic usage? 
To start, it seems like an ideational sort of meaning in that the notion 
of meaning is a private one, or at least a non-public use not readily accessible. 
Secondly, there is something valuational about it, though valuational in a 
different way from ilk); perhaps the difference between "senseless" and "non-
sense" best reflects this: senseless is wholly without sense, whereas nonsense 
masks as sense, following its structural rules. 
It would seem, then, that we have simply isolated the ideational notion of 
meaning. But there is more to be found here. Third, there seems to be a 
pattern in this valuation, especially evident in the negative use in (10) where 
meaningless could be paraphrased as "falling outside any frame of reference". 
Viewed in this light, the meaning of (5) and (12) also takes on form. But (11) 
remains problematic and might be called quinteasentially ideational in character. 
It is particularly the notion of meaning in (5), (10), and (12), which 
we could paraphrase as "a frame for placing other things, a topography of the 
world", which is, to my mind, the central notion of meaning that in turn under-
lies the other notions. 'Jhereas in the referential notion the object or the re-
lation is central; in the ideational, the correspondence between language and 
idea; in S-E, its quantifiable public character (a combination of the referen-
tial and ideational); and in the operational, the number of possible combinations 
and permutations — in this notion of meaning as frame, coherence is central, 
that the frame is able to order the phenomena into relatione with each other 
in some fashion. 
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4.2.4.2. Coherence Theory and the Four Approaches to Meaning. 
If we relate this theory of meaning — call it the coherence theory — 
to the other theories and their problema, we get the following: 
Referential theory. Coherence theory overcoaea the num-lng function diffi-
cultiea by accounting for the linguistic particles such as "and", "although" 
and so «HI. They become operators within the pattern of coherence and as such 
have meaning in that they fall within the fabric of the pattern, having a 
clear function. "And" thus is Juat as much part of meaning as is "John", 
something Bussell could not account for. Иогеотег, within the topography of 
coherence theory, valuational words such as "good", "true", "ugly", and so on 
also find a place and need not be devalued into "emotive meaning". To continue 
the topography metaphor, names could possibly be accepted as high ground in 
the universe of meaning, but they are not the only type of ground permitted or 
even recognized. Indeed, they depend on other sorts as well. One of the 
difficulties of relatione in referential theory is that there is little rhyme 
or reason in the one-to-one connections between words and linguistic bits of 
varying size. Within the skein of coherence theory, the relations take on 
clearer form. 
Ideational theory. Clearly, coherence theory is close to ideational 
theory. To described coherence theory, we have had recourse to pictures and 
metaphors. And by suggesting there can be any number of coherent patterns, we 
are close to the problem of other minds. Tfeis is, to an extent, the case. 
However, insofar as coherence theory has a logic, it is accessible to other 
minds, willing to work within the operations of that logic. Given such an 
entry, it becomes difficult to construct a wholly other minds example. Per­
haps the example of a wholly private universe of coherence would be that of a 
schisophrenic, although even its logic can be discovered if there is comini-
cation in some form. And secondly, the logic prevents the infinite regress of 
intentions that Schiffer discussee — it offers the reason why the regress 
will stop at a given point because of the logical connection. 
Insofar as S-R theory is a combination of the foregoing two, it need not 
be discussed here. 
Operational theory. A coherence theory will explain why these relatione 
and not other relations obtain in operational theory; and to that extent to 
which the logic of a universe can be uncovered, the difficulties surrounding 
locutionary meaning and illocutionary force will received clarification. 
The obvious next step arising from this is a search for the logic of 
coherence. And it should be noted that this search has already begun, in the 
search for underlying constitutive rules. The role of rules in conventions has 
already been discussed and at this point it can be carried further, having learned 
something from the history of meaning research. 
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1. First of all, meaning is being equated here with the sun of all the consti­
tutive rules in eyetern, system forming a sort of metarule. Meaning is thus 
not a touchstone, determining the presence or absence of meaning, but an 
open-work series of possibilities determined by the connectedness of a series 
of rules. Thus to Ьеііете that a formulation of the rules will result in an 
exact formulation of meaning, Imctioning as such a touchstone, is a false hope. 
For rules simply give the finite number of combinations and permutations 
within which a phenomenon can function. And aeaninglessness can only happen 
when a phenomenon falls wholly outside the system of rules, i.e., does not 
even follow the rules in breaking them — something extremely difficult to do. 
Moreover, establishing meaning entails first having established all the rules 
and their connectedness with one another. These rules may not exhibit a type 
of logic to which we are accustomed; but again, they might. To cite Searle, 
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we may know how to use them without really knowing how they work. Thirdly, 
in a large universe of meaning something breaking the rules may not even be 
recognized at all; since meaning also constitutes (in large systems) the phenom­
ena as phencoena. Thus it is usually a long journey to the edges where the 
universe of meaning no longer obtains. And actions first deemed meaningless 
may a posteriori (and usually a posteriori) be seen to have meaning after all. 
2. The history of meaning research also tells us scaething about the search 
for tules. In terns of linguistic meaning, the operational theory would offer 
the best entry into ouch work. For it tries to be conscious of the entire 
terrain, at least in its surface structure or manifestation as phenomenon. 
Referential theory has usually gone hand in hand with one or other form of 
ideal language philosophy, which amounts to tglng on logics until one more or 
less fits (always with particular attention to certain favorite aspects), 
whereas ordinary language philosophy, and especially speech act theory, retains 
more sensitivity to its own preliminary and provisional character and thus is 
able to more slowly build up rules and not be continually confronted with having 
to chuck an entire logic. And the search for rules, noted in Searle, and the 
discussion la the section on convention, indicate that speech act theory is at 
least capable in principle of cominicating with those systems attempting to 
explore adeep structure of phenomena, as in certain kinds of linguistics and 
••miotics. 
3· An important developoent in regard to a theory of reference deserves special 
mention. Instead of meaning residing inthe object in the world, the reference 
direction has turned l80 degrees: it is the connected universe of meaning that 
confers meaning on the object. TUs smacks of idealism, of placing all meaning 
In mind, but a closer examination reveals that such is not the case. It is, 
rather, the natural consequence of the acceptance of the notion of convention — 
that meanings are made, not born. And the universe of meaning, if it is a large 
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one, ie acceeeible to a large population — in the various classes of convention 
discussed in the previous section. The problem of the private universes of 
meaning is not as serious as it may seem. It bears resemblance to our bald 
king of France: it is a system-generated problen. Just as the king is only 
problematic if one accepts Russell's theory of reference, so also these wholly 
private universes only occur if one accepts one particular sort of ideationalist 
theory. For what can become problematic for the coherence theory of meaning is 
not idiosyncratic ideas, but idiosyncratic rules. And if rules can be wholly 
idiosyncratic, they must nevertheless maintain some fona as rules to be rules — 
whereupon they can be deprived of that idiosyncracy. For being odd and being 
wholly idiosyncratic are quite different concepts. 
k. Following the earlier point made that meaning in a coherence theory is the 
sun of all the constitutive rules in system, meaning and convention come to 
fall together. And thus at the present level of research, one can talk of 
four classes of meaning, just as four classes of convention were spoken of. It 
should by now be clear that these foor classes will not correspond with any of 
thp four theories of meaning discussed earlier, although speech act meaning vili 
include operational, referential and ideational notions. There will be no 
attempt here to further articulate the constitutive rules mulHng up the skein 
of meaning, for the same reasons that the miles of convention classes were not 
articulated — this is pre-empting the research. Howrver something can be said 
about two classes which will figure largely into our discussion of eschatology: 
that of speech acts and symbolic universe. 
As for speech act constitutive rules, it is clear that not all of them 
can be laid down at this time. But we have seen how to go about disovering 
these rules, and in the case of promising in the previous chapter we have 
shown this at some length. So, although the rules cannot be given, it has 
been shown how to go about it. 
In the case of symbolic universe constitutive rules, a chapter will be 
devoted to the research in this area, particularly the research into semiotics. 
Certain rules for certain kinds of expressions of symbolic universes have been 
isolated (as also was our case with speech acts), and these will be discussed 
there. 
k.J,. Definitions of Truth and Truth Criteria. 
"Meaning is thus not a touchstone, determining the presence or absence 
of meaning, but an open-work series of possibilities determined by the connec-
tedness of a series of rules." "For rules simply give the finite number of 
combinations and permutations within which a phenomenon may function." These 
two statements, made in the previous section, would seem to point up a glaring 
difficulty in a coherence theory of meaning: the lack of criteria for exclusion 
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ог inelueion of phenomena within the fabric of meaning. Although the meaning-
meaningleae distinction vae diacuaaed, the important diatinction of true and 
false was not eren touched upon. To put the question directly to the theory 
of meaning: how does the system of meaning connect up with the world? How 
does one distinguish possibilities simply generated by the structure of the 
conatititutive rules from those possibilities that exist in the world as 
reality? And more radically, why this syatem of meaning and not another? 
The latter question is actually two questiona, namely, about the criteria 
of preference of systems and about the criteria for system-building and devel­
opment. And any diacussion of hww meaning as a system of underlying consti­
tutive rules connects up with the world will have to face them. These ques­
tiona have to do with the justification of the system and an ongoing support 
for its methodology. Aa such they touch upon the two points that must receive 
elaboration if the theory of coherence meaning is to be functional. 
These questiona all point, however, to a more fundamental one, namely, 
the truth question. How do we know that the meaning generated by the underlying 
rules is true, is really the case? To answer this, a definition of truth must 
be given and elaborated that will not only reply to the questions, but integrate 
those responaea into the fabric of the theory. The truth question, like the 
radical question about why this syatem of rules and not another, is twofold, 
corresponding to the two subquestions that went to make up the radical question. 
In the case of the truth question, we really have, then, two questions: (1) what 
do we mean by truth? and (2) how do we ascertain ita presence or absence? 
4.3·1· Criteriological Problems of the Coreespondence Theory of Truth. 
The definition moat forthcoming in a diacussion of truth is a time-honored 
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one in the history of philosophy. It baa its roota in Aristotle and received 
its still basically accepted formulation in the Middle Agea: truth is an 
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adequatio ad rem, or adequatio rei et intellectua. In contemporary philosophy 
the principle is expressed thus: truth is a correspondence between propositions 
and the world. Thus if a proposition is true, it corresponds with some state 
of affairs in the world. From this, the definition has also received its name: 
the correspondence theory of truth. 
This most straightforward and commonsenaical of definitiona of truth was 
paired in reeent times with a referential theory of meaning to produce its 
criteria for aacertaining whether the correspondence between proposition and 
world was indeed the case. The elaboration of these criteria took place among 
the logical positivists, work having been initiated by Schlick and Carnap. 
Their criterion waa first known as the principle of verification. The tortuous 
history of verificationism from verification to verifiability through falsification 
91 to confirmation is too long to describe here. We will confine ourselves to 
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aketching the plateaus in the reaearch, i.e., the various major definitions of 
the principle and only the most serious objections to it. For although the 
principle in one or other form has enjoyed wide support in the past, it can 
be said that it is no longer subscribed to by any significantly large number 
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of the philosophizing population. The principle suryives in its application 
to restricted types of propositions in restricted circumstances, and even here 
only in vague application. 
The original notion of verification as the principle to be applied for 
ascertaining the truthfulness of a statement was give the simple form of: the 
meaning of a statement is its method of verification. The method of verifica­
tion was, however, more restricted than it may seem. Not only did it not allow 
Just any method of verification (in which case a very good ease could be made 
for its applicability), and not only was the operationalist sense of verifica­
tion ruled out, but verification had but one sense: empirical verification via 
the observation of some empirical phenomena in the world. 
This notion was then incorporated into a "strong" principle of verifica­
tion which was to obtain for all non-analytic statements. Those statements 
which could not be fully corroborated by an empirically observable referent in 
the world were not false, but meaningless. Besides, of course, resurrecting the 
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problem of the false-meaningless distinction, this radical principle proved 
itself unworkable in any number of ways. Meant to do away with the universal 
statements of metaphysics and theology, it did away with the universal statements 
of science as well, since all possible incidents of a phenomenon had to be observed 
to verify a statement like "water boils at 100 C. at sea level". Moreover, among 
other things, it ruled out conjunctions of observable statements, in which each 
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part may have an observable referent, but the whole may not. And, rather 
amusingly, it was pointed out that the principle itself was not verifiable, 
95 thus by its own definition meaningless. 
This strong sense of verification, faced with these problems, gave way to 
a "weaker sense" of verifiability. This principle advocated setting up a set 
of basic observation sentences (Carnap'β Protokollsätze) to which all statements 
were to correspond to greater or lesser degree. The degree of correspondence 
would be the degree of verification. This principle suffered much the same 
fate as its predecessor, because it posed analogous difficulties compounded 
by the extreme difficulty in providing basic observation sentences. 
Popper's suggestion of f aleiflability offered some improvement on the 
principle of verifiability. According to tUe approach, if one phenomenon 
could be found which contradicted or falsified the theory, then the theory was 
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not verifiable. Such a criterion better reflected how knowledge grows in 
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science and how verification takes place, but it too is not free from 
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diffieultiee, particularly because of ita negative approach. Beeide· the 
iopoesibility of falaifying exietential βtatenentβ, the relation of existential 
to univereal statenenta and the difficnltiea accruing fron the structnre of 
negation in a logic with an excluded middle present formidable problema we 
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cannot go into here. 
From verifiability to falsifiability, the search for criteria limited its 
scope even further to the question of confirmation of scientific hypotheses, i.e., 
ascertaining the criteria for confining hypotheses where it will never be 
possible to have all the data. This has led some philosophers, notably Carnap, 
to develop useful and powerful inductive logics, but the applicability of a 
criterion of confirmation beyond a threshold of statistical probability became 
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more and more restricted and thin. And one Important problem, pointed out by 
Badnitzky, is that the confirmation principle directs itself toward the hypo­
thesis as finished knowledge, rather than as an ongoing growth of knowledge 
where hypotheses acutally reside. He insists that science simply does not 
work in the fashion that would permit the type of confirmation those philo­
sophers developing it have in mind. 
When all is»id and done, the verification principle has been reduced to 
seeking out the semantic rules that govern the truth value of predicates of 
empirical sentences — a far cry f г «a its first pretensions. And the inevit­
able conclusion so that the notion of verification in its empirical sense, while 
at first blush seemingly sound and most fitted to a correspondence theory of 
turth, turns out to break down in all but a snail number of cases, namely, 
those existential stateaente purporting to be aapirical and explicitly referring 
to gross observables in the world. And the case of an incorrect reference or 
lack of referent will make than false, not meaningless. 
But while verification may not be the most suited principle for ascertaining 
correspondence between sentences and the world, this does not of itself invalidate 
the definition of truth as an adequatio. Other criteria could be found. But 
such criteria will have to account for more than observation statements to 
provide principles for ascertaining correspondance.' For there is a whole array 
of sentences understood as true and meaningful that have no referent at all 
in the observable world to provide an adequatio: universal propositions, those 
facts about the past no longer reachable, probaULity assertions, modalised 
propoaitione of necessity and possibility (the laws of logic and mathematics), 
hypotheticals, conditionals, and counterfactuala. These can be non-analytic, 
be part of what is emaidered to be true, and yet never have an object in the 
world to which they correspond. 
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^•3.2. The Coherence Theory of Truth. 
Faced with this, will it be neceasary to withdraw the definition of truth 
as correspondence? Although other definitions of truth are available, we 
would be reluctant to part with this definition. This is because it functions 
so well as definition, i.e., saying what the truth is for us. But immediately 
the problem of applying the definition runa into seemingly unsurmountable 
obstacles. 
One poeeiluity for at least temporarily staving off the problem is to 
concentrate wholly on the problem of the application of a notion of truth to 
phenomena, of adducing the criteria for truth in a situation. This seems 
more plausible than trying to bifurcate the meaning and truth matrix; for 
while we can speak of meaning without truth, to speak of truth without meaning 
can oily obtain in those analytic situations where the notion of synonymy is 
sufficiently embedded beforehand. Thus to follow the distinction between a 
definition and its application would aeem the more hopeful. 
In addressing ourselyes, then, to the question of the criteria for truth, 
of what counte as a standard for the truth or falsity of a sentence, we will 
make use of the truth and meaning matrix. For meaning is a necessary condition 
(though not a sufficient one) for truth and as such will help perhaps in cooing 
to terms with the other problem. 
Following, then, our choice of a coherence theory of meaning, we will 
explore a coherence theory of truth. We cajjnot, however, postulate an equi-
valence between the two and thereby consider the problem solved; a coherence 
theory of truth must be developed on its own terms, namely in reference to a 
notion of truth. 
Coherence can refer, philosophically, to at least three different notions: 
a metaphysical one, an epistemologica! one, and a logical one. In the first 
case, coherence is a doctrine on the nature of reality; in the second, it has to 
do with a contiguity and consistency in knowing and perception; and in the 
third, it has to do with the cohesive character of a system of logic in its 
reasoning. In talking about coherence here, the concern will embody most clearly 
the second and third uses. For criteria of truth entail epistemologica! and 
logical aspects, whereas a definition of truth will rely more heavily on the 
metaphysical notion. The coherence sought here will be logico-epistemological 
in character. 
The notion of a coherence theory of truth is hardly new. In modem 
philosophy it has been represented principally by Hegel and various strains of 
10k idealism. In the Anglo-American world, hardly anything has appeared since 
the idealists lost their position in the universities some thirty-five years 
ago. However most recently a rather thorough program for a coherence theory 
of truth has appeared which embodies a logical precision in its argument that 
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the idealiste never achieved or eimply eschewed: Nicholas Hescher's The Coherence 
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Theory of Truth« Our development of a coherence theory of truth will 
depend heavily upon his work. 
The principal notion underlying a coherence theory is that of system, 
that somehow truth is one — certainly an honorable idea in the history of 
philosophy. But one must go further and attempt to characterize the features 
of this system. Bascially it must (1) have an inner logical consistency or 
coherence; (2) emphasize the contextual character of propositions) i.e., not 
treat then insolation; (3) present clear criteria! boundaries which exclude 
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some possibilities; ( Ό but likewise be as comprehensive as possible. 
These all seem clear enough; the difficulties in actualizing them appear in 
some of the general objections to a coherence theory of truth. First of all, 
those arguments familiar from the discussion of meaning: why this system and 
not another? Secondly, it should be noted that "cohere" is an intransitive 
verb. It must cohere with some thing. What, then, is it coherent with? Third, 
a methodological problem of circularity. If one works with a coherence 
theory of truth, one must have criteria on which to base the coherence. But 
these criteria will themselves be expressive of truth. And if prior truth is the 
basis of the system of truth, then there seems to be a circularity that removes 
the need for a system of truth. Fourth, an epistemologica! problem of actually 
somehow "»^"e sure contact with the world. And fifth, a metaphysical problem 
best expressed as "why should coherence indicate truth?" All of these 
questions need answering if a coherence theory of truth is to be not only 
plausible, but preferable. 
Although the course of the argument here will deal with them in more 
detail, the following can already be mentioned from general principles. As for 
the first objection, it can be said that only that system which best actualizes 
the features mentioned above as characteristics of a coherence theory will be 
the preferable one, not only from the aspect of completeness and consistency, 
but especially also from the idea that, in the end, there can be but one coherence 
theory of truth, if truth is indeed one. As for the seoond objection, the 
coherence of a coherence theory has to do with propositions or sentences, though 
with a clear eye to sentences about the world. It is not a matter of coherence 
pure and simple with the world in the first instance, though that is implied. 
The idealists believed, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, that the 
coherence was with our experience, but this seems to obscure the fact that 
criteria of truth are first and foremost about propositions. The third objection 
109 is as old as the Stoics and is difficult to meet. It points out perhaps the 
most important fact about coherence theory other than its problem of connection 
with the world. This is the incomplete character of any coherence theory. All 
coherence theories are incomplète in their cooprehensiveness and criterial 
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power because to be complete would entail embracing the whole world. And if 
that were possible (I do not think it is), then there would be no need for a 
criterion theory; a correspondence theory would have overcame the problems 
aforementioned about universality (proBeos of hypotheticala and counterfactuals 
would disappear because they could not be the case). What this all means in 
terms of the objection is that the criteria notion remains a partial one as 
long as the system is not completely closed; and it is not closed so long as 
only some, not all, sentences are taken into consideration (not all sentences 
seem to raise the need for the application of truth criteria; think of per­
formatives) and these prior criteria are not the only factors entailed in a 
completely comprehensive system. Thus an answer to the objection is only a 
partial one, but it does stave off the brunt of its otherwise annihilating 
objection. The fourth objection is the most crucial one, for with the response 
to this a coherence theory stands or falls. It can only be answered within a 
concrete theory; thus our answer will wait until the discussion of a theory 
ijnediately below. The fifth objection is really in its breadth a suonation 
of all the previous objections plus a few minor objections not being considered 
here. Perhaps the only direct answer, short of presenting the theory itself, 
is that if It solves more of the problems of criteria for truth than any other 
theory, it deserves to be taken most seriously. 
Turning then to developing such a coherence theory of truth. Rascher offers 
the central question: "Begardless of how we resolve the issue of defining truth, 
truth is determined by the relation of a proposition to the actual facts." 
And so the investigation will begin with sorting out the propositions or sen­
tences coming under consideration for their relation to the facts. Bescher 
calls these propositions data. Datr are all those propositions that might 
have a proper claia on truth, on being related to actual facts in the world. 
This does not mean that they already have a claim; they are simply truth-
candidatea. "A datia is a proposition which, given the circumstances of the 
case, is a real prospect for truth in terms of the availability of reasons to 
warrant its truth-candidacy." A datum seldom appears in faolation; it will 
usually occur in a family of data that together cone into consideration. Data 
must be distinguished from evidence. Data ara only truth-candidates; evidence 
has already won its right to be part of the coherence theory of truth. Nor 
should data be confused with the basic observational sentences of the weak 
sense of veriflability. Data need not be primitive sentences, while the basic 
observational sentences must be. There is in fact no single and uniform 
criterion of datahood, other than a real prospect for truth. 
The next important step is to establish a logico-epistemological methodology 
that will sort out the truth-candidates and work theo into a coherent theory. 
Rescher introduces a central concept: the т.е.е., or mmrlmnl consistent subset 
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of α propositional set £ inherent in the data. By determining the various 
т.е.β. inherent in the data, it is possible to get a spectrum of alternative 
consistent and coherent data-groupings. Then propositions are derived from 
the data. If propositions can be found that invariably follow as a consequence 
(called(¿5 -consequences) from those m.c.s. which have been found most suitable 
as truth-candidates (this baifcig been done by subjecting them to an epistemic 
decision theory for alethic eligibility), we then have the beginning of a 
coherence theory of truth. Then, by implementing standard logic "that a 
proposition must count as true relative to a set of premisses when it is a 
consequence thereof" it is possible to extend to a full theory, based on the 
idea that this proposition will cohere with others if it is consistent with 
them and its contradictory is inconsistent with them. 
The resulting coherence theory presents a system that is comprehensive, 
consistent and cohesive, providing (1) inferential closure (i.e., a closed 
range of inductive possibilities); (2) logical inclusiveness; (3) restricted 
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completeness (holding in "standard cases"); ( Ό consistency. 
To return to the objections, it can now be seen that what is cohered with 
is the data, or more properly speaking the m.c.s., which in turn provide the 
link with the world, since these data were the propositions about the world 
(but not the only ones). The coherence theory carries us further than simply 
stating some propositions and not others in that it (1) places these propositions 
within a coherence that gives consistency and closure to the m.c.s., the subset 
having been chosen not by affective preference, but based on decision theory; 
(2) it works as truth-widening in that the patterns of coherence among the 
propositions can produce new, refined truths from old ones; (3) it works as 
truth-originating, i.e., "it yields truths as outputs without requiring that 
truths must also be present among the supplied inputs" ; (4) its strength 
to provide the criteria surpasses that of other theories of truth (though it is 
not superior defidtionally) and is enhanced by its truth-widening and truth-
originating powers. 
However, the power of the coherence theoy to best provide criteria for 
truth because of its logical power has been accepted in the past. Even the 
logical positiviste at one point resorted to a coherence theory of truth. 
The next important step is to consider the epistemologica! foundations of 
coherence theories of truth especially as opposed to foundationalist or intuitionist 
theory, which starts with a set of foundational basic truths and via use of 
121 inductive logic arrives at derivative truths. Here the epistemologica! 
foundations of certainty are touched upon. The foundationalist approach can 
offer them in a maimer the coherentist cannot, thanks to the former's basic 
truths. The coherentist has only m.c.s. with which to work. The coherence 
theory is clearly in the fallibilist tradition of Peirce where no knowledge 
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ean ever be seen to be final. Reecher comparée the two: 
The foundationalist beßins his epistomologieal vork with a 
very anali initial collection of absolutely certain truths 
trom which he proceeda to work outwards by suitably additive 
procedures to arrive at a wider domain of truth; by contrast, 
the eoherentist begins with a very large initial collection of 
insecure pretenders to truth from which he proceeds to work 
inwards by suitably elminative procedures to arrive at a 
narrower domain of truth. ... For the eoherentist, knowledge 
is not a Baconian brick wall with block supporting block upon 
a solid foundation, rather an item of knowledge is like a node 
of a spider's web which is linked to others by thin strands of 
connection, each alone weak but all together adequate for its 
support.123 
Moreover, the all-important truth-widening and truth-originating powers of 
coherence theory must not be forgotten. For this allows it, by a process 
of feedback upon the data, to not only refine the data but actually reconsti-
tute the т.е.е., and so go beyond its primitive m.c.s. in a way the founda­
tionalist theory can never go or see beyond those patterns laid down implicitly 
121* by its basic sentences. This is important for the self-generating character 
of the criteria for truth. Although the system can never reach closure, this 
self-gamerating character can have the same effect as a steady-state system in 
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general systems theory, i.e., be highly responsive to and in communication 
with the environment while maintaining its logico-epistemological integrity. 
But what about knowledge? Can the-e ultimately only he a debilitating 
Bceptioiem with regard to the results of th« coherence theory of truth? Bescher 
counters this point with a two-pronged reply. Scepticism is averted by 
combining the criterial justification of the criterion of truth-
determinations with a pragmatic justification of the criterion 
of truth. On this view, a particular, specific knowledge claim 
is supported with a reference to method, which is then in its 
turn supported on pragmatist lines, ^ o 
The pragmatist notion is the foundation of the discovery of m.c.s. in the 
data and the features of coherence. The power of this theory lies not in 
its a priori certainty, but in its breadth, and through a posteriori accumu­
lation of coherent criterial power comes to match in some manner the virtual 
certainty of a foundationalist approach which cannot account for so much of the 
data as it can. 
In closing, Bescher characterizes the eoherentist epistemology explicitly: 
A eoherentist perspective in epistemology views human knowledge as a 
collective, interpersonal structuie, a position that foundationalist 
epistemology would render untenable. The coherence approach affords 
a theoretical rationale for the natural albeit non-Cartesian, view of 
knowledge as a social product; in contrast to a Cartesian-style ego­
centric epistemology, it is fundamentally pluri-centnc and other-
involving. The coherence theory thus acquires the substantial merit 
of being able to avoid the disaster of congitive solipsism implicit in 
the foundational approach. In short, it o^ens up the prospect of seeing. 
the build-up of our knowledge as an essentially interpersonal enhrprise. 
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1*.3·3· Criteria and Definitions of Truth. 
If we accept the coherence theory of truth as the most powerful eriterially, 
i.e., that truth or falsity must be tested within a coherent set of semantic 
rules governing propositions, how shall this be related to definition? The 
atyle of argument, the method of approach are so different from the corres-
pondance character of definition that one wonders if they can be brought 
together. Kescher is satisfied to let them live in a notion, though nonlogical 
and atheoretical, coexistence and warns against letting the coherence subsume 
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the definitional statue of the correspondence theory. And there are good 
reasons for doing this, the chief one being that the correspondence theory 
underpins the pragmatic Justification of method in coherence theory. If it 
were not for the notion of correspondence between proposition and the world, 
Bescher could not take the step of establishing the notion of data as truth-
candidates (done along the pragmatic lines of those seeming to have a real 
claim on correspondence truth) and then preparing the way for the m.c.s. and 
a?-preference. And so, some sort of distinction must be maintained. 
However, the truth-generating and originating-power, as we have seen, is 
a powerful part of coherence theory and goes some distance toward undermining 
the definitional status of correspondence theory with an operationalist defini-
tion supported by this originating power. Thus, Rescher's work is not ccnpleted 
and this problem cannot be solved so easily and glibly as he seems to think. 
To go further into this difficulty is impossible here; it can only be signalled. 
For, despite this unsettling difficulty at the end, the coherence theory is 
Kescher has developed it still has more power for explicating the relation of 
sentences to the world as truth and falsity than any other theory; and that is 
our main concern here. 
4.3.4. Coherence Theory of Truth in Relation to Meaning and Convention. 
To integrate the coherence theory of truth into the understanding of 
underlying rules cannot be done here, mainly because those rules for the 
various classes of convention have not been presented (with the exception of 
some for speech conventions) and could not be presented (either through lack 
of logical refinement of the various classes of constitutive rules or because 
they simply have yet to be formulated). However, two things can be done. 
One can programmatically discuss relating coherence theory of meaning and 
coherence theory of truth, and point out striking parallels between the coherm ce 
theory of truth and the notion of rules as convention and meaning as developed 
so far. 
As to the first point: it was noted above that, while it is possible to 
speak of manning without truth, one cannot speak of truth without meaning. This 
entails that a theory of meaning can be developed apart from truth cœsiderations. 
-ΙΐΉ 
If our theory of meaning as coherence, then, provides the most comprehensive, 
yet most rationalizable approach to the prohlem of neaning, and an adequate, 
comprehensive eet of criteria for truth hare been developed, then they should 
in some fashion be reconcilable at least and integratable at best. This integra­
tion will have to take place at the level of method — of meaning and conven­
tion's attempt to adduce the constitutive rules of phenomena in the respective 
classes, of truth's attempt to ascertain m.c.s. and J&-preference and process 
them by Bescher's inductive logic and decision theory for epistemic preference. 
To show where points of contact may be, it will be helpful to point out some 
of the parallels between the coherence theory of meaning and the coherence 
theory of truth. 
1. Both have to contend with the arbitrary overtone produced by the fact that 
both theories seem to come into the problematic midway and try to construct the 
theory from there. In th» case of meaning, we saw this in the problem of the 
arbitrary character of conventions and how this impedes every discussion of 
them. We also noted that the arbitrariness can be overcome by something other 
than resorting to a deductive system. In the case of truth, it is the problem 
of the pragmatic justification underlying an important step in the method; but 
again, the only alternative seems to be embracing a foundationalist apprcatch 
and losing the criterini power of the coherence theory. Both, to use Carnap'β 
famous phrase, have the feeling of having to rebuild their ships on the high 
seas. With deductive possibilities ruled out, both need to resort to a refined 
sort of inductivism, a particular sensitivity to the data, and a growth by the 
type of recurrence marked by a feedback system. 
2. By reason of this nondeductive procedure, the method is more transparent in 
both cases, complete with the fallibility with which both are fraught. For 
meaning, it shows how the rules are formed; for truth, the move from data to 
m.c.s. to criteria. The latter may have in this respect, because of its greater 
logical power, eventually something to offer in atreanliniog the rules of con­
vention classes. However, this cannot be done at this time; more such rules 
will have to be articulated, more "truth-candidates" have to arise, before such 
will be possible. 
3. Following this train of thought, truth can contribute logico-episteaological 
backing and support to the coherence of meaning once it enters into meaning to 
provide the matrices of truth and falsehood; and meaning can provide truth with 
that important link with the world with its primitively constituted facts of the 
world (I say primitively, becuase of the reconstituting power of the truth 
theory sketched above). 
if. Finally, both answer their opponents on the question of "why this system and 
not another?" with the same claims to coherence, consistency and comprehensiveness. 
Both strive toward basically the same ends with regard to system (although some 
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of the reeearchera in convention would doubt the posaibility of the eventual 
coherent comprehensiveneee of the system). Not a little of this comee from 
the fact that the notion of meaning, like that of truth, must seek the same 
sort of total applicability. But the problem of the application of meaning 
and truth brings us back to the problem of their relation as systems of coher-
ence, and to the problem of falsehood and meaningfulness. And so no more can 
be added to these suggestions without exceeding our prograimatic intent. 
-lie-
Chapter 5: THE smiOTICS OF THE SYMBOLIC UNIVERSE. 
In the previous chapter, we defined the symbolic universe conventions 
in the following fashion: 
They are universes in that a whole world is created that forms a frame 
of reference on an anthropological and cosmologica! level for the indi­
viduals and institutions. They are symbolic in that they can span 
spheres of reality (or classes of conventions) and in turn point beyond 
these classes to areas beyond the realities constituted by a given 
class of convention. 
In this chapter the vague outlines of this definition will receive more 
definite contour, not only with regard to Just what is meant by symbolic 
universe, but also the method of investigation to be applied to it. 
Symbolic universe conventions are an odd class of conventions. While 
we can point to places where they may be searched out — in myths, tales, 
proverbs, "commonsensp" beliefs and the like — and while we are able to iden­
tify underlying constitutive rules governing their manifestations, they still 
seem to elude our grasp. Whereas the relation between language сonvedi one 
or social conventions and their respective modes of manifestation is relatively 
straightforward, just what symbolic universe conventions and their manifestations 
actually are supposed to do remains elusive. For, as has been recognised by 
authors researching them, they are partially linguistic and partially social 
phenomena, though to attempt to reduced them to either one or the other results 
in their slipping out of our grasp. Any discussion of symbolic universe con­
ventions, then, will be abstract; yet that risk must be run to get a better 
hold on them. 
One can begin by saying that the constitutive rules of the symbolic 
universe class have to do with the problem of meaning, particularly that sort 
of meaning called coherence theory of meaning in the previous chapter. Meaning 
was defined there as the BUB of all the constitutive rules in system, i.e., 
not only the sum of all the nies, but also the operations governing the 
generation of those combinations and permutations that go to form the skein 
within which the phenonenon is placed and Indeed constituted. It was intimated 
that, whereas language, speech and social conventions limited themselves to 
particular fields of endeavor, symbolic universe conventions formed constitutive 
rules at the most fundamental level of society, encoaçiaesing all the others. 
Thus the symbolic universe conventions, realized in such phenomena as myths, 
tales, coomonsenee, and the like, are intended to provide a frame wide enough 
in its applicability to encompass the other classes of conventions. 
But the symbolic universe class is not only ccncemed with meaning as 
such, but also with the mediation of meaning. This introduces the notion of 
a specificity of operation, another important canponent of symbolic universe 
conventions. Meaning can provide a nexus of relations and genérete via its 
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rulea a large number of poesibilitiee. However, a choice has to be made about 
which possibilities will receive actualization in the coherence. The discussion 
of truth and epietemic decision was geared to provide a beginning for this. 
To put it in the words of Lévi-Strauss« symbolic universe conventions attempt 
to mediate a situation "in which the universe is never charged with sufficient 
meaning and in which the mind of man always has more meanings available than 
there are objects to which to relate them." This mediation is twofold. On 
the one hand, it has to relate the other classes of meaning and convention into 
a meshing network capable of being a society. And on the other hand, building 
upon this, it must bring about the actualization of an interlocking network of 
'some of these possibilities into a real symbolic universe, exhibiting codes 
of operation that provide the meaning and truth rules for a given society. 
These codes will be found in their most abstract form in those particular 
actualizations of the symbolic universe such as myths, proverbs, and so on. 
These actualizations may also combine to form a network of their own, in which 
case we have ideologies, mythologies, "epistenes", and so on. It should be noted, 
however, that in the case of the latter networks it is well nigh impossible to 
completely and exhaustively describe the total network; we usually end up 
giving piecemeal descriptions of its components. 
In sum, one can say that the actualization of those constitutive rules 
forming the symbolic universe are concerned with the establishment and mediation 
of a general frame of meaning encompassing a society. The universe they manifest 
is given symbolically in the surface structure of myths, tales, coomonsense 
and the like. We will now turn to an examination of the structure of these 
actualizations so as to cone to an understanding of how they function. 
5.1. The Structural Semantics of the Symbolic Universe. 
Of all the studies having to do with the phenomena of the symbolic uni-
verse, ranging from sociology of knowledge through general systems theory to 
structuralism, the work of the structural linguist A.J. Qreimae has shown the 
most precision in not only bringing together important methods, but also in 
their application. His principal inspirations have been the work of the Danish 
linguist HJelmelev, the folklore research of the Russian formalist Propp, and 
the ethnographical studies of the French structuralist Lévi-Strauss. He has 
worked to combine these into what he calls a structural semantics or a semiotics 
of the structurée of meaning, and has been particularly concerned with applying 
this model to myths, folklore and narrative structures. His aethodlogical 
integration of the various strands of research is not yet complete and so the 
method still shows some ragged ends. Moreover, his approach has undergone a 
strong evolution in the past ten years which has caused shifts in terminology 
and displacement of erstwhile central concepts. Consequently, an attempt will 
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Ье made to give a coherent account of his method in places where his own coher­
ence is less evident. This will entail ignoring some concepts and expanding 
others. 
Arter an introduction into a few basic concepts presupposed in his study 
we will present an outline of hie method as applied to myths and other narratives. 
5.1.1. Some Prolegomena to Semiotics. 
Before beginning an actual description of Greimas' method, several points 
that undergird his approach need highlighting. These points are drawn from 
structuralism and from linguistics, the two major ingredients in the development 
of his semiotics. Three such points will be discussed here: the notion of sign 
and signification, the notion of system, and the notion of surface and content 
level within the system. 
Greimas' notion of sign and signification lies central to his project. 
The bases for these notions are drawn from the linguistics of Saussure. 
Saussure saw in the idea of sign the basic unit of meaning upon which a theory 
of meaning could be developed. For him, a sign had a tripartite structure: it 
consisted of a signifier (signifiant), which he also called the acoustical image; 
of a signified (signifié), which he also called a concept; these two combined 
to become a sign (signe). Thus, a sign was the interaction of something standing 
for an object and the object or idea itself. 
Greimas takes over Saussure's notion of signifier and signified, but sub-
stitutes for sign the term sigdfication; this has the advantage of expressing 
the dynamic structure of the relation and also its fragility. For, as shall 
shortly becooe clear, signification will be concerned with the shifting of 
signifiers around a single signified. Meaning, then, which forms the central 
quest in Greimas' constitutional model of structural semantics, is to be found 
in the signification, or in a system of signification. Greimas prefers to call 
this latter assemblage the "collection of signification structures", so as not 
to prematurely impose patterns upon them. Concretely, studying collections of 
sigdtication structures will involve studying the signifiers and their interactions 
both with one another and with the collection as a whole in its interaction 
with the signified. 
But how does the collection of signification structures take shape? This 
brings us to the notion of system. The elements of the system are called terms 
and relatione. The terms are the signifiers, those variable elements whose 
interchange and transformations are the stuff of the signification structure in 
its development and manifestation. The relations are the functions (in a 
logical or mathematical sense) of the system. They are a limited number of 
operations which connect the terms and subject them to various changes and 
transformations. They are, in fact, the invariable elements of the structure, 
and are of a limited number, including such operations as conjunction, disjunction, 
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1лversion, Bumation, ioplicatìoo and so on. Tbua л study of the signification 
system ia a study of the terme and how they are organized, reorganized and 
transformed by the operations of the relations. 
A corollary to this is the all-important notion of binary opposition. 
Saussure believed that language was built upon a series of opposites and oppo­
sitions. The Copenhagen school, especially HJelmelev, further developed this 
in phonological studies and Lévi-Strauss raised it to a universal principle 
for structuralist study. Thus hardly anything ever happens singly within the 
system; nor are univocal concepts given. Any term will always be generating 
an opposite and every relation will imply a similar movement of its inverse 
or contrary. The binary opposition is principally responsible for the initial 
and thereafter guiding movement of the development of a signification structure. 
Often the relation will be used as a third element mediating two terms. And 
the "resolution" of a signification structure will often be given in two pairs 
of terms in proportional relation to ane another of the form: a is to a. as 
b is to b.; or, a is to b as с is to d, etc. 
Further, most structuralists and linguists will have levels of system as 
well. Host often there are two such levels: a surface level that immediately 
presents itself and a deep level that constitutes the surface level into its 
present form. We are already familiar with this notion from the discussion of 
convention where the distinction was made between the phenomenon and the 
underlying constitutive rules. Among Anglo-American linguists, Chomsky's notion 
of surface and deep structure, exhibiting the levels of linguistic performance 
and competence, respectively, is the moat familiar. 
Grelmaa, however, distinguishes three levels in his assemblage of sigqi-
fieation structures: the content level, the surface level and the manifestation 
level. The content level corresponds to the deep level; investigations at this 
level of signification will reveal the aigdfieds, which Oreiaas calls the 
"content", which the entire three-level signification structure is trying to 
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signify and mediate. The surface level provides those structures that immedia­
tely organize the manifestation level, which is the text or corpus with which 
we are first confronted. The content level bears what he calle the "elementary 
structures of signification" which provide the constitutional model for the 
entire signification structure. The surface level provides the "narrative 
structure" which controle the unfolding of the manifestation level ae the "text". 
(It should be noted, incidentally, that "text" for a etructuralist means simply 
the closed system of data-signs under consideration; thus not all texts are 
linguistic in nature). Thus, to fully understand the structures of signi­
fication will entail a study of all three of these levels. Neither study of 
simply the content level nor the surface level nor the manifestation level alone 
will suffice. Qreimaa sums up his project, which he calle a structural 
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semántica or semiotics, as follows: 
Le projet structural relatif à cette instance de médiation eet donc 
double: il s'agit, d'une part, d'esquisser la construction des 
modèles de l'articulation des contenus, tels qu'ils sont imaginables 
à ce niveau du parcours du sens; il s'agit, d'autre part, de mettre en 
place les modèles formels susceptibles de manipuler ces centenus et 
de les arranger de telle sorte qu'ils puissent commander la production 
et la segmentation das discours, organiser, sous certaines conditions, 
la manifestation de la narrâtivité.l1 
Put simply, a structural semantics will entail the construction of a founda-
tional grammar consisting of a semantics (content level) and a narrative syntax 
(surface level). It is to a description of these two projects that we now turn. 
5.1.2. Semantics: The Elementary Structures of Signification. 
At the content level is revealed the elementary structures of Bigrification. 
They most clearly represent the fundamental relation of the system of terms to 
the content, and pervade the entire foundational grammar. Those elements 
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called terms that are the simple signifiers are now called semes by Greimaa. 
They are articulated in binary pairs which will constitute a semantic axis. 
Signification is articulated upon this axis S. The semes upon this axis will 
be in contrary pairs, representing a sort of semantic continuum. They are 
labelled s. and s?. Thus, by way of example, on the semantic axis "human", 
e1 = "man" and s_ + "woman". The relation between s. and s ? is one of contrairety, 
one of the forms of opposition in binaries. But the semantic axis S generates 
an opposite as well, S, and therefore s. and в., respectively, s. and β-, 
besides maintaining a contrary relation with each other, also stand in relation 
to their counterparts β. and в.. The relation here is one of contradiction. 
Thus, s, is the contradictory of β, and e ? the contradictory of в.. To go back 
to our example: now S = nonhuman; a, = nonmale; a, s nonfemale. 
However, one can likewise posit relatione between a. and s-, and between s, 
and s.. These will be relations of implication. Thus, a, (male) implies a, 
(nonfemale), and s. (female) implies βη (nonmale). To provide a visual aid, 
this elementary structure of signification can be drawn ae a box with connecting 





But there is more to the structure than these four terms or semes (s,, 
s_, I,t s_), abd three sets of relations (contrairety, contradiction, impli-
cation)· The structure haß dimensions as well which correspond to the three 
sets of relations. The first set of dimensions has already been mentioned, 
the semantic axes S and §, corresponding to the contrary relations (s. + s.) 
and (s. + s-). The second set of structural dimensions Greimas calls schemes 
and correspond to the contradictory relations (s. + s~) and (s, + s.). Finally, 
there are also dejjea corresponding to the relatione of implication (в. -f β.) 
and (s. -f s.). For the sake of clarity, the information about relations, 
structural dimensions, and seoie structures can be given in a table. 
relatione structural dimensions seoic structures 
contrairety axis 5, S s. + β_; β. + β, 
contradiction scheme 
implication deixis 
"l + "l' β2 + e2 
"l 
It should be noted that particularly the axes and the deixes will play impor­
tant roles in the movement of the developing semantic structure. The scheme 
occupies a unique position that will also become evident. 
Greimas also provides what he calls the basic structure of the semiotics 
system in the form of a proportionality of semic structures. It is simply 
"l : »1 " β2 ! "2 
While this may seem deceptively simple, it should be remembered that all the 
operations and relations noted above are contained in this simple proportion. 
Another important concept bearing upon the structures of signification is 
that of isotopy. Qreimas says that 
Far isotopie nous entendons un ensemble redondant de catégories 
sémantiques qui rend possible la lecture uniforme du récit, telle 
qu'elle risulte des lectures partielles des énoncés et de la 
résolution de leurs ambiguïtés qui est guidée par la recherche de 
la lecture unique.1^ 
The notion of isotopy owes much to Hjelmslev's idea of discourse as a redundant 
morphology, i.e., a small number of basic structures composed of terms and 
relatione that repeat themselves in variations over and over again. Greimas 
has taken over the idea of recurring patterns which he calls "structures redon-
dantes" that go to make up the development of a text. An isotopy is one such 
complex of semantic structures that provide a sort of lodeatone around which all 
other complexes are ordered. It could be compared to a leitmotif in a muscial 
composition. Each level of a semantic structure will have an isotopy — the 
content level, the surface level and the manifestation level — which will 
provide a cohesive semantic category in the organieation of that level. 
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Upon the bare bonee of the elementary structure of signification is put 
content, a process Greimae calls "investing with coitent". Investing with 
content, while beginning with assigning a value to s., activates the entire 
synten in such a fashion that values are thereby assigned all the semic struc-
tures and structural dimensions. The structural dimensions are of particular 
interest here. The two axes (S and S), in defining the contraries, provide 
the basic frame for the semantic universe, since they give the number of terms 
possible. The two schemes (e, + ¡L; e_ + в ? ) , in defining the contradictories, 
provide what terms exclude each other. The two deixes (s. + s-i Sj + sl^· 
in defining the implications, provide the two poles of incompatibility which 
indicate the two spheres in which the semantic universe will unfold itself. 
The two deixes are incompatible with each other since the two terms in each 
deixis are related to one another by a conjunctive relation (implication), 
but are related to each terms of the other deixis by a disjunctive relation 
(contrairety or contradiction). To give a famous example from Lévi-Strauss, 
in the semantic universe of the tribes he studied in Le Cru et le Cuit, the 
two deixes would be culture and nature, respectively. On the basic semantic 
axis S, s. = cooked; s. = raw, with the cooked falling in the deixis "culture" 
and the raw in the deixis "nature". The opposites generated on 3 would be β. 
(noncooked on the nature deixis) = fresh; s, (nonraw on the culture deixis) s 
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rotten. If one works out further the consequences of this "logique concrete", 
one sees how the first deixis (culture) implies that something is don· with 
the natural product, either cooking by man or fermentation (rotting). On the 
second deixis (nature) both raw and fresh are left untouched by culture. How­
ever, raw is related to cooked in that it is an opposite in the contrary eenee, 
just as fresh is to rotten; both form a kind of continuum where one could, in 
this case, envision a progression from less cooked to mors raw and leas rotten 
to more fresh. The sehemic axes (cooked and fresh; raw and rotten) are, however, 
exclusive categories of contradiction. 
One such invested structure of signification or sealotlc system doe· not 
mean much in itself. Most often it will be combined with another structure of 
signification Invested with other value·. Then two or more of these seoiotic 
système can be combined. The sum of all the aemie relatione of all the semio-
IQ 
tic systems is the combinatorie· (cenbinatoire) of a seaantic universe. For 
example, Levi-Strause produces other such structures involving sexual relation-
ships, social relationships and the like with the corresponding culture deixis 
now representing permitted relationships and the nature deixis forbidden rela-
tionships. One could then see if, for example, there were any correlations 
between food and sexual taboo·, male-female taboos about the gathering and 
preparing of food, etc. One can have either a full one-to-one correspondence 
between two axes S which Greimae calle an integrated structure; or a partial 
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correspondence, which he calle a correlated structure. The conjunction of a 
series of deuces will define what he calls a semantic space. And the number of 
semic structures that are actually utilized in the conjunction of these semiotic 
óyeteme provide the usage of a social system. In one study, for example, Qreimas 
compared sexual relationships, economic relationship, and values of individual 
versus society in contemporary France. The first two presented an integrated 
structure, whereas the third combination with either of the other two provided 
only a correlated structure. In working out the usage from the combinatorics, 
he could locate those points in the respective semic structures that provided 
the areas of non-correlation. People thus involved in that particular nexus of 
relations would not be fully integrated into society and would be labelled 
outsider, pariah, or transgressor. The entire usage of a social system Greimas 
calls an episteme, which we have called above the symbolic universe. It re-
presents the combinatorie of values that provide the frame of social and personal 
existence. Greimas usas as examples a bourgeois episteme, or the episteme of 
21 
the corpus of an author (Balzac and Bernanos). We intend below to attempt to 
establish the eschatological episteme or symbolic universe. 
5.1.3· Toward a Foundational Grammar: the Syntax of Narrative Structures. 
This section has been headed "Toward a Foundational Graramar" for two 
reasons. First of all, all the narrative structures that go to make up a 
foundational grammar have not yet been isolated. Many of the terms and relatione 
of the narrative structures seem to have been discovered, but they interact 
in more fashions than do the terms and relations of the content level in the 
elementary structure of sicnification. While many important ones have been 
isolated, not all have. Secondly, the precise interaction of surface and 
content level is not fully understood, jiet as transformational grammar has not 
yet been able to account for all the relatione between linguistic performance 
and competence. Greimas is currently completing a book on narrative structures 
22 in which he hopes to resolve much of the difficulty here. It should be noted 
that it is at this point that he has been making his greatest contribution: 
combining the work on the content level of Llvi-Strauss with the work on the 
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surface level by Propp, other formalists, and the folklorista of various hue. 
агеішав' intention is to provide a comprehensive grammar that will include 
2k both the content and the surface level. In a first attençt at this, he 
distinguishes between syntactic operations at the content level and syntactic 
activity (faire syntaidque) at the surface level. By this is meant that those 
structures at the content level are repeated in the surface level, but with an 
important difference: on the content level they are conceived of as logical 
operations whereas on the surface level as anthropomorphized activities. In 
other words, the semes become subjects and objects, either human or anthropo-
morphized is some fashion. These anthropomorphized semes and their syntactic 
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activity are not, however, to be equated with the manifestation level. They are 
merely positions and functions in a syntax that will be invested with values, 
much in the sane manner that the semes were invested with content. In fact, 
the syntaxes of the content and surface levels are sinply metalanguages attempting 
to describe the manifestation level or text. 
Just as th«" content level elements could be divided into semes and their 
relations, eo Greimas also divides the elements of surface level grammar into 
actanta and functions. Actante should not be confused with actors, since 
actante are not always active agents; rather, they are positions in the syntax 
where values can be placed and where anthropomorphized semes cone to stand. 
Moreover, several actors can be subsumed under one actant. Revising the 
number and organization of characters Propp catalogued in his Horphology of the 
Folktale, Greimas presents three pairs of actante that go to make up narratives 
and myths: sender-receiver (destinateur-deetinataire), helper-opponent (adjuvant-
opposant), and subject-object (sujet-objet). Any text can be coded into these 
six actante. For example, the Marxist text: sender = history; receiver = human-
ity; helper = proletariat; opponent = bourgeoisie; subject = man; object = 
classless society. 
The actante are organized into a aeries of relatione that give the 
actantial model. It can be diagrammed as follows: 
eender object ) receiver 
helper ^ subject f opponent 
Three interlocking axes emerge: eender - object - receiver ie the axis of 
communication; helper - subject - opponent, the axis of the test; subject -
object, the axis of desire. These axes, along which the activity of a narrative 
will move, need further description. 
The axis of communication finds its expression cœcretely in those talea 
or parte of talee dealing with a contract, i.e., where a broken contrat or 
disrupted social order needs to be reeatabllshed. In this case, for example, 
a sender commissione a receiver to go in search of a lost object. The axis of 
the test deals with those narratives or parts of narratives where the receiver 
(who is also the subject) goes through a series of struggle whereupon he 
receives a special aid (charm, weapon, magic spell) from a helper so that he can 
defeat the opponent. The axis of desire relates how the subject (who is also 
the receiver, and, in Propp, the hero) armed with the special aid and having 
overcome the opponent, is in a position to achieve the object. This reeulte in 
returning to the axis of conmunication where the object is then restored, and 
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with it the contract or social order. Propp considered this to be the basic 
outline of all Rueeian folktales and Greimas and others have extended it to 
coyer other tales, myths and narratives, i.e., they will use part or all of this 
27 
scheme for the narrative structure of their text. 
Ноге generally, the axis of conmunication can be called a structure of 
exchange in which the eender (d,) transfers a value (0) to a receiver (d,). 
This type of narrative structure unit Greimas calls a translative statement 
(énoncé translatif). These actante d. and d, can also be tsanscoded into the 
content level seoic structure. The transmission of the value will then move 
along the relations of the semes — the axes, schemes, and deixes. Suppose, 
then, that we set up the following semiotie system: two deixes of culture and 
nature. Let d. = society, which then generates the other semes: d- = abode 
of the villain; 3. = villain; 3. = hero. The object value (0) then moves 
along the relations. Thus in the case of the folktale, the daughter of the 
king (0) is stolen from the king's castle (d.) by the villain (iL) and hidden 
in his cave (d.). The hero (3.) finds the cave (d ) and returns the daughter 
to the king's castle (d.). The tale can then be coded in the following fashion: 
((^ -» 0 -> J j ) - » ^ -4 0 -• d2) 
(32 -• 0 -> d2)-*(d2 -» 0 -» dj) 
One then bas a circular transmission of values, from d. back to d.. Greimas 
describes this semiotie system of communication with the following proportion, 
giving the transformations of the situation: 
before : after a inverted content : reinstated content 
Thus, the initial situation (before) is narked by a disorder or lack (inverted 
content) which in the end (after) ia reestabliehed or regained (reinstated 
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content). The purpose of the coaunication of 0 ia to bring this about. 
The other axes of the teat and deaire Qreimaa has not yet integrated into 
the content level structure. For now, we will present what he has done to date 
on theae two axes. 
The axis of the teat ia characterised by a three-step progression that 
presenta two actant-aubject (or on· subject and one anti-subject) representing 
two contradictory activitiea. They clash (1); one subject conquers the other 
(2); and the winner ia given some value, often wrested from the loser (3). It 
can be coded as follows: if S. and S. = subjects, and О с object value, then 
(1) (Sj f* S 2) » confrontation 
(2) (Sj -» S 2) = domination 
(3) (Sj^  f- 0 ) = attribution (or: (S2 -> 0 -> S^) 
In the case of the basic actantial structure above, this process will be 
repeated once for the subject and helper, once for the subject and opponent, 
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and eómetiraee once between subject and object. 
The axle of desire holds the axis of the test and of communication together· 
The subject's desire for the object is subject to a hierarchy of modalities: 
wanting -Ь knowing -^ being able to -^ doing 
The wanting (vouloir) modality is established for the subject when, as receiver, 
he obtains the communication from the sender. His knowing (savoir) or being 
able to (pouvoir) arises out of the result of the test — he is armed either 
with knowledge or power or both for approaching the goal. Bis achieving the 
goal is the doing (faire). It should be noted that there is a hierarchy of 
action here: one must first wish for the object, then gain either knowledge or 
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power, before actually nngaging in doing. 
This, then, is the model of Greimas for the analysis of surface and content 
level. As was noted, the model is not ccoplete. It is hoped that Chapter 
Seven with its investigation of the eschatological symbolic universe will, by 
using this model, contribute to its theoretical formulation. 
5.2. Myth as the Manifestation of the Symbolic Universe. 
After the somewhat abstract presentation of the elements of Greimas' 
method, it must now be placed in the concrete context of a manifestation of the 
symbolic universe. Our interest here will be in myth. 
Greimas himself is interested in myth, since it appears to be a "natural" 
metalanguage, "c'est-à-dire comme un langage> dont les diverses significations 
secondes se structurent en se servant d'une langue humaine déjà existante 
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comme d'un langage-objet." Moreover, "la recherche mythologique pourrait 
servir de modale à l'étude des superstructures, à la description des idéologies 
sociales." 
It should be noted at the start that the aemiotical study of myth owes 
much to Lévi-Strauss and especially to his pioneering study "The Structural 
Study of Myth". Not only the method, but also the attitude toward myth 
expressed there is still reflected strongly in the literature, especially 
among the folklorists. As two of them have explained Lévi-Strauss' approach, 
"according to Lévi-Strauss, the mythical mind •stablishes a web of relationships 
between aocio-historically given facts and it works on a symbolic level under-
laid by the interplay of infra- and super-structures." ^ More specifically, 
"the deep structure of a myth is the solution to a problem of a cognitive, 
sociological, technological, or othar central order and, once found, it generates 
the myth in the codes available to the society." "Solution" is perhaps too 
strong a word for what Lévi-Strauss has in mind, since seldom does a myth 
actually provide a solution; more often myth is a mediation of seemingly irrec-
oncilable opposites that represent fundamental metaphysical options for a 
society. This is achieved through a series of ongoing transformations which 
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then conetitute the moet powerful myths of a eociety. 
Definitions of myth are, of course, myriad; the most simple one is "myths 
are histories of the gods" — which indeed tells us little or nothing. 
L¿vi-Straues has made the idea clear that myths are closely wedded to the 
36 processes of eociety and undergo continuing transformation, and may even 
"57 die. A recent collection of readings on mythology, most of which are inspired 
in some fashion by structuralist research, offers two definitions of myth: 
(1) as "the culture-conditioning mechanisms that mould ethnic cognitive 
systems"; (2) "Myths display the structured, predominantly culture-specific, 
and shared, semantic systems which enable the memhers of a culture area to 
understand each other and to cope with the unknown. More strictly, myths are 
stylistically definable discourses that express the strong components of seman-
38 tic systems." Another definition of myth would have it appear as a grid that 
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supports the semantic system of a given society. 
There is no need to make further attempts to define myth, beyond calling 
attention to the salient points that have arisen so far and will arise in the 
following sections. Notable, then, is that myth is the process of the moulding 
of the cognitive and semantic systems (what we have been calling the symbolic 
universe) of a society. This process of moulding can be ascertained. Moreover, 
it is intimately tied up with the other processes in eociety — economic, social, 
technological « and as such reflects the vagaries of fortune of a eociety. 
The following sections will go into eome of these matters in more detail, 
especially (1) the structure of myth, (2) the status of meaning and truth in 
myth, and (3) myth and the Лег manifestations of the symbolic universe (in 
particular, folklore, ideology and ritual). 
5.2.1. The Semantic Structure of Myth. 
On· could say that structuralist method cut its teeth on myth, starting 
either with L¿vi-Strauss * Les Structures Elémentaires de la Parenti? or with 
Propp'a Morphologr of the Folktale. In both instances it is a case of dis-
counting the prominence of the signifiers, whose constant change and tmnafor-
mations have always been a source of confusion for mythographers. In myth, 
the importent thing is to arrive at revealing the signified, since all too 
often whole families of myths and variants upon them can be brought back to 
attempts at articulating the same sigrified. As Qreimaa puts it, "ces unités 
du signifie, malgré la richesse des signifiante, se présentent dans le récit 
, Ι,ο 
en nombre tree limite...." Because of this myth is actually the opposite 
of poetryс 
Myth is the part of language where the formula traduttore tradittore (sic) 
reaches Its lowest truth value. From that point of view it should be 
placed in the gamut of linguistic expressions at the end opposite that 
of poetry, in spite of all the claims to the contrary. Poetry is a 
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kind of speech which cannot Ъе translated except at the cost of 
serious distortions; whereas the mythical value of the myth is 
preserved even through the worst translation.^· 
And a myth can change every tune it is told by a different narrator or in a 
different situation. 
The key to myth and to its signifieds lies in the structure of the 
relations between the signifiers. Greimas amplifies upon this by pointing out 
that myth has a threefold structure: a framework, a code and a message. The 
framework (armature) would include what was said above about the elementary 
structure of sigrification that provides the basic algorithm for the myth. The 
framework also subsumes the proportion of before : after = inverted content : 
reinstated content, and the notion of movement from an initial situation to 
a final situation. In other words, the framework is the formal model presented 
ν ''3 above. 
Ά 
The message is "la signification particuliere du mythe-occurrence" 
what we called above the investing of content in the structure of signification. 
This investing manifests itself in a double isotopy at the level of content (in 
the analysis of the semes) and at the surface level (anthropomorphizations, etc.). 
The code, "rendant compte de l'ensemble de la manifestation topique du 
mythe", is concerned with the identification of the movement of the narrative, 
Кб 
or the syntagmatic chains, in the narrative structure and their interrelations. 
The code, in union with the framework is then able to spell out the message 
of the myth. As Maranda puts it, "a code is a system of rules of transformation 
to pass from one system of idioms to another." Qreunae goes on' to give the three 
syntagmatic chains which combine to give the narrative structure of the myth 
and bring about the transformations. These three are: (1) the performantial 
syntagma, which are the structures of the axes of the test; (2) the contractual 
syntagms, which are the structures of the axis of communication; (3) the 
disjunctive syntagms, which are connective elements of the narrative, i.e., 
the departures and returns of the actante. On the basis of what was said 
above (and based on a more recent article by Qreimas than this three fold 
listing of syntRgms), one would want to list a fourth syntagmatic series based 
on the structure of the axis of desire, which we will call modal syntagms. 
To arrive at the structure of a myth, then, one must locate the syntagms 
in the narrative, establish their order, thereby enabling the move to the con­
tent level where the semic strcture and the investing of the semic structure 
with content can be realized. At this point the code can be formulated that 
will illustrate how the myth in question mediates a content through a series 
of transformations that provide (1) a resolution to the problematic character 
of the content which set the mythic process in motion; (2) a hook-up with 
other mythic processes so as to establish semantic spaces; (3) the Ье/тіппіпдз 
of the coordination of semantic spaces into a cohering symbolic universe for 
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a given aociety. The code, then, attenpts to catch the highly fluid and 
dynamic proceas of myth-making in a society. The codes tend to be relatively 
simple, compared with the contents they médiat^ and more compie« codes are often 
merely a recurrent chain of simpler codes. To sum up the myth-making process 
in a phrase borrowed from Lévi-Strauss, "la pensée mythique est par essence 
4δ 
transformatrice." Or, in the words of Haranda: 
It is the expression of the dynamic disequilibrium without which 
a semantic domain would cease to be productive. It is the expres­
sion of the dynamic disequilibrium which is the (acknowledged) 
powerlessness to build adequate homomorphisms between incompatible 
and hence disturbing facts. It is the expression of the reluctant 
acknowledgement that the event is mightier than the structure. But 
myth is also and more than anything elae the hallucinogenic chant 
in which mankind harmonizes the vagariее of history....^9 
5.2.2. Meaning and Truth in Myth. 
In speaking of the semantic structure of myth, the question of meaning 
and truth cannot go unasked. Do myths have meaning? And are they, or can 
they be, true? 
The meaning to be found in myths, we have seen, is not located in the 
manifestation level of the myth narrative, but ultimately has to be sought out 
at the content level. Moreover, the arbitrary character of the signifiera 
in the mythic account preclude any referential sort of meaning. Once again, 
it would seem that the only way to account for the meaning of myth is to describe 
it within a coherence theory of meaning. This is be case for a number of 
reasons. 
First of all, meaning in myth cannot be restricted to any one single 
element. As was seen in the discussion of the content level, the process of 
signification will entail at least four semes and three sets of relations 
connecting them. Within this structure the signfied makes itself known. Thus 
even to locate one seme invested with content will not yield the meaning of 
myth — the entire structure of signification has to be taken into account. 
Secondly, it is difficult to extract meaning even from one structure 
of signification of a myth. As Lévi-Strauss' Mythologiques have shown, to get 
at the meaning of any one myth, one must take into account all its variants as 
well. For the variants are not merely eccentric formations caused by the 
transmission of a myth, but provide important elaborations upon and developments 
of the structure of signification. 
Finally, a myth will often if not always yield a whole number of meanings. 
As Lévi-Strauss notes in the introduction to Le Cru et le Cuit, the first of 
his four-volume Mythologiques. what he intends to do is simply analyze the 
same myth over and over again. Thus, in investigating the meaning of a myth, 
the environment in which the myth is recounted is important for the selection 
of meanings to be yielded. 
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A second important question about meaning жі myth is the relation of 
conetent to the structure of sigdfication. The presentation of the structures 
of signification present the norms of coherence for the meaning of myth; they 
supply the frame which brings about the revelation of meaning. One should 
avoid two misinterpretations of this. On the one hand, meaning cannot be 
simply identified with content. Content has no meaning until it is articulated 
within the frame of the structures of signification. Before that it represents 
the height of abstraction or universality: life/death, culture/nature, etc. 
The structures of signification, and the interconnection of several such 
structures, in a concrete environment and fully articulated via the mediation 
of the narrative strctures, present the indispensable conditions for the 
emergence of meaning. Thus, to simply locate the content will actually tell 
us next to nothing. 
On the other hand, the structures of signification should not be identi­
fied as the meaning. They are simply the (indispensable) conditions for its 
emergence. To identify meaning with them would bring us back to locating the 
meaning of myth in the signifiers as such. The structures of signification, as 
the name implies, are the constitutive rules for an entire class of conventions. 
But the rules are not the conventions; only their laws. Just as one does not 
have a language when one has a phonology and syntax, so one does not have 
myth when one has the structure of aigiification. They constitute necessary, 
but not sufficient, conditions for the emergence of the meaning of myth. 
Do myths have anything to do with truth? The common usage of "it's a 
myth" would militate against assigning them any truth value. It is easy to 
see how such a conception could arise: if the meaning is identified with the 
signifiers and the syntagmatic chains with historical progression, then, of 
course, myth has no truth value. But this is a misreading of myth, not only 
in regard to its structure, but also in regard to its intention. 
If we return to the discussion of truth in the previous chapter, a dis­
tinction was drawn between the definition of truth and its criteriology. Taking 
the classic definition of truth as an adaequatio rei et intellectus, the res 
will, in myth, not be located in the signifier, but in the structure of signi­
fication invested with content. The question of the adaequatio is the question 
of the criteria for judging truth and falsity. In the discussion in the previous 
chapter, it was noted that meaning forms the foundation for truth as a necessary 
though not sufficient condition. It provides the forme of coherence that give 
it its systematic and explanatory value. 
But the all-important point of contact with the world remains largely 
untouched by this. And while any attempt to find a one-to-one correspondence 
between the manifestation level of the text of a myth and conditions of the 
world must: be rejected as naive and crude, this still does not answer how, in 
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establiehing the hook-up with the world, true and false mythe can be disting-
uiahed. This question has not been taken up as such by the mythographers; but 
going on what has been said in this chapter and in the previous one, the outlines 
for such criteria could be given. 
One could say that those myths are true which best reflect the conditions 
of a given society. In other words, those myths that best articulate the 
content of the basic options of a society are the true ones. This process is 
of course dialectical, since the conditions are partially created by this 
and previous systems of myth. But this, while recognizable as best articula-
ting criteria, offers too little for actually applying them. 
If, however, one begins by asking which myths are false, one comes a bit 
further. False myths will be those that do not reflect the genuine conditions 
of society. They will be detectable either as ideology or dying myths. In the 
first instance, an analysis of their structure and content will reveal a mediation 
that does not or no longer belongs to or reflects the relationships in society. 
As an example, many existentialists writers noted that the myth of Prometheus, 
which well reflected nineteenth century man's self-understanding, no longer held 
in twentieth century conditions. The angst of late capitalist society was better 
reflected in the myth of Sisyphus. This example also shows the relation of 
meaning and truth. While both myths provide a frame of meaning, only one frame 
actually corresponds to the real conditions within oocidy at this moment. We 
can see how meaning can exist without truth value, but the opposite cannot be 
the case. 
When a myth outlives its usefulness, it becomes an ideology. But often 
the myth that no longer reflects the conditions of society in its mediation of 
underlying options leaves the scene more quickly. This is the case of the death 
of myths. L¿vi-StrauM has investigated this problem at least superficially 
among tribes in Washington and British Columbia. There we find the myths, 
instead of producing variants still maintaining the basically same structure of 
aigdfication, splintering into accounts no longer respecting this structure. 
Qradually the myth's parts are subsumed into other tales and the old myth is 
50 
forgotten. This píscese undoubtedly occurs often in societies under severe 
stress when the old conditions disappear quickly and the old myths are so 
rapidly undercut as to lose even that slender hold that makes ideology passible. 
One can say, then, that the criteria for true myth are twofold: a 
correspondence between the myth's mediation of content with the existing condi-
tions in society, and a coherence of a myth and its variants based upon the 
same basic structure of signification. 
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5.2.3. Myth and Other Manifeetations of the Symbolic Dniveree. 
Although most definitions<f myth among those influenced by structuraïem 
will insist upon the definable structure of myth and will constrast it with 
other manifestations of the symbolic universe, in practice the differences be-
tween these manifestations have not yet been demonstrated. We will mention just 
three other manifestations: folktales, ritual and ideology. 
KÖngäe Marauda and Maranda apply all that Lévi-Strauss says about myth 
directly to a corpus of fclklore in their Structural Models in Folklore and 
Transformational Essays. Greimas insists on a difference between the structure 
of folklore and myth and in one essay sets out to give some form to this notion. 
But his model for exploring myth is based heavily on Propp's analysis of the 
Russian folktale and in the essay in question does not come to any definite 
conclusions. Propp himself sees similarities between myths and folktales. 
Lévi-Strauss, however, finds significant differences between them, principally 
in the technical terminology, the prohibitions against telling myths at certain 
times that do not apply to folktales, the more stable and less arbitrary oppo-
sitions (deixes and semic axes) of myth in contrast with the folktale, and 
the fact that myths are less open to the free play of transformations than are 
folktales. With the exception of the technical terminology and the prohibitions 
on telling myths, which are external criteria, the others would have to be 
established on the basis of a large body of research. 
Lévi-Strauss has also taken up the question of the relation of myth and 
ritual. There are striking similarities, and the opinion has often been 
proffered that myths originated as explanations for ritual action, or, that 
there are societies which have rituals but no myths. Lévi-Strauss argues that 
in talking of ritual one must clearly separate ritual activity from the verbal 
exegesis and glosses upon it and that it is actually a nonverbal activity: "Lea 
gestes exécutés, les objets manipulés, sont autant de moyens que le rituel 
s'accorde pour éviter parler." Ritual action is basdd on two movemente: 
breaking the action into small bits, and repeating. 
En morcelant des opérations qu'il détaille à Itinfini et qu'il répète 
sans se lasser, le rituel s'adonne à un rapetassage minutieux, il bouche 
des interstices, et il nourrit ainsi l'illusion qu'il est possible de 
remonter à contre-sens du mythe, de refaire du continu à partir du dis-
continu. ... En ce sens, le rite ne renforce pas mais renverse la démarche 
de la pensée mythique qui, elle, scinde le mime continu en grosses 
unités distinctives entre lesquelles elle institue des écarte. Au total, 
l'opposition entre le rite et le mythe est celle du vivre et du penser, 
et le ritual représente un abâtardissement de la pensée consenti aux 
servitudes de la vie.55 
Thus, the two actually do work differently, and so long as one does not 
confuse myth with the exegesis of and glosses upon ritual, there is little 
difficulty in distinguishing the two. 
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Greimae touches upon the question of ideology briefly. In dealing with 
Hjelmslev's notion of denotation and connotation, he discusses how semiotic 
systems of connotation are built up to foster certain illusions. One such 
connotation of our society is that language is an instrument of communication — 
which obscures the fact that it never has that sort of objectivity in our hands: 
it always bears our cultural values and cultural praxis as well. He goes on 
to note how these semiotic systems create an external semiotic space, populated 
with cultural creations that seem like things: 
Une sort de réification de la structure linguistique en résulte: 
la langue devient un 'fait social', un instrument plus ou moins 
imparfait; certaines zones sóniotiques — le droit, la religion — 
prennent l'apparence d'institutions sociales, d'autres — la 
poésie, le mythe — produisent des effets de sens de vérité, pro-
fonde et/ou sacrée, selon les coimunautés envisagées.5° 
In another essay he notes how the student of myth, in interpreting it, trans-
lates myth into a new language which is "ideological", a move fron a "connotative 
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semiotics" to a "denotative semiology". From this, one could say that myth is 
for Greimas part of the superstructure of society, generated at least in part, 
if not entirely, by the linguistic structures and the structures of significa-
tion. However, he seems to distinguish mythical language and ideological 
language and to that extent one could not say that he equates the two. At 
still another point he asserts that Anglo-American linguistics, represented by 
such figures as Fodor and Kat«, is incapable of analyzing myth because of the 
methodological neglect of the context of the language. This would argue for 
the fact that he does not see myth simply as a system-immanent phenomenon 
generated by a superstructure, but, following Lévi-Strauss, would thus have to 
argue for the rootedness of myth in social relationships. Myth would be 
different from ideology, then, to the extent that myths accurately represent 
the social relationships which in turn reflect the actual conditions of society. 
The question is complex. One could say that myth need not be ideological (in 
the sense of a superstructure falsely representing the condtions of the base), 
though it can be and that translations of myth are particularly susceptible to 
an ideologization. 
5.3. Semiotics and Speech Act Theory. 
After this presentation of the symbolic universe conventions in terns of 
the structural semantics of Oreioas, the question arises as to how this relates 
to speech act theory, if at all. Does the fact that myth represents nonordinary 
language mean that there is no connection? Or, conversely, does ordinary 
language become a special ease of the structural semantics of Greimas? 
Greimas separates myth language off from ordinary language by saying that 
59 
the former is not dependent upon stable signifiera in the way the latter is. 
This would seem to indicate that his semiotic analysis is not immediately 
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applicable to ordinary language, since his analysis presupposes a large degree 
of manipulation of the signifiers, with the sigmueds as the invariable elements 
in the text. However, in his use of metalanguage, i.e., in translating the 
message of myth into another language, an attempt is made to provide the 
signified with a stable signifier, however abstract such a signifier might be. 
And this would seem to bring the metalanguage into the realm of ordinary 
language again. One could say that attempts at discursive discourse would thus 
fall under ordinary language, whereas nondiscursive types — such as the ling­
uistic manifestations of the symbolic universe — would not. To this we might 
add that the seeming absence of recurring semantic structures (or a recurrence 
that is во seldom as to render analyse unmanageable, if not impossible) would 
likewise preclude the use of Greimas' structural semantics in ordinary speech 
situations. Thus, one can make a case for the two areas being, at least at this 
point in their respective methodological developments, mutually exclusive. 
On the other hand, however, there are points of contact and comparison; 
for one, the presence in both cases of constitutive rules and an attempt to 
articulate them. However, the constitutive rules of speech act theory are 
geared to successful performance only and reflect the problem of the emergence 
of ordinary language syntax and semantics only insofar as they likewise study 
unsuccessful performances, i.e., how speech acts can go wrong. But the consti­
tutive rules of the symbolic universe seem to aim mainly at describing that 
universe and say little about performance; we saw, for example, the difficulty 
in distinguishing folktales from myths or in establishing the relation of myth 
to ideology. Clearly there are no performance criteria available here. So at 
first glance this seems to be just another point of difference. 
But the point cannot be left at that. For we noted areas where analyses 
of ordinary language went awry — most clearly in the case of the "ordinary 
notion of time". Here no performance criteria as such could be established; 
rather, simply a description of the various usages was given with rules for keeping 
the boundaries between then relatively firm. In fact, it meant that there was 
no single univocal ordinary notion of time. This would mean that what appeared 
to be part of ordinary language turned out not to be so in the way that, say, 
promising was. And ordinary language analysis ав not equipped to dig out some 
deep structure that might have found a unity underlying usages of time. What 
this points out is the fragility of the semantics of ordinary usage: in the 
interstices of ordinary language semiotics may find a foothold and from there 
actually be able to show the deep structure of ordinary language semantics. 
This indicates deo an important difficulty inherent in ordinary language 
semantics. While, for example, the semantics of promising could be established, 
and the notions of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts could govern its 
provenance, it remains almost wholly dependent upon surface structure analysis. 
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Ite only entry into deep atructure occurs when the atructures of the two levels 
are homeomorphic. One only need recall Searle'β dilemma at being able to 
establish the illocutionary force indicating device while failing to find the 
propoeitional indicators. 
One important point where semiotics and ordinary language do meet, however, 
is in the notion of meaning. Both function on a coherence theory of meaning, 
i.e., a cumulative nexus of relations that order and constitute phenomena. 
Greimas with his elementary structure of signification would seem to have a 
better hold on meaning than the inductive processes used in speech act theory 
discussed in the section on truth in the previous chapter. 
But on the basis of the possible connections between their respective notions 
of convention, meaning and truth, one can postulate some eventual connections 
between speech act theory and semiotics. And that the connections should occur 
precisely at these points is far from arbitrary. For it is here that the question 
disucssed at the end of Chapter One re-emerges: that of a two-pronged theory 
that will investigate language in all its concretenees, yet somehow penetrate 
to its constituting possibilities. And it is along these lines that such a 
theory will have to be developed. At this time we are confronted with two 
relatively well-developed theories, speech act theory and structural semantics, 
which manifest certain points of contact. Rather than integrating them here 
methodologically, it would seem more fitting to plunge now into applying them 
both to the question at hand: the elucidation of eschatological language. In 
the course of Chapter Seven, the outlines of a possible methodological integration 
will be seen to be emerging, an integration that offers vistas wider than these 
which could be achieved by blending the two theories here, in a way perhaps 
that would blunt their specificities of operation. 
-136-
Chapter 6: THE LANGUAGE OF ESCHATOLOGT. 
6.1. Speech Act Theory and Eechatologj. 
After the long discussion of speech act theory and structural semantics, 
we are now in a position to approach the eschatological data. In this chapter, 
various aspects of speech act theory will be applied to a set of concrete data, 
derived from the theological works of Jürgen Moltmann. The choice of a single 
author, and the choice of Moltmann as that author, needs more clarification. 
In the first place, there is a definite need to choose one single author. Host 
often in studies of religious language a whole range of notions taken from 
•arious authors is analyzed at once. But this seems to be on the whole a 
questionable procedure. Religious language is a very wide field and the same 
subject will be spoken of in many different speech situations: in academic 
theology, as scriptural data, in liturgical ceremonies, in preaching, in church 
order, etc. To cull statements willy-nilly from the expanse of religious 
language will only dislocate any sort of analysis of the use and general deploy-
ment of speech act patterns; any chance of acceptable conclusions will be lost. 
Moreover, euch a technique quickly plays into the hands both of the supporters 
and the opponents of religious language. The supportes will tend to seek out 
statements that support their viewpoint, easily bringing together scriptural 
quotations, excerpts fron theologians, gleanings from liturgical practice, and 
a big dosage of their own unsupported views. The opponents usually find enough 
from theologians to support their positions, but often they too will base their 
analyses on "theological statements" that cannot be traced to any single 
theologian, but are intended as statements to which all theologians would give 
2 
their assent. This is not unlike the vague "ordinary sense of time" discussed 
in Chapter Three. 
This study prefers to concentrate on the work of one theologian, and then 
only on his strictly theological work, in its investigation of concrete usage of 
eschatological language. While the basis of investigation is a good bit 
narrower, it is felt that this will lead to more positive results than the 
attempts to roam over the entire domain of religious language. For the hidden 
assumption of such generalizations is that all religious language is cut fron 
one cloth. Quite often the theory of language used to investigate religious 
language will exhibit the same sweeping assumptions. Instead of all this, the 
tradition of Austin's careful analysis of language in a given concrete situation 
will guide the analysis here. 
Secondly, there is the question of why a systematic theologian has been 
chosen rather than a direct confrontation with exegetical data or with the work 
of an exegete. Two considerations urged the choice of a systematic theologian 
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rather than the data of exegesis or an exegete. To begin with the data of 
exegesis, one can say that it does not exist as such. The data of exegesis is 
always the result of the work of an exegete, and one will always be dealing 
with his worldview implicitly or explicitly. The fact that an exegete interprets 
the scriptures, even on a purely philological basis, does not resolve the 
problem of hermenautics. And to take the work of "biblical theology", we saw, 
does not solve the problem either. Biblical theology is an actualization of 
the biblical data, but most often the aseumptions governing the actualization 
remain undiscussed. And if we turn to the systematic theologian, we find 
these problems by no means solved. The systematic theologian relies on the work 
«f exegetes; and he too harbors his own interests and worldview. But the deci­
sive differense is that he should be more cautious about how his own views are 
interpreting the data; that is, after all, what should distinguish the systematic 
theologian most clearly from the exegete. Thus we have entrusted ourselves to 
a systematic theologian rather than an exegete because (1) those factors governing 
his worldview are more readily accessible; (2) he has, in his work, already made 
a (hopefully conscious) decision about the hermeneutical problem and we will 
not have to be second-guessing him. We can accept his solution of the hermen­
eutical problem as a possible solution. 
It should be noted, however, that the all-important NT text will not be 
ignored; it will receive treatment at some length in the following chapter. 
There it will be confronted as the text generative of meaning for Christian 
eschatology, thus setting down the boundary lines for eschatology and for 
Moltmann. Such an approach, following a structural semantics investigation, 
would seem to obviate some of the problems of "biblical theology". The success 
of such a technique will do more to recommend it than further argumentation 
presented here before its actual implementation. 
Finally, the question of why Holtmann will be studied and not some other 
systematic theologian who has treated eschatology (such as Althaue or Brunner 
or Pannenberg). The overriding motive was the Moltmann bas made the most com­
plete attempt to think through the entire eschatological problem and to see the 
whole of theology as eschatology. That this is recognized in the theological 
community can be seen from the response to his Theologie der Hoffnung. Other 
books appeared at roughly the same time, but have not had the effect of Holt­
mann 'a. The widespread recognition of Holtmann'β work and the amount of 
literature and critique it has produced seem a good indication that the choice 
is more than warranted. 
Concretely, then, the following will be attempted in this chapter. Speech 
act theory will be applied to the theological work of Holtmann (his sermons will 
not be included). Basis for the study is his Theologie der Hoffnung, especially 
the first three chapters which form the "Begründung einer christlichen 
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Eschatologie", as it is stated in the subtitle of the book. This is also his 
most cohesive treatment of the eschatological problem. The вЫу will not be 
restricted to these three chapters, however; all of his works will be included 
insofar as they are germane to the topic. 
The two knottiest problem areas of Moltmann's project will be subjected to 
analysis, i.e., hie notion of promise and his understanding of the tune asym­
metries, especially the notion of the future. These will be analyzed in light 
of the speech act theory developed in Chapter Three. These two areas, of 
promise and time, seem to be central to his problematic and as such provide the 
principal structure for the articulation of his eschatology. As will be seen, 
it is these two points that also have been most extensively treated by his 
critics, a fact that corroborates our choice of them. 
Along the way, some of the «oniequences for theology deriving from the 
analysis will also be indicated. Beädes these references in passing, more 
conclusions and consequences will be brought out in the general conclusion. 
6.2. Promise as the language of Eschatology. 
6.2.1. Holtmann and Biblical Promise. 
"Die eigene Sprache der christlichen Eschatologie ist aber nicht der 
griechische Logos, sondern die Verheissung, * sie das Sprechen, Hoffen und 
7 Erfahren Israels geprägt hat." Holtmann indicates that Christian eschatology 
cannot be understood from a Oreek point of view, but rather that it has its own 
inner logic which can be reached if one stuàies the particular structure of 
promise in the Judaeo-Christian eschatological experience. To study the notion 
of promise — or aa he often calls it, the language of promise — gives one 
entry into the uniquely eschatological moment of Christianity. In several 
places, he carries the notion of promise further, speaking of an horizon of 
8 9 
promise, and of promise-history. This all seems to indicate that not only 
does promise give us entry into the uniquely eschatological world of Judaeo-
Christianity, but that promise forms a clearly central category that provides 
guidance toward further understanding of the eschatological horizon once we have 
entered that world. 
Before beginning with an investigation of what Holtmann understands by 
promise and how he uses it to develop a logic of an eschatological horizon, some 
attention should be given to the background of his understanding of the idea. 
For his notion of promise has raised objections from many quarters: seme consider 
it too formal and abstract, others have called it "apocalyptic mythology", 
still others consider it an hypostaaization not uncomnon among those subscribing 
to a Worttheologie, and finally it has even been called an ideological 
superstructure used to legitimate a praxis of hope. Holtmann himself has 
-139-
14 
replied to soné of these objections and it is hoped that the development of 
the argument here will help in illuminating some of the objections and in 
waylaying others. 
The critique in itself, however, raises an important point; namely, what 
is the genedogy of his notion of promise? It certainly cannot be reckoned 
among the general theological categories. Moltmann himself explicitly gives 
two of the sources: recent OI theology and the notion of promissio in early 
Deformation theology. The third source not explicitly mentioned is the 
17 philosophy of Ernst Bloch. It would be worthwhile to deal briefly with 
his understanding of the first two of these sources. 
When Moltmann speaks of recent OI theology, he seems to be referring 
principally to Q. von Had and W. Zimnerli, to judge from the citations in 
18 
Theologie der Hoffnung. However well-respected these exegetes may be, it never-
theless seems a questionable practice to so commend oneself to such a narrow 
base when discussing ОТ eschatology. For eschatology is no less a can of 
19 
worms in ОТ research than it is in systematic theology. And if eschatology 
is still plagued with a range of sometimes contradictory interpretations, one can 
say that the notion of promise within eschatology will a fortiori be at least 
as complicated. Added to the confusion is the fact that there is no single 
term for pDomise in the ОТ. And an overview of ОТ research will reveal at 
least five different complexes of ideas where promises play a role, not to 
mention the problem of unravelling the various traditions that contributed to 
the formation of these complexes. To sort out all these facets of promise 
in ОТ research goes beyond the task of this study; indeed, it would be a study 
in itself much larger than this one. Two things will be done, however. First 
of all, some indication will be given of the dimensions of the protiem Moltmann 
has not taken into consideration when discussing ОТ promise; and secondly, the 
problems facing the systematic theologian when attempting to use ОТ data will 
be treated briefly. 
As was mentioned, five different complexes of ideas involving the notion of 
promise can be extracted from ОТ research: (1) promisee's role in ОТ thought 
before and after the period of the classical prophets; (2) promise as the basis 
of a notion of history (and the changes, again, before and after the classical 
prophets); (3) promise and covenant structure; (4) promise as staple blessing 
(as opposed to curse) in covenant formulas; (5) the promise as an oath of 
Jahweh. The first two complexes of ideas are closely related, with (1) having 
• large Influence on (2). One central problem ia whether one can talk of a 
shift and a certain ideologizing of the notion of poomise in the period of the 
classical prophets, i.e., the use of promise as a legitimation of situations to 
an extent hitherto unknown. The problem becomes particularly acute in the 
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queetion of the newness of the new covenant spoken of in Jer 31ι and in the 
problem of whether the new covenant arises fron such deep disappointments that 
22 
the covenant is wholly negated. Holtmann himself clearly opts for a 
notion of continuity in the history of Israel and dismissed the problem of 
the crisis in ОТ prophecy all too summarily. For him, prophecy and eschatology 
23 
remain subordinated to a history of pranise, not the other way around. 
Eschatology becomes simply a universalization of the promises once made to 
Israel. 
Intricately tied up with the ОТ notion of promise is the whole covenant 
(berit) notion (complexes 3-5)· Kutsch has devoted a good bit of work to 
24 
clarifying the meaning of the word berit in the ОТ. His principal conclusion 
is that "covenant" (Bund) is not the proper translation for berit; rather, it 
should be "duty" (Verpflichtung) and within the context of this duty one can 
25 
speak of a "pledge" (Zusage). Holtmann refers to the tradition of promise in 
his description of ОТ experience repeatedly, but interestingly enough first 
introduces the idea of the covenant in his description of ОТ experience nearly 
halfway through his argument; Nevertheless, other authors, when speaking of 
promise, connect it inmediately with these covenants with the forefathers: with 
26 
Abraham, the promise of an own land, and the promise to David. 
This brings up the second point about the systematic theologian's use of 
ОТ data and the work of ОТ exegetes. One thing surely made clear from the 
situation just described is that there is a .great danger in committing oneself 
into the hands of a single exegete or group of exegetes, particularly in the 
case of highly controversial areas such as eschatology. Perhaps even more 
dangerous is simply relying on "biblical theologies" constructed by ОТ theolo­
gians without having some idea of the type of data that they have worked into 
their plan. These biblical theologies are sometimes subject to unarticulated 
assumptions that control the entire epistemologica! structure in the presentation 
One can say that Holtmann has left himself open to the criticism of ideologizing 
ОТ data and is to some extent guilty of it. On the other hand, however, one 
can also say that he has chosen two major interpreters of the ОТ and has 
followed them closely. This is better than unaided speculation. And when all 
is said and done, Holtmann seems to fare no worse than most systematic theologians 
in his use of exegetes' work. 
The second main source of his promise notion can be traced to the concept 
of promieeio in the theology of the young Luther. "Fides et promissio sunt 
28 
relativa" is a well-known citation of the core of his prooisaio idea. The 
idea of the Word and the Gospel as promissio is part of the Reformation tradtion. 
The question arises, then, about the use of promissio in Luther's own theology 
of the ОТ and its influence on those exegetes of the Lutheran tradition. 
27 
-1kl-
This is an interesting point we cannot go into here, but if a connection can 
be shown — and there is reason to believe there is one — then the unarticulated 
notion of promissio could be influencing the structure of some ОТ exegesis ала 
ОТ theologies and along this way also influencing Moltmann indirectly. And the 
question as to what strength the notion should be given in the formation of CT 
history, and more importantly, in the formation of the theology of the young 
Luther, could have significant consequences for Moltmann's understanding of 
the ОТ and thus for his entire project. More directly, the promissio concept 
has influenced Moltmann in his notion of the word of promise. 
All in all, we can see that Moltmann's notion of promise is not without its 
predecessors. We do not intend, on the basis of this information, to attempt 
to "correct" or "improve" his notion of promise. This would go against the 
methodology laid down at the beginning of the chapter. Bather, these points 
have been presented here to help place our own results in the proper perspective; 
namely, that our results fren analyzing Moltmann cannot be immediately iden­
tified with the ОТ and NT data. Moltmann's concepts have a history, too, and 
to pretend that suchuere not the case would be a waste of time. We can only 
hope that this background will help to better place our results in the proper 
context. 
6.2.2. The Shape of Promise. 
In the course of Theologie der Hoffnung Moltmann on four occasions gives 
what could be characterized as definitions of hope: 
In den Verheissungen kundigt sich die verborgene Zukunft an und 
wirkt durch erweckte Hoffnung in die Gegenwart hinein.-^ 
Verheissung kündigt eine Wirklichkeit aus der Zukunft der Wahrheit 
an, die noch nicht da ist.?1 
Eine Verheissung ist eine Zusage, die eine Wirklichkeit ankündigt, 
die noch nicht da ist.^ 
Verheissung steht auch in diesem Falle zwischen Wissen und Nichtwissen, 
zwischen Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit, zwischen dem, was noch nicht ist, 
und den, was schon ist.33 
Interesting in these four statements is their almost hypostasized character; 
nothing is said of who promises, or to whom is promised. And what is promised 
is usually also an hypostasization: "verborgene Zukunft", "Wirklichkeit aus der 
Zukunft der Wahrheit", and so on. Nevertheless, Moltmann wams us that we 
should not equate premise with a word-event (Wortgeachehan), although we can 
35 36 
speak of a promise-event-^ and even of a word of promise. Moreover, there 
37 
are distinctions to be drawn between ordinary promise and divine promise, and 
38 between ordinary promise and eschatological promise. However, these three 
kinds of promise all seem to share a certain number of characteristics that 
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cluster together to give the shape of promise. Promise is future, is new, 
4l 1*2 1*3 M* 
is possibility, is hope, is ferment and contradiction, is not yet, has 
a moment of fulfillment, and makes history. Taken together, they give 
ал abstract idea of what Moltmann understands by promise. 
Judging from these preliminary data, one can readily get the impression 
that the promise Moltmann is talking about will be quite different from the 
one investigated in Chapter Three. But there are other elemente that 
give pause to such a hasty conclusion. To mention but one of them, at one 
point he calls promises "Tatworte", a phrase reminiscent of Austin's perform-
It? 
ative. The first task at hand, then, is to see to what extent Moltmann's 
understanding of promise can be explicated within the rules for promising given 
in Chapter Three. 
6.2.2.1. The Speaker in ОТ Promising. 
If we ask who is ¿ in the promising Moltmann speaks of, it can be said 
unequivocally that j> is God — in the ОТ as Jahweh, and in the NT as the Father 
who raises Jesus from the dead. "The God of promise" is a recurring yhrase. 
Given this as a point of departure, we can go further into the questions of ¿'в 
activity. This will give us one facet of what is meant by promising as Molt­
mann understands it, though for the total picture an investigation of H and ¿, 
the hearer and what is promised, will have to be included. 




liegt in der Glaubwürdigkeit dessen, der sie gibt." This indicates that the 
normal sanctions against breaking promises can obtain in this situation — if 
the promise is not carried out, the credibility of ¿> will suffer. As Moltmann 
says at another point: 
Das Offenbarwerden der Gottheit Gottes hängt darum ganz und gar 
an der wirklichen Erfüllung der Verheissung, wie umgekehrt die 
Erfüllung der Verheissung in der Treue und im Gpttsein Gottes 
ihren Wirklichkeits- und Möglichkeitsgrund hat. 9 
Four things are clear about the nature of promises here from this. (1) If God, 
as £, is subject to the same set of sanctions as man if he fails to carry out 
his promise, then one can speak of a real prooising situation in this case. 
Whether the promising itself will be nondefective remains to be seen; nevertheless, 
the foundation of the illocutionary act of premising — the applicability of 
the sanctions against breaking promises — do obtain. (2) If one can speak of 
the real fufillment of the premise, then the notion of promise cannot be abstract; 
some thing or some futur« state of affairs must be promised. (3) If we combine 
this with the essentially circular definition Moltmann gives of the difference 
50 between human and divine promise, then we can say that the difference will not 
lie in who promisee or how he promises, but in what is promised. (If) Nevertheless, 
if normal sanctions against breaking promises obtain, we can say that what God 
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as S_ promises will lie within hie power to bring about. Molt mann makes this 
same point when he says that the fulfillment of the promise rests not only on 
God's faithfulness but also has its reality and possibility grounded in him. 
The further questions applying to £, as to whether he can be held accountable 
by H, whether S and H are the same individual, and the content of j>, will be 
treated in the following sections. 
6.2.2.2. The Hearer of the Promise. 
Who the Я is in Moltmann's understanding of promise is very unclear. And 
because of this, the notion of promise becomes more confusing since, as was seen 
in Chapter Three, ti really plays the central role in the understanding and 
contouring of the nondefective performance of the illocutionary act of promising. 
Here, too, the seeming hypostasization of promise which some of Moltmann's 
critics have pointed out is most keenly felt. 
Who is ti is Moltmann's promise scheme? There seems to be three possibilities. 
First of all, at some points Moltmann indicates that H is the same as £, or 
God himself. "Sind sie Verheissungen Gottes, so muss Gott auch als Subjekt 
der Erfüllungen angesehen werden." And at another point Moltmann says that in 
52 promising, God promises himself. This would correspond to the notion of 
berit discussed above as developed by Kutsch; namely, that berit is Jahweh'β 
pledge growing out of a comnitment to himself. 
But other sections give the impression that Η is Israel. At one point, the 
people of Israel are called the hearers of the promise and are taken up into its 
process. At another point Moltmann says that promise binds man to the 
future, a statement which would indicate that man is taken up into the promising 
situation initiated by God as S. When speaking briefly of the covenant (Bund), 
he seems to contradict what was just sketched about the notion of berit; here 
the covenant takes place as a communion of God and his people. And at still 
another point, he says, when speaking of human obedience and the notion of 
promise and covenant: 
Dabei muss der menschliche Gehorsam noch nicht einmal als effektive 
causa der Erfüllung verstanden sein, sondern kann auch nur als occa-
sio für die Erfüllung durch Gott selbst genommen werden. Damit liegt 
aber die Kraft der Verheissung zu ihrer Erfüllung nicht mehr in der 
Treue Gottes selbst, sondern in gehorsamen Meaechen.-*3 
This all seems to indicate that Η is the people Israel. 
However, a third possibility also presents itself. In this case, the 
data supporting the idea of Η as Israel could be taken as meaning that the in­
volvement of Israel is a consequence growing out of God's faithfulness to 
himself. Then Israel would fall outside of the immediate promising situation 
and would become interested bystanders, as it were. 
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Which really represente Moltmarm'e own position cannot be said with 
certainty. It would seem that H is probably God in his scheme, and that the 
activity of God pledging himself is meant to have repercussions in Israel. 
If we look at the consequences of the various possibilities in light of 
the constitutive rules for nondefective promising, the following things become 
evident. If H is God, the £ and Я are the sane; and this was seen to be a 
defective promising situation. Then what was meant as promise can only really 
be serious intention. If ji's promise to himself takes the form of an oath 
(and Moltmann mentions this possit&ity) then as was seen, a different Я is 
introduced into the picture. One can possibly work out a theology of promise 
where S is H in a Whiteheadian philosophy of process, but there is no indication 
- -
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that Moltmann has such an option in mind. 
If, on the other hand, H is Israel, the question arises as to whether 
Israel can hold God (as S) accountable for his promise to do A, i.e., can impose 
the sanctions against breaking promises. Judging from ОТ data, Israel is in 
the position to do so: it can abandon God, a problem the prophets often had to 
face. But the possibility of abandoning God, aside freo the consequences of such 
an action as outlined by the prophets, also brings up another point: to what 
extent does Ж understand ¿'s intention to do A? This is a very complicated 
point, made even more difficult by the notion that Israel really only grasped 
God's promises after they had been made. We are once again confronted with the 
enigma of just what does berit entail. And thirdly, the whole problem of the 
legitimation of the belief in Jahweh as a motive for the "prophetic turn" in 
59 
Israel cannot be overlooked. And all of this can be boiled down to one of 
the requirements for nondefective illocutionary promising: did H accept S'a 
proniae? This question entails all the problems of understanding that form the 
conditions of posfiitility for H's being able to apply the sanctions if needed. 
And given the murky sitution sketched here, it is ВДіІу questionable whether 
Israel as H could function as a promisee in a nondefective sense. 
If, finally, H is iä and Israel is merely an interested bystander, the 
promising situation is lifted entirely out of the domain of nondefective lllo-
cutionary acts and transferred to the realm of perloculionary acts. Then S 
performs a perlocutionary act to evoke an illocutionary act (Israel's commitment 
to Jahweh) from Israel. As we shall see, this will best explain the promising 
situation as Moltmann described it. The promising situation is at any rate 
defective as an illocutionary act, which opens the possibility for perlocutionary 
activity. Of course, this will have important consequences for any theological 
interpretation. 
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6.2.2.3· Tb« Content £ of the Promiee. 
Significantly, Holtmann devotes much more tine to diecuesing what the 
promise does than what is actually promised. Promise is connected with the 
hidden future and comes to Israel from this hidden future. The most common 
indication of the content of the promise, recurring throughout Theologie der 
Hoffnung, is nova creatio or creatio ex nihilo. At any rate, he tells us, the 
promise is not an empty one, but is real and will he fulfilled. When dis­
cussing N1 promise he makes the following interesting statement: 
Fragen wir nun nach den Verheissungs- und Erwartungsinhalten der 
Zukunft des auferstandenen Christus, so stossen wir auf Verheissungen, 
deren Gehalt aus den prophetischen Erwartungen des Alten Testamentes 
in gewissen Umrissen schon aufleuchtet, deren Gestalt aber durch das 
Beden, Leiden und Sterben Christi bestimmt ist."-1· 
The ОТ promises of land and the eternal reign of the Davidic dynasty are 
transformed in the NT situation to a threefold promise: 
Die Yerheissung der Gerechtigkeit Gottes, 
die Verheissung des Lebens aus der Auferstehung von den Toten und ^ 
die Verheissung des Reiches Gottes in einer neuen Totalität des Seins. 
When we ask about the content of these promises, we discwer that they are 
symbols of other realities "im Widerspruch zur vorhandenen Wirklichkeit". 
But can one promise symbols? Can £ be a symbol? 
In our discussion of £, three criteria were given for its being able to 
be constituted as £ in nondefective illocutionary promising. These three 
criteria were that £ be clear, future and realizable. 
That £ be clear implied clarity in ¿'s uttering, and clarity in H's 
accepting. To start with the latter, H's acceptance was already seen to be 
problematic in this situation. And the lack of clarity of Н'в acceptance will 
reflect back on £'e clarity of intention in uttering £, at least insofar as 
his intention is not clear to H. Part of the clarity problem is also fixed 
upon £ itself. Can one promise symbols? Such a promise would seem to fall 
under one of the varieties of empty promises. Such a promise was given in the 
example where I love someone very much and promise her the moon and the stars. 
No one takes me at my literal word, but understands the symbolic mention of 
the firmament as an expression of the depth of my commitment. A second example 
would be promising a surprise. This was classified as a vague promise, because 
the position of Η was greatly weakened. Vague promises as surprises border 
closely on perlocutionary acts, where the intention is to heighten expectation. 
One thing can be definitely said about the clarity of £ in the case of the NT 
promises Holtmann outlines: they are clearly institutional as opposed to brute 
fact in character. The phrase "im Widerspruch zur vorhandenen Wirklichkeit" 
keeps recurring throughout Theologie der Hoffnung. And if we recall how 
matrices of meaning can not only mediate facts, but actually create and 
reconstitute them (section ^.3.2.), then one has to radically rethink the 
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origine of "bnite" facte. They, too, may be in large neaeure part of conatnieted 
reality, something Searle hinted at in his making of this distinction (section 
2.3.3.). In this case, those facts contradicting "ordinary reality" will be, 
structurally seen, institutional in character even though at first sight they 
will be perceived as brute facts. In the case of the central symbol promised, 
the Reign of God, Moltmann even makes this clear: 
Seine Herrschaft steint also nicht zuerst ein Weltkönigtum über 
die naturhafte Umwelt des Menschen, sondern Führung in die land-
schaften der Verheissung, also geschichtliche Herrschaft, die sich 
in einmaligen, unwiederholbaren, überraschend neuen, zielgerichteten 
Ereignissen zeigt."* 
This idea that the symbols promised are not, nor do they point to, brute facts 
is also partially corroborated by Moltmann's insistence that the promises are 
not predictions. As was noted in the section on promising, brute facts 
promised border in their future orientation on prediction while institutional 
facts promised border on swearing and ceremonial oath. 
In the question of the futurity of p, there is little problem. Time and 
66 
time again Moltmann refers to the future character of promise. The only area 
where a problem does arise is the moment of fulfillment. When in the future 
does fulfillment take place? This question cannot be answered simply. It in-
volves, first of all, the realizability of the £ promised, and secondly the 
time-awareness involved. The first part of the question can be breeched here, 
while the second part must wait for the section on time. 
In the question of how realizable is £ we encounter a correlate of the 
claxity issue. Can symbols be realized, or do they stand for a reality to be 
realized? What defines the conditions for the realization of symbols? Secondly, 
there is the problem of overspill (Überachüssigkeit) in ОТ Promise to which 
Moltmann accords great importance. And finally, can a definite when be given 
for the fulfillment (or lack thereof) of promised symbols? For the first and 
third questions, no answer can really be given. As was seen in the clarity 
discussion, whether symbols can be promised at all in a nondefective illocutionary 
fashion is indeed doubtful. If the question is extended to the reality behind 
the symbol, or to the reality to which the symbol refer·, then one must aak 
two questions: (1) if fulfillment is really directed to a reality other than 
the symbol, what ie the function of the symbol in the illocutionary situation? 
and (2) if the reality can only be brought to expression in the symbol, is it 
possible to even speak of illocutionary (instead of perlocutionary) promising? 
And the thrust of both these questions would seem to indicata that to involve 
the symbol in the matter of realizability will entail either a misuse of the 
symbol or a defective illocutionary act. It seems that the only way to safe­
guard both the integrity of the symbol and the symbolic function, and the 
nondefective illocutionary act is to consider the activity of prcedse here as 
nonillocutionary. 
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The notion of the overepill of prooiee, i.e., the situation where at the 
moment of fulfillment the promise opens new poseibilitiee and carries its 
strength and valence as promise again into the future, would corroborate this 
sense. Moltmann seems to employ the idea mainly to show a continuity in the 
history of promising, to develop a promise history, as it were. In speech act 
theory, one would be more inclined to speak of a series of promises that were each 
and separately noAdefective illocutionary acts rather than one promise over­
flowing into another, new promise. The notion of overspill is an historiograph-
ical, rather than a linguistic notion. That overspill takes place would raise 
the question of the realizability of the promise and would again press us in 
the direction of a nonillocutionary notion of promise. 
6.2.3· ОТ Promising as a Perlocutionary Act. 
We can summarize our findings concerning Moltmann' use of promise in 
Theologie der Hoffnung as follows: 
1. Í5 is clearly God, and Moltmann gives every indication that he wishes to 
talk about real, illocutionary promise. The difference between divine and 
human promise lies not in how the promise is made, but in what is promised. 
2. Who precisely H is in Moltmann'ε presentation is unclear; it can be 
either God or Israel or God with Israel as an involved bystander. It seems 
most likely that the third possibility is the case. But then ¿ and Η are the 
sajne, which means, according to the constitutive rules of nondefective illocu­
tionary promising, that the promise would become a serious intention rather 
than an illocutionary promise. The involvement of Israel as a bystander pointed 
in the direction of a perlocutionary act rather than illocutionary intention. 
3. The £ promised are future symbols. They are not clear (neither in ¿'s 
uttering nor in II'β or Israel's accepting) and ¿ would fall into the category 
of vague and empty premises — and they also tend in the direction of perlocu-
tionary acts. The content of the symbols, insofar as it can be delineated, is 
institutional (thus, not brute) fact. As for the realization of £, problems 
presented thenselves as to cmditions for the realization of £ because of its 
symbol character and the range of £ (the overspill problem). 
From these results we can only conclude that the promise of which Moltmann 
is speaking is certainly defective as an illocutionary promise. At the same time, 
while showing some motion in the direction of illocutionary intention, the 
bulk of the results point in the direction of a perlocutionary act. Whether 
that is the case will be taken up shortly. 
The defective character of the illocutionary promise has been noted by 
several critics, as was seen above. Expressed in various ways, the basic feel-
ing was the the promise was stretched beyond its normal (illocutionary) 
bounds: either promising was made to do more work than it was intended for, the 
content of the proolse was abstract, or it was pure superstructure under the 
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label of promise. With speech act analysis we have been able to show pre-
cisely where the notion of promiaing deviated from "normal", illocutionary 
promising. On the basis of this we will be able to draw some conclusions later 
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on for theology. 
But first, the promising question itself needs some futher treatment. 
While it has been shown to be defective in an illocutionary sense, how exactly 
Moltmann intends his pr mise to be understood has to be elucidated. At one 
point in Theologie der Hoffnung he does talk about the function of promising: 
'Verheissung' hat insofern nicht in erster Linie die Funktion, die 
seiende Wirklichkeit der Welt oder des Henschseins zu erhellen, zu 
deuten, zur Wahrheit zu bringen und im sinnvollen Verstehen das Ein-
stimmen des Menschen in sie zu erwecken, sondern sie eröffnet viel-
mehr im Widerspruch zur vorhandenen Wirklichkeit ihren eigenen Pro-
zess um die Zukunft Christi zur Welt und zum Menschen.^ 
And more interesting is hie recurring use of the word "provozieren" to express 
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the function of promise. We have already noted above the aspect of promise 
as contradiction and ferment. put in a larger frame, namely that of escha-
tology of which promise is the language, Moltmann at one point in Umkehr zur 
Zukunft says that "das Christentum ganz und gar Eschatologie ist, nämlich eine 
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weltverändernde und weltuberwindende Hoffnung." 
Bringing this all together, the conclusion is obvious. We have here the 
use of promising in a classical case of a perlocutbnary act. By "promising", 
£ tries to get Israel to commit itself to certain action. By "promising", a 
gnawing element of contradiction is introduced into an otherwise serene situation 
with the intention of pulling Israel forward to the future where the "promise" 
will be fulfilled. When the "promise" tends toward achieving fulfillment, over-
spill creates new possibilities that keep Israel moving toward an absolute futuxe. 
Thus, a defective illocutionary promise ia used to evoke a aove into the future. 
The perlocutionary effect to a great extent unconventional due to the highly 
defective character of the illocutionary act. The use of promise is intended 
to evoke the level of commitment which reaches its most complete form in 
illocutionary pranising. To this extent, it is not unlike the electoral 
promises discussed in section 3.2.1.2. 
That the promising spoken of in Theologie der Hoffnung is perlocutionary, 
rather than illocutionary in character, has a number of consequences for theo-
logy. We would like to indicate a few of them here. This matter will also be 
laken up again in the general conclusion. 
1. If we are not dealing with illocutionary acts, but with perlocutionary 
ones, then all those things pertaining to the structure and conventions surroun-
ding illocutionary acts will not obtain in their proper sense. To give an idea 
of what that entails: Moltmann's use of promise has been shown to be perlocutionary. 
And perlocutionary promises, as all perlocutionary acts, are nonconventional 
in their structure and especially in their effects. Thus, one may rightly ask 
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if the ОТ and NT promises are fulfillable — or even meant to be fulfilled. For 
in perlocutionary acts, there is no test for infelcity. And one wonders if 
some fulfillment could even be located and identified, given the perlocutionary 
character of the promising utterances. For theology, this could have enormous 
consequences. The entire notion of covenant, the relation between God and his 
people, between God and the world, will have to be rethought. For we can no 
longer base our notion of a salvation history on the promises of God and see 
the "end" of salvation history as the fulfillment of these premises. One must 
ask the question instead: what effects is God trying to achieve with perlocu­
tionary promises? Are the effects identifiable? If they are, then one can base 
a salvation history on the desired effects. 
2. There is also the question of eschatological verification, a probien 
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Koltmann refers to several times explcitly, and many more times implicitly. 
Will God and his acts be clarified and verified at some point in the future'' 
Will the promises be fulfilled at that time? If the promises are cast in per­
locutionary form, we cannot point to some future time for the fulfillment of 
their content; their "fulfillment" is their achievement of the desired effect 
in Israel. Then it becomes possible to ask whether one can speak of eschatological 
verification at all. Without this final verification of God in the end, some 
foinns of theodicy and some notions of history will have to be recas into other 
terms and some will have to disappear altogether. 
3. A further question within the fruework of eschatology concerns the 
function of these eschatological perlocutionary proeises. We will attempt to 
answer this in some fashion below in section 6.3.'*. 
4. A second big question within eschatology is whether the use of perlocu­
tionary acts may not lead to an even more radical reformulation and demythologiza-
tion of the eschatological terrain than was achieved in the last hundred years 
in ш eiailar fashion in protology. With the utterly future point obscured by 
perlocutionary acts (in that there is no future point indicated as in illocu-
tionary acts), the traditional symbols of the Last Things will have to be 
critically rethought; are they, too, perhaps perlocutionary symbols intended to 
evince some sort of illocutionary act from us? Rethinking eschatology will be 
more difficult than rethinking protology was, mainly beqû^ ijee in the former the 
inevitable barb of death has to be given a central place when speaking about 
any sort of end. 
5· Connected with this is our understanding of the resurrection of Jesus and 
the generiti resurrection of the dead that has been promised. How is this pro-
mise to be understood? If its illocutionary sense has been undermined, can we 
then really look forward to a point in tune when the dead will be raised? Or 
are we once again confronted with a perlocutionary premised symbol? These are 
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hard questione not admitting of easy answers. Moreover, to take the discus­
sion back one step, what does perlocutionary promise mean for the resurrection 
of Jesus? Perhaps we will have to look for something different in the raising 
of Jesus. Instead of speculating about the empty tomb, we should be addressing 
ourselves to the function of the apparitions to the disciples. Perhaps what is 
reported of these apparitions is the sense of the resurrection. The under­
standing of the resurrection and its correlate, the death of Jesus, will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
6. Йоге generally, the concrete study of perlocutionary acts can give 
content to the notion of "evocative", a favorite word among theologians and 
religious philosophers for describing religious language. Although the sense 
of "evocative" is complicated and the word is not used in the same fashion by 
all philosophers and theologians, we can locate one important meaning of the 
word: evocative language is a perlocutionary act uttered to achieve an illo-
cutionary act in response. This has important consequences for the theologian· 
How much of Christian doctrine is he prepared to consign to evocative language? 
For with evocative or perlocutionary utterances, it is not the utterance itself 
that is significant, but the response it evokes from the hearer. Then one can 
ask the question: why this particular utterance and not another? Or: why this 
kind of doctrine and not another? Then theology could perhaps be better prac­
ticed by advertising executives than theologians: for with perlocutionary acts, 
the important thing is the response of H. Even apart from this possibility, 
it should be clear that the presence of perlocutionary acts will entail some 
hermeneutical options and exclude others. To give one example: the location 
of the person and message of Jesus will be less important than in determining 
the early church's response. For the person and message of Jesus become simply 
the occasion for achieving certain responses fren the church. 
7. Connected with the hermeneutical problem is a structural problem of 
perlocutionary acts themselves. In studying the effects of a perlocutionary 
act, to what extent can we read back to the illocutionary act itself? As we 
saw, perlocutionary effects are pre-eminently nonconveit ional in character. 
And in the formulation of the constitutive rules for perlocutionary acts it 
was noted that the perlocutionary effect beoaies more conventional to the extent 
that the perlocutionary act approaches the nondefective illocutionary act upon 
which it is parasitical. If we can determine the amount of "defectiveness" of 
the parasitical perlocutionary act, we can better come to an understanding of 
how closely we will be able to relate the effect of the act to the act itself. 
This will be important for ascertaining the relative "strength" of eschatological 
symbols; i.e., if the symbol promised closely approaches an illocutionary pro­
mise, then we have a strong perlocutionary sense which will be less open to 
nonconventional effects. On the basis of this we could possibly classify and or­
der the various eschatological symbols. 
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8. A final note of caution, however, needs mentioning. The promise seen 
to be perlocutionary was Moltmann's understanding of promise. Whether the same 
judgment would hold for the occurrences of the notion of promising and promise 
in the ОТ and NT would require a separate study. It would seem, however, that 
the results will not differ too widely from those found with Holtmann. 
The implications of perlocutionary promise could be extended further. But 
our interest now turns to the concretization of one aspect; namely, how per­
locutionary promise functions within Moltmann's eschatological universe. This 
will involve a study of its effects on his conception of time and eechatology 
as a symbolic universe. 
6.3· Time-Awareness in Eechatology. 
6.3·!· Time-Awareness and the Symbolic Universe. 
As we saw in our discussion at the beginning of section 3.3·ι any dis­
cussion of time done on a fundamental basis always tends to become problematic. 
Since time, with space, forme the coordinates upon which our constructs for 
explaining the world are hung, a full discussion of tune will always entail 
a detailed epistemologica! and metaphysical elaboration. Speaking now in the 
concrete situation of eechatology and having in the meantime discussed sym­
bolic universes, we are in a better position to illustrate the difficulty and 
at the same time how how time-awarenese does indeed build up a symbolic uni­
verse. We shall see that, in general, time-awareness gives form to the sym­
bolic universe in the following ways: (1) it lays down the directions of the 
movement of tuie within the symbolic universe and determines the priority of 
directions; (2) it establishes the symmetries and asymmetries between the six 
time dimenaione of simple past, present, future and absolute past, present, 
future; (3) it defines the movement and interpretation of events and their 
truth value (history); ( Ό and finally, it extends these movements in both 
directions to a proton and an eschaton which bee one the pillars upon which the 
symbolic universe comes to rest. 
In particular, and more immediately related to our cmcern here, time-
awareness will, on the one hand, illuminate particular aspects of the perlocu­
tionary act of promising and especially why the perlocutionary act was performed 
at all. Time-awareness combined with perlocutionary activity provides us with 
a functional logic for the eventual entry into the symbolic universe. On the 
one hand, the perlocutionary act will help unravel the time-awareness and give 
shape to an answer to some of Moltmann's critics. On the other, the time-
awareness will be included in the development of a functional logic that will 
bring the eschatological symbolic universe into focus. And the role of tune-
awareness as a constitutive element in the formation of the symbolic universe 
as such will receive attention. 
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6.3.2. Moltmann'B Understanding of Time-Awareneas. 
The central terra in Moltraann's Theologie der Hoffnung that has caused 
perhaps even more misunderstanding than this notion of promise is his notion 
of future. As we saw above, promise and future are closely related throughout 
the book. And just as he defined promise in terms of future, he defines future 
in terms of promise: 
Als 'Zukunft' ist dabei diejenige Wirklichkeit gemeint, in der 
das Verheissungswort seine Entsprechung, seine Antwort und seine 
Erfüllung bekommt, in der es eine Wirklichkeit findet bzw. schafft, 
die ihm gemäss ist und in der er zur Ruhe kommt.'3 
Thus future is closely related to the notions of promise and is to be found at 
that point where promise meets its fulfillment. Moltmann is subordinating the 
entire problem of tune-awareness to the structure and function of promise. "Die 
Zeltvorstellungen ergeben sich erst aus den Erwartungen," he says. He 
realizes that what he is presenting is a time-awareness other than the "ordinary" 
one: 
Der abstrakte naturwissenschaftliche Zeitbegriff, der seit Kant 
das Denken der Neuzeit bestimmt, darf hier noch nicht angewandt 
werden, bevor er nicht auf seinen eschatologischen, und das heisst 
bei Kant transzendentalen Horizont geprüft worden ist.'5 
Thus one must be careful not to too quickly attempt to Integrate Moltmann's 
promise into another time-awarenese scheme. The future of which he speaks 
cannot be simply identified with the future dunensions as ordinarily understood: 
Unter 'Zukunft' verstehen wir hier nicht einen weitentfernten 
Zustand, sondern eine Macht, die die Gegenwart durch Verheissung 
und Hoffnung, Befreiung und Schöpfung neuer Möglichkeiten quali-
fiziert. Als die Macht der Zukunft wirkt Gott m die Gegenwart 
hinein. Als Ursprung neuer Möglichkeiten befreit er die Gegen-
wart von den Fesseln der Versangenheit und der angstvollen Be-
harrung auf dem status quo.^ 
Thus, to say that Moltmann is robbing us of the present by his constant emphasis 
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on the future, as some critics have said, is misguided. One cannot identify 
his notion of future with our ordinary simple future dimension. If Moltmann 
is depriving us of anything, it is the hegemony of the past over the present, and 
the an absolute "past" that correspcnds to the absolute "future" of which he 
now speaks. To clarify hie notion of future somewhat, he has developed since 
the writing of Theologie der Hoffnung the two notions <f futurum and adventua. 
This distinction throws a dilfcrent light on the old problem of reconciling 
futurist and realized eschatology. The question is no longer "entweder prä-
sent ische oder futurische Eschatologie oder dialektisches Auspendeln beider 
Aspekte", but is rather now "beetlmt die Gegenwart die Zukunft in Extrapoia-
na 
tionen oder bestimmt die Zukunft die Gegenwart in Antizipationen?" Moltmann 
connects the notion of futurum with this first notion of the present determining 
the future by extrapolation. He engages in some etymology to explain his 
position: futurum is connected with the Greek phu8, whose substantive form is 
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physis. And phyais expresses the type of future of futurum: 
Physie ist das Hervorbringende, der ewig-zeugende und gebarende, 
göttliche Mutterschoss aller Dinge und Erscheinungen. Was sein 
wird, entspringt aus dem ewigen Werde- un Zeugungsprozess des 
Seins. Es ist Aktualisierung топ Drpotenz.79 
Thus futurum is a future that is a realization of possibilities present or 
immanent within the present. 
Adventus on the other hand cooes from the Latin adveptus which in turn is 
the translation of the Greek parousia "wobei der Ton adventlicher Erwartung 
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durch den messianischen Geist der Propheten und Apostel ins Wort gekommen ist". 
It is connected with the idea of coming, of anticipation of a future person or 
event that owes its origin not to the bowels of the present reality, but can 
only be perceived in this present reality as anticipation, as dream, as Vor-
8l 
schein. Christian eschatology is primarily adventus in its origins, i.e., 
"nur wenn die universale Zukunft Gottes und seines Seiches der Realgrund fur 
das Chrietusgeschehen ist, kann das Christusgeschehen zum Erkenntniagrund für 
diese Zukunft genommen werden." Thus, Christian eschatÒIOQT includes both 
futurum and adventus, but the futurum works only within the reality provided by 
the adventus. This futurum cannot operate out of "des ewig-zeugenden und ge-
bärenden, göttlichen Hutterschosses aller Dinge und Erscheinungen". The present 
of the Christian and the eschatological moment realized in the raising of Jesus 
cannot be assimilated into the normal reality of the everyday present. It 
receives its basis sot from a developing proton in the past, but from the 
adventus of promise. Thus one can say that a different epistemologica! ground 
is established and a different consciousness is provided. The extrapolation 
within the circle of eschatological adventus will not correspond to extrapolations 
made in everyday reality. Its effect on the present is likewise different. 
We have, then, the following situation: adventus, the absolute future, 
replaces the absolute past as the foundational element of time-awareness. The 
present becomes the Vorschein, the prolepsis, of the absolute future and the 
most "real" moment to date as it moves toward fulfillment in the absolute future. 
But whereas in the other time-awareness the present maintains its reality even 
as it becomes simple past (due to the analogy between simple and absolute past), 
in this time-awareness the present will lose its reality once it has moved into 
the past, since the newer present is "real" as it moves toward an absolute future. 
Nevertheless, the present in this time-awareness exhibits a greater "reality" 
character than in the other time-awareness. For it remains the front of the 
absolute future, whereas in the other time-awareness emerging from the absolute 
past, it becomes further removed from the absolute past. This is where the 
analogy between simple and absolute past turne on itself. This will be taken 
up again in section 6.3.3.3· 
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АБ ал example, the eschatological enthusiasm of the first disciples 
cannot devolve into a repose in the present situation, since it is not the 
most developed point on a front moving into the future, emerging from a proton. 
Rather it is being drawn into the source of the adventus, and while assured 
that it is on the front moving toward the real and is itself the most "real" 
to date, it is calm and subdued in its enthusiasm. For while it enjoys the 
Vorschein, it is still the furthermost point from the source of the adventus 
at this time. It is a face forward, not backward. 
6.3.3. Adventus as the Foundation of the Eschatological Symbolic Universe. 
Having sketched out the basic time corrdinates within Moltmann's vanety 
of time-awareness, we can now turn to how they function. As a whole, the 
time-awareness Holtmann develops moves along two lines: externally by being 
constantly compared with another type of time-awareness, and internally by 
the gradual unfolding and interworking of aspects peculiar to adventus time-
awareness and aspects of time-awarenesses in general. This gradual fleshing 
out of the time-awareness leads to an inclusion of all those concepts that 
border upon and depend upon the character of the time-awareness: causality, 
change, truth, knowledge, memory and action. Once these have attained a well-
delineated status, the time-awareness stands on the verge of being a foundation 
for a symbolic universe; i.e., together with the concept of space it provides 
the conditions of possibility for the cognitive and semantic structures of a 
society. 
Moreover, the development of the time-awareness will show a certain inner 
logic of its own. The transition fron a simple perception to the organization 
of an entire consciousness does not occur haphazardly. The functional logic to 
be traced here will try to include both the logic of its constitution and the 
logic of its deployment. The development of the logic will be given in a 
series of four moments: the moment of appearance, the moment of explanation, 
the moment of expansion, and the mooant of foundation. 
6.3.3.1· Contradiction as the Moment of Appearance. 
The idea of contradiction (Widerspruch) holds within it the immanent logic 
of developaent of the time-awareness Moltmann has in mind. The contradiction is 
the first moment of awareness of a cleavage between what is experienced now 
and some other reality. Moltmann sees the moment of cleavage as between present 
and future, between Christian eschatology and Greek logos: 
Gegenwärtiges und Zukünftiges, Erfahrung und Hoffnung treten in 
der christlichen Eschatologie in Widerspruch zueinander, sodass 
durdi sie dem Menschen nicht Entsprechung und Einstimmigkeit mit 
dem Gegebenen zuteil wird, sondern er in den Widerstreit von 
Hoffnung und Erfahrung hineingezogen wird.'" 
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tfhat results from this contradiction is that the experienced reality no longer 
Jibea with the horizon within which it takes place. The horizon is the raiein« 
of Jesus. The Christian hope, the fruit of the ргопііве of the resurrection, 
contradicts the reality given in the Greek logos. What results is an "inadae-
quatio rei et intellectua", where the rea of the given reality no longer 
corresponds to the intellectue of future promise. We have here the beginnings 
of a new notion of truth, which Holtmann clearly implies with his play upon the 
adaaquatio rei et uitellectus as a definition of truth. 
But how does the idea of the inadaequatio rei et intellectus get worked 
out further? The situation does not remain with the mere indication of a 
cleavage between reality and piense. In the first place, truth value is 
accorded to the promise present in the intellectus, which means that nontruth 
will reside with the res of ordinary reality. At another place, Moltmann 
expreaaea this first atep with a reference to Bloch, where Bloch playa upon 
Spinoza's definition of truth aa Moltmann himself has played upon the medieval 
definition. Spinoza'a definition is "Veritas est index sui et falsi" (aie); 
oc 
Bloch'a definition ia "Veritas est nonduM index sui, sed jam falsi". Secondly, 
the two realities' relation to each other ie more closely defined functionally. 
The present situation, while being now false, does not remain so. There is a 
mediation between the present and future situation. What appears in the present 
is not yet the future. Thus the present as a situation is not wholly denied as 
true; for if that were the case, the future truth could not manifest itself 
within the situation. The important matter is that the present cannot be 
understood wholly fron itself or from the past. 
In terms of the law of identity, the situation here is one where "S is not 
yet P', inatead of either "S is V" or "S ia not P*. 7 And in thia not yet, 
a fundamental category m the development of Moltmann'в argument, not only are 
truth conditions set up, but also a process is set up and initiated. The 
baaic options for a theory of knowledge are provided in that what exists 
QD 
now is only a Vorschein of that* which is to come. 
6.3.3.2· Negation as the Moment of Explanation. 
Out of the not-yet definition of the current state of reality, the funda­
mental procesa initiated can be expressed in a clearer rationale of how the 
present situation frees itself from the overriding interpretation of reality 
and moves toward the future of promise. Recently, Moltmann has gone some 
distance in explaining the basic options that are available for the development 
from the current state of reality to the absolute future of permise. It is, 
go 
he says, basically a choice between a development by analogy or by dialectic. 
He goes on to characterize the former as typically Greek and the latter as 
best suited to eschatology. For analogy accepts the basic soundness of the 
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analogue, while the dialectic moves by a negation of that reality. Negation plays 
a central role in the development from the present to the future. But this will 
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not be a via negativa or via remotionia, since in this situation one remains 
bound to that which one negates. Bather, in Christian eschatology one has a 
negation of the negation, which will free the negating consciousness from the 
first reality entirely. But the negation of the negation does not lead back 
to the first reality negated; there is an asymmetry involved due to the intro­
duction of the future element of promise. This is the force behind the negation 
which will make it more than the symmetrical opposite of that which is negated. 
The work of the negation is elaborated beet in Der Gekreuzigte Gott, though the 
seeds of it are to be found already in Theologie der Hoffnung. Here we see how 
the death of Jesus is a negation of the current reality's notion of God — for 
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the immortal God becomes "der Gottverlassene". God is dead. But in the 
resurrection, this negation is negated. The Forsaken One is raised up and 
glorified with God. And the fact of this resurrection of the Forsaken One 
becomes the new point of departure for reality. 
This allows us to say several things about the moment of explanation in 
the development of this time-awareness. First of all, by the negation of the 
negation, consciousness ів freed from the old for the new. Secondly, the 
present is freed from the hegemony of the past, both as simple past and absolute 
past. Third, this freeing the present from the past is the first step toward a 
rearrangement of the asymmetries of the six time dimensions. And fourth, the 
introduction of the asymmetrical moment in the negation of the negation is the 
basis of the establishment of the absolute future as the ground of reality. The 
"otherness" provided by the asymmetrical leap of the negation of the negation 
thus clearly defines its separateness from the constituting ground of the old 
reality. 
6.3.3*3. History as the Moment of Expansion. 
In the notion of history, the work of the negation is set forth. Holtmann 
belongs to those who do not want to see history in reality, but reality as 
92 history. That is, instead of the world being the stage for history, history 
will be the horizon for the world: "Denn nicht die Welt als Inbegriff des ver­
gänglichen Seins ist der Horizont der Geschichte, sondern die eschatologisch 
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geöffnete Geschichte ist der Horizont der Welt." ^ And what determines history 
is the future, the future begun in the resurrection of Jesus, the negation of 
the negation. The future is absolute; it is the mode of God's being: "Als Gottes 
Seinsweise in der Geschichte wird die Zukunft vielmehr zur Dominante der Zeit 
94 
oder zur 'Seele' der geschichtlichen Zeit." And without this sense of the 
future, it is very difficult to maintain the experience of the reality of 
95 history· In this sense one can speak of the "future of the past" and the 
"future of the present", for future is not simply that beyond the present, but 
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it ie the adventus of God as the ground of possibility for history and time-
awareness. 
In terms of the three simple dimensions of past, present and future, the 
asymmetries are worked out in the following fashion. The present is not offered 
up at the expense of the future, as some critics have maintained. That comes 
from a misunderstanding of the meaning of present. For Moltmann, present is 
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"Anfang , Angeld, Antizipation und Advent der Zukunft", "Anfang der Zukunft 
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gegen das Vergehen". It ιβ the point where the future is already begun. 
That the past seems to have lost its normative power over the present, as other 
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critics have also noted, again grows from a misunderstanding. First of all, 
such an objection equates past with the absolute past, the grounding force 
behind situations where tradition is absolutely normative. And seronaly, it 
confuses past with the past of the ordinary time which is ahistoncal: what 
was to be, has been and is no more. Bather, Moltmann makes a distinction 
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between two kinds of past: Vergangenheit and Ergangenheit. In his scheme 
of time-awareness, it is primarily the second kind that plays an important role. 
Ergangenheit is the past the future can change, is the source of memory that 
has a future. This past has possibilities yet to be realized, but not in 
the sense of a teleology or finis ultimus; it is rather a past with possibilities 
that the future can reach back into. Finally, there is future as well. In 
this simple future we have the futurum of the adventus; that is, the extrapo­
lations into the not yet that can be made on the basis of the present begun as 
Angeld and Antizipation. 
If we were to cast all this in terms of asymmetries, it would go as follows: 
the absolute future^ absolute past or present; present^ past or future. 
Once the asymmetries have been given and the sweep of history from the 
present into the future is clarified, it is not difficult to see how the «cncept-
clustere bordering on time-awareness fall into place. First of all, history 
itself. History is the stage upon which the world plays — for there is no end 
to history within the world. Memory and anticipation were already touched 
upon. Memory is the future still in the past (Ergangenheit), and anticipation 
is the edge of the present moving into the future. Truth, we saw, is an inadae-
quatio rei et intellectus, the dissonance between what ia and what is not yet. 
Causality will cone cut the opposite of the causality concept of the "ordinary" 
world; instead of "what is" bringing about "what is not", the "not yet" creates 
"what ie". Poeaibility becomes, instead of that which is still outstanding, 
"das Beal-Mogliche" in that possibility is more real than what is. And any 
theory of action will be played out in history — the continuing move toward the 
not yet, the negating of the present reality. 
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6.3.3·1*· "he Lschaton ae the tloment of Foundation. 
It is but a short step from the complete sweep of historical expansion to 
ontological foundation· At tins point the final development in time-awareness 
takes place; it is the move fron the phenomenological to the foundational. At 
this point one can turn around and retrace the entire development from appear­
ance to explanation to expansion to foundation, but then starting in reverse 
order; it is the move from a posteriori to a prion. 
In the gradual development of promise in the ОТ, promise and future became 
eschatology at the point in the history of the prophets where the span of the 
nonzon of the eschaton corree.oonded to tne span of the horizon of the proton: 
Von einer wirklichen 'Eschatologie' wird man also erst sprechen 
können an Stellen, wo der geschichtlich beschränkte und perspek-
tivische Horizont auf das angesagte Zukunftige im Eschaton das 
Proton der ganzen Schöpfung erreicht, wo der Horizont des sich 
ankündigenden und kommenden Gottes auf alle Volker geht, denn es 
gibt nichts, was darüberhinaus in der «leite noch gedacht werden 
kann.10? 
In the NT, this development proceeds a step further: "Die Auferstehungsberichte 
stehen also nicht direkt in einem kosmologischen Horizont der Fragen nach dem 
Ursprung, dem Sinn und dem Wesen der Welt." This is the case becuase "die 
Auferstehung Christi meint nicht eine Möglichkeit in der Welt jnd ihrer Geschichte, 
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sondern eine neue Möglichkeit von Welt, Existenz und Geschichte überhaupt." 
In other words, where the ОТ horizon of the eschaton could match that of the 
proton, in the raising of Jesus the horizon of the eschaton creates a new 
possibility as horizon. In ter s of the biblical promises, as was seen above, 
the ОТ promises were recast m a new form in the NT event of the raising of Jesus. 
Thus "Omega ist mehr als Alpha, und erst wenn das 'Ende gut ist', kann 
'alles gut' werden." "Von Ende her erläutert sich der Anfang, vom Kommenden 
her ändert sich die Geschichte. Das Eschaton ist nova creatio, jedoch nicht 
ex nihilo, sondern — genauer gesagt — neue Schöpfung aus dem Nicht-Mehr-Sein, 
und darum Auferweckung der Toten und anakephnlяібвів aller ine Vergängliche 
gestürzten Dinge." Future ie the foundation of transcendence and the 
emergence of this transcendence is seen in the arrivai of the New. The New 
(Novum) is the central phenomenon marking the Coming God, whose being is future. 
In light of this, the proton loses its centrality in the interpretation 
of reality. The eschaton is no longer the fulfillment of the proton (and in 
that sense greater than the proton), but it is the source of the proton Seelf. 
In this distinction of the eschaton being greater than the proton, Moltmann 
makes most clear his position against the "transcendental eschatology" stemming 
Ilk from Kant wlich has played such a large role in the history of eschatology. 
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G.Ji.k. Time-Awareness and Perlocutionary Promisp. 
There still renains one task in elucidating the concrete languac« of 
Moltniann's eschatolocy; namely, a brief look at the relation between tne-
awareness and perlocutonary promise. Their work together resulted m the develon-
ment of a complete nevi time-awareness under the aegis of adventus of the Cornine 
of God. Our concern now is to look more closely at how their interrelation is 
structured and why the effects of this relation are what they are. This can 
be brought under two headings: how perlocutionary acta aid time-awareness and 
hou time-awareness elucidates the presence of a perlocutionar/ act of pronibinj. 
rfow does the perlocutionary act of promising aid in the developnent of 
time-awareness'' As we followed the gradual developnent of a full-b'Oi'n new 
tine consciousness from the mors nt of its first appearance to the moment of its 
independent foundation, it was noted that the f'rst step was based on contra-
diction of the given "Oreek" or "Kantian" notion of time. This constant 
comparison of the given notion of time with the gromme sense of eschatologcal 
time continued as a leitmotif throughout the course fron appearance to founda-
tion, although the given notion of time began to fade more and nore into the 
back-ground as the developnent progressed. This first nonent of contradiction 
had to have a firm basis of its own to confront the widely accepted notion of 
time. And as Moltmann tolds us, "Die Zeltvorstellungen ergeben sich erst aus 
den Erwartungen," which is to say that the promised future of adventus, of the 
Coming of God, provided the basis to challenge the given notion of tine. V/ithout 
keeping one's eyes fastened on this fact, that the challenge cones from a wholly 
different and future reality, one easily falls into the misunderstandings and 
premature dismissals of some of Moltmann's critics. For if one tries to inte-
grate Moltmann's time-awareness into the given notion, one can only convict 
hun of sacrificing the present for the sake of a future, for downgrading the 
past of revelation. If one does not continue to refer the challenge to the 
things promised, one will not see the need for the establishing of a diffeimt 
time-awareness; indeed, the attempt to do so will not even be recognized. We 
have tried to delineate the time-awareness Moltmann develops in some detail with 
the hopes of showing that the objections raised about the salifiée of past and 
present and an empty futurism are ill-founded. Within his tune-awareness, the 
past and present are indeed respected, and are even given a new dimension not 
had in the given notion of tune. The dimensions that are lost are the past as 
absolutely normative (and the hermeneutical question of the interpretation of 
the past and who writes the history of the past) and the notion of a present 
which is the idea realization of that absolute past. That the replacement of 
the absolute past with an absolute future does not solve the basic hermeneutical 
problems is, of course, evident. 
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Οη the other band, thla etudy of tiBe-a«ar«neae has illuminated eoaething of 
perlocutionary promioing, both why there was perlocutionary promising in this 
situation and the function of perlocutionary promising in general. The first 
point grows out of the study of Moltmann'e notion of promise. It was concluded 
that the promise of which he spoke was perlocutionary promise. But just why 
had he developed a perlocutionary notion of promising instead of an illocutionary 
one? For perlocutionary promising borders upon such "suspect" things as vague 
and empty promising. And the Christian will certainly feel uneasy withthe 
thought that his God is basing his relationship with his people on vague and 
empty promises. Some critics have called Moltmann to task on this point, that 
his promises were abstract and hypostasized. But if the simple question is 
asked — could the time-awareness have been achieved with a promised future 
that was promised illocutionarily rather than perlocutionarily — some of the 
difficulties can be waylayed. 
If we recall that contradiction played the leading role in the generation 
of a new time-awareness, we can rephrase the question to read: could the illocu­
tionary effect have beeneble to initiate the same process as a perlocutionary 
effect, namely, the creation of a new time-awareness? The answer would be: 
within certain limits the illocutsnary act can be the basis of such an act of 
contradiction. But the illocutionary act remains convention-bound and subject 
to conditions for its nondefective performance. And if the strength of the 
illocutionary act required exceeds these boundaries, then the act as illocutionary 
act becomes defective. If we return to Moltmann'e objections to the given 
notion of time, and the type of time-awares ss he develops, it is clear that 
what the illocutionary act is called upon to do will exceed these conations. 
Whatever the situation, an illocutionary act will not be possible. 
A second test would be based on the assumption that the promising Moltmann 
speaks of is either illocutioDary or perlocutiœary and we wish to ask about 
the effect· of the proaieing. By effects in terms of illocutionary acts is not 
meant the fulfillment of the conditions for a nondefective act, but rather 
how H reconstructs his situation in light of the illocutionary act. If we 
look at what Moltmann considers the effects of God's promises upon the believers, 
then we hear of an exodus church, the challenge of "Götzendienst", Christian 
atheism, missionary activity, and so on. Christian language is a language of 
117 liberation, he tells us. Here the contradicting of the given reality makes 
itself evident without any reference to time-awareness. And the terms which 
Moltmann uses, his description of Christian eschatology as "eine weltverändernde, 
weltüberwindende Hoffnung" would likewise lead us to the conclusion that the 
effects of the promise will go against the conditions for illocutionary acts. 
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Our conclusion has to be that Moltmann's understanding of eschatology entails 
necessarily a perlocitionary act of promising and that an illocutionary act in 
this sii'iation can only be defective. 
But why perlocutionary promising? Perhaps becuase, as Searle reminds us, 
it is the highest form of human commitment and the task and the consequences 
of Christian eschatology as Moltmann sees them can be accomplished by nothing 
less than the highest form of commitment. An interesting side-note can be 
given here on the notion of perlocutionary promising. When it was investigated, 
the question was asked whether symbols could be promised. It is interesting to 
see that what is perlocutionarily promised is net brute fact, or even institutional 
facts as such, but symbols — which can form the basis for a new symbolic 
universe! That too, in its own way, corroborates the conclusion that Moltmann 
is aiming at the most radical sort of contradiction of the given reality in 
his enterprise. 
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Chapter 7: ТНЬ STRUCTURAL SQANTICS OF LSCHATOLOGICAL IANGUAC.E. 
7.1. Koltmann's Eschatological Horizon and the Symbolic Universe. 
Jp to this point we have duelt extensively on Moltmann's notion of pro­
mise and tine-awareness, tie saw particularly in the notion of time-awareness 
that all the elements were present for a scheme broader than simply one seg-
nent of consciousness. 
It is now tine to approach the matter of the breadth of his eschatological 
conception as a whole, and so study tne structures that constitute his concrete 
use of langjage. Moltmann himself does not speak of a symbolic universe, but 
the tern "horizon" recurs throughout his diseussions of eschatology. At one 
point he discojrses at length on what he understands by horizon. It is worth 
quoting as a whole: 
Erfahrung und Urteil sind inner mit einem Horizont von Wirklich-
keitserschlossenheit verbunden, in welcli»m etwas in Lrschemung 
tritt und erfahrbar wird und in welchem Urteile sinnvoll werden. 
ijii solcher Horizont enthalt eme gewisse Vorbekarmtheit dessen, 
rías in Lrfahrung gebracht wird, hr ist kein geschlossenes Sys-
ten, sondern bringt auch offene Fragen und Antizipationen bei 
und ist darum offen fur Neues und Unbekanntes. Solche Horizonte 
können aus Überlieferungen vermittelt werden, sie können auch 
aus dem Kontext der eigenen Erfahrung und Weltvertrautheit stam-
men. Sie können aus der unabsehbaren Bedeutung bestimmter wider-
fahrener Ereignisse stammen, sie können auch aus eigenen Entwürfen 
gesetzt werden, mit denen bewusst Geschiente in Lrfahrung gebracht 
wird. Ohne einen solchen Horizont und abstrahiert davon ist kein 
Ereignis erfahrbar und aussagbar. 
Koltmann sees the eschatological horizon as making events and experience 
"erfahrbar und aussagbar". He chooses for a "dezidiert eechatologischen 
Horizont von Erwartungen, Hoffnungen und Fragen an die verheissene Zukunft." 
It is the horizon of promise and mission. Eschatology is "the horizon of ex-
pectation for a world transforming initiative through which 'the renewal of 
If 
the world is anticipated in this age in a certain sense'." 
The horizon is marked by expectation, hopes and promise with its con-
comitant sense of mission. In speaking of the relation of the notion of 
hoDzon to promise, he says: 
Nun passt der Begriff des 'Horizontes' als einer Erwartungelinie, 
die mitwandert und zu weiterem Vordringen anlädt, schon auf den 
allgemeinen Begriff von Verheissung. 'Der Gottesglaube Israels 
ist zukunftshaltig. '-' 
If we compare Moltmann's notion of eschatological horizon with what was 
said about the symbolic universe above 
They are universes in that a whole world is created that forms a 
frame of reference on an anthropological and cosmologica! level 
for the individuals and institutions. They are symbolic in that 
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they can span spheres of reality (or classes of conventions) and 
in turn point beyond these classes to areas beyond the reach of 
the realities ccnstitued by a given class of conventions. 
and 
In sum, one can say that the actualization of those constitutive 
rules forming the symbolic universe are concerned with the estab-
lishenent and mediation of meaning encompassing a society. The 
universe they manifest is· given in the surface structure of mythsi 
tales, commonsense and the like. 
we can see that there are many similarities between the two conceptions. 
Both attempt to provide a frame of reference on an anthropological and cosno-
logical scale. While Moltmann formulates the frame of reference in terms of 
•making experience and judgment both possible and expressible, the syrabolic 
universe was discussed in terms of the mediation of meaning, of providing that 
nexus of teres and relatione that constitute phenomena. Moreover, the dis­
cussion of Qreimas' investing semantic structures with content and values 
parallels Moltmann'β formulations even more closely. Both point toward how 
horizon and symbolic universe are capable of generating new and previously 
unknown phenomena. All in all, it seems that Moltmann's eschatological hori­
zon can be taken as an example of a symbolic universe. 
On one point, however, the two conceptions differ. Moltmann ascribes 
the origin of his horizon to any number of sources: tradition, personal exper­
ience, experiences of contradicting events, and so on. The point was made in 
section h.2.k.2. that meaning (and a fortiori the symbolic universe) is essen­
tially social in character. Even if one were to follow out Moltmann's notion 
of horizon one would have to conclude that horizons are never as personal as 
they may seem. While certain combinations of elements in a horizon may be 
unique, they still must fall within the purview of the social horizon to be 
"erfahrbar und aussagbar". In actual practice, Moltmann himself opts for a 
social sense of horizon based on a nexus of meaning surrounding the Coming of 
God and all the perlocutionary promising and time-awareness entailed in it. 
7.2. Eschatology as Myth. 
In speaking of the manifestations of the symbolic universe in Chapter 
Five, the discussion centered upon one particular manifestation of the symbolic 
uniTerse: myth. Myth was described there as the process of the moulding of the 
cognitive and semantic systems of a society. This process could be ascertained 
in terms of a special framework, a code and a message which distinguished it 
fron other manifestations of the symbolic universe. It was seen there also 
that myth is to be taken a good deal more seriously than those notions of 
myth that would see it merely as fanciful tales of illiterate peoples. The 
processes of myth-making continue to give form to the cognitive and semantic 
systems of all societies. 
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It is our intention here to discuss the eschatological symbolic universe's 
manifestations in terras of myth and the myth-making process. Holtmann himself 
is not adverse to the notion of myth, an attitude unfortunately still too rare 
among theologians. Speaking of myth he says "Myth is not only explanation of 
the world and expression of human self-understanding, but also expression of 
7 
the misery of the world and protest against it." He does, however, recognize 
that myths are not eternal and that they can lapse into ideology. Thus he 
presses too for a certain demythologization, though not in the style of a 
Feuerbach or with the crudity of a Bultmann. Taking hie cue from the young 
Marx's famous statement, he says: 
...Christian eschatology contains the critique of the estranged heaven 
as well as of the estranged earth, since it hopes not only for a new 
earth, but also for a new heaven. For this reason the Christian faith 
must demythologize and demystify its religious notions. 
Besides the point of unmasking ideology, the idea of demystifying religious 
notions deserves special attention. For Moltmann, like many under Barth's 
influence, makes a distinction between faith and religion, indentifying the 
l a t t e r with a l l "pagan", i . e . , non-Judaeo-Christian elements, which make up 
faith. This point will have its influence on the options for possible responses 
to the resurrection myth (cf. sections 7.6.1.-7.6.3.). 
If one wants to locate the central or reference myth within the eschatological 
symbolic universe, one must look to the raising of Jesus. As Moltmann points 
out, "Die Auferstehung Christi meint nicht eine Möglichkeit in der Welt und 
ihrer Geschichte, sondern eine neue Möglichkeit von Welt, Existenz und Geschichte 
überhaupt." Moreover, it is the resurrection that raises new questions about 
the interpretation of the world and its history, and about the true nature of 
man. And as we aaw, it also provides an entire new tine-awareness, stretching 
fron the nouent of appearance to that of ontological foundation. The raising of 
Jesus is a promissio inquieta, of such a nature as to restructure the cognitive 
and semantic system of society: 
Die Auferstehung Christi ist promissio inquieta so lange, bis sie 
Ruhe findet in der Auferstehung der Toten und einer ToULität des 
neuen Seins. Durch die Erkenntnis der Auferstehung des Gekreuzigten 
wird der standig und überall wahrnehmbare Widerspruch einer unerlöeten 
Welt, werden Trauer und Leiden an ihr hineingenommen in die Zuversicht der 
Hoffnung irdisch und universal. Jeder Boketismus in der Hoffnung, der die 
irdischen Verhaltniese oder die Leiblichkeit in ihrem Widerspruch 
verfallen lasst, sich auf Kriche, Kult oder gläubige Innerlichkeit 
reduziert, ist darum Leugnung des Kreuzes. ^ 
The the death and raising of Jesus supersedes the myths of the old 
symbolic universe and for the Christian any return to that universe is a 
"Leugnung dee Kreuzes". But in Moltmann's view, such a return actually occurred 
in the history of Christianity. Christians remembered the resurrection but 
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have forgotten the cross, the great moment of contradiction that called the 
old cognitive and semantic system into question. He recounts the long Μεtory 
of "religious" Christianity where, for fear of a disappointment of the promises 
and an inability to live with the uncertainty of unfulfilled promise, the reli­
gion of exodus became the religion of return. It became a situation where, 
instead of "incipit vita nova", a "restitutio in integrum" gave the predominant 
I»* 
tone. "Die christliche Hoffnung auf eine neue Schöpfung kam auf die alte 
apokalyptische Melodie zurück: das Ende ist wie der Anfang." Gradually 
the feast of Christmas replaced the feast of Easter in the center of Christian 
consciousness. 
Gottes Offenbarung wird dann nicht mehr als Eröffnung einer neuen 
und anderen Zukunft verstanden, sondern als Aufdeckung und wahre 
Erhellung der den Menschen immer schon angehenden Wirklichkeit. 
Offenbarung ist dann nicht der Vorschein einer neuen Wirklichkeit, 
sondern die Deutung der Wirklichkeit, wie sie im Grunde ist.l" 
Thus one cannot interpret the central eschatological myth, the raising of 
Jesus, inside the old framework without sacrificing the very "meaning" of 
this reference myth. 
What Moltmann is fighting against is one of the recurring problems in 
twentieth century theology. If the myth of the raising of Jesus with all its 
promises of the Reign of God, the гаi»ing of the dead, and the Coming оГ Jod 
and his justice is interpreted within the cognitive and semantic structures 
of the given reality, the vigor of the eschatological vision quickly ebbs away 
into Althaus' axiological eschatology, or, more seriously, into Bultmann'ε 
existentialist theology or a one-sided realized eschatology. While it is granted 
17 that these positions are not without foundation in the NT, the questions 
still remains about how to underdand these two versions of KT eschatology. 
Making the raising of Jesus the reference myth for the eschatological symbolic 
universe shifts the ground far asking the question. It is no longer a matter 
of choosing between axiological or teleologica! eschatology or some combination 
of the two, but rather: is the resurrection of Jesus a radically foundational 
myth, i.e., foundational of a new symbolic universe, or is it to be interpreted 
within some other symbolic universe? Is the resurrection the interpretane or 
simply another (albeit important) interpretandum? If the raising of Jesus is 
an interpretane, then it must, as reference myth, be allowed to generate a 
new symbolic universe. It must be allowed to shape new cognitive and semantic 
systems via its variant myths and series of shifting signifiers. And there 
seems to be every indication, not only in Moltmann but also in the NT (as e.g., 
I Cor 15, Ι Ό , that the raising of Jesus is meant to be taken as an interpretane. 
Піів does not of course mean that the history and tradition of a people literally 
begin with the raising of Jesus. Rather, all previous symbolic universes and 
what they constituted as "events" and "meaning" will be reconstituted in light 
of this symbolic universe. And, as Moltmann has also said, the future still 
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lj.es buried m the pist am only *ith the raifinc of Jesus can thi 'iture 
be released, ./ithout it, the future becomes merely an extrapolation of the 
past. 
7.3. rhe oeniotics of the "iaismc of Jesus. 
The point has no ai rived where a structural analysis of the reference 
nytli, the laising of Jesjs, needs investigation. The reason for this inves­
tigation
 l a tuofola: on the one hand, to explicate the se^intic structure 
jeneratea by the riyth and to thereby indicate its effects upon the construction 
of tne esc latological бутлЬоІтс unive-se and its cognitive and senantic systems; 
or tue otner hand, to tie in the discussion of perlocutionary pror ise and tir.e-
awareness, discussed in the previous chapter at some lengtn, into the deep 
strjeture, or cortent level, of the eschatological synoolic universe. 
7.3.I. Locating the Reference Myth. 
To begin, the pertinent data neea assenbling. As has been noted, Moltmann, 
19 in his "Begründung einer christlichen eschatologie", continually refers to 
the raising of Jesus as the point of departure for the Christian horizon. This 
myth, of the death arid raising of Jesus by God, will forn the reference myth. 
It will be recalled that the reference nyth holds a unique position among 
the rnytns of a synbolic universe. The irference mytn contains the basic signifi-
cation strjeture which will forn the pattern for all other myths in that uni-
verse. These other myths, called variants h,ere, will usually concentrate on 
one part of the reference myth and elaborate upon it. In any elaboration, they 
respect the basic isotopies of the reference myth, for to go beyond them heralds 
the death of a reference myth as generative of meaning in a symbolic universe. 
The reference myth, together with its variants, supplies in its isotopies and 
repertoire of oppositions, the cognitive and semantic structures for reformula-
ting salvageable features of the old symbolic universe, and also for generating 
ne» features peculiar to this symbolic universe. This is how it moulds the cog-
nitive and semantic systems of a societ_. 
rfhere does one look to find the reference nyth7 In this case, the Christian 
text, the NT canon, will have to be investigated. The entire NT canon forms, 
structurally speaking, a single text. It is the product of a single series of 
20 
myth-making processes of a coordinated series of social systems. And, more 
importantly, it has served as a unified locus, produc ...ve of meaning, for 
succeeding generations of Christians. This lumping together of all the books of 
the NT, so painstakingly dissected, analyzed and classified by historical-philo-
logical research, will no doubt seen cavalier, but the course of this presentation 
?1 22 
will bear out the reasons for doing this. For, as Haulotte and Mann have 
pointed out, and GÜttgemanns as well in a somewhat different fashion, the 
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reason for respecting the "closure" of the NT text can be deducted fron the 
praxis of the Christi«! community: it has always used the NT text as a whole, 
productive of meaning for each generation of Christians, without distinguishing 
levels of historical development, literary genres, ipsissima verba Jesu, and 
eo on. The only important exceptions to this would be the reluctance to accept 
certain books of the text as canonical, such as the disputes surrounding Rev 
in the first centuries of the church, and the discussions of the deuterocanor 
at the tune of the Keformation. The mythological praxis of the first communities 
was even rather casual with the ipsissima verba Jesu, as Schulz lias pointed 
24 
out, or at least casual in a fashion offensive to the sensitivities of 
nineteenth century histoncisn and not a few rormgeschichtler. The difficulties 
surrounding the historical-philological approach, which, despite its great 
achievements, are becoming more and more evident, cannot be gone into here, and 
have been handled at length elsewhere. Our interest here is merely in 
asserting that the NT text can be considered, for structural semantic purposes, 
as a single text. 
The next step is identifying the reference nyth within the text. In 
searching out this myth, one is reminded of the words of Lévi-Strauss at tne 
beginning of his Mythologiques : "le point de départ de l'analyse doit inévi-
tablement être choisi au hasard." This does not mean that any item can be 
taken as the myth, but that when confronted with several variants upon the 
same myth, it will be difficult if not impossible to locate one single myth as 
the reference myth. Nor, indeed, will it make any difference, if the variants 
are structurally homologous. Again, it seems to offend against historical 
methodology. But the development of a myth m terms of structure, while urged 
on by historical circumstances (and indeed must be urged on by historical cir-
cumstances to prevent its becoming ideology) will first and foremost take form 
and develop acoording to the rules of a fundamental grammar rather than according 
to the rules of the manifestation level of historical occurrence. It is precisely 
this adherence to the rules of a fundamental grammar that permits the myth to 
generate cognitive and semantic systems. This is why NT myths, while capable of 
having had an historical basis, will not conform to the norms of nineteenth 
century historiography in every case. Oattgnanna has clearly illustrated this 
dialectic of history and grammar in an analysis of problematic parts of the 
27 pencope of the Marcan Easter myth. 
So, rather than hoping to locate the reference myth account right off, we 
shall group together those mythic narratives most patently concerned with the 
raising of Jesus. There are, of course, others which are less clearly and 
28 directly concenned with the raising of Jesus, but these will not be considered. 
Historical-philological research would also seem to verify this list as centrally 
concerned with the reference myth. The myths can be grouped into four sets: 
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1. Simple reports of the death, raising and exaltation of Jesus: 
^ = I Cor 15, 3-4 
M 2 = Acts 2, 22-36 
M, = Acts 3, 13-16.21 
M^ = Acts 10, 38-42 
M = Phil 2, 6-11 
"6 
Occurrences at the Tomb. 
Hr = Rm 1, 3-k 
H = Mk 16, 1-8 
Mg = Mt 28, 1-20 
M g = Ik 24, 1-12 
M 1 0 = Jn 20, 1-10 
3· Appearances of the Bisen Jesus. 
м 1 1 = I Cor 15, 5-8 
м 1 2 = Mk 16, 9-10 
K^ = Mk 16, 12-18 
M l l f = Mt 28, 9-10 
M = Mt 28, 16-20 
M l 6 = Lk 24, 13-35 
М 1 7 = Ik 24, 36-49 
M l 8 = Jn 20, 11-18 
M l g = Jn 20, 19-23 
M J Q - Jn 20, 26-29 
M 2 1 = Jn 21, 1-24 
4. Jesus is taken up into heaven. 
M 2 2 = Mk 16, 19-20 
M 2 3 = Ut 24, 49-51 
M 2 l f = Acte 1, 6-11 
In this analysis, we shall start with the first set of myths (M.-M/O since 
these present the story of the raising of Jesus in its most succinct and com­
plete forms. Extensive reference will be made to the other variants, especially 
M„-M. 0 and M „ - M 2 r . Of interest is the fact that M.-M,- nave been identified 
by historical-philological methods as being the most anciaat forms of the myth. 
Our primary interest here, however, is not the historical progression in the 
development of the myth, but rather the signification structure present in 
these myths. Thus a full explication of the twenty-four accounts will not be 
undettaken since our interest is not in all the possible messages present in 
them, but rather in establishing the basic framework of the reference myth. To 
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engage in an exhaustive analysis goes beyond the needs of this presentation. 
Lengthy analyses of M 7 end MQ have been published, but even these do not 
29 
exhaust the messages coded into the myth structure. Likewise, studies on K. 
30 have also been undertaken. 
The texts of FL-M-^ are readily available and need not be reproduced here. 
What will be given here, however, are those sections of H.-M/- relevant to the 
investigation of the reference myth. Pertinent sections to be discussed are 
underlined. 
Mj. I Cor 15. 3-1». 
v. 3: hoti Christos apethanen huper tfin hamartifln hèmôn kata tas grafas. 
v. h: kai hoti etafè, kai hoti egègertai tèi hèmerai tèi tritèi kata tas grafas. 
Mg. Acts 2, 22-36. 
ν. 22: lèsomi ton Hazfiraion, andrà apodedeigmnon apo tou theou eis humas 
dunamesi kai terasi kai sèmeiois ktl. 
v. 23: ekdoton dia cheiros anomfin prospèxantes aneliate, 
v. 24: hon ho theos aneetèsen lusas tas Sdinas tou thanatou kathoti ktl. 
v. 32: touton ton lèsoun anestèeen ho theoa, hou pantes hèmeis esmen martures. 
v. 33: tèi dexiai oun tou theou hupsOtheis tèn te epaggelian tou pneumatos 
tou hagiou ktl. 
v. 36: asíalos oun gin6sket8 pas oikos Israel hoti kai Gurion auton kai Christon 
epoièsen ho theos» touton ton lèsoun hon huméis estaurCsate. 
И,. Acts 3. 3-16.21. 
v. 13: ho theos t6n paterfin ЬетЙп edoxasen ton paida autai lèsoun hon huméis 
men paredSkate kai èrnèsasthe kata рговвроп Pilatou, krinantos ekeinou 
apoluein. 
v. 15: ton de archègon tes zSès apekteinate, hon ho theos ègeiren ek nekrCn, 
hou hèmeis martures e men. 
v. 21: hon dei ouranon men dexasthai archi chronSn apokatastasefis pantOn hon 
elalèsen ho theos dia stomatoe hagiSn ap'aiSnos autou profètfin. 
M^. Acts 10. 39-^2. 
v. 39: kai hèmeis martures pantSn h6n epoièsen en te tèi chOrai tSn loudaiön 
kai lerousalèm» hon kai апеіігш кгemasantés epi xulou. 
v. ЦО: touton ho theos ègeiren tèi tritèi hèmerai kai edCken auton emfanè 
genesthai. 
V. 42: kai parèggeilen hèmin kèruxais tOi laSi kai diamarturasthai hoti houtos 
eatin ho horismenos hupo tou theou kritès z8nt6n kai nekrfln. 
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>ν. Phil г, б-ii. 
—5 
v. 6: hos en mor fé the ou huparchfin ouch archagtnon è^èsato to einai isa theOi, 
ν. 7 : alla heauton екепбаеп nor f en doulou labSii, en homoimati anthrfipSn 
Kenonenos' kal schènati heurethtis hSs anthrSpos 
v. 8: etapeinösen heauton genonenos nuèkoos mechri thanatou, thanatou de etaurou. 
ν. 9: dio kai ho theos auton huperups6men kaï echansato autfii to onoma to 
nuper pan onona, 
v. 11: kai pasa giessa exomologèsetai hoti kurios lèsous Christos eis doxan 
theou patros. 
Le- »» ii r-h· 
v. 't: tou honstnentos hui on theou en dunamei kata рпешпа hagiSsunès ex 
anastase6s пекгбп, lèsoj Christou tou k u n ou hèm6n. 
The analysis of these myths concentrates upon identifying the movements in the 
surface level narrative structure as a prolegoirenon to penetrating to the 
signification structure at the content level. 
Ь.. Christ died (v3), is buried (v1*) and is raised up (v1*). There is a 
movement downward (death -* burial) and a movement back along the same route 
(burial —¿.raised up). One could add a third movement that is presupposed: the 
movement of God raising up Jesus (implied in the passive verb) of the form 
(God -^ burial -^ raised up). Thus one can say there are two sets of movements 
in the narrative: the movement of Jesus (dea.th -^. burial) and the movement of 
God (God -* burial -> raised up). 
M,. Jesus is a man singled out by God (v22); killed and crucified (v23)i and 
God has raised him up from death ( 2^.32); and bas exalted him to the right 
hand of God (v33) making him Lord and Christ ( Зб). The movement of M, is 
elaborated upon here by adding that Jesus has been designated by God and has 
been exalted to the right hand of God. The two sets of movements read thus: 
Jesus (designated -> crucified — ^ buried) and God (God -^ buried -> raised up 
-> exalted). 
И-. God has distinguished his servant Jesus (vl3)t the Lord of Life (vl5)i be 
is killed and God raised him from the dead (vl5); he must remain in the heavens 
until the restoration of all things (v21). Again, Jesus is designated, this 
time as Lord of Life; he is put to death, raised up and exalted to the heavens 
where he waita. The movements are the aame aa in M.t Jesus (Lord of life -? 
killed -^buried) and God (God -> buried -> raised up —¿»exalted). 
Mj . God anointed Jesus with power (vjS); Jesus is killed (v39); God raises him 
up (v4o); he is made judge over the living and the dead (vkZ). We see the same 
pattern again of designation (anointed with power), followed by death, with God 
raising hin up and exalting him ( ^г), this time to judge over the living and 
ri­
deau· Tne novenetits are the sane аб in t. , а с ы л a l so uitli tne tlieme oí Life 
and ^eath . 
Mp. Jesus was in ь forn Ііле God (vG); becai'ie ?iaii (\7); was r,urc>red ( Г); is 
raised up and exalted above all (v'*); partakiric of th« с1 о гУ of '^ о^  the rather 
(vii). .Ve again see the sa"ie iiovenients: desicnation (this tir,e beinß like 
God), death and being raised up, folloved by exaltation (this ti.iie to divinity 
itself). In this situation, one could rr.ake a case for an extra ir.overier.t -n 
the second set, based on the height of the exaltation to divinity, eyceedmg 
that of the right hand (li?), the heavens (I!,), Jud^e of Life and Death (t'.i ). 
?hus the movements n. Kr are: Jesus (like God -^ man, killed —* buried) and 
God (God -^burial -^ raised up —} exalteo -^ becomes divine). 
M^ -. This myth is a short formula; it does not nention a desicnation, b'it beyond 
that ccrresponds to the novements of K^ -l·!,. The exaltation m this instance 
is beine made Son of God (νΊ). Like I', , the f irrt set of nover ents is missine 
in the first tern: Jesus (Killed -^ buried) and God (God —> buried —^ raised up 
—^ exalted). 
Uhat conclusions can be dra'/n from this su-nary analysis of the movements 
in the structures of Гц-lb? The most obvious is that the -lovenents are gov-1 6 
erned by the isotopy of connumcation, described as the conrunicaticn axis m 
section 5.1.3. In the isotopy of comnunicatior the movement of an object-value 
С is traced between a series of signifiers and its novenert is described in 
the following moves: initial situation —^invers_on of the situation —^ hero 
sent to aright the inverted situation -» struggle of the hero -^ success of the 
hero —-^ re-establishraent of the initial situ; t ion. The central moves concenung 
the hero were further elaborated in the actantial structure. Thus the sending 
of the hero was described on the communication axis of the actantial model; his 
struggle with the enemy and his receiving of aid from the helper, on the axis 
of the test; and success in re-establishing the initial situation, on the axis 
of desire, horeover, the movement of the object-value 0 could also be trans-
coded onto the structure of signification, which provided one of the important 
links between the surface and content levels. All of this can be applied to 
H.-M/-, which represent, in whole or in part, a communication isotopy. 
To begin, the spheres of action aan be defined, of the initial and inverted 
situations. In terms of M.-Mj-, these can be called the sacred and profai e 
deixes, respectively. Then the semes will provide a nucleus around which the 
various signifiers can cluster. Let a.. = the abode of the object-value; in 
this case, God. a. generates the abode of the villain, a,; in this case, 
earth or evil men (cf. M ? ) . The axis A likewise generates its opposite, Â. 
a. is the villain; in this case, death or burial, a. is the hero or the abode 
of the hero, Jesus or the heavens. The object-value 0 will be discussed below, 
as will the four semes, but at this point it will already seem justified to 
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preliminarily define О ал life or Jesus. One thus bas s structure of signi­
fication that looks like this: 
SACRED PROFAHE 
God Earth 
Given this structure, M.-M¿; can be coded in the following fashion: 
Мд^  = Jesus (a, -^ ä^ -> God (a. -> â^ -^ a. -> a.) 
M2 = Jesus (i2 -> a2 -^ ä^ -> God (а^ -> в^ -» a- ->· a-) 
M, = Jesus (ä2 -> a2 -^ äj^ ) -> God (a^ -> ¡^ -^ a2 -^ âp) 
М^ = Jesus (ä2 -^ a2 -> ä^ -^ God (a^ ^ -^ ä1 -• a2 -^ ä2) 
M5 = Jesus (i2 -* a2 -* ä^ )^ -^ Gou (зц -^ 5 1 -» a 2 -t ä2 -> a1) 
Hg = Jesus (a- -^ a.) -^ God (a, -• ä. -^ a. -^ ä2) 
Looking at the codes, we find that M-, and M/- exhibit the same structure. 
M,, M-, and H. have the same structure. Μ
ς
 has the same structure as M., M,, 
Mr, plus the addition of an extra movement at the end of the second set of 
movements. M. and M,- also have the same structure as Η,, M_, Μ. , minus the first 
move in the first set of movements. Based upon this, we shall call M_, M,, Mr 
examples of the reference myth. As such, they exhibit the code of the reference 
myth of the raising of Jesus, t^ and M, are abbreviated versione of the 
reference myth, and Η_ is an elaborated version of it. 
Having established the code of the myth of the raising of Jesus, what 
can be said of the value or the message in the communication ieotopy that 
has been set up? If we look at the manifestation levels of the myth texts, 
we find a message of life overcoming death in H2, H_, H^ (more precisely, in 
Acts 2, 2^; 3, 15; 10, 42); a message of holiness overcoming sin in Л. (I Cor 
15. 3), M 2 (Acts 2, 23). H 5 (Phil 2, 10), Mg (Rm 1, 3-1»). There is also a 
vague case to be made for Jesus himself as the message in Μ-· In this presen­
tation, then, we shall take the message of the reference myth as being life 
overcoming death, since it occurs in each example of the reference myth. 
The message of holiness overcoming sm can be subsumed under this message as 
a use of a different set of signifiers for the same content. The hypothetical 
message of M, (the person of Jesus) will be referred to in the discussion of 
presence vs absence below. 
An analysis of the actantial model may help clarify the position of the 
message in the communication isotopy. Coded into those terms, sender = God; 
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rceiver = humanity; helper = God raising Jesus from the dead; opponent = death; 
subject = Jesus; object = life, salvation. Recast in a narrative structure, 
the encoded actantial model would read thus: God sends Jesus to rescue humanity 
(or life). Jesus meet the opponent, death, and is defeated. But God as helper 
gives him an aid against death by raising him from death; this means that 
Jesus has defeated death, thereby giving mankind life. Having restored life 
to mankind, he is exalted to the nghthand of God. Thus the move from the 
initial situation (ä? -> a.), through the struggle (a? -> a.) with victory 
(a, -»· a.) and re-establishment of the initial situation (a. -^ I,) is 
31 
completed. The reference mythe could be futher elaborated in terms of the 
actantial structure but there is no need for doing that here, since our 
interest is primarily in the content level and its elementary structure of 
signification. For this semiotic structure of the myth of the raising of 
Jesus revede more information about the eschatological symbolic universe than 
the actantial structure. This is the case because of its location at the 
content level. As such it will govern the further generation of the eschatolo-
gical symbolic umerse in a fashion not so readily evident in an analysis of 
the surface level narrative structure. The point of actually involving our-
selves in a discussion of the surface level structure here at all was to 
indicate its task of mediating between the structure of signification at tie 
content level and the manifestation level of the text. 
7.3.2. The Eeference Myth and Variants M7-M_.. 
Before actually going into the further analysis of the signification 
structure revealed in the code of the reference myth, it would be good to look 
at H--H-., the variants upon the reference myth. As variants, they respect 
the signification structure, but provide elaborations upon particular points 
within it. They are divided here into three groups, based upon the manifestation 
level of their texts: myths of Easter morning at the empty tomb, myths of the 
appearances of the risen Jesus, myths of the ascension or exaltation of Jesus. 
They all exhibit a narrative structure, sometimes of great complexity. We 
will forego the complete analysis of these structures here in order to concen-
trate upon just how they elaborate upon the signification structure and the 
content invested in it of the reference myth. 
7.3.2.I. «„-R.Q. Myths of Easter Homing at the Tomb. 
These accounts all deal with women arriving at the tomb of Jesus and 
not finding him there. They all represent elaborations upon and transcodings 
of the message of life overcoming death. 
M_ (Hk 16, 1-8). This account has been subjected to structural analysis by 
32 both Harm and Quttgemanns. In Harm's analysis, he notes a series of 
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oppositions: sacred ve profane time (diagenomenou tou sabbatou vs lian ргві 
tèi niai ίβη sabbatSn), looking for a closed tomb ve finding an open one, seeking 
death (women coming to embalm a body in a closed tomb) vs finding life (women 
hearing that Jesus lives and the tomb is open)· Thus the life vs death is also 
elaborated with the notion of presence vs absence. In this case Mann sees 
the message formulated in the following fashion: the presence of a dead body 
has been transformed into the absence of the living Jesus, who goes before 
them into Qalilee. Important here, then, is the introduction in the life 
vs death message of the presence vs absence opposition as an elaboration upon 
the message. 
GÜttgecianns acknowledges harm's study and embarks on a study using a 
slightly different method (Karin used a structural semantic analysis like that 
being enployed here). He too finds the life va death message 01ticulated, 
this time in search of a person, an isotopy taken over from Propp. This search 
is the articulation of the presence vs absence opposit ion. Guttgemanns Gumma-
nzes his understanding of the account thus: "Die Penkope ist also nicht die 
'Erzählung vom leeren Grabe', sondern...die Text-Werdung der möglichen Relationen 
der Leser zun 'Subjekt' des Textes." Translated from the jargon of generative 
poetics, this means that the text in question deals with how one relates to 
the presence and absence of Jesus and explores the possibilities for that. 
Again we find the life vs death message combined with the presence vs absence 
opposition. 
Mr, (Ht 28, 1-20). Lai has used Greunas' method to analyze this account within 
the larger segaent of Mt 27, 57—28, 20. He discovers a communication isotopy 
governing the generation of the text. The text is concerned with the transmission 
of the message of life (Jesus and the angel) vs the transmission of the message 
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of death (Jewish religious authorities). The text shows how the Christian 
religious authorities block the message of death and transmit the message of 
life, while the Jewish religious authorities do exactly the opposite. Because 
of this Lai concludes that the text is not an apology for or an explanation 
of the resurrection, but is really concerned with this message of life vs 
38 
death. This is corroborated by our own findings on the reference myth. Whether 
or not there is a message of presence vs absence here as well is a point lai 
does not investigate, since hie concern is with the iaotopy of the larger eegaent. 
M,, (Ut 21», 1-12). Again, the women come to the tomb looking for Jesus, but he 
is not to be found (v3). The presence sought and the absence found is »ombined 
with the message of life vs death by the question of the two men at the tomb: 
ti zèteite ton zOnta meta tin nekrOn. This tune, the woaen transmit the message 
of life to the Eleven and the others (v9). 
H-0(Jn 20, 1-10). The entire account emphasizes the absence of Jesus from the 
words of Mary Magdalene onwards (v2). The disuse into which the toab has 
-175-
fallen (v5ff) indicates that Jesus is no longer to be found there. 
In conclusion, one can say that the ¡¿aster morning narratives er.phesize 
the message uf life overcoming death by a series of opi-ositions surroundiiic 
the tomb. The women come to anoint the body of Jesus but do not find hin; the 
tomb that should be closed is found open. These oppositions are hignlighted by 
a presence vs absence opposition that elaborates upon the message of life vs 
death. In one case, we have the women transmitting the message (H0) whereas 
in another case they told no one (M7). 
7.3.2.2. K.,-K„. Appearances of the Risen Jesus. 
Whereas И_-К._ were concerned with unpacking the message of life vs 
death, Μ.,-Μ-., the many appearances of the risen Jesus, deal with the commis­
sion to transmit the message. This fact, also discovered by historical-philo­
logical research, has often been used to explain the appearances of Jesus as 
the legitimations for apostleship, i.e., that their co.mnission to preach the 
Gospel rests upon an order to do so fron the risen Jesus. 
Vj.-. (I Cor 15, 5-S) sinply reports the appearances, but in an hierarchical order, 
to which Paul in v9 connects the appearance of Jesus to him with the notion of 
apostleship. This would imply, because of that, the comnana to transmit the 
message of life overcoming death. 
И,- (Hk lo, 9-10)» Magdalene carries the message of life to those still mourning 
for someone thought dead (vlO). 
IL·., (Hk 16, 12-18) presents not only an explicit commission to transmit the 
message (vl5) but also says that it will be accompanied by supernetural powers 
and signs (vvl6-l8). 
M.^ (Mt 28, 16-20) has Jesus commissioning the women to take to Galilee the 
message that he lives (vlO). 
M,,- (Mt 28, 16-20) again presents Jesus commissioning the Eleven, emphasizing 
the power given him (vl8) andthe assurance of his continued presence among them 
"heos tes sunteleiae tou аівпоб" (v20). This emphasizes his presence even in 
the face of his apparent absence. 
K,c (Lk 2k, 36-^9) gives a traneraission of the message of life (vjO which is 
affirmed by Jesus' physical presence among them (w36-O)· He then commissions 
them to transmit the message of life (vv46-48) and promises them "ex hupsous 
dunamin" ( ^9). 
M.о (Jn 20, II-I8) orders the transmission of a message of Jesus' exaltation 
(vl7). The account presents absence (vl3) overcome by presence (vl6). 
М._ (Jn 20, 19-23) sends the dsciples with a message that will undo sin (= death), 
an evidence of supernatural power. This is a use of the latemative signifiers 
found in H-, M , M_, Mg. 
Mgo (Jn 20, 26-29) in the tale of Thomas presents the entire problematic of 
presence vs absence, ending with "makarioi hoi me idontes kai pisteusantes" 
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(v29). 
>Ц (Ju 21 ! 1-2^) is cinother appearance, dealing with a transferral of power 
to Peter. 
In conclusion, then, several points assert themselves as elaborations upon 
the reference myth. First of all, the emphasis on the transmission of the 
message of life (M,,. M--, M.-, M-g, Μηο^· There is also an elaboration upon 
the message: the message of life includes the forgiveness of sins (H..). Also, 
the message is embued with divine power (M.,, M.,-, M.-, M.g). Secondly, there 
are important elaborations upon the presence vs absence opposition. The presene·--
.ε linked with Jesus1 being alive and physically present (K.-, Mp-i) and the 
diffioulties of absence and presence-in-atsence appear (K.^)· He is present 
in his message and indeed is with them all days (M..), but blessed are those 
who have not seen and still believe in the presence (M,,). Thus besides the 
legitimation of apoetleship, the appearance myths also grapple with the presence 
vs absence problem, a problem that threatens to overshadow the message of life. 
7.3.2.3. М-р-Ир!· Exaltation of the Risen Jesus. 
These brief accounts deal with the exaltation of Jesus, that he has departed 
and is now with God. 
Ир, (Mk 16, 19-20) presents Jesus being taken up into heaven and seated at the 
right hand of Qod (vl9)· But he continues his presence among them "sunergountos 
kai ton logon bebaiountos dia tSn epakolouthountSn sèmeiSn" (v20) even in his 
absence. This succinctly brings together his absence, his continued presence, 
and the power manifested as a result of his exaltation. 
Mp, (Lk 2U, ^9-51) has Jesus departing (diestfc) and being carried up into heaven 
(v51).39 
h^ i. (Acts 1, 6-11) promises that power will come upon the disciples and commi-
ssions them to transmit the message (v8). Then he is lilted up (eperthe) into 
tie heavens. He will, however, return (vll). This latter point can be seen as 
another way of elaborating upon presence vs absence. 
M?p-M-. can be read in several fashions. On the one hand, they are an 
expression of the raising of Jesus. Secondly, they can be seen as an expression 
of his exaltation. Third, they are a rouding off of the appearances of Jesus, 
though he also is reported to have appeared to Paul (M..), as one born out of 
due time (1 Cor 15, 9)· Fourth, they are yet another mediation of the presence 
vs absence opposition, explaining why he is no longer present physically in 
apparitions, but nevertheless works with the church (Hpp) and will indeed come 
again "hon tropon etheasasthe auton poreumenon eis ton ouranon" (Mp^). 
7.3.3. Conclusions. 
Looking back over Mj-M-., we can draw the following conclusions about the 
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reference myth and ite variants, which together constitute the semiotics of 
the raising of Jesus. 
1. The reference myth of the raising of Jesus, i.e., that myth giving the 
eigrification structure upon which all the variants rest, can be found in H-.-Mg, 
especially H.-M.. As was seen in section 5-2.1., myths consist of a framework, 
a code and a message. The framework was given in the diagram of the communi­
cation isotopy as a structure of signification. The codes for the reference 
myths И.-Н/- were provided immediately after that. And the message was seen 
to be one of life overcoming death. 
2. Η_-Η
ι η
 presented elaborations upon the content of the message, i.e., on 
life vs death and life overcoming death. This was developed principally in 
an opposition of presence vs absence. These myths were very compact and 
presented the message using a vmriety of signifiers (e.g., closed vs open 
tomb, coming to anoint a dead body vs discovering the absence of a living 
person). The presence vs absence opposition simultaneously refers to the 
message of life overcoming death (in terms of the tomb) and to the new sense of 
Jesus' existence among the disciples. As such, it represents the most important 
variation on the message. 
3. H-.1-H-1 had a straightforward structure and were lees compactly organized. 
The emphasis lay on the transmission of the message of life overcoming death. 
In this, the actantial structure of a communication axis can be clearly defined 
with Jesus as sender, the women am' "the disciples as receivers, and the object-
value being the message of life overcoming death. By use of apparitions, the 
presence vs absence problem was further elaborated upon. It became clear that 
this was done not only to make sense of the message of life overcoming death, 
but also had roots in the praxis situatim of the believers. No doubt it was 
part of the legitimation of apostieship and also tried to mediate the simulta­
neous presence and absence of the Lord in his church. 
't. "„-M., were brief narrative reports of the exaltation of Jesus and served 
a number of functions and could also be seen to be rappling with the mediation 
of his presence and absence, expressed here even more acutely than in M--«.-. 
7.'t. The Structure of Signification in Eschatology. 
Having now shown how the variants H--K., function in relation to the 
reference myth, by emphasizing details in it and by unpacking problematic 
areas of content, we can now turn to a further analysis of the elementary 
structure of signification. What will be shown here is how the signfication 
structure is productive of meaning, how it generates the boundaries within 
which problems can be discueeed, and how it expands and transforms these problems. 
7Λ.1. The Terse: The Variety of Signifiers. 
П ш study of the eleaentary structur« of signification for the myth of the 
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raising of Jesus, given іь t.io diagran in section 7.5.1., will begin with an 
in-depth study of the sigmfiers invested in the se .íes of the structure. By 
approaching it in this fashion, it can be shown how the signifiers exploit the 
logic of the signification structure for the production of meaning. It also 
brings out the tensions bc-t.v?er. the content and surface level resulting in 
the jroduction of noanii-jg in the n^nifestation level text. It is likewis-
! cried that this combining of the study of the syntactic operation of the semes 
..•ith tue syntactic activity of the signifiers will also contribute to one of 
tue "ost difficult nrobleins in senantic analysis, that of unit boundary 
determination. 
The senes serve as a nudeus, attracting any number of signifiers that 
show a united intnrchangeability with reference to a single seme. Thus, for 
exariple, we saw that a, could either be the heavens, or Jesus, or the right 
hand of jod. The first question to be tackled is about this interehangeability. 
.ihat were the criteria used to assign certain signifiers to certain semes? It 
will be recalled that to a1 was assigned God or life in a sacred deixis. This 
generated its contrary, a,, to which was assigned earth, mankind, sinful men, 
in the profane deixis. This axis A had its counterpart in Ä, · ith a. as the 
contradictory in the profane deixis of a, , invested with death, the realm of 
the dead, burial, hell, sin, etc. Finally, there was a- in the sacred deixis, 
representing Jesus, the heavens, the designation of God. 
To begin, then, with a.. Little needs to be said about this, since a, is 
't! 
simply the starting point of the signification structure. It represents the 
signification of the established order of things in the myth, if approached 
in a communication isotopy or a myth or a tale; it is the position of the sender 
of the message; when the signification structure is invested with the content 
of the message, the positive aspect of the message resides here. It is also the 
point of resolution of the action in an actantial structure, i.e., a restora-
tion of the inverted situation, what Greimas called the final situation or the 
re-establiehnent of the initial situation. 
But as soon as a. is introduced (invested here as earth, sinful men, man-
kind, etc.), the problems start. If a. is invested with the signifier God 
and the value life, why then is a ? not the opposite of this — death, devil, 
sin, etc.? Why are these located at a. instead of at a.? There are at least 
two reasons why these values are not located at a,. First of all, it will be 
remembered that a. and a_ represent a continuum that in effect lays out the 
range of a signification structure. They fairly well determine the ultùnate 
limits of signifiers and the deixes. Thus the most sacred is God and the most 
profane is earth or man (as shall be seen, death is less profane than the 
earth). One could say that the amis A does not so much give the problem or 
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opposition that called the myth and attempts at its resolution into being 
(although that can be and often is tue case), as define tbe limits witnin 
which it vili be treated and, hopefully, resolved. Horeover, it gives the 
primary configuration that any transformations of the myth will have to respect. 
Secondly, in our situation here, we have seen that the ressage is not 
an irreconcilable opposition of life vs death, but rather life overconinf; 
death. In this sense death could not be located as life's contrary (a. and 
a,, respectively), since this would be indicative of an essentially irreconci-
lable opposition for which only a modus vivendi could be found by way of 
"resolution". This is the case in situations where a. and a, will be male and 
female, for exanple. Here it is nota case of reconciliation (with the excep-
tion, perhaps, of some sort of supeisession or Aufhebung), but ratner fitting 
the rest of the symbolic universe into this insuperable opposition. 
This raises the question of mediation, which is the essence of the signi-
fication structure. Mediation is what creates the need for the signification 
structure, sets it in motion, and generates the limited nunber of possibilities 
to be styled as resolutions or even solutions. Between contrarj.cc „here is 
seldom movement in the signification structure (in the case of the nyth of 
the raising of Jesus, none whatsoever). This is no doubt due to the ambiguity 
of the contrairety relation? it is at once disjunctive and conjunctive. It 
forms the basis of what appears on the manifestation level as paradox and 
dilemma. 
More concretely, certain conclusions can be drawn for tie myth of the raising 
of Jesus from this discussion of a. and a_ in its signification structure. 
Kost important is that the message of life vs death is not located in contrary 
relation (and thus does ntat represent a Manichaean dilemma), but is resolved 
as life overcoming death. This would indicate that the problematic that called 
the myth-making into being, and the entire signification structure within 
which that problematic was articiiated, will be superseded in some fashion. This 
means that in the resolution of the problematic, important shifts in the semic 
structure can be expected since the resolution of the problematic (life vs death 
into life overcoming death) in the semic structure will have exhausted the need 
for its existence as productive of meaning. In terms of the resurrection myth, 
we have the following situation. The experience of Jesus being alive even 
though he was known to have died can only mean that death can no longer hold 
out against life; it has been conquered. With that, the entire symbolic universe 
that was based on the necessity and inevitability of death is shattered. Con-
fronted with an alive Jesus, the meaning it can produce has become ideology, 
being contradicted by the shattering of the frame of reference that gives it 
its coherence and hook-up with reality. The only way to cope with this event 
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is to maintain that the experience of the raising of Jesus (or its signifiers: 
the empty tomb, the appearances, the exaltation) can only be dealt with inside 
a new framework. And this is the message of the new creation, of the new 
heaven and the new earth. The content investment of the-semes will change and 
with it the meaning generated. One sees this particularly in the ànost frenetic 
interpretational activity of the NT text: the rereading of the ОТ text, the 
reconsidering of almost every meaning produced by the ОТ signification structures 
— the election of Israel, the primacy of the Law, the concept of the Messiah, 
the liturgical praxis. Or, as Moltmann put it, all the ОТ promises were cast 
into a new form. In every case, it is the regenration of meanings that 
had been generated by a now obsolete signification structure. The shift 
entailed here, from one structure of signification to another, is one of the 
key problems of eschatology that will be dealt with below. At this point we 
oify want to signal its presence and its origins, since it can only be fully 
understood once the entire structure of significüon has been treated. 
With this comes the move to the negative axis Ä. The negative axis brings 
out important aspects of the positive axis. It may or may not be wholly syra-
metrical with its positive counterpart. We shall begin with the seme generated 
in the sacred deixis, the nonprofane contradictory of the consummately profane 
a_, which is iL. Signifiers and values assinged to it included Jesus, the 
designation of God, the heavens, the right hand of God, power divine, and so 
on. The most obvious question here is: why are âp contents not located at a_, 
where they would seem to belong with regard to their semantic content? 
The first thing that can be said about this is that it reflects the 
mediation problem. It is one reflection, as it were, of the irreconcilability 
of a., and a, as representing absolutes in their respective deixes. In this 
case, the reflection of the irreconcilability is weighted for the sacred deixis: 
it is a contradictory of a? (which puts it into a peculiarly close relationship 
with it) yet is located in the sacred deixis. This allows for a whole range 
of meanings that would otherwise be impossible to articulate. It mediates, in 
an odd way, a., and a-. Put concretely: one of the great problems in religious 
language is talking about God. We people, in the a, position, can ultimately, 
from our position of the absolute profane, only speak of the absolute sacred 
as being beyond the boundaries of our speech. Thus our only true language of 
God is couched in those terms at the edges of language (such as the via negativa) 
and must ultimately lapse into silence or inarticulateness. To approach the 
sac-ed, most completely embodied in a., we resort to äp, which mediates our 
anthropomorphisms, since it is a mirror image of sorts of our a,. But at the 
same time, it is more than that, since it is located in the sacred deixis. 
It can thus reflect the tendion of God vs nonGod we call heaven, or the ОТ text 
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called the right hand of God, the word of God, his spirit, wisdom, and so on. 
Jesus as signifier raust be located here, for in the NT text he is seldom wholly 
identified with God as a. (and in our case only perhaps in Μ
ς
) . From this it 
is clear that the analogies and metaphors and anthropomorphisms will be in­
herent in any talk of the sacred a.. It is also clear why a_, because of the 
mirror iaage link, ia ao prone to projectiona on the part of man, as any 
number of authors from Feuerbach onwards never tire of pointing out. 
a. brings out the mediation of sameness and difference. One could say 
that the a, - a, relation expresses sameness but difference (because of the 
contradictory mirror image effect), and i_ - a. difference but sameness (because 
of the implicatory relation). 
Secondly, a. maintains a peculiar relation to a.. This is not only because 
it has chanced to land in the same deixis and, by a seeming logical default, 
be in a relation of implication to it. a- is, in an odd way, the generator 
of the signification structure in much the ваше fashion as a., since it embodies 
in a way all the other semes. It is the mediation point between a_ and a. ; 
as the contrary of iL, it also stands midway, as it were, between a. and a.. 
But it is also created, in the second instance, by 5.. Put in terms of the 
reference myth, death is a presupposition to exaltation. Heaven remains almost 
a pale abstraction until ¡L has been activated and overcome. One could almost 
picture it thus: that i_ receives its contour from the confrontation with I.. 
Within the Christian symbolization, meanings about the "opening of heaven" are 
worked out from this relation. 
Finally, then, the unique position of ä. becomes evident. One could call 
it the mediation of the paradox. It has this advantage over S. because of its 
position in the sacred (positive) deixis. In terms of the eschatological sym-
bolic universe, this will also be the case. The notion of a new creation will 
be generated from ä_ where Jesus resides in his exalted state, waiting for the 
restoration of all things (M,). As will be seen, in this interim period a 
provisional symbolic universe will be generated with a, becoming a sort of 
new a,, and a, a new a., which will only assert the ambiguities created by the 
myth of the raising of Jesus, with the earth being already new and not yet 
passed away. It will also be the second important coaponent in working out the 
problem of the old and new creation. 
Raving said all this, little needs to be added about a., which was 
invested with the signifiers and values death, realm of the dead, sin, etc. 
The question why these are located here and not at a, has been answered by 
the discussion of a-. The only area left to be treated is its relation to a. 
as a sort of mirror image and contradictory. 
The mirror image is one way of unpacking the absolute content in one of 
the semes of the positive axis. By inversion and by locating itself in the 
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opposite dpj.>:is, xt presents the dark side of tne absolute enbodinent of the 
deii-is. It is the case of a double negative, tut then an asymmetrical one that 
can only lead to an Aufhebimc, never to a return to its positive counterpart. 
In the case of 5,, such a mirror inagc resulted in the mediation of the paradox. 
The position of a. is the precondition of possibility for the nediation of the 
paradox, a precondition which is suept away in the successful achievement of 
a mediation of the paradox. This was the case in the myth of the raising of 
Jesus. Only by acknowledging and overc ming death could heaven be "established", 
i.e., opened to mankind. Moreover, a, can represent some aspects of a. that are 
not clearly reflected in its position of absoluteness, yet need recognition. 
For the reliGious symbolic universe, the problem of evil is located here. 
The very fact that evil is located here in the Christian synbolic universe, 
and not at a,, defines папу of the limits of speaking about it. This makes 
the evil problem ultimately reconcilable, which could not be the case if it 
were located at a_, as it is in Hanichaean and some Gnostic systems. Kor will 
it allow a model of good and evil on a sinilar footing with a transcendent God 
standing above the problem, as in Zoroastrianisrn. By the fact that evil is 
located at ä-, in a very mirror image of God, the Christian God bee ones involved 
in the suffering of the world, which is represented in hie overcoming of it by 
raising up Jesur from death. This could also be seen as setting the semantic 
boundaries for certain ethical options in Christian belief — the outcast are 
not to be shunned, but are to be taken into the very center of the Christian 
conr.unity. By God's intervention at â1, what was evil has somehow become holy 
and with it all previous proportions are turned on their heads: the elite become 
the outcast (Dm 9, 30-31) and the outcast the elect (I Cor 1, 27)· One could 
also see a. as the repository of the negative aide of God — of his wrath and 
inexorable justice. 
In conclusion, then, one can see the highly complex relations between the 
semes as syntactic operators. They are ordered by a logic which will skew the 
content invested in them and in so doing will present the limited number of 
possibilities open in the surface and manifestation levels. These possibilities 
will be further limited by existing conditions of context at the manifestation 
level. And it is only in conjunction with conditions at the manifestation level 
that the usage of a semiotic system actualizes itself. For example, conditions 
had it that in first century Palestine only certain signification possibilities 
were open to designate and encode the experience of an alive Jesus who was 
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known to have died. The Hindu notion of avatar, while a possibility logically 
speaking, was existentially impossible. 
Secondly, it is hoped that this deeper understanding of the semes will 
-135-
contribute to a nore scientific apprcach ir unit boundary deteminationG. This 
is the problem of deciding what constitute phenomena, and especially valjes 
and signifiers, at the content level in a text. Lévi-Strauss has been accused, 
and nphtly so, of a highly intuitive approach to this vhich nales ruch of Ьіч 
work nonrepeatable and thus unvenfiable beyond that it can have groat explana­
tory power. If the rel-i+ion of the cernes is more clearljdefined, this car be 
Ά 
a first step toward such a boundary unit dptermmation. 
7Λ.2. The Relations Between the Sigmfiers. 
But a discussion of the senes does not exhaust the signification structure 
as productive of meaning. The relations between the senes describe in nore 
detail the contour of the semés, and especially the novements between then 
that are productive of meaning. 
In discussing the semes, as the terms of the signification structures, 
a good deal was already said about the relations. The contrary relation betueer 
the semes on the same axis, the contradictory relations between counterparts 
on different axes, and the inplications between semes in the same deixis all 
received some treatment. At this point we would like to expand upon i-.hat vías 
said there and present it in more systematic fashion, as well as rake any 
necessary elaborations. 
There are three sets of relations: contrary (a. + a.; a. + a,), contra-
dictory (a. + a,; a. + a-), and implicatory (a.. + â?; a, + ä.). In discussing 
the reference myth, it was seen that the action of the myth moved along these 
relations: (ä2 -» a. -> ä,) -* (a. -^ a, -> a- ->· i_). 
It is interesting that in the reference myth no use of the contrary rela-
tions appear. Why ie that? First of all, simply, because they are not in the 
text of the reference myth. But more importantly, as was seen in the disoussion 
of a, above, it is precisely the contrary relation which the myth is trying to 
mediate. If we remember Lévi-Strauss' understanding of myth, this is exactly 
what the myth-making process is about: the mediation of the two opposites, the 
conjunctie oppositorum. If the mediation could simply move along the contrary 
relation, then there would be no need for the myth-making process. It would 
either be achieved in one move (which would be the collapse of a signification 
structure as generative of meaning), or if prolonged beyond that point, it would 
lead to a disintegration of the unit boundaries of the semes on that axis, which 
of couree would likewise bring a muddling of meaning. It was also noted that 
the contrary relation maintains an operational ambiguity of being both conjunctive 
and disjunctive. This is the basis of its ability t establish a signification 
structure, since it embodies the two modes of relating, but never resolves them. 
In this manner, it presents the harmonious disequilibrium (to use Maranda's 
phrase) that is generative of meaning. The a ntradictory relation is disjunctivw 
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while the iraplicatory one is conjunctive. Once, however, a contrary relation 
is mediated, it will have to iicLude both a conjunctive and a disjunctive move. 
As we shall see in the next section, this is the case in our reference toyth, 
and because of it, it brings about the collapse of the signification structure 
and with it a given symbolic universe. 
But if the contrary relation is ambiguous, is not a move along the contra-
dictory relation, along the scheme, impossible? We noticed that in the ref-
erence myth there are three such moves. While the contradictory relation is 
disjunctive, it is precisely this move that, by inverting the cmtent, brings 
actual motion into the signification structure. This move of inversion is the 
primary form of transfornation. It is primarily this transformation that makes 
the generation of meaning possible. There are of course other transformations 
but this is the only one that is present at the content level of the semantic 
structure here. One could call the substitution of signifiers and values 
midway through a syntactic operation a taansforraation (as in the case of tales 
where one of the characters changes form or in a situation where a different 
character takes over the role in the same actantial position), but these do 
not concern us here. This notion of transformation is, of course, familiar 
in the dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. This move is a taking ad-
vantage of the mirror image structure of the semes on a sheme. The mirror image 
may be that of a funhouse mirror, skewing the relatione, but it is a mirror 
image nonetheless. It is this that allows it the sameness in difference that 
will eventually make mediation possible. This was discussed more concretely in 
the relation of a. and ä. above. One can say, then, that a move along a 
scheme, from one deixis to another, is a transformation. 
Implication is a conjunctive relation that occurs in the code of the 
reference myth twice (or three times, if H_ is used as a reference myth). 
Implication and entailment are highly involved questions, as we saw already in 
Chapter Two. It is an odd sort of correspondence between different terras. In 
the movements of the reference myth, we had a situdion where positive semes could 
entail negative ones, but the opposite was not the с а м . Thus a^ coold entail 
a. (being a man entails dying), but a. did not entail a. (a return from the 
grave was not entailed in being dead). The latter move did occur, however, when 
preceded by a transformation. Thus Jesus could rise from the dead due to the 
transformation wrought by God; and in M,., Jesus could Ъесше equal to God by 
virtue of his exaltation by God. This can be formulated in terms of two rules 
which will hold for the production of meaning within the eschatological sym­
bolic universe defined by the reference myth: 
1. For implications, a move from 'a positive seme to a negative seme on the 
same deixis can occur at any time without further ado. 
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2. For implications, a nove from a negative seme to a positive sene raust be 
preceded by a transfomation, i.e., a nove along a contradictory scheme. 
Even looked at from a purely logical or operational point of view, this 
would seem to be the case not only for the eschatological symbolic universe, 
but for any signification structure. For the negative axis is generated by the 
positive one; and so the positive seme can entail a negative one. But the 
opposite cannot be the case. 
7.4.3. The Movement: Generation of Meaning in the Eschatological Symbolic Universe. 
We are at last in the position to fully describe the movement m the ref-
erence myth and account for the generation of meaning from its signification 
structure. What is called for now is an analyas of the code of the reference 
myth, move by move. 
The code, we saw, consisted of two circuits of a total of five moves: 
(ä2 -» a 2 -> ij) -> ^ -> L·^ -> a2 -» ä 2 ) . 
(1) (a- -• Bp)· A transformation takes place, a move from heaven to earth, a 
move described by different signifiera: anointed by God, destined by God, kenosis, 
and so on. The transformation also describes the eschatological act par 
excellence: the intervention of God (sacred deixis) in the history of men 
(profane deixis). This intervention is, of course, a transformation. Symbolically. 
the radicality of the transformation was often represented in ОТ and NT texts 
as a cosmic eataclysm (Day of Jahweh; cf. apocalyptic literature and the escha­
tological discourses in the Gospels). The entry of the sacred into the profane 
deixis at a, is variously described as the incarnation, the anointing of Jesus 
at his baptism, etc. But interestingly enough, when one interprete this move 
in terms of the ultimate message of life overcoming death, it does not of itself 
constitute the message itself, even thongs the sacred has intervened in the 
profane. The struggle with death has not yet begun. In terms of theology, 
this highlights one of the problematic questions arieing from the incarnation 
in christology and sotenology, the medieval dispute about the motive of the 
incarnation. 
The diqpute was about whether there would have teen an incarnation had nan 
not Binned, i.e., had there been no need for the redemption. There were those 
who held that there might have been an incarnation even had there been no sin 
(Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great). The position became identified with 
Duns Scotus and the Franciscaa School. On the other hand, tere were those, 
notably Aquinas and the Dominican School, who held that the incarnation was 
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ordained by God as a remedy against sm. Bonaventure succinctly mediates the 
two positions in saying: "videtur autem primus modus magis consonare judicio 
rationis; secundus tarnen, ut apparet, plus consonat pietati fidei: quia aucto-
ntatibus sanctorum et sacrae Scnpturae magis concordat." 
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Lookinn at the dispute frcr- the possible neaninps to Ъе genersted iron an 
eschatolo^ical syiibolic universe, one v<ould have to agree with Bonaventure. 
Tue Scotiet poation would Ьг е to be generated in a different syibolic universe 
than the one descnbpd by the eechatdogical code and framework. lor the 
eschatolocical Б.-ЧЬОІІС universe is geared to the generatine of -leaning in tens 
of tnc ressage of life overconing death, whereas the Scotist position would 
need eyposition in a aniverse geared to a pleroma iressage, reconciling sacred 
and profane, where Jesus uould be a "Scotist cosmic Christ". 
?his iiove could also help m locating some of the problems surrounding 
Chalcedoman clu-istology (DS 300-303), namely the question of the unity of the 
52 person of Christ. If Vie problenatic is placed uithin the eschatological 
PigmficatiOr stn-icture, the sacrality of Jesus (a,) is espirea m the earthly 
Jesus (a.) by the transformation (a. — a?^· ^ ' need not! however, aeenbe to a. 
personality in our contemporary understanding of the concept. In fact, not to do 
so heirhtens the effect of the exaltation (a- -* a.) and especially in the move 
in V- (a_ -> a 1 ) , where Jesus becomes equal to God. While such an exposition 
do"o not offer any nei' for-i-lations at the manifestation level (no content 
level structure is neant to do so directly), it does demonstrate the limits 
vnthm which any eschatological christology, bearing the message of life over-
conrf death, will vork toward its formulations. Schoonenberg's formulation 
is not only compatible uth this structure of signif ication, but is likewise 
corroborated in its respecting of the limits of this structure. 
It would be iiteresting also to investigate the generation of the meaning 
of the symbol of the virgin birth within this model, but space does not permit. 
Models for discussing it, particularly consonant with the a, mediation position 
between a,and a,, have been developed elsewhere.'''' 
(2) (a_ -> a.). This is a relation of implication, roving from a positive 
to a negative seme. Although it is preceded by a transformation, this is not 
necessary for this move. This can occur at any time within the signfi cation 
structure. In terms of what is invested in this structure, Jesus dies. However, 
interns of the reference myth, it corroborates what was said in M ? about the 
predestination of Jesus to die. The idea of an object-value (here: Jesus) from 
the sacred deixis being subjected to death (profane deixis) is accentuated by 
the untimely and violent manner of his death, emphasizing the oddness of the 
divine message dying. V.r represente the death of Jesus as not only possible 
but necessary (Lk Oh, 26). For the sacred to wvercorae death, it must enter into 
struggle with it. 
(3) (a. -> a.). This is the second transformation, where God (a.) as absolute 
life and helper (actantially speakii^, enters into and overcomes death, and 
raises Jesus to life (a.). This is the eschatological intervention. This is 
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the shattering fact — Jesus was net swallowed up in death, Jesus is alive — 
that will bring down the old symbolic universe. Attempts to fit its senantic 
potential into the old signification structure fail because one se-e, a,, has 
been definitively undermined. And so the signification structure loses one 
pole of its quadrioartite structure. A new structure will have to be generated 
to deal with the world seen in light of this fact. This transforration, as was 
seen above, accounts for the herneneutical activity and irost of the theology m 
the HT text. Interesting for twentieth century research is the light that it 
throws on our attempts at understanding M„-M?., i.e., the tonb and appearance 
narratives. These narratives are not a matter of "evidence" in an apologttical 
sense, nor are they a scenario for the raising of Jesus. They do not of them­
selves answer the qie stion of whether Jesus was raised. The reason for this 
is that the decisive act does not take place at a,, but at a-, where death is 
defeated. 
( Ό (a, -> a,) is a relation of implication which, as a move from a negative 
to a positive seme, must be preceded by a transformation. That is the case 
here. И„-Н_. are attempts to deal with the alive Jesus' presence on earth. 
The divine confrontation has made him more than human; while he can eat and be 
touched, he aleo appears and vanishes. Μ,,-Μ-.. are also wrapped up in the trans­
mission of the message that Jesus himself is: that life has overс one death. 
Thus to get involved in the physiology of the resurrection body or to speculate 
about the contents of the tomb of Jesus is beside the point; the signification 
structure had to generate this sort of meaning and interpretation of Jesus, 
confined as they were to the culture of first century Palestine. To паке dis­
tinctions about the resurrection body is a doomed attempt to resolve a paradox 
that is only mediated in the text, but not resolved: namely, how the old and 
new man are related. 
One could add that the actantial model, with God as helper giving Jesus 
the aid to conquer death, can also provide the limits for reformulating the old 
debate about whether Jesus rose from the dead on his own power or was resusci­
tated by the Father (DS 359, 539). While the NT text is fairly unanimous in 
saying that Jesus was raised up by the Father, one could, by using the actantial 
model, show how Jesus, though dead (= defeated in the struggle with death and 
the inverted situation), rises from the dead (= is given an aid by the helper, 
God, and defeats death, inverting the inverted situation). This shift would 
involve one of those transformations in character mentioned in section 7.b.Z. 
Jesus' being armed with the divine aid accounts for his superhuman powere as well. 
(5) Ca, -^ a,). The third tranefonnatlon. The risen Jesus (a.) is exalted to 
heaven or the sacred deixie (a-) by God. This move is expressed symbolically in 
Μ-,,-Μ,Λ· By this transformation, the sacred deixis is now accessible for the 
profane deixis, expressed symbolically as "the gates of heaven being opened" 
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ог Ъу "èggiken gar ho basileia ton ouranCn" (Mt 3, 2). This was to an extent 
already the case after move (1), but has become fully founded and established 
by move (5). By this transformation, the genuine realization and foundation of 
the Heign of God is inaugurated. 
As was seen, M_ adds yet another move: a, -> a.. In this move the exalted 
Jesus becomes equal to divinity (a.) itself. In the history of theology, this 
move was later affirmed in councils of the church, notably at Nicaea, Constanti-
nople and Chalcedon. 
While this move would веет to complete the semiotics of the raising of Jesus, 
since all moves have been described and their generations of meaning indicated, 
that is, unfortunately, not the case. Especially the variants M„-Mp. bring 
this incompleteness to the fore. The message of life overcoming death is 
clear enough, as is the commission to transmit it. Access to the sacred had 
once again been established. The life vs death opposition has not only been 
successfully mediated, but also resolved. Yet we saw that in M7-Mp. a second 
opposition continually asserted itselft presence vs absence. This second oppo­
sition was being combined with the message of life overcoming death. Jesus 
appeared and vanished; the tomb mean for the dead had been forsaken for llf*^ 
Jesus went away, but his message remained; Jesus went away, but continued to 
work with his disciples in power; he promised to send his spirit in his absence; 
he has gone away, but will return. 
One detects a disintegration of the signifier in the move from a ? to a,. 
Whereas in a, Jesus and his message were indissoluably one, in the move to a, 
it seems to have lost its focus: we have the person of Jesus, his message, 
the spirit, the basileia. A genuine ambiguity arises which is expressed sym­
bolically in the presence vs absence opposition. 
In fact, one can locate two separate problematics that the presence vs 
absence is trying to resolve. 
First, the new relation between âp and a.. The eschatological myth of the 
raising of Jesus has radically suited the axis which defines the symbolic 
universe. No longer is it a matter of mediating a. and a. in its old form, 
for a successful mediation has taken place, â, and a. have been brought into 
contact, but in just what does this contact consist? The question of the 
presence and absence of Jesus locates itself here. He is simulataneously 
present and absent in a-. But when will the definitive resolution of this 
presence vs absence come? Given the only signification structure at hand, a 
raodol of meaning is developed based on that of the raising of Jesus: Jesus will 
come again and reassert his presence at a^, thereby reeolving the ambiguity of 
the ä? - a, relation. Along these lines, then, the semiotics of the return 
of Jesus are built, following the semiotics of Jesus. Within this signification 
structure, the sense of time is developed, as well as a sense of time ending, 
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and the peculiar relatione between a- and a, are fomulated in terms of promise. 
All of these things are generated from the basic signification structure of 
the raising of Jesus. Together they form the first problematic: the arbiguity 
of the return of Jesus. 
Second, the presence vs absence of Jesus heightens the sense of the insta­
bility of the profane deixis. a, has been definitively undermned and the 
relation patterns of a. have been radically altered by its new contact with 
a,. Moreover, with the provocation of a return of Jesus, even the definite 
character of βρ is called into question. Dealing with this generates a narber 
of meaning circuite concerning a, and ite ambiguous state. In terms of the 
history of Christianity, the questions of ideology, utopia, apocalyptic, 
chiliasn, revolution, etc., take on form here. The presence vs absence oppo­
sition attempts to mediate the unstable a with relatian to its position in 
the old synbolic universe, whose meanings generated are now seen to be passing 
away; and the βρ of the relation with i_ which is part of an entirely ne·. 
synbolic universe. This is an outline of the second problematic: the instability 
of the profane deixis. Together, these two problematics, representing the 
disequiüna in the myth of the raising of Jesus, are generative of the meaning 
of Jesus as present and absent. 
The history of the resolution of this presence vs absence problem is the 
history of Christian eschatology. 
7.5· The Future of Heaven: The Ambiguity of the Return of Jesus. 
If the presence vs absence opposition is coded into the signification 
structure of the reference myth with particular refsrence to the relation 
between a, and a-, how is this to be resolved? The resolution takes place in 
the generation of a second signification struoture that will fcllow the circuits 
of the primary signification structure in the generation of meaning. We will 
code this new signification structure with the seme b. It is the attempt to 
work out the presence vs absence problem, using the circuits developed in the 
semiotics of the raising of Jesus. Among the meanings and symbolizations that 
it develops are the time-awareness of the period after the raising of Jesus, 
the perlocutionary sense of promise, and the end-tune scenario. In so doing, 
it defines the limits for the generation of meaning in the eschatological symbolic 
universe by providing a system of mediation between the relation of a. and a.. 
What the axis В presents, then, is the eschatological symbolic universe, i.e., 
the system moulding the cognitive and semantic systems of that society believing 
in the message that life has overcome death in the raising of Jesus. 
Before actually going into these circuits and generated meanings, we shall 
present this second sigiification structure. Given the opposition of presence 
vs absence, articulated upon the same sacred and profane deixis, one gets: 




We tum now to the three important areas of meaning Generated by this аіеці-
fication structure to aee how the circuits and invested contents combine to 
create these fields of meaning. 
7·5·1· The Question of Time. 
Section 6.3. presented a lengthy discussion of Holtmann's understanding 
of the time-awareness of eschatology. It was shown there how the time-awareness 
could form the foundation of the eschatological symbolic universe. Hecalling 
briefly its structure, the spatial metaphor governing the development of time-
awareness was that of the Adventus Dei, the Coming of God. The asymmetries were: 
absolute future Ъ absolute present or past 
present У future or past 
This opposed itself to the sense of time of the old symbolic universe, a 
time-awareness which takes on various forms (cf. section 3.3.). But in any 
case the sense of absolute time in the old symbolic universe was located, as 
absolute present or past, either in a ? or in the axis A. 
The situation resulting frcm the raising of Jesus brings a shift which 
finds its expression in the presence ve absence situation. It was seen that 
particularly the â2 - а^ relation had replaced the centrality of the axis A 
in the concerns. With this has come a shift in the sense of time. The abso­
lute foundation has now centered itself at i 2 since it is from this point that the 
eschatological symbolic universe takes shape. In the mediation of presence vs 
absence, this places the center of the time awareness at Б (nonabsence). On the 
basis of the relation of ä 2 to a2, a time model can be built up ttat accounts 
for the ambiguous presence vs absence of Jesus. It can be explained in the 
following way: 
That E2, nonabsence, is the foundation of a time-awareness for b- (a,) 
results from the fact that the sacred has made its incursion into the profane 
deixis. The fact that it forms the foundation for time in the profane deixis 
underlines that the old sense of time-awareness, and its symbolic universe, is 
no longer self-contened. Even if one maintained that the old tine-awareness 
was based on the axis A does not change this; for in its contrary relation it bed 
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to remain paradoxical. One can say that the frame of reference has shifted from 
the axis A to the scheme Ç ? - b-, which defines the conditions under which 
life after the raising of Jesus is lived. This does not mean that this scheme 
has beœme an axis, for this would end in negating the significance of the ref-
ernce myth. Indeed, the axis В is generated from the situation arising from 
the resurrection myth. And the resolution of the presence vs absence problem 
will take place within its terms. The circuit is the same series of operations 
that defined God's raising Jesus from the dead, but this time with a different 
set of semes: (b. -% Б, -^ b_ 
Б-). Interpreted, this means that presence 
(bj^ ) must overcome nonpresence (b.) as a prelude to coming to teirns with absence 
(b,) which can then be transformed into the sacred deixis as nonabsence (Б_). 
Investing time values into axis В we get: 
SACHED PHOFANE 
already 




Following Holtmann, Ъ^ = the "already", the reality created by the raising of 
Jesus, b- = the not yet, the Widerspruch or contradiction between the old 
reality (βρ) and the new one which has experienced the raising of Jesus. But this 
contradiction means that what has been experienced is not yet fully realized. 
It is proleptic, Vorschein (b_). Б., as the contradictory of the already of 
the risen Jesus, is what falls outside the new reality irretrievably. Ъ is 
Holtmann.'s negation of the negation; it is the fulfillment of the expectation 
of the not yet. 
The moves upon the circuit, following the eschatological code, provide 
the opportunity to explain a number of things relating to the Christian sense 
of the presence and absence of Jesus. 
Ь^: Ър
 r e f l e c t e the instability of a- on a time basis. It is its implicatory 
connection with Б^ ^ that holds back ite move into fulfillment. It also explains 
the sec cm d half of our description of Holtmann'ε time-awareness: present) past 
or future. This at the time seemed odd, and many of Holtmann's critics had 
mistaken this for the more obvious possibility of: future present or past. 
On the basis of the generation of the sense of eschatological time on axis B, 
we can see why our reading of Holtmann has to be the case. For to make the 
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fjtjre as such prinary would neß'te the sense of nresence of Jesas already in 
the vorld; it wojld be a sirmle resolution of the auestior of presence vs absence 
as one of void or sheer absence. But the absence of Jesus can only паке sense 
J.Î the possibilitj' of presence is inplied; one cannot fee"1 the absence of sone-
thing that has never been present. To interuret the sinple future as determining 
our sense of the present and past would be sacrificing the presence felt now for 
an even vaguer senee. Ultimately it would be, to use Koltmann's ter s, for-
saking the adventus for the futurun. The futurun does not draw its meaning 
from the adventus, but from the front of the present moving toward the adventus. 
The mplications of this for understanding how to make sense of the instability 
of the profaie deixis, of claliasm and revolution, will be taken up in section 
7.6. helow. 
This should, however, clarify Ноч Molt'-ann's time-awarenecs consti*! tes a 
oifnificant advance over ohcr previous attcnpts to deal with the problem of 
tne, hether as already realized (Dodd), as wholly future (teleoloßical), as 
ontempora] (Bultnaim) or sore conbination of these (Althaus, Berkhof). To 
opt for a realized node! or a teleologica! one ends in failing to come to 
ter^s n t h the presence vs absence opposition in the NT text. With a teleo-
logica! position, presence is forgotten for the ?ake of the absence now which 
/ill be resolved in the future. One ends up with a variant upon future S past 
or present with all the difficulties of the primacy of the futurum just sketched. 
i^ th the realized position the opposite occurs — the absence is forgotten for 
the sake of the presence. This results in a fading of the adventus and conse-
quently of the proleptic power of the present. The Bultnaim position ultimately 
disregards the time problem altogether. And to simply say that a combination 
is needed — rfhile true — says nothing about how this combination is to be 
conceived. It merely restates the opposition of presence vs absence without 
any attempt to creatively deal with it. But in any event: only Koltmann's model 
recognizes the true proportions of the presence νε absence opposition of the 
IIT text and resolves it in ter ε compatible with the eschatological code in the 
myth of the raising of Jesus. 
bpi But to what doe8 this "not not yet" corre8pond7 If compared with the A axis, 
it would be heaven, basileia, and so on. But should that not be b.? In point 
of fact, not. For the aeynnetries of the semiotic system require that the 
contradictory of the contrary of b. will not equal b,. If that were the case, 
the semotic systen would resolve itself quickly. But, it may be argued, then 
Бр can bear no relation to a_, since that is the already. Again, this is not 
accurate. For !_, while located in the sacred deixis, does not equal a 1. And 
perhaps more clearly, a 2 does not equal b-, although ä, could, in an important 
sense, be transcoded as an already. For if a, equalled Κ , this would mean 
that the absence (b,) in a, would be undiluted — a void. But thlá does not 
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correspond te the ΙΓΓ text, which sreakr cf a .Taxed or real sence of abser.ee — 
Jesus is present in power and spirit, in the nessape of life uhich is to be 
transmitted. And if the absence were actually a void, then the only relation 
to the sacred deixis would be one of total passivity, where any action on the rrrt 
of the profane deixis vould be irrelevant. It wodd be a raatter of v/aitinn for 
the unfoldinc of time. The present tine could bear no Vorschein of the 
adventus, since no presence occurred in the absence. 
On the basis of all this something can be said about the mediation of the 
presence vs absence problem beyond Koltmann's treatment of it. One conld describe 
the tine-awareness at b. (a-,) in the current eschatoloRical symbolic universe 
as follows: it is a mixture of presence and absence, weichted for the sense of 
absence. 
In other words, both presence and absence are perceived, but it is the 
sense of absence that continually forces itself upon consciousness. It is 
not a natter of an asynnetry, but of a weichting. By this is meant that the 
sense of absence does not overwhelm the sense of presence, but is nevertheless 
the center of concern, for those whose cocnitive and semantic systems are 
moulded by the eschatolopical symbolic universe. Because of this concern, this 
weichtine for absence, the presence can be truly seen in its proleptic propor­
tions. It provides the sense of contradiction that is the ethical rioinsprinR 
of life in the eschntological syrnbolic universe. 
The clarification of the tine-awareness is difficult, .-ri although the core 
of it has been given here, it needs further concretization to bring out its 
significance mae clearly. As was noted in the overview of the research back 
in Chapter One, to cone to ternis with the time problem in eschatology is to 
understand eschatology itself. In the following sections, this working out of 
the presence vs absence problem will be treated from different angles: promise, 
the sense of the end-time scenario, and the future of the earth. We turn now 
to two other important aspects of the notion of the return of Jesus: promise 
and the end-time scenario. 
7.5.2. The Perlocutionary Character of Promise. 
In the analysis of the notion of promise in section 6.2., the conclusion 
was reached that Moltmann's understanding of it could only be called perlocutionary 
in character. It was found that S and H were the same person (in this case, 
God) with Israel as an interested bystander. The status of £ was also inadequate 
for a nondefective illocutionary promise, since it was neither clear nor 
realizable. On the basis of tHs, some suggestions about the consequences of 
something so central as promise to eschatalogy were put forward. These conse­
quences were, on the whole, rather radical as concerns our notion of eschatology 
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ana the relation if God ала man on the whole. 
Having established the eemiotics of the eschatological system, it might be 
Good at this point to reconsider eschatological promise. Perhaps such a further 
consideration will throw light not only on eschatological promise, but on the 
nature of perlocutionary acts as well. 
Looking then at the signification structure of eschatology, we see that, 
were the promise to be illocutionary, S would have to be a. and H would have 
to be a_. But as was seen, the mediation between a. and a_ was not a direct 
one; it occurred via the mediation of ip in the first circuit and ä. in the 
second. Thus in the first instance the direction conmunication between a. and 
a,, necessary for an illocutionary act, was not achieved. Secondly, it was 
found that the nature of the circuits within the eschatological signification 
structure were such that the relation between the semes was radically altered, 
and, in one case (a-), undermined. On the basis of these circuits, new meanings 
were generated. Mow, given the necessity of stable conventional structures as 
a condition for nondefective illocutionary acts, it is again clear that the 
communication was bound to be perlocutionary, because of the noncenventiona}. 
character of the speech act. 
But what of the promises of the second circuit, of the return of Jesus? The 
first question that would arise is whether they could be considered promises 
and were not simply exigencies arising from coming to terms with the presence 
vs absence opposition. But even if it were conceded that they were given as 
promises, we would still not have an illocutionary situation. For one must 
take into account the instability of the profane deixis and the general ambi-
guities surrounding the return of Jesus. In such a sitrtion, j5 can only be 
H, i.e., it must be a matter of God pledging himself to do Д; for the very 
speech act is constitutive of its own meaning. And because of that one cannot 
hope to establish those cœventions that are conditions for an illocutionary 
act. One can say, then, that the content level structure of eschatology and 
eschatological talk corroborates the perlocutionary character of the promises 
made. 
One interesting point can be added, however. At the time it was noted 
that once the promises are cut loose from the conventional structure of illo-
cutionary acts, it would seem that in the matter of evoking the appropriate 
response, the perlocutionary act is open field. In this sense, anything that 
evokes the appropriate response on the part of a_ is acceptable. And so the 
comment aas made, somewhat facetiously, that perhaps theologians could be 
replaced by advertising experts. Looking now at the semiotic structure of 
eschatology, we find that this will not be the case. Certain linits have to 
be respected: the correct diemnsions and proper weightings of the presence vs 
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absence Opposition; the limited number of signifiers available that nay be 
invested at the respective eemesj the moves within the eemiotic system that 
can be made. Thus the perlocutionary evocation is far less arbitrary than it 
may seen. Secondly, what was called the perlocutionary act's "parasitic" 
character upon the illocutionary act also becomes more clearly defined — it is 
all the limiting factors of the sigiification structure for a given universe of 
meaning that impinge upon the possible wide-ranging character of the perlocu-
tionary act. These limits explain why a perlocutionary act can be hoped to 
elicit a response or responses within a given range, yet bear no clear relation 
to any illocutionary act. 
What does all this mean for perlocutionary acts in general? First of 
all, that the presence of perlocutionary acts will indicate that ordinary 
sense or meanings, i.e., those prevailing within a given coherence of meaning 
indicated by the discourse, will not obtaih. The meaning will be "nonordinary". 
As to how it will be nonordinary, there are two possibilities, both of which 
can only be ascertained by recourse to the deep structure or content level of 
the speech act. It can mean that use of different signifiers (still related to 
the same seme) are being implemented that give rise to different, though not 
totally dissimilar, meaning in the speech act. In such a case, the perlocuticnary 
act remains still reasonably close to the illocuticnary act and all that goes with 
it. Alternatively, it can mean that the perlocutionary act will be constitutive 
of new meaning rather than affirmative of old meaning (of which the first 
possibility was an example). Put in terms of semiotics, this means that the 
perlocutionary act points to transformations within the eemiotic structure 
that break through the coherence of meaning heretofore established within 
that eemiotic structure. Eschatological promise is a case of this second 
possibility. 
In line with this, something can now be said about the use of so-called 
"evocative" language in religious ontexte. We see first of all that evocation 
will have Is limits. It must respect the signifiers surrounding a given seme, 
and especially the moves in the circuits within the eemiotic system. Secondly, 
the impossibility of reducing religious language to poetry is clarified. For 
poetry can open itself to a much wider range of interpretations of the same 
signifier than can religious language, where the interrelation of signifiers 
on the circuits of the eemiotic system present somewhat definable limits. 
But on the other hand, because of the floating character of the signifiers, 
religious language can present a suppleness of expression, allowing for trans-
lation and actualizing interpretation in a way that would destroy the structure 
of a poem. Thus while poetry is not to be excluded from religious language 
(far fron iti) to call all religiotts language poetry is not correct. 
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7.5.3· The End-Tme Scenario: The Resurrection of the Dead. 
Part of the anbijuity of the esch?tological myth lies in the understanding 
of the verv message itself, of life overcomng death. The N7 text itself reflects 
this anbifuity. Althouph death is overcome, believers continued to die. The 
lettFrs oï Pail acknowledge this and try to deal with it (I Cor 15! 1 Thess Ό . 
When this is combined i.ith the notion of presence vs absence, we get a further 
cJanficatioT of the messafje of the cschatological myth in a scenario of the 
end-ti ie. 
"hat uill be snid in this section deals only with this one aspect of the 
end-time scenario, the plight of the dead Ъеііетегв. Thus, the question as 
to uhat extent the understandinc of the raising of Jesus is based on a previous 
nobon of the resurrection of the dead \ ill not be treated here. The whole 
constBuction and meaning of the end-time scenario obviously includes more 
than this, and will be returned to once all the implications of the presence 
vs absence problem have been discussed (section 7.7·)· 
The letters of Paul present us with two passages on the plight of dead 
believers, I Thess 't, llt-l8 and I Cor 15, 20-28. An analysis of their semio­
tics will indicate that they are variants upon the reference myth; as such, 
we can label then К _ and M-^ -, respectively. 
In M-c, the text discusses the resolution of the presence vs absence 
problen, in which Jesus returns. In this passage, the daad rise (vl6), the 
living join them "en nefelaie", there to meet the Lord descending from heaven, 
all together "eie aera" (vl6). 
In Mpg, God abolishes death (v25) and then Jesus delivers up the kingdom 
to the Father (ν24), Jesus himself having been "aparchè tfln кекеоітетепбп". 
Coded into the reference myth, we have the raising of the dead (I- -> a_), 
where together with the living (a2) they neet Jesus descending (â? -* a,) in 
K2_. M-/· has God abolishing death (a. -* ä.) and Jesus delivering the kingdom 
to the Father (a2 -* I_; + -> a.). By combining these two variants we again 
have the code of the eschatological myth, with one exception: Jesus does not 
die (a- -^ a.) since he is already risen, the first-fruits of the risen (I Cor 
15, 20). Nor do all raen die. 
What is interesting in this is that the return of Jesus is given in terms 
of the definitive end of death, and then in a code identioal (with the one 
obvious exception) to that of the reference myth. Several conclusions can be 
drawn from this. First of all, the power of the reference myth in its generation 
of aeaning. In being confronted with the шов! diffftcnlt probi« eeaplez, a 
combination of a still undefeated death and the presence vs absence enigma, 
resolution of the problem will revert to a repetition of the code of the 
reference myth. This would seem to amount to a reaffirmation of the reference 
myth, saying simultaneously that the reference myth does indeed solve the 
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problem, although that may not be obvious at this time, and that any further 
action or intervention on the part of God will presume this structure. Second-
ly, it raises the question of just what an end-time scenario neans. In that its 
structure is the sane as that of the raisinp of Jesus, is perhaps the rout of 
death occurring with the death of every believer, as some theologians have 
56 
suggested recently, or will there indeed be a second coming, another literal 
adventus Dei, to definitively rid us of death? In view of the semiotics of 
the eschatological symbolic universe, it would seem that the second coming 
would still be necessary. For the rout of death ui the dying of each believer 
does not solve the presence ve absence opposition still so clearly present. 
Some sort of definitive adventus Dei, connected or not with the definitive 
rout of death (though nost likely so), would still be necessary. And consider-
ing that the message of the raising of Jesus is precisely this overcoming of 
death by life, the resolution of both probleirs would have to be tied together. 
A further exposition of this will have to wait until tho rest of the 
difficulties of the eschatological symbolic universe have been treated. We 
'"i rn now to them: the problems surrounding the instability of the profane deixis. 
7.6. The Future of the Earth: Instabilities in the Profane Deixis. 
In discussing particularly the move (a, ^ a,), and the undermining of 
the sene â-, it was said that a profound instability in the given symbolic 
universe in general, and in the profane deixis in particular, occurred. In 
the discussion of the axis B, it was noted how the weight of the presence 
vs absence opposition came down heavily upon the profane deixis. All of this 
means, concretely speaking: how does one cope with one symbolic universe, seen 
to be passing away, while the new one is not yet fully established' If the 
ambiguities of the return of Jesus, the future of heaven, rested upon the 
transformation (a- -> a,), the problem of the future of the earth is a matter 
of relating a, and b . Ibis relation bears the brunt of radical change — not 
just important shifts within the semiotic system, but a shift between two 
systems themselves. It is the attempt to mediate this that gives rise to the 
various topics to be discussed in this section: old and new creation, ideology 
and utopia, chiliasm and revolution, and the generation of the individual eschata. 
Before going into the various solutions to this profound instability, the 
general structural problems need looking at. For these provide the context 
for the various solutions to tie difficulties. 
a2, while clearly shaken by the instability of the profane deixis, is 
nevertheless not undermined so definitively as is a.} although it is undermine 
to the extent that content invested in βρ entails death, sin, etc. — all 
those contents to be invested m â.. a can, despite the introduction of the 
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referance "nyth, still be seen as iruch the same self-refemns, self-enclosed 
system it jas before the raising of Jesus. It is precisely this fact that 
»(acerbates the absence in the presence vs absence opposition. One can go even 
further to say t uit vis A, when all is said and done, is not really undermined 
a*; such. Rather, the contents to be invested, the distribution of signifiers, 
is radically curtailed if the system is still to -orovide coherent meaning. 
How far the axis is undermined depends upon how much curtailment one wishes 
to allow. If one accepts the reference myth of the raising of Jesus as 
constitutive of its own meaning, this curtailment will ¡jo very far indeed. 
b , thr "not yet" in the presence vs absence semibtics that is born of the 
ne' meaninR of the reference myth, cannot function wholly independently of the 
axis A. To be true to the reference myth, it must follow the circuit laid 
down by the myth within axis A. However, it is not wholly confined to axis A, 
since ap has been "strengthened" as has a. been undermined. The axis В presents 
the projected resolution of the presence vs absence opposition and with it the 
radical curtailment of axis A. 
If one accepts all this, how does one come to terms with the unstable 
profane deixis? Or, how is meaning generated in this trans-systçjnal eituation? 
Meaning in this situation amounts to finding articulation in the presence vs 
absence situation in b-, where as "not yet" in the presence vs absence, it is 
weighted for emphasis on absence in its presenee-and-absence state. This is 
opposed to Ç , the "not not yet" where ths double negation points toward a 
weighting of the presence in the preeence-and-abeence state. Moreover, Ъ. has 
to be understood in itself, as presenee-and-absence weighted for absence, in 
order to effectively cope with meaning generated in a ?, which is also fairly 
self-erclosed. In the elaboration of Moltmann's approach to eschatological 
time-awareness, the present, as constitutive of future and past, as Vorschein 
of the adventus, and evocative of the Ergangenheit of the past, is the mode of 
presence vs absence at b-. With this structural background, we are m a position 
to examine the several meanings generated by which believers attempt to come 
to terms with living "between the times". 
7.6.1. The Old and New Creation: The Critique of Origins. 
The problem of the old and new creation is already present in the МГ text. 
Put simply, the problem is this: if the world is to be interpreted within the 
semiotics of the raising of Jesus, what is the statue of all that which was 
ordained by God that preceded the raising of Jesus? Is there a continuity of 
interpretation between the old creation (the period before the raising of Jesus, 
and continuing now to the extent that death is not yet wholly overcome) and 
the new creati tu (the period since the raising of Jesus as perceived by believers)? 
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For to maintain a continuity ' ould call into ciuestion the radic=lity of t'ie 
raising of Jesus and \ ojld even sucGest that it is not constitutive of геашхг^, 
tut -lust Ъе interpreted \ ithin an olrepdy e^^^tent sybolic ir^verse. Ilovscver, 
to opt for radical discontinuity also nas its effects. TI с logical conscruerce 
of a total negation of the old creation creates nr ethicnl irc^fferercc ir \ Vach 
God decided to save a depraved r.aiikind, and uhere the acts of -en are сот"1 etc"; 
irrelevant to the act uherein life overeo-es aeath. It '/oi^ d a1 so be diffi­
cult to see hou Jesus could be \ holly nan and still be the instrument of lifr 
in its victory over death. For the "like us in all thircs but «vr" clause 
vould, paiedoxically, lose its r.eaninc — if nankind is so utterly ^errpved and 
devoid of salvageable nepninc, i'hat could a nan uith out sin possibly be like? 
But, acain, on the other hand, the radicality of God's intervention in nuvn 
affairs and the overcor int, of ieath nust be saftfuarded. AIT ir аУ , the 
ргоЬІеті looks insoluble in its " ^ous circvlanty. 
Viewing the problem within the presence vs absence opposition offers ι 
possible -ediation. The difficulty is created by seeing a as a pre'-crce-ird-
absence weighted for presence instead of for absence. This rer jits ir inv^stm;-
content in this sene which would otherwise not cone under considentior. This 
content then creates the vicious circulrrity while trying to hold on rather 
unsuccessfully to all the values in rund. Put cencretel; , this probler arises 
when one trios to give an account of origins, or in terms of Christian faith, 
a particular creation theology. The sipnifiers, and no e importantly, the 
operations or moves implied in this content, hopelessly confuse the issue. 
This point deserves further examination. 
As an exanple of this kind of creation theology, one can take a recept 
offering from a reforned theologian who cautiously tries to reinstate a creation 
57 theology as a frane for biblical theology. A study of this article reveals nost 
of the difficulties alluded to here. For creation theology does not atterpt 
to come to terms with the beginnings of things, with oriijns, m terms of them­
selves, but in terms of the position occupied by the reader of those origins. 
Creation theology demands a herneneutical stance where the relation of reader 
and text is particularly perilous. One is attempting to make sense of the pro-
sent by extrapolating from that present to its putative origins. Schmid, as 
no ОТ exegete, clearly sees this in his reading of Genesis: the notion of law, 
the right order of things, and divine justice converge to form a bepinmng 
for the present. By coming to terms with the beginning, one can for-i a 
frane of reference of cosmic proportions for the ordering of meaning. But the 
Circularity of such a frane cannot be overlooked. It is Ъапі on a peculiar 
reading of the present, and the types of operations upon this content are dis­
tressingly uniform. Because of this, the äyles of meaning tend to folloi a 
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recoEnizable pattern, v/xth similar results and regularly insoluble problens. 
One G et s a cosmologica! argument for the existence of God once the frame has 
been established — the way things are now show that there nust be a God who 
59 
nade then that //ay. Secondly, as i;oltmann pointed out, the development of 
such a theology will be based on analogy, as the nediation of identity and 
difference. Analogy, of course, depends upon ат emphasis on identity, on 
the soundness of the analogue, which is presence in a presence vs absence 
opposition. From this several things result. 
First of all, extrapolations can be made to the future as well as to the 
past: the future becomes a closed systen, with no surprises, emanating fmm the 
present. Secondly, the problem of evil becomes messy and sometimes so intrac­
table that the terns of a paradox can hardly be established. This is the case 
because one must account for evil in the beginning. To do so must either make 
it a co-eternal principle with God; or it must be subordinated to God, which 
then either makes theodicy necessary or bagatellizes evil. Third, the model 
can only operate on a static notion of the world; radical change is an 
aberration (unless a limited change is enclosed within an extrapolation) and 
flux is the encroachnent of chaos , since these both disturb the pattern of 
the "beginning". If one insists upon a creation with a distinction of being 
and nothingness as unmixed entities, one cannot break out of this static world-
view. Fourth, eschatology as a radical intervention of God can only be met 
with silence or, Bore often, with resistance, since it implies all that change 
which is inimical to the model. Fifth, the potential for the legitimation 
of any social syste-n usine,
 ti creation theology reaches nonstrous proportions. 
Sixth, creation theology ultimately undernines the fundamental goodness of the 
earth it purports to safeguard. For while rightly affirming the refrain of the 
hymn of Gen 1: "And God saw that it was good", it will set up an arbiter of 
right and wrong that stands above questioning, shored up by a mechanical senee 
of a "natural law", a "divine comnand" that comes near to contradicting its 
belief in the fundanental soundness of human nature. While attempting to stave 
off anarchy, it absolutizes a sele ction of possibilities in a structure of its 
own understanding. Because, then, it is ordained to be so from the beginning, 
as the first principles that make the symbolic universe possible, it is beyond 
question. Seventh, and finally, Moltmann reminds us that the strains of the 
old apocalyptic melody of "the end is like the beginning" will be heard. And 
then one will have to requestion that ваше cosmologica! argument — what is 
the earth really all about? While a creation theology does make an important 
attempt at answering this, it can only really answer: God's good pleasure or 
some divine lila that cannot help but not take a, seriously. 
Thus creation theology, by too heavily emphasizing presence in a model 
actually weighted for absence, creates this sort of situation where the myth of 
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the raising of Jesus can only be understood as an adjustment of the symbolic 
universe, not its reconstitution as something new. It remains a theology of 
the old creation, and this seems to be built into its very logic. 
This does not, of course, mean that a creation theology is impossible — 
far from it. Rather the point is to emphasize that creation theologies do 
not describe origins, but reflect the present's need for accounting for things 
as they are. A sense of origins is part of the construction of a symbolic 
universe. But it should be recognized that creation theologies always have a 
strong legitimating function. The eschatological symbolic universe will have 
a creation theology as well — Paul sketches as much in Romans. The point to be 
made here is that any creation theology must remain faithful to the reference 
myth and not itself try to be the frame for the eschatological event. 
On the other hand, the weighting of the absence in the presence-and-absence 
•odel ia not eelf-explanatory. It, too, can devolve into a logic as nonrepreeen-
tative of the reference myth as the creation theology just sketched. VJhen the 
absence becomes so overwhelming that the presence fades away, then a theology 
arises not unlike the creation theology just sketched. In this apprtn ch, the 
point of departure is again the present and the reader, upon seeing the absence, 
develops a sort of night-blindness. The corruption of the world can only be 
met by a complete eradication of its forms and the destruction of its idols. 
Whereas the creation theology was built upon analogy, this approach rests 
upon undiluted, nondialectical contradiction. In this, it ends up being per-
versely guided by the very symbolic universe it attempts to destroy, and its 
operations will be symmetrical mirror-images of it. Just as the creation 
theology cannot account for evil, this approach cannot account for good. Its 
Justifiable attempts to eradicate evil, since the pattern of its operation is 
governed by the evil phenomena themselves, never can reach an end unless it 
destroys itself. The alternative to this is an arbitrariness about at what 
point the destruction of evil is achieved or at what point a line of resistance 
will be established. The arbitrary character usually results in ferocious 
criteria for orthodoxy beyond the wildest ambitions of a creation theology. 
The advantage of this position is that the notion of a radical intervention by 
God can be exhibited in all clarity. This grows from its emphasis on absence 
in the presence-and-absence situation of b.. The clear disadvantage is the 
ccaplete passivity deaanded of a_, which can only lead to moral indifference. 
One is reminded of those apocalyptic groups in the Middle Ages who placed 
themselves "beyond sin" in their expectation of the imminent intervention of 
God. 
As Moltnann points out, only in terms of a dialectic that recognizes both 
presence and absence, are these extremes to be avoided. For while both start 
from laudable enough positions, the logic of their operations fails to catch their 
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respective OTinositec. The result can only be one-sided. One nust start with 
contradiction (i.e., an enpahsis on absence), but this contradiction nust also 
nove to a cortradiction of the contradiction. In other words, there trust be 
a chance of an Aufhebung. 
Is there any ι econciliation of the problen of old and new creation'' In 
terms of the reference nyth, one would have to say the following: 
1. As a general principle, the old has to be subsuired, aufgehoben, into the 
new. This will nean a total reconstitution of the reaning of the old creation. 
2. However, the problem is dialectical in nature, for time and time again it 
has been evident how nuch the reference nyth depends upon the axis A for 
articulation, even bhile undermining it. What we are confronted with here is 
the лгоЫеп and possibility of radical change. The new symbolic universe nust 
break free from the old where, in our caae, death still reigne for the time. 
3. If creation theology is extrapolated fron the present into the past and is 
in constant need of critique, this is no less true for the theology of the 
new с tion, eschatology. For we saw in sections 7.'*.3. and 7.5- to what extent 
the returr and end-time scenario are generated fren the structural myth, and as 
sjen are structural extrapolations fron the present situation into the Iture. 
liSChatology will also need critique, especially at those points where its 
extrapolations to the future bearne sheer projection of monentary need and 
no longer reflect the proportion of the presence vs absence opposition as 
embodied in the reference myth. 
7.6.2. Ideology and Utopia. 
In Chapter Five, those myths were called ideological that did not reflect 
the conditions actually existent in society. Ideological myth would attempt 
to nould the cognitive and serantic systems without reference to, or with only 
partial reference to, existing relationships within society. In termscf the 
history of theology, those syibolic representations put forward that in effect 
ignore the radicality of the reference myth would have to be called ideological. 
Among these are those theologies of history that ignore the absence factor by 
portraying the successive states of affairs of mankind (or of the church) as 
one long success story, nondialectical theologies based on evolution, and those 
creation theologies that fit the patterns described in the previous section. 
To this list can be added also those moral theologies taking the part of the 
strong or dominating elements in society against the weak and oppressed ele­
ments. For by consigning the latter groups to the edges of theology, one is 
denying the aspect of absence of Jesus in the world. In other words, those 
kinds of "diesseitige" theology — that undialectically ignore the absence 
weighting, and can only function as an apology for the way things are, and not 
as a critique of them — are ideological. 
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Close]^ related to ideological solutics to the nres°rcp vs чЬзс-се 
OTiposition are Utopian solutioas. Taese ^iffc fron líeologiral solitions 
i"- they they recognize the cic ele~<"nt of abc^ncf in the lorld, Ъі t гезртч' 
to it by attenrtinn to create ^ pockft of presence ir tl"i= ••t'-fcp t-^ at η ir^or+ε 
to be nondialcctica'lly related to the sacred dej.xis. This ci" ti'e t1"» fnr-
of an enclosed с nmurity that attempts to solve t e problei э of absence iitl in 
its own limts only, or of en individualist piety thnt attermts ^he ч^і0 it^pian 
solution in t^e life of a sincle individua], bltnatel; ho'ever, utopia is a 
form of ideology if it fai] ^  tc involve the world in its se-i-ch for гчіг-юче. 
The involvenent of the jorld with its Fixed sense of Presence and ibsence is 
necessarj to keep the search for presence in it·; ргопег dialectical propc-tiors. 
'/ithout it, utopia will forpet absence and celebrate only pr^^ence. 
7.6.3. Chiliasm and Hevolution. 
'Ліегеав utopia and creation theology too easilj veer into pre biens of 
forgetting absence, chiliasn and revolution tend toward forcettinp preserce. 
By chiliasm is meant here that peculiar brand of apocalyptic tvat preaches a 
passivity in the face of Ihe presence vs absence opposition. The passivity is 
based on the ultimate redominance of absence, an absence which only the inlrer-
vention of God can dissolve. The moral passivity can take on the violence of 
the opposite form to creation theology sketched in section 7.6.1., and has indeed 
done so often enough in the history of Christianity. Basically it recognizes the 
situation as it is (and thus cannot so easily be called ideology). It sees 
the presence of God accentuated by the absence in the weak and oppressed 
doirinated by the powers of this world. It has eyes for the return of Jesus 
and his eschatological message of the transformation of the earth. But it can 
push the sense of absence to the point where it becomes controlled by the 
false sense if presence it seeks to destroy; whereupon, cornered in its attempt 
to fix a new symbolic universe, it must revert to an arbitrary line of resistance. 
In nest cases, thia will result in the establishrer.t of an elite, where the 
true presence shall dwell. At this point the dialectic ceases, and with it a 
relaticm to the proportions and emphases of the presence vs absence heritage 
of the raising of Jesus. 
Revolution, too, has the problem of forgetting presence, but in a more 
complicated fashion. It can correctly analyze the combination of presence 
vs absence in the world and attempt to change superstructures to more closely 
reflect the sense of eschatological presence. In doing this, it would be 
correct in taking the side of theweak and appreesed, the outcast of this world, 
as seen in the Nf text. The difficulty arises upon the completion of such a 
dialectical move, the resolving of the synthesis. If this is mistaken for the 
return of Jesus, i.e., for the abolition of the emphasis upon absence in the 
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preeence-and-abaence situation, the revolution has gone awry. 
All in all, however, xf would seen that the revolutionary mediation of 
the presence-and-аЪвепсе of Ъ. is the closeat representation ^ of the eschatological 
symbolic universe, its forme for generating meaning, and ite ambiguities, that 
is available to ue. For ite proportions are those of a symbolic universe passing 
away and being replaced by a new universe where the old values may be turned 
on their heads — the rich impoverished, the wise made foolih, the elect become 
the outcast. In so doing the presence of Ood and message of life overcoming 
death is experienced in all its proleptic character, in the very absence already 
felt. 
7.6Л. The Individual Eschata. 
The history of Christianity has long bad what have been called the 
individual eschata alongside of the collective eschata. Theological interpretation 
is fairly unanimous in seeing them as having risen from the lapse of tiae 
between the raising of Jesus and his return. Put into terms of structural 
seeantico, it ia an attempt to solve the preaence-and-absence problem in the 
interim period, recognizing that thinga are by no means the same since the 
raising of Jeaus, yet also acknowledging the continuing power of death. The 
fact that the NT text offers little to go on in reference to them has resulted 
in various different models and scenarios about exactly what does happen to 
those that die before the return of Jesus. Speaking in terms of the semiotics 
of the eschatological universe, we can say that a subsystem of meaning is 
generated (call it axis C) parasitic upon (i.e., not integrated into but external 
to) the eschatological semiotic system. 
Axis С corresponds to axis Ä: c. s heaven, c. = death. The axis С 




One can see how the generation of the axis δ has taken place, c. as the contra­
dictory of the sacred c.. and implied in the profane c. would be a death that 
is not undermined by the semiotics of the eschatological symbolic universe, c,, 
ie the contradictory of death in the eacred deixis, i.e., the place for those 
who have died and are not so wholly eacred as to enter c.. Purgatory would be 
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the best description of it. Moreover, it ie clear how this construction collapses 
with the definitive overcaning of death, as indeed the Christian church teaches. 
Interesting, though, is what vili happen to c., the nonending death of 
hell. Since early times the Christian church has held that it is indeed ever-
lasting, though this has always weighed uneasily on the Christian conscience. 
One could interpret it, sturcturally speaking, in two ways. Either it is some-
how resolved in the return of Jesus, or it is cut loose from the semiotic 
system as a locus of consummate meaninglesanees. In terms of theology, both 
possibilities have been preferred. It would be a far too complicated matter 
to go further into here. 
7.7. An End-Time? Sketches for a Sense of Finality. 
One question left untouched until now is the notion of the end-time as 
such. Is there a collective end-time, when the overcoming of death by life 
will be an evident reality, when the presence vs absence opposition will be 
definitively and collectively resolved? Will there be a return of Jesus as is 
represented in M,.-M-g? 
To give any sort of full answer to this query exceeds anything that can 
be done here. For the models for actually correctly posing the question do 
not yet exist. Any attempt to answer this question will have to include at 
least the following: a complete seniotical study of the apocalyptic genre; a 
sorting out of what would constitute the conditions f>r such a phenomenon as 
the return; a developed sense of finality that would have to match an as yet 
equally undeveloped sense of origins, i.e., the relation of our thinking, and need 
to think, about origins and finality from the point of our present situation; 
a much more developed philosophy of time and time-awareness; a more complete 
understanding of historiography; further investigations into the semiotics of 
the return as based on the semiotics of the raising of Jesus. Although such a 
study cannot be reasonably undertaken here, an attempt can be made to sketch 
out how the problem may be approached on the basis of this presentation and 
how that will interact with the work still to be done. 
Looking back over what has been said in the course of this chapter, we 
can say that the notion of the return of Jesus grows out of four factors: 
(1) the seeming "insufficiency" of the raising of Jesus, i.e., that death is 
overcome, but not routed. 
(2) the model the NT text presents for achieving this final rout is a tsans-
formation based on the raising of Jesus which, however, only calls for his 
return and not for his death again (M?c., M ?g). 
(3) the perceived instability of the profane deixis which indicates that its 
instability cannot resolve itself and will need such a resolution from outside. 
(4) the perceived absence of Jesus must be overcome by presence. 
In terms of time-awareness, it is a matter of resolving b_, the not yet, 
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which would seem to demand a resolution of this into the sacred deixis, i.e., 
a move to Б_ (a ?). 
If one works with the options generated by the reference myth of the 
raising of Jesus, then a return of Jesus, another set of transformations in 
which death will be routed and absence overcome, seems to be the best and 
probably the only symbolic solution. 
This, however, only leads to the next question: will such a resolution 
occur within history or outside of it? And here we stumble against all the 
problems mentioned at the beginning of the section. It might be profitable 
to confront these problems with the structural semantics that have been developed 
here. 
A charge regularly leveled against structuralism in all its forms is that 
it can only work with synchronic models and ma»t reduce all change through time, 
or diachrony, to its synchronic proporitons. That this difficulty is present 
cannot be denied. In discussing structural semantics in Chapter Five, this 
became particularly clear in trying to coordinate surface and content level 
structures. It was noted at the time that more than anyone else, Greioas has 
worked toward an integration of these two. Ve made heavy use of his conmuni-
cation isotopy, the structure of exchange, in Chapter Seven — one aspect where 
the narrative and deep structures do mesh. But not only has Greimas worked 
toward integrating the two, he has also written the most powerful critique of 
this objection to structuralist method, an essay entitled "Structure et Histoire". 
The whole of structuralism is based on the idea that a limited number of 
elements are involved in signification and that movement must be interpreted as 
strings of these recurring signification structurée. He grants that "toute 
saisie de signification a pour effet de transformer les histoires en perman-
enees."65 
But the historians do not stand above this wrestling with the problem of 
meaning in time. The terms "synchrony" and "diachrony" are leftovers from 
nineteenth century historicism and not all changes are really so-called 
historical transfoBmations. The nub of the question в precisely here: defining 
kinds of change and then coming to terms with theo. Greimas posee two questions 
to the historians: (1) what makes up the historical character of social struc­
tures? and (2) how does one account for the diachronic tranaformatione which 
are situated between structures juxtaposed on the same line of temporal 
succession? 
The problem is the problem of radical change, of transformation, which 
neceesitates talking about two states of affairs instead of simply one. For 
the very notion of rupture indicates the inadequacy of the first state of affairs 
to account for the second. So, "une meilleure connaissance des règles générales 
de transformations structurelles est nécessaire avant qu'on puisse prononcer avec 
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quelque certitude sur le caractère spécifique des transformations diachroniques." 
It is hoped that this study in the semiotics of eschatology has cmtributed 
toward understanding diachronic transformations, especially through a closer 
consideration of the logic of the elementary structures of signification, here-
tofore insufficiently examined, and in the attempt to discuss the presence vs 
absence problem within the terms of the signification structure. Likewise, the 
insistence on dialectic, until now the only workable model that can deal with 
radical transfonnatione, has been at least preliminarily incorporated into the 
signification structure. This also bears out some of Greimas' own unpublished 
research: 
...il semblerait bien, d'après les premières investigations que nous 
avons tentées, que la démarche dialectique, considérée сопле destructrice 
des corrélations mythiques, dans la mesure bu elle nie la conjonction 
des termes contraires et affirme la possibilité de nouvelles articu-
lations de contenu discrets, a pour corollaire, la démarch mythifiante 
inverse, créatrice de corrélations dite symboliques et qui concilent 
les inconciliables."" 
One can go so far as to say that eschatology _is the grammar of transformation. 
It brings with it the ambiguities inherent in a rupture of a given symbolic 
universe and the difficulties in establishing a new one. As such, a closer 
study of eschatology should yield not only a better understanding of the 
foundations of Christian theology, based as it is on the raising of Jesus? but 
also on the logic of change, the transformation of symbolic universes, the 
functioning of myth in society, and perhaps even more light on the notion of 
time. 
To return to the problem at hand: does the return of Jesus occur inside 
history or outside it? The question will have to be rephrased. If history 
is confined to a posteriori establishment of meaning, then an event that by 
definition "ends" the existence of the profane deizis outside the sacred deixis 
would provide no future for such a posteriori considerations. If one can follow 
out the logic of eschatological movement, the return of Jesus is meant to 
provide an end to the presence vs absence and will do so in a dialectical 
Aufhebung implied in the transformation (b, -* fL). In this sense, the end-
time would be a consuonation of history. It ends history, and the question 
of whether it comes inside or outside is irrelevant. 
But what of the hiatoricity of the end-time occurrence? While this Is 
better formulated to the needs of the inquiry, it shatters on the current 
state of historiography. Before such a question can be answered, cue must be 
able to answer Qreimas' query: how does one handle a rupture between two states 
of affaire? Is it part of the first or the second — or neither — or both? 
Troa within our analysis of the seniotica of the eschatologioal symbolic 
univerae, mam» senae of the statue of the end-tlae can be preferred, though 
with the utmost caution. If the return of Jesus is modelled upon hi« raising, 
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to the extent that that ie the case, to the ваше extent will it he "hietorical". 
However, even this is complicated by two factors. The two models are not 
wholly isomorphic; Jesus is not subjected to death a second time. And secondly, 
the raising of Jesus itself. Debates on its historicity are many and varied, 
69 having been a problem from the very beguming. We have stated that looking 
to the HT text in the form of the variants on the reference myth will provide 
no apologetic evidence. For to seek out evidence in this manner misses the 
point: if the raising of Jesus is not affirmative of meaning, but constitutive 
of it, one cannot establish the analogous cases that could be used as criteria 
for historicity. Thus even this returns to the same place: how does history 
account for the radical transformations; or, in the phrase of Certeau, a 
"rupture instauratrice"? 
More and more we are drawn into the significance and the centrality of 
the eschatological myth, constitutive of the Christian symbolic universe. We 
see how Schweitzer's phrase, quoted at the beginning of Chapter One, is so 
true — how extremely difficult it is to get into the mechanics of the escha­
tological worldview. It is easier, too, to appreciate the twentieth century 
research and its shifting from pole to pole in trying to come to terms with 
this worldview. And it is hoped that this two-pronged study, aimed at devel­
oping a sensitivity to eschatological language and a method for unpacking 
its symbolic and linguistic structure, has contributed to dealing with its 
central enigma: the grammar of transformation. 
7.8. Coda: Structural Semantics and the Hermenéutica! Inquiry in Theology. 
Before closing, a number of points need to be brought together as con-
cerns the use of structural semantics in theology. These will be given in 
a series of brief statements: 
1. Structural sonantics cannot be seen as supplanting the historical inquiry 
into the Christian tradition. Although its strength is most evident in those 
areas where historical research has been the least fruitful, this by no means 
entails that it is now no longer necessary. It was repeatedly affirmed through-
out this study that while sturctural semantics can provide the range of semantic 
and cognitive possibilities available for a response to a situation, it is only 
in conjunction with the historical conditions that some of these possibilities, 
and not others, are actualized. To neglect the study of the historical condi-
tions .of emergence would be to consign all these possibilities to ideology. 
2. In view of this, structural semantic investigations should be seen as 
studies in the conditions of possibility of response to situations. It is a 
foundationalist study. Thus, the results of structural semantic researches 
cannot be called theology as such; rather, they provide the frame within which 
valid theology will have to be developed if it is to respect the tradition of 
responses that have been generated from the NT text. The results of structural 
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semantic analysis Etre necessary, but not sufficient conditions for theology. 
3. Structural semntics should not be identified with the deep structure of 
a theological grammar and historical research with its surface grammar. Struc-
tural semantics includes both deep and surface grammar. It provides the combi-
natorics, and because of a history of generation of meaning, an important segment 
of the usage of theological expression. This, however, does not mean that 
historical researih is external to it. For in the case of the models available 
for expressing the experience of an alive Jesus who was known to have died, we 
saw the powerful role of historical conditions in determining what possibilities 
for expressing this could be included in the arsenal of signifiers. 
k. The meaning and truth question in theology will have to be answered principally 
from within a structural semantic analysis. For it is its coherence that provides 
71 the frame, the rules of operation, the proportions , and the circuits that 
provide the akein of meaning and the criteria for truth. In terms of the 
development of doctrine, a study of successive generations of meaning in con-
junction with the historical conditions evoking them may provide an important 
alternative to the hermenéutica! model of kernel of belief and historical 
trappings. The location of the signified or the message of a particular theo-
logical myth should not be identified with such a kernel. For the signified 
can only come into its own, its meaning and intent can only be unpacked, by 
the variety of signifiers. 
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SOME CONCLUSIONS, CONSEQUÍUCES AND CONJECTURES. 
In this final section, some of the more important conclusions will be 
given that have been reached in the course of this study. Also, some of the 
further consequences and implications of these conclusions for speech act 
theory, structural semantics, eschatology, and the study of religious language 
in general will be indicated. And finally, some speculation about further 
directions such an investigation could take will be included. 
8.1. Speech Act Theory. 
1. This study attempted to widen the base for speech act theory so as better 
to describe and account for the concrete use of language. It was felt that 
only through such an extension of the theory of Austin and Searle could it 
reach its goal of describing "the total speech act in the total speech situa-
tion". By identifying the principal methodological tools (inventories, 
felicity conditions, uses of asymmetries, pursuit of the vanishing distinction) 
it was possible to develop the theory in such a manner as to respect the thrust 
and intentionality of the theory even while going beyond it. This proved 
helpful in searching out those areas that constitute the possibilities for 
ordinary language use, especially time, convention, meaning and truth. 
2. Chapter Three contributed studies in four important areas for speech act 
theory that illustrated four styles of research needed to give speech act theory 
the broad base it seeks. The discussion of promising was the most complete 
aaalysis of promising within speech act theory to date. It covered not only 
the uses of the word "promise" but also promising in other forms, borderline 
cases of promising, and the relation of promising to neighboring illocutionary 
acts. The conclusions about the central role of the hearer pointed out the 
weaknasses of Searle's analysis and were thus able to provide more complete 
rules for illocutionary promising. The analysis of promising showed how research 
into illocutionary acts is to take place. 
The discnssion of time, an alternative to most approaches to the ordinary 
language study of time was presented. It criticized the "silent majority" 
approach to ordinary language study where it is presumed that everyone knows what 
ordinary language usage is, whereupon the author is free to use his own definition. 
The attempt to map various usages of time expressions and time-awarenesses 
provided a second approach to ordinary language analysis, an approach geared to 
investigating those areas constitutive of ordinary language use which themselves 
are not illocutionary acts. 
Negation is one of those borderline cases which represent an element of 
speech that can both be an illocutionary act and a linguistic element in all 
speech acts. The discussion of illocutionary and propositional negation was 
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geared to illustrate this type of problem. The study was able to identify 
three different kinds of negation: illocutionary, propositional, and an odd type 
that springs out of the ипітег е of discourse. 
Finally, the much neglected area of perlocutionary acts was tackled, a 
fourth type of research needed in speech act theory. An attempt was made to 
flesh out important aspects of the framework developed within speech act theory. 
Perlocutionary acts were found to be structurally parasitical upon illocutionary 
acts and to lack the latter'β clear relation to a given conventional structure. 
The discussion of perlocutionary acts in terms of semantic and structural con­
siderations in section 7.5.2. helped clarify the position of perlocutionary acts 
in speech situations more fully. 
These four studies fairly well sketch the methodological boundaries for 
speech act investigation. As such, they should be applied to other areas — 
space, action, knowledge, intention, possibility, causality — to better 
account for the totality of concrete usage in the speech situation. 
3. Chapter Four dealt with those aspects of the speech situation that never 
appear as linguistic elements, but play subsurface roles in constituting the 
speech situation as a totality: conventions, meaning, and truth. The three 
were discussed in terms of rules and coherence, since these are the two things 
that link them together to give them their constitutive power. One could 
characterize them as the deep structure of the concrete usage of the speech 
situation. In the case of convention, it was found that along this route 
that speech act theory will find its hook-up with other researches into 
human communication and society. The discussion of meaning examined the various 
interpretations of meaning in language analysis and opted for a coherence sense 
of meaning that could not only include the four major approahhes to meaning 
within language analysis, but also neet the shortcomings of the respective 
theories and link them, by the emphasis on rules, to nonlinguistic configura­
tions of meaning. Finally, the tension between truth as definition and truth 
criteria was treated. It was found that a coherence sense of truth was necessary 
to provide adequate truth criteria. As such, a hook-up with meaning and con­
vention was effected. 
if. One important consequence of all this work concerning the deep structure of 
the speech situation is that the reality of the speech situation emerges as 
a constructed one. A constructed reality should not be confused with an arbi­
trary reality; rather, the emphasis on constitutive and regulative rules, on 
brute and institutional fact serves to emphasize that sooething indeed can be 
known of those structures that constitute the possibilities actualized in the 
speech situation. The more of these rules that can be isolated, the closer we 
will be able to cone to a unified theory of human communication, spanning the 
distance from linguistic competence and performance to the macrostructures of 
soceity. 
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8.2. Structural Semantics. 
1. To get at that level of deep structure constitutive possibilities that 
could underlie the range of structures of coanninìcation — called the eymbolic 
universe — it was felt that a different approach was needed. This grew out 
of the highly nonordinary character of the linguistic data it afforded and 
the extraordinarily vague contours it presented to the researcher. To this 
end, Greimas' structural semantics was employed, centering in upon one important 
manifestation of the symbolic universe, myth. Not only did Greimas' approach 
prove most fruitful, but it also serves as an important means for rehabilitating 
the much maligned notion of myth. Myth was defined here as the moulder of the 
cognitive and semantic systems of a society. As such, it was generative of 
the basic frame of meaning for society which is theifactualized by the histo-
rical conditions of that society. 
2. Two contributions were made to structural semantics in the course of the 
presentation. The first, and most important, had to do wih the notion of 
unit boundary determination or the choice of paradigmatic units for deep 
structure investigation. By more fully exploiting the logic of the structures 
of sigiifieation, the relation, between the signifiers was clarified. Through 
his, the various positions in terms of the irreconcilable character of the 
dilemmas, their mediation passibilities, and the conditions for their mediation 
could be highlighted. On the basis of these relations, it is possible to de-
termine whether the signifiers in the sturctures of signification are indeed 
the proper ones, reflecting the disequilibria that generate the meaning of the 
myth. Secondly, by further exploiting Greimas' communication isotopy, the way 
was opened for introducing an element of diachrony into the signification 
structure. It was shown that dialectic need not be destructive of myth and 
may indeed even be shown to contribute to the generation of meaning. 
3. Certainly one area that still needs much work is the relating of other forms 
of narrative structure to the deep structure or content level or analysis. Until 
this is done, structural semantics will not be able to give the complete account 
of symbolic universes for which it aims. 
8.3. Eschatology. 
1. The long discussion of methods of language analysis at all its levels was 
all well and good, but it proved to be only cm academic exercise until it was 
exposed to the acid test of eschatological language. And it was found to stand 
up quite well under the test and provide some interring results for theology. 
2. In the ordinary language analysis of eschatoliy in Chapter Six, two major 
results were reached. First of all, in the analysis of Moltmann's notion of 
promise, it was found that this promising, as he described it, could only be 
called perlocuticdary in charader. Seme of the consequences of this for 
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theology were sketched out at the tine. The moet important of these is that 
the notions of covenant and the relati en of God and the world will have to be 
rethought in terms of the perlocutionary character of this promise. Secondly, 
Moltmann's time-awareness was clarified; this not only met to objections of 
some of his critics, but also indicated its central role in the building up of 
his eschatology as horizon for Christian experience. 
3· Chapter Seven investigated the deep structure of Christian eschatology in 
the hopes of ascertaining its logic. After identifying the framework, code 
and message of the reference myth of the raising of Jesus, the variants upon 
the myth were studied to locate the directions of the generation of meaning. 
In this study, the two key problems were located already in the NT text that 
have served to determine the subsequent history of eschatology: the presence 
vs absence of Jesus, and the dilemma of straddling two symbolic universes, one 
of which was passing away and one of which was being inaugurated by the 
semiotics of the raising of Jesus. The message or signified of the reference 
myth was that in the raising of Jesus life had overcome death. But the 
variants expressed the continuing difficulty with the actualization of this 
message in these two key problems. It was then shown how these two key problems 
generated the further history of eschatology and its meanings — the problems 
of the end-time scenario, social responses to the reference myth (utopia, 
chiliasm, etc.). It also pointed out some of the recurrently insoluHe problems 
the myth has generated, most notably the problem of the old and new creation. 
Finally, the notions of perlocutioiary promise and Moltmann's time-awareness 
were introduced and found to be corroborated by the content level analysis of 
the eschatological myth complex. 
4. A return to the problems that have most consistently dogged eschatology, 
as summarized in section 1.2.3·, will reveal that most of them have received 
treatment in the course of Chapter Six and ежресіаііу Chapter Seven. The 
question of the status of the collective eschata was broached, partieulady 
on the notion of an end-time (it was found that this seems to be structurally 
and symbolically demanded); the relation of the collective and individual 
eschata was clarified in section 7.б.1*.; the notions of promise and time 
received extensive treatment, including the various options ranging from 
realized to a futurist eschatology; something of the structure of eschatology 
as horizon was indicated, by way of the acamples of its generation of meaning; 
the question of history was not treated as such (since it fell outside the 
scope of the study), but conditions for discussing it posed by language analysis 
were adumbrated; the relation of eschatology to other Christian doctrines 
was indicated, particularly in the examples drawn from christology, as well 
as mention of the influence of the eschatological symbolic universe upon the 
ethical options for the Christian. Basing all of this on the structures of 
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signification gave a unity to the presentation that showed, at least implicitly, 
the interconnections between all these topics. 
5. The consequences of this study in terms of further eschatological research 
are many, and only a few of them can be indicated here. Only some of the most 
important will be mentioned. 
To start, any sort of Bultmannian demythologization can now be shown up as 
the crude approach that it is. The complexity of myth indicated and developed 
here goes far beyond the simplistic notion informing his approach. However, 
there is something of his intent that deserves to be retained, and that in 
regard to ideology, i.e., those myths that have outlived their historical time. 
In other words, in }3ace of a demythologization of theology, we need a deideolo-
giaation of theology. This would entail a critique of those expressions of 
doctrine that serve now only to legitimate some practice no longer reflecting 
the concrete СЬгйіап situation or inherently inimical to the best in Christian 
tradition. For example, our notion of salvation history. To make this one 
long success story, moving from strength to strength, forgets that a Heils-
geschichte is also an Unheilsgeschichte. Schillebeeckx's notion of a lijdens­
geschiedenis is a very good attempt to come to terms with this. Entailed in 
recognizing the church's failure in history is coming to terms with the fact 
the the constradictions of history cannot be smoothed over, that our hermen-
eutics must be able to admit gaps, deadends and detours. This all is important 
for making theology a living praxis of the Christian community, and not merely 
the legitimation of power structures or traditions of moral insensitivity. 
The fact that eschatology pivsents a grammar of transformation, the pro­
blem of radical change with one world passing away and another coming to be, 
has ethical consequences as well. These were indicated at several points in 
the course of the study. The radicality of the transformation demands that 
the church be ready to stand in critique of the world, the implications of 
which have been worked out in recent political theology: the deprivatization 
of religion, the critique of the established order, the leaven of liberation, 
the solidarity with the oppressed, and so on. Important to remember is that 
the political hermefyjutice of eschatology is not only the victorious hermenmi-
tics of the resurrection; it is also the defeated hermenéutica of the cross. 
One problem most clearly left unsolved was that of the old and new creation, 
which carries with it the future of the earth. The wrestling with this problem 
already done in section 7.6.1. cannot be expanded upon here, except perhaps with 
a suggestion: a theology of origins will have to take into account the constructed 
character of reality as we perceive and live it. If this is done, the dangers 
of legitimation would be greatly lessened. 
Moltmaxm's faith and religion distinction (section 7-2.) impinges upon 
the grammar of transformation. Can eschatological faith meet the needs of 
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the religious psyche, providing comfort as well as challenge, transcendence 
as well as transformation? Is the history of "religious" Christianity inevit­
able once the church grows to include large segments of the population? Can 
a logic of change also provide stability? Can a Volkskirche also be an escha-
tological community, faithful to the meaning generated by the myth of the rasing 
of Jesus? Hard questions indeed about the challenge of the raising of Jesus, 
but ones that need confronting. Put another way, how does the universalist 
character of the church's missioniaing mesh with the radicality of its belief 
that life overcomes death in all its forms, i.e., not only biological death, 
but the death inherent in oppressive conditions in society, the death of the 
flight from freedom and responsibility? 
Θ.4. The Study of Religious Language. 
Although the welter of studies on religious language was only briefly 
referred to in section 6.1., a bit should be said about the implications of 
this study presented here for the study of religious language. 
1. Most important is the necessity to always approach religious language on the 
basis of concrete texts to be analyzed. Vithout this, analysis of religious 
language is simply another sort of ideal language philosophy, a logic in search 
of a reality. The application of speech act theory to Moltmann's theological 
corpus bears this out. One simply cannot treat "religious sentences" and 
certainly not "religious words" apart from their cmtext, no more than it is 
possible to do so with other units of language. The need to remain with con­
crete texts obviates the danger of lumping together all sorts of language 
usage — liturgical, legal, homiletical, theological — that might be broadly 
classified as "religious". It is no more possible to find the meaning of "God" 
in isolation than it is to find the meaning of "good" under like cmditions. 
2. Another important notion is that religious language should not be encouraged 
to seek some sanctuary apart from the rest of language in some "religious" or 
"odd" usage. To do so will only lead to a further isolation of religion from 
the mainstream of human experience. If religious language and religion itself 
is part of the human experience, it should be willing to subject itself to 
analysis — with all the risks and possible mistakes this may bring with it. 
3. More concretely, we can say that academic systematic theology must be willing 
to submit itself to the type of speech act analysis used here with Moltmann. 
For the very hermenéutica! intent of systematic theology would seem to mean that 
it is meant as a traanslation of the language of the religious symbolic universe. 
Ordinary language analysis, however, cannot be extended immediately to all 
religious language usages without some prolegomena, mainly because of the 
intent of the language involved. In this case, a structural smantic analysis 
may have to precede an ordinary language analysis, as was the case with eschatology. 
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For religious language is no more cut fren one cloth than ів other Bectors of 
language. 
k. The study of perlocutionary acts and their relation to linguistic manifesta­
tions of the eschatological symbolic universe (sections 3.5·ι 6.2.3.ι 7.5-2.) 
should do much to clarify the notion of "evocative" language, a favorite term 
among students of religious language. Both the dimensions of perlocutionary 
use, and the implications for the development of any doctrine were touched upon. 
Also its relation to poetic use came up for discussion. While such usage 
no doubts should be accorded an important role in religious language usage, it 
should not be used as a stopgap for every situation when the academic theologian 
is set upon by questions of analysis. 
5. One interesting consequence of structural semantic analysis is how it will 
provide theology with a responsible reappropriation of patristic and medieval 
exegesis, alongside the efforts of more recent historical-philological research. 
For the "four senses of Scripture" can be brought into line with the notion of 
deep structures generative of meaning and so provide a re-entry into the tradi­
tion for the hermeneutical inquiry into theology (cf. section 7.3.). While this 
by no means entails a return to the period before the rise of historical research, 
it can bring an important reappropriation of the meanings generated by the 
Christian tradition for generations of Christians. By restating the position 
of the reader and the text, it can once more make these meanings generated 
available to post-üilightemnent theology. 
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APPENDIX: Searle's Conditions and Rules for the Performance of the Illocutíonary 
Act of Promising. 
I. Conditions for the Performance of the Illocutíonary Act. 
Given that a speaker £ utters a sentence Τ in the presence of a hearer H, 
then, in the literal utteimce of T, £ sincerely and non-defectively promises 
that £ to Jl if and only if the following conditions 1-9 obtain: 
1. Normal input and output conditions obtain. 
2. S^  expresses the proposition that ¿ in the iterance of T. 
3· In expressing that ¿, £ predicates a future act of S. 
k. Η would prefer S/s doing A^  to his not doing A^ and j3 believes Η would 
prefer hie doing X to his not doing A. 
5· It is not obvious to both ¿ and Η that £ will do A in the normal course 
of events. 
6. jS intends to do k. 
7. §_ intends that the utterance of £ will place him under an obligation 
to do A. 
8. 5^  intends (i.) to produce in Η the knowledge (K) that the utterance of 
T_ is to count as placing £ under an obligation to do A. S^  intends to 
produce К by means of the recognition of i,, and he intends by i, to be 
recognized in virtue of (by means of) H's knowledge of the meaning of Ί. 
9. The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by ¿ and Η are such that 
£ is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions 1-8 
obtain. 
II. Bules for the Dse of the Illocutíonary Force Indicating Device. 
1. Pr (promise) is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or 
larger stretch of discourse) T, the utterance of which predicates some 
future act il of the speaker £>. (Propositional Content Rule) 
2. Pr is to be uttered only if the hearer Я would prefer S'a doing ± to 
his not doing A, and £ believes H would prefer Sfa doing A to his 
not doing A. (First РгерагЛзгу Rule) 
3· Pr is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both ¿ and H that £ 
will do £ in the normal course of events. (Second Preparatory Rule) 
4. Pr is to be uttered only if S_ intends to do A. (Sincerity Rule) 
5· The utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to 
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erfarenheten hor egentligen hemma inom tidlóshetspekulationens varderlära, den 
teleologiska har spirat fam ur en profetisk historietolkning. Sjâlva termerna 
axiologisk och teleologisk pass bast i den idealistiska värdestravans samman-
hang." As more explicit source of the two concepts, he gives Windelband's 
neo-kantianism and Troeltsch's philosophy of religion as the origin of the 
axiologieal aspect and Kahler for the teoleological aspect. 
2k. W.G. Kummel, Verheissung und Erfüllung (Zurich, 1953); P. Althaus, Die Letzten 
Dinge, op. cit., 37-^3; W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," KuD 
5(1959)259-288; idem et al., Offenbarung als Geschichte (Göttingen, 21963); J. 
Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung (München, 19(A), passim. Aleo on promise: 
Kreek, op. cit., 195-214; Sauter, op. cit., Iif9-l6l, 251-262. 
25. Cf. Althaus, RGG II, 357. Althaue pointe out that eschatology has to do pri-
marily with the end of history and not merely with the finitude of history. 
26. The notion of the "end of tùie" is highly ambiguous and what precisely it entails 
is far f roa clear. How ia the notion arrived at? For some, it авеяа to be a 
matter of revelation, for othsre a necessary postulate or extrapolation of a 
given system of thought. 
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2?. One is reminded here of W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," op. cit.; 
Pannenberg et al., Offenbarung als Geschichte, op. cit.; Berkhof, op. cit. 
28. Here stands Moltmann, op. cit. Also his formulation of this difference as 
"futurum" and "adventus" in "Probleme der neueren evangelischen Eschatologie," 
VuF 11(1966) nr. 2, 100-124. P. Minear, "Christian eschatology and historical 
methodology," Neutestamentliche Studien für Rudolf Bultmann (BZNW, 21), 15-23 
notes how difficult or even impossible it is to apply сditemporary historio-
graphical methods to a study of eschatology. If one chooses for an end of 
history coming from outside of hidory, it is all the more difficult. 
29. A. Cohen, "The past and future of eschatological thinking," Religion and 
Contemporary Society (New York, I963), 117f. Cohen also points out the 
importance of a metaphysics of history in dealing with eschatology. 
30. Cf. among others P. Althans, RGG II, 35fl: "Urständ und Vollendung, Paradies 
und Millenium geboren zusammen." 
31. E. Schillebeeckx, "Enkele hermeneutische beschouwingen over de eschatologie," 
Concilium 5(1969) nr. 1, eep. 45-46; Α. Darlap, art. "Anfang und Ende", SM I, 
13B-145; G. Sauter, op. cit., 161-182; K. Rahner, art. "Eschatologie," SM I, 
II86. For a philosophical account of the methodological and typological con­
siderations involved in the problem of primitivity and finality, cf. W. Dupre, 
Keligion in Primitive Cultures (The Hague, to be published), esp. 8-9. 
32. A. Schweitzer, op. cit., 222-443; К. Barth: "Christentum, das nicht ganz und 
gar und restlos Eschatologie ist, hat mit Christue ganz und gar und restlos 
nichts zu tun." Der Romerbrief (Zurich, 51947)< 298. This should be taken 
in lts context, namely. Berth's struggle against Rischlian liberal theology. 
33· In TH, op. cit.; but more important for the discussion here, in his "Theology 
as Eschatology," in The Future of Hope (New York, 1970), 1-50, where the impli­
cations of an eschatological horizon for the Whole of theology are tentatively 
explored. One is reminded, too, of the debate Käseoann unleashed in the be-
ginning of the 1960's on the role of the apocalyptic in the formation of Chris-
tian theology. Principal contributions to the debate have been collected in 
R. Funk (ed.), Apocalypticism (New York, 1969); the difficulty of dealing with 
apocalypticism seems to be a magnified form of the problem with eschatology. 
Cf. in this same trend of thought the "Streitschrift" of K. Koch, Ratlos vor 
der Apokalyptik (Gütersloh, 1970). 
34. An example of this is H. Berkhof, "Over de methode der eschatologie," NThTs 
19(1964)4e6ff., in M s critique of Moltmann Where be speaks of eschatology 
as a pro-jection on the screen of eternity of that which is already given ue. 
While it may be assumed that Berkhof is intending to speak of premise in a 
proleptie fashion, his reaction to Moltaann seeas to go too far in the other 
direction and devolve into a pure teleology of the premise. 
35· K. Rahner, "Zur Theologie der Hoffnung," SehAt \ П П , 561-579 approaches the 
problem in a fruitful fashion from the standpoint of the traditional scholas­
tic speculation on the theological virtues. Cf. further TH, 14-18; Kreek, 
op. cit., 102-108; Althaus, Die Letzten Dinge, op. cit., 46-48. 
36. As Berkhof, "Over de method der eschatologie," op. cit., 484-486 rightly observes, 
to do so leads to a narrowing of eschatology. There must remain room for the 
pneumatic element as well. 
37» Especially K. Rahner, "Theologische Prinzipien der Hermeneutik Eschatologischer 
Aussagen," SchTh IV, 425, where he calls Christ "de hermeneutische Prinzip aller 
eschatologischen Aussagen." In a less formal fashion also in Kreck, op. cit., 
118 and 199-203; Balz, op. cit., 267-270. 
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38. К. Bahner, art. "Eschatologie," SM I, 1191· A more extensive, though lees 
methodologically oriented enumeration can be found in P. Kiinzle, "Die Eschatologie 
im Gesamtaufbau der wissenschaftlichen Theologie," Anima 20(1965)231-238. 
39. К. Bahner, art. "Eschatologie," LTMC2 III, 1095; idem, SM I, II86. 
ΊΟ. Κ. Bahner, "Theologische Prinzipien...," op. cit., kOZ, Ίοβ. 
kl. On the problem of the future, cf. also K. Bahner, "Fragment aus einer theo­
logischen Besinnung auf den Begriff der Zukunft," SchTh VIII, 555-560. 
1*2. M. Kahler, art. "Eschatologie," ВЕ^ V, 1*95. Kahler's conclusion was that 
eschatology should in this situation base itself directly upon the biblical 
statements. Althaus, Die Letzten Dinge, op. cit., 63-65, rightly takes Kahler 
to task for this. It was such a mentality, Althaus notes, that caused escha­
tology to be consigned to the appendix of dogmatics in the first place. 
1*3· Kreck, op. cit., esp. 115-119· On the weaknesses of such a hermeneutics on 
the whole, cf. E. Schillebeeckx, "Naar een katholiek gebruik van de hermeneutik," 
Geloof bij Kenterend Getij (Boermond/^laaseik, n.d.), esp· 110-112. 
M*. Althaus, Die Letzten Dinge, op. cit., 63. 
1*5. Althaue, art. "Eschatologie," BOG 5 II, 682. The unreflective appeal to the 
"Wort Gottes" was even stronger in his article in BGG'. 
1*6. Althaus, Die Letaten Dinge, op. cit., 63-69. 
1*7. К. Reimer, "Theologleche Prinzipien...," op. cit., 1*0?. 
1*8. К. Bahner, ibid., 1*03; H. Berkhof, Gegronde Verwachting, op. cit., 15-21; idem, 
"Over de methode der eschatologie," op. cit., Wtff.; Althaus, BOGS Ц , 355ff.; 
idem, BOG? II, 682; Kreek, op. cit., 213-216. 
1*9· К. Bahner, "Theologische Prinzipien...," op. cit., ІЮ?. 
50. К. Bahner, ibid., 1*25; Kreek, op. cit., И в . 
51. R. Hiere, "Eechatology and Methodology," JBL 85(1966)170-181*; G. Wanke, 
•"Eschatologie·. Ein Beispiel theologischer Sprachverwirrung," KuD 16(1970) 
ЗОО-312. Ρ· Stuhlmacher, "Das Bekenntnis zur Auferweckung Jesu von den Toten 
und die Biblische Theologie," ZThK 70(1973)365-1(03, finde all of biblical 
theology fraught with thie problem. 
52. Hiere, op. cit., ITI. 
53. ibid., І83. 
5I*. Wanke, op. cit., 301, quotes Kreck: "Es ware schön, wenn man das programmatisch 
voranstellen und dann flugs an seine Entfaltung gehen könnte. Aber es zeigt 
eich, dass schon die präzise Fixierung der Fragestellung trotz allen eschato-
logischen Interesses und allen Badens von Eschatologie nicht so einfach ist." 
He goes on to cite as examples of the problem H.D. Preuee, Jahweglaube und 
Zukunfteerwartunn (BWAUT, 87), and H.-P. Muller, Ursprünge und Struktur Alt-
testamentlichen Eschatologie (BZAW, 109) — although they appeared within six 
•ontba of each other and both treat the ааше vo bulary, they coae to opposing 
cnanlneione« 
55· Cf. in this regard C.F.D. Moule, "The Influence of Circumetancee on the Use 
of Eechatological Terme," JThS KS 15(1961*)1-15 where he pointe out that there 
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is no unitary eschatology in the NT and that in different circumstances and 
with different groups of people, any and all the different twentieth century 
models can be made to make sense. 
56. Cf. the discussion of horizon in the section on eschatology as horizon above. 
57. Iloltmann's oeuvre, and especially TH, has generated a good deal of criticism 
and reflection. Beyond the critical reviews in almost every theological jour-
nal, a collection of essays entitled Diskussion über die 'TheoloRie der Hoffnung' 
(München, I967) appeared. We do not intend to go into all the critical comment 
on Iloltmann's uork here; we are well aware of the fact that he has been con-
sidered more Barthian than Barth ('ein Barth nach vorwärts!') and that he has 
been accused of resurrecting "consequent eschatology" by others (among them, 
Kreck, op. cit., 20Ό. Moltmann hiirself has responded to his critics, and 
has made corrections upon his work in subsequent articles and papers. Our 
interest in Moltmann here, as will be clear below, is not primarily in a 
critique of his work but rather in taking his work as it stands to see what 
can be learned about a twentieth century attempt at allowing eschatology to 
be its own horizon. 
58. Cf. e.g., H.G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tubingen, 1965), 289f. 
59· This has always been a major problem not only for eschatology, but for other 
approaches to the future, such as utopias, as well. Studies such as N. Cohn, 
The Pursuit of the Millennium (London, 21970) and V. Lanternari, The Beligions 
of the Oppressed (New York, I965) have emphasized how interest in eschatology 
and its symbolism increase in times of great cultural stress. This does not 
mean that we can reduce eschatology to the troubled visions of stress reactions, 
but the fact that it manifests itself most graphically in such situations only 
complicates the problem. Such considerations will also push us in the direc­
tion of concern about how the symbols function rather than remaining content 
with whatever the content of the symbols might be. 
60. Here is the perennial problem in theology about what counts as eschatological 
phenomena. It manifests itself most clearly in the question of eschatology 
and apocalyptic — are they the same or are they different? The answer to 
this usually says more about the author's own worldview than the phenomena. 
This reinforces the notion that data are never really "given", but are consti­
tuted within a given horizon. 
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1. Austin himself published only a few essaye (mostly addresses to learned soci-
ieties) and book reiiews in his lifetime. The essays were collected posthumously 
in Philosophical Papers (Oxford, I96I; expanded to include some unpublished 
essays in 1970. The second edition will be used here.). Also published post-
hunously were his William James Lectures How to Do Things with V/ords (Oxford, 
1962) and a series of his Oxford lectures Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford, I962). 
2. J. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Languane (Cambridge, I969). 
J. Several accounts of the development of analytic language philosophy have appeared, 
especially treating the period fron Wittgenstein's Tractatus until 19^5· Cf. 
e.g., J. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis (Oxford, 1956); G· Nuchelmans, Overzicht 
van de Analytische Wijsbegeerte (Utrecht, 1969)1 бі-бу. 
k. PI, Part I, no. 23. 
5· ibid., passim; cf. esp. Part I, no. 43. 
6. Austin cites Wittgenstein only once (S&S, 100) and is probably referring to 
him in PhP, 2 3 ^ . J. urmson, "Austin's Philosophy," Symp, 32; S. Hampshire, 
"J.L. Austin, I9II-I96O," Symp, kh; D. Pears, "An Original Philosopher," Symp, 
56 — all who knew and had worked with Austin, felt that while Austin owed 
much to Moore, Wittgenstein had no influence on him. That Austin was well 
acquainted with Wittgenstein's work, eepecially И , ie attested to by Q. Pitcher, 
"A Personal Menoir", Essays, 24; and by G. Warnock, "Saturday Mornings," Essays, 
36. Moreover, the two philosophers are not as alike as some authors, such as 
E. von Savigny, Die Philosophie der Normalen Sprache (Frankfurt, I969), l6lf., 
would have us believe. Cf. Urmson, Symp, 32: 
Austin...was far йоге unlike Wittgenstein than is sometimes recog­
nized. For Wittgenstein an understanding of ordinary language was 
important because he believed that the traditional problems of 
philosophy arose from misunderstandings of it, but Wittgenstein 
had in mind gross category mistakes, and he wished to study ordinary 
language only so far as was essential for eliminating these. Austin 
was interested in fine distinctions for their own sake ana. saw the 
application of his results to the traditional problems of philosophy 
as only a by-product. 
For a nore extensive treatment of the Austin-Wittgenstein relationship, 
see S&M, 50-55. 
7. For Moore's influence on Austin, cf. S&M, 2-31-
8. H. Rorty, "Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy," in R. 
Rorty, (ed.), The Linguistic Turn (Chicago, 196?). 1-39. 
9. The terms ILP and OIP stem from G. Bergmann, Logic and Reality (Madison, 1964), 
177. 
10. Rorty, op. cit., 1. 
11. ibid., 12. 
12. This part of later l U derives from Bergmann, op. cit. 
13. The phrase is P. Strawsorfs, quoted by Rorty, op. cit., I5, from Strawson's 
"Carnap's Views om Constructed Systems vs. Natural Languages in Analytic 
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Philosophy," in P. Schlipp (ed.) The Philosophy of Hudolf Carnap (LaSalle, 
І96З), 50>5l8. 
Ih. F. Bradley, The Principles of LORIC (London, 1922), I, 95, cited in Nuchel-
mans, op. cit., ¡ni. 
15. Horty poes on to accuse both sides, and especially OU?, of "methddological 
nominalism". While this can certainly be maintained, one muet not expect 
that this justified assertion will allow traditional philosophy to disregard 
OLP and ILP and to consider itself thereby vindicated. This failure to think 
through to the basic metaphysical options taken in the choice of method, while 
decried here as nominalistic, is a recurring shortcoming throughout the his-
tory of philosophy. Perhaps more important is the sobering realization of 
precisely ν here the limits lie in each attempt toward a philosophical system. 
And in this respect the later ILP represented by such people as Bergmann, and 
the OLP of such people as Austin and Searle show a good deal of humility about 
their own contribution are are willing to admit limits (cf. Austin's description 
of his work as "one possible way of doing one kind of philosophy"). Thus ILP 
and Olí, while ultimately no better in examining their own foundations, are 
certainly no worse than other attempts. 
16. S. Hanpshire, Symp, Ά . Hampshire relates that in the years preceding the war 
Austm regularly attended political meetings as a heckler — undoubtedly a har­
rowing experience for the speaker! For another description of these dis­
cussions, cf. I. Berlin, "Austin and the Early Beginnings of Oxford Philosophy," 
Essays, I-I6. 
17. Cf. his paper "Are There A Priori Concepts?" PhP 32-51», especially the first 
section. In the heat of philosophical combat Austin was prepared to say that 
there were no universels, that there were no concepts. For an analysis of 
Austin's arguments on these points about universels and concepts, cf. S&M, 
9-ЗО. 
18. "AGATHON and EUDAIMOHIA in the Ethics of Aristotle," PhP, 1-31. 
19. Hampshire, Symp, Uj. 
20. The titles often indicate these words: "unfair to Facts", PhP, 15l»-17lf; "Ifs 
and Cans," PhP, 205-232; "Pretending," PhP, 253-271. Austin once summed up 
the problem of the philosopher's misuse of language with the quip "It's not 
things, it's philosophers that are simple." PhP, 252. 
21. S&S, 15. 
22. Cf. ble diecuoaion of legal language in "A Flea for Ezeuaee," ІЪР, l87ff.i and 
in the following section of this chapter. 
23. PhP, 55-75· 
Zk. PhP, 68. 
25. PhP, 69. 
26. PhP, 134. 
27. НТО, 3; PhP, ЮЗ, 23^· 
28. PhP, 175-201». Here especially I8I-I89. 
29. PhP, I82. 
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JO. PhP, l8l. 
31. PhP, 183. 
32. PhP, 182. Nevertheless, he goes on to say, we have to prise words off the 
world to be able to realize their inadequacies and abntranness. 
33. The phrase is Max Black's. Cf. his "Austin on Performatives," Symp, ΊΟΙ-Ό.!. 
З^. PhP, 191-193· This will be very important in our study of eschatology. As 
will be seen, talk about the future is asymnetrical in comparison with talk 
about the past or present. And the strong negative element in eschatological 
talk will play an important role as well. 
35. HTD, Lectures II-IV, 12-52. 
36. HTD, 1. Our presentation of Austin's theory of performatives concentrates on 
HTD because this is the most complete and systematic exposition of the per­
formative theory. The idea was present in hs work as early as "Other Hinds", 
PhP, 76-II6, in ig'té. Besides HTD, there are also two papers on performatives: 
"Performative Utterances," PhP, 233-252, from 1956, and "Performatif-Constatif," 
from 1958, published in Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie No. IV, La Philo-
sophie Analytique (Parie, 1962), 271-281. 
37. HTD, 5. 
38. HTD, 6f. 
39- HTD, 11. 
ЦО. The names and groupings in the three sets of conditions are mine, not Austin's. 
41. E.g., PI, Part I, noe. 1t01t-it05; I. Hamsey, Religious Language (London, 1957), 
38. Austin himself refers to this asymmetry in HTD, 67. 
42. HTD, 12. Again, note the pursuit of the vanishing distinction. 
43. HTD, Ik. 
Vf. HTD, 14. 
45. HTD, 15. 
46. HTD, l8f. 
47. HTD, 19, 20, 25, 311 З6, 69, 80, 84, 102, 103, 104, 106, IOS, 120, 121, 127. 
48. Black, op. cit., 401-411; P. Strawson, "Intention and Convention in Speech 
Acts," Symp, 380-400, conjiders this problem of a restricted sense of conven­
tion one of the reasons Austin's performative theory broke down. This will be 
handled in more detail in the section on research after Austin. 
49. HTD, 12. 
50. HTD, 54. 
51. BTD, 147. 
52. RTD, 146. 
53. HTD, 94. 
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5k. HID, 95· (my italics) 
55· «HO, 98. 
56. HTD, 99. 
57. HTD, 100. 
58. HTD, 101. 
59. HTD, 121. 
60. HTD, 121. 
61. HTD, ISO. 
62. HTD, I52. 
63. HTD, I54. 
б^. HTD, I56. 
65. HTD, I59. 
66. HTD, I60. 
6?. Or three, if one counts Furberg's work twice; J. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 
1969)! M. Furberg, Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts (Gbteborg, 1963); idem, 
Speech and Meaning (Oxford, 1971)· The latter is the second edition of the 
former, though substantially revised and expanded. A number of unpublished 
dissertations have appeared on Austin as well. 
68. A list of publications on Austin up to 1969 can be found in Symp, hTO-hSZ, 
containing 235 titles, most of which appeared in the period 1959-1968. 
69. Black, op. cit., 411. 
70. A. Duncan-Jones, "Performance and Promise," PhQ l't(1964)97-117, esp. 99. 
71. L. Goldstein, "On Austin's Understanding of Philosophy," PPB 25(1964)232; cf. 
also R. Chisholm, "Austin's Philosophical Papers," Symp, 101-126. 
72. С New, "A Plea for Linguistics," Symp, 148-165. 
73· S. Davis, Illocutionary Acts and Transformational Grammar. Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Illinois, I968; W. de Pater, "Theologie der Рег-
formativen Sprache," Theologische Sprachlogik (München, 1971), 109-177. 
74. M. Jourdain was Molière's famous character who defined letter writing as 
"composing prose". W. Cerf, "Critical Review of How to Do Things with Words," 
Symp, 366f., makes the comparison. Cerf feels that Austin's classifications 
illuminate our actions in no way. 
75. L. Apostel, "Illocutionary Forces and the Logic of Change," Mind 8l(1972)208-234 
applies von Wright's deontic logic to Austin's theory. Other attempts include 
S. Danielsson, "Definitions of 'Performatives'," Theoria 31(1965)20-31; Z. Vend-
ler, Linguistics and Philosophy (Ithaca, I967). 
76. H. Schwyzer, "Bules and Practices," PhRev 78(1969)451-46?; V. Alston, "Linguistic 
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Acts," AnPhQ KigéUJl^S-lUó; J. Searle, ЬА. 
77. W» Cerf, op. cit., disparagingly contrasts Austin's "рориігіг" mode of pheno-
menologj to the "esoteric, radically idealistic, methodologically self-con­
scious work" of Husserl (p. 375). And the problem of Austin's popular, nundane 
sort of phenonenology was that it lacked "lethodological and logical rigor, was 
plagued with subjectivism, and was «nsystenatic. Other discussions of the 
relation of linguistic analysis and phenomenology can be found in The lionist 
і
»9(19б'*) no. 1 (artides of Dovmes, Chappell, Turnbull and Gendlm), /. Nays 
and S.C. Brown (ed.), Linguistic Analysis and Phenonenology (London, 1971). 
78. Especially in the area of what truth is; Chisholn, op. cit., 112f., compares 
Austin (and Strawson) to Brentano, and draws parallels between Austin's thojght 
and that of Mach and Hemong. 
79. Ç. Skinner, "Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts," Phi^  20(1970) 
ІІ8-І38, esp. 1 3 5 ^ 4 though somewhat unwittingly. He is but barely «ware 
of continental hemeneutics, but the progran he wishes to see has been prac­
ticed since Dilthey. 
80. Because this falls into one trap Austin wanted to avoid, nanely, reducing 
perfornatives to reports of mental acts. If the performative is not doing 
something, then it ceases to be a perfor™ative in Austin's sense of the woid. 
Cf. PhP, 23^. Two authors bho have gone this route are H. Fingarette, "Perfor­
matives," AmPhQ '+(1967)39-48; and to a lesser extent, I. Hedemus, "Perfornatives," 
Theona 29(1963)115-136. 
81. Black, op. cit., Chisholm, op. cit.; h. Furberg, "Meaning and Illocutionary 
Force," Symp, k^^-kèS; W. de Pater, op. cit.; A. Sesonske, "Performatives," 
JPh 62(1965)¡i5')-tt6&·, G. Warnock, "Some Types of performative Utterance," assays, 
69-89. 
82. E.g., L. Ferguson, "In Pursuit of Performatives," Synp kl2-kl9. He argues 
that neither Black's nor Chisholn's amendments avoid the problem that caused 
Austin to abandon the performative. They keep drawing distinctions between 
performative utterances and other kinds of utterances, Austin saw that this 
was not possible, since all utterances have a performative role. Hence the 
"strict" performative was dropped. 
83. R. Gale, "Do Performative Utterances Have Any Constative Function1"1 JPh 67(1470) 
117-121; G. Nuchelmans, "Austins term 'performatief'," Algemeen Nederlands Tijd-
schrift voor Wi.isbegeerte en Psychologie 5^(1961-62)15^-172; С Olsen, "Austin's 
rfornes About 'I State That '," Mind 7б(19б7)111-11і*. 
&k. L. Cohen, "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?" Symp, 'tSO-Wf; esp. p. M+lf., where 
he distinguishes the three mœmings of "statement"; (1) to both say something 
and commit oneself to it; (2) as a technical term of logical analysis within a 
prepositional calculus; (3) m a philosophical sense, in contrast to commands, 
questions, etc. 
85. J. Searle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," PhBev 77(19б8)іЮ5-'+2і+, 
esp. 422; Olsen, op. cit. 
86. H. Garner, "Austin on Entailment," PhQ 18(1968)216-224; challenged by J. Wheatley, 
"•Entailment' Between Performatives," PhQ 19(19б9)1б1-1б2. 
8?. R. Gale, op. cit.; challenged by G. Sampson, "Pragmatic Self-Verification and 
Performatives," FL 7(1971)300-302. 
88. J. Hartnack, "The Performatory Use of Sentences," Theona 29(1963)137-146; and 
less strongly I. Hedemus, op. cit.; E. Ryding, "The Truth Value of Promises," 
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Theoria ЗЗСідб?)!^-!^. 
89. J. Houston, "Truth Valuation of Explicit Performativee," PhQ гОСідтОіЗд-І^Э· 
90. This problem was largely responsible for Furberg's radical revision of Locutionary 
and Illocutionary Acts — he had conflated locutionary acts with constative 
illocutionary acts (Preface, SbM, xi), as T. Hordenstam, "On Austin's Theory 
of Speech Acts," Hind 75(1966)11*1-11*3 had pointed out. 
91. HTD, \h8. 
92. Austin was certainly fainiliar with Frege, considering that the had translated 
Frege's Grundlagen der Arithmetik (= Principles of Arithmetic (Oxford, 1950))· 
Cohen, op. cit., hZJiî., doubts that Austin is following Frege's theory of meaning. 
Furberg, "Meaning and Illocutionary Force," op. cit., 'tJSf·, expresses doubts 
about Cohen's exegesis of Austin and of Frege on this point. 
93· L· Cohen, op. cit. 
9^. Notably J. Searle, SA; idem, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," 
op. cit.; challenged by L. Ferguson, "Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," 
Essays, 16O-I85; L. Griffiths, "The Logic of Austin's Locutionary Subdivision," 
Theoria ЗЗІідбд^гО^-гі1*·, В. O'Neill, "Conventions and Illocutionary Force," 
PhQ 22(1972)215-233; J· Cameron, "Sentence-Meaning and Speech Acts," PhQ 20(1970) 
97-117; 3. Thau, "The Distinction between Ehetic and Illocutionary Acts," 
Analysis 32(1971-72)177-163; P. Strawson, "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning," 
Kssays, 46-68. In developing alternate theories, most of these have had occasion 
to refer to the work of Cohen — most often to show where, in light of their 
new-formed theories, he went wrong. 
95· H.P. Grice offered his theory of non-natural meaning in "Meaning," PhHev 66 
(1957)377-388. The meaning Grice tries to locate is not the meaning as content 
of a word, but what the speaker S means by jn utterance. Hence the name "non-
natural", as opposed to "natural"neaning as reference. Grice's definition runs 
thus: £> non-naturaily means something by an utterance χ if ¿ (i..) to produce 
by uttering зс a certain effect ¿ in an audience k_ and intends Ti?) that A shall 
recognize £'s intention (¿χ) and intends (i.3) that this recognition on the part 
of A of S's intention OjTshall function as A^ 's reason, or part of his reason, 
for his response. P. Strawson, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts," Symp, 
280-ItO0 has made the most important application of Grice's theory to illocutionary 
act. Cf. also SA, 'tè-SO; SSM, 256-279. Α. Mackay, "Illocutionary Forces," 
JPh 61t(1967)7'tO-7'tl| comments on the various attempts. It is of interest also 
that Grice has expanded and revised his the-ry in "Utterer's Meaning and Iiten-
tions," PhHev 78(19б9)1І*7-177; and in "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, 
and Word-Meaning," FL ^(1968)225-242. 
96. В. Hare, "Meaning and Speech Acts," PhHev 79(1970)3-24; challenged by G. Warnock, 
"Hare on Meaning and Speech Acts," PhHev 80(1971)80-84. In a much more restricted 
vein as an attempt to determine meanings of words from illocutionary forces, 
cf. W. Alston, "Meaning and Use," PhQ 13(1963)107-124; challenged by D. Holdcroft, 
"Meaning and Illocutionary Acts," Ratio 6(1964)128-143. 
97. R. Brown, "Meaning and Rules of Use," Hind 71(1962)511. 
98. Black, op. cit., 4o6ff. 
99* Strawson, Symp, op. cit. A challenge to aspects of his distinctions by Q. 
Skinner, "Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts," PhQ 20(1970)118-138. 
Skinner in turn challenged by P. Mew, "Conventions on Thin Ice," PhQ 21(1971) 
З52-З56. B. O'Neill, op. cit., gives a good overview of what work has been done 
on conventions up to 1972. 
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100. J. Cameron, op. cit.; Q. Skinner, op. cit.; Soi, 58-80. 
101. Of special note in this regard is the excellent article of A. Melden, "On 
Promising," Hind бЗЦдЗб^-бб. 
102. P. Ardal, "'And That's a Promise'," PhQ 18(1968)225-237; with a reply by С 
New, "Ardal on Promises as Statements," PhQ 19(1969)159-160; and a reply back 
by Ardal, "Reply to New on Promises," PhQ 19(19б9)2бО-2б2. 
103. A. Duncan-Jones, op. cit.; J. Schneewind, "A Note on Promising," PhSt 17(1966) 
33-35. 
104. J. Hartnack, op. cit.; I. Hedenius, op. cit.; E. Ryding, op. cit.; J. Harrison, 
"Knowing and Promising," Mind 71(1962)Mf3-'t57. 
105. D. Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (ed. L. Selby-Bigge) (Oxford, 1888). 
On promises, esp. Book III, Part II, Section V, pp. 516-525· 
106. J. Searle, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'," PhRev 73(1964)1*3-58. 
IO?. H. Garner, op. cit.; L. Holborow, "Promising, Prescribing, end Playing-Along," 
Philosophy 44(1969)149-152; F. McNeilly, "Promises Demoralized," PhRev 81(1972) 
63-81; K. Pahel, "Some Notes on Austin's How to Do Things with Words," Mind 
78(1969)433-436; b. Zemach, "Ought, Is and a Game Called 'Promise'," PhQ 21(1971) 
6І-63. 
108. SA, I75-I98. 
109. London, І96З. 
110. Gütersloh, I966. This is an abbreviated version of a work first published in 
Sweden. 
111. Tentatively entitled, Analyzing Convictions. My attempts at contacting the 
authors have thus far been of no»ail. 
112. On Austin and Evans: R. Jenson, The Knowledge of Things Hoped For (New York, 
1969)i 113-121. On Bejerholm and Hornig: Α. Jeffner, The Study of Religious 
Language (London, 1972), 88-104. Further articles: J. Gill, "J.L. Austin and 
the Religious Use of Language," Sophia 8(1969)29-37; J. Smith and J. McClendon, 
"Religious Language after J.L. Austin," RelSt 8(1972)55-63; J. Gill, The Possi­
bility of Religious Knowledge (Grand Rapids, 1971)108-116; J. Ladrière,"Langage 
auto-unplicatif et langage biblique selon Evans," Tijidschrift voor Filo-
sofie 28(1966)441-494; idem, "De performativiteit van de liturgische taal," 
Concilium 9(1973) nr. 2, 51-64. 
HJ. Examples of this are Evans and Furberg, where it is done on a large scale. 
Where Evans moves mto areas not considered by Austin, it is of course to be 
expected that new terminology is needed. But he felt also a need to recast 
what Austin himself had done. No one has followed his suggestions in the latter 
area. 
114. A good example is Ryding, op. cit. 
115. SA, 4. 
116. SA, 4f. 
117. SA, 11. 
118. SA, 14. 
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119. SA, 15. 
120. SA, 16. 
121. SA, 17. In "rfhat I do as a philosopher," a talk Austin gave in GÖteborc in 1959 
and is preserved on tape, Austin said he was moi e interested in parole than 
langue, if he were to speak m Sauss ire's distinctions. This is reported in 
SÊ> , 57f. Furberg goes on to note, however, that Austin did not denj having 
interest in langue as well, and his discussion on method exemplifies this. 
122. И. Schuyzer, "Rules and Practices," op. cit., treats this problem in detail. 
He point out an often neglected aspect of what is understood by rules — namely, 
that all regulative rule conditions and indeed even all constitutive rule 
conditions can be fulfilled Mnd ue can still not have the game. He gives the 
exarrole of a hypothetical chess gane in Runtania between two priests. If 
white wine, the year will be good; if black wins, it will be bad. Cness is 
played on no other occasion. Thus, even if all the constitutive rules are 
observed, it can still happen that one does not have the game in its conventional 
sense. Chess as "a form of life" is different in Huntania. The point is that 
constitutive rules cannot be equated with conventions without also considering 
their actualizations. 
123. Ья, 22. 
12k. SA, 2**1. As is almost always the case, the perlocutionary act is given the 
short shrift, rfith the exception of the criticism of Gnce's thery of meaning, 
it fairly well disappears from Searle's account much as it does elsewhere. 
125. SA, 29. 
126. SA, 30. 
127· SA, 30f. Although the problem of propositions returns irithe later chapters on 
referring and predication, its direct connection with the illocutionary act 
remains no more clarified than it is here. The problem has been taken up by 
critics of Searle, e.g.: B. Richards, "Searle on Meaning and Speech Acts," FL 
7(1971)519-538i V. Peetz, "'Propositional Content'," Analysis 32(1971-72) 
I83-IS6. These cast some doubt on the virtue of his distinction. Moreover, 
it raises the question as to whether this compromise with the more strict, 
earlier generation of language analysis is a desirable one. I think not. 
128. SA, 33ff. 
129. SA, 3ö-lt0. 
130. SA, ^З-'*?. 
131. SA, 48-52. 
132. It may seem odd that something so central to the exposition should be consigned 
to an appendix. Two considerations prompted this decision: (1) There was no 
particular need to comment on his statement of conditions and extraction of 
rules in this chapter since no new twists of method or new terminology were 
introduced; and (2) since this model will be the point of departure in section 
3.2. in the following chapter, it is more accessible for handy reference in 
an appendix. 
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1. G.H. von Wright, "On Promises," Theona 28(1962)275-297. Cf. aleo Furberg's 
discussion of the promisee, based on von Wright, in S&M, 220-223. 
2. J. Schneewind, "A Note on Promising," PhSt 17(1966)33-35· 
3. ibid., 3kî. In this section, the reader will note two spellings for the term 
designating the one who promises: promisor and promiser. The former is the 
term used in law, and the latter the term ordinarily used in English. Although 
the former will appear in some quotations, the latter term will be used through-
out. I am indebted to Michael Daly for calling this distinction to my attention. 
4. An exception to the'Velshing" on threats is when the threat is made by a societal 
body such as a legislature or court of law. To not follow up on threats re-
sults in a loss of sanctioning power by these bodies, fhe same would occur 
in individual cases of, say, a parent who regularly threatens punishment but 
never delivers. One could say that by never carrying out the threat, ¿ could 
over a period of time be excluded from the institution of threatening. Я would 
no longer take the threat seriously. 
5. P. Ardal, "'And That's a Promise'," PhÇ 18(1968)233 says that intentions are 
sometimes promises, sometimes threats and sometimes neither. II can, by ruling 
out his cooperation, emasculate these attempted illocutionary acts. 
6. A. Duncan-Jones, "Performative and Promise," PhQ 1'»(19б'»)100. Cf. Austin, 
PhP, 100: "but if I say I promise, you are entitled to act on it, whether or 
not you choose to do so." 
7. S&M, 221. 
8. SM, 222. 
9. If one turns to Hoget's Thesaurus, one finds that most of the words given as 
synonyms for promise have this binding character: covenant, be answerable to, 
secure, enter into an engagement, betroth, plight faith, etc. They also indi­
cate that a promise is primarily a social agreement requiring at least two 
parties. 
10. Ardal, op. cit., 226. 
11. Thus Austin, PhP, lOOf., against Ardal, op. cit., 226 who considers the sales­
man's promise still to be a promise because it is about the future. Both 
promises and predictions are utterances about the future, but they are quite 
different. 
12. SA, 59. 
13· In the Gncean analysis, the big thing was S and his intention. There was 
little attention paid to H and to what extent H understood beyond S's intention 
to communicate. Cf. Searle'ε extension of the Gncean analysis m SA, 42-50. 
1Ί. An exception would be that I promise you a surprise tomorrow. Then you have no 
way of circumscribing k. This point of Η understanding ¿'s promise will play 
a very important role in our discussion >^f promises in eschatology, especially 
Holtmann's conception of the overspill (ffberschüssigkeit) of God's çromise. 
15. PhP, 99. 
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16. A good exanple of a need to oreak an electoral pronise is s l v e n l n ^i.e Dutch 
cabinet formatio- of ί')7Ύ· Jen Uyl ' s iromise t his constituents that the 
Procressieve U n e v/ould not \/ork ntn the Confessionele D n e in a government 
as considei ed by so-ie as a promise that need not be keot and by others as 
a dovnnçht irritation that Den Uyl should pretend that it t'as a "real" pronise. 
17. Against m.H. Carter, "On Promsing the Unwanted," Analysis 33( 1972-73)SC-9?, 
v/ho fails to analyze the entire speech situation and so fuses deathbed 
pronises with ordinary proTiises. He then goes on to draw conclusions from 
deatnbed pronises about unwanted promises in the ordinary promising situation. 
lo. How the idea of personal "honor" fits in here I an not sure. This honor seems 
to be an extension of the sense of honor surrounding pronises. Nevertheless, 
it seens to be a different reality fron promsing. 
19· If promises are indeed social, public affairs, one wonders about the status 
of promises to God (exceot of course for vows, which have an eninently public 
character). 
20. Cf. section 2.2.5·, especially note Ю З . 
21. K. Garner, "Austin on uitailment," PhÇ lo(1968)2l6f. 
22. V. Peetz, "'Propositional Content'," Analysis 32(1971-72)183-136; J. Harrison, 
"Knowing and Promising," hind 71(1962)Ά3-'+57. 
23· This has very important implications for eschatology. What is promised in 
the 'promise' of eschatology? If what which is promised is an institutional 
fact, then the type of verification vail be quite different fron that used for 
brute facts. 
24. SA, 38. 2ka. ibid. 
25· ¿e introduced the metaphor of meaning of words as a magnetic field instead of 
an unequivocal aton in the last chapter. This metaphor seems to respond better 
to the needs of looking at words in the total speech situation than the ideal 
language approach of assigning every word a single univocal meaning. 
26. Interestingly enough, both of these extreme positions meet each other in a 
spatial metaphor of tine as simple location in space. And both positions ignore 
any conceptual structure within time. For a discussion of the various options 
for approaching time and the weaknesses attendant upon each, eee M. Whiteman, 
Philosophy of Space and Time (London, I967), especially chapter 20. 
2?. Whiteman, op. cit., 291. 
28. Cf. W. Duprl, art. "Zeit", Handbuch Philosophischer Grundbegriffe (München, 
to be published), k: 
Auf das Zeltproblem angewandt heisst das, dass wir...die Frage nach 
Bezug und Bedeutung von Zeit sowohl auf ihren empirischen ale auch 
theoretischen Gehalt hin analysieren museen....Damit hangt zusammen, 
dass weder die eine noch die andere Frageweise davon absehen kann, 
dass sie je schon aus einer kulturgeschichtlichen Synthese erwachsen 
ist...sofern es der kulturelle Kontext ist, in dem di· Frag« nach der 
Zeit ihre 'Zeit' hat, konat der Analyse der kulturgeschichtlich·!! 
Situation sogar eine Vorrangstellung in der Thematisierung des Problems zu. 
29. McTaggart's Paradox is named for J. McTaggart, who m an article in Hind in I9O8 
tried to combine dynamic and static notions of time. His attenpt resulted in 
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provinp that I ^ t-t г -otion (called the B-Senes) could be redjced to the 
dynamic notio (cajl<d tic ^-benes). B\it the A-Senes narboi ed a contradiction, 
thus, tine ( ^ s unreel. 'hile hclarßait's arcunent bas long since been provee 
to be fallacious, his influence has fairly doninated all Anglo-Sa^on discussions 
of time. 
30. R. Gale, The Lan^uafte of Time (Hew York, 196S), 5. '/ittcenstein nakes essen-
tially the same point in PI, Part I, no. 90· 
31. Gale grouns and re\iews this literature in the course of his book, -tordly any 
of it, however, will be included in this dudy because of its dependency upon 
KcTaggart's Paradox. While we can aßree n t h Gale, 6, that "hcTaEG^rt's arpu-
nent is fallacious, but it is fallacious in such a deep and basic way that an 
adequate answer to it must sutiply a rather extensive analysis of the conept of 
time, along with a host of nei^hboring concepts that are thenselves of philo-
sophical interest, such as chance, substance, event, proposition, truth, etc.," 
the authors have remained by and large within hcTaceart's franeuork. An example 
of this is the extensive literature on tensed and tenseless time (Gale, op. 
cit., 28-33) which corresponds to A- and B-Senes in licTagcart, respectively. 
Gale, 2δ, makes it clear that ordinary language is tense lan£uaße but this does 
not broach the basic problem of why we should bother with trying to translate 
back and forth between tensed and tenseless language at all, if the paradox on 
which the tensed-tenseless distinction is made has been seen to be fallacious. 
Moreover, as we shall see shortly, discussions of time using I cTaggart even as 
a negative point of departure fail to account for ноге than two conceptions 
of time-awareness. 
32. ibid., Ю З . 
33. ibid., 103f. 
Уі. ibid., ІОЗ-ІЗЗ. 
35. ibid., ІЗ^-Іб1*. Gale himself states his argument somewhat differently than this, 
but his argument can be reduced to this form. An interesting contribution is 
his discussion of the use of the word "true" à la Strawson's analysis, 13Sff. 
For Strawson, cf. his "Truth", a 1950 essay collected in his Logico-Linguistic 
Papers (London, 1971)1 190-213. 
36. ibid., I65-I85· In this last point, on nanee and titles, he goes beyond the 
generality-of-predictions thesis. 
37. ibid., 103. 
38. ibid., 126. From pp. 112-126, it is interesting to note that, whenever an 
objection becomes particularly menacing, Gale invokes "ordinary language" or 
"our ordinary concept of time" against it, like some apotropaic formula. 
Such an attitude is only possible if one has not surveryed ordinary language 
before beginning! 
39· Gale includes moet of this point in his postulate "statements about the past 
are either true or false while some statements about the future are neither" 
(ibid., 104). Commissives in this sense are neither true or false. 
kO. Cf. the discussion of precognition in Whiteman, op. cit., 302-304. Gale's 
failure to take these odd phenomena seriously has a long and honored tradition. 
For instance, Kant in Die Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, 270, says: 
...eine besondered Grundkraft unseres Gemüths, das Künftige zum 
voraus anzuschauen (nicht etwa bloss zu folgern), oder endlich 
ein Vermogen desselben, mit anderen Menschen ui Gemeinschaft der 
Gedanken zu stehen (so entfernt sie auch sein mögen), das sind 
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Begriffe, deren höglichkeit ganz grundlos ist, weil sie nicht auf 
Erfahrung und deren bekannte Gesetzte gegründet werden kann·... 
kl. 3. hayo, "The Open Future," Kind 71(1962)1-1'*. 
kZ. ibid., if. 
kj). Thus tine usages falling outside the SAE range will not be considered. An 
example of such a usage that differs from SAL· usage can be found in B.L. 
Whorf's "An American Indian Model of the Universe" in Collected Papers on 
Hetalinguistics (Washington, 1952); and nis "The Relation of Habitual Thought 
and Behavior to Language," in Language, Thought and Reality (New York, 1956). 
kh. J. Smart, art. "Time", LFhil VIII, 126; C. Mundle, art. "Time, Consciousness 
of," EPhil VIII, I5S, goes especially into the problem of being misled by 
metaphors: 
If we picture the passing of time in terms of movement along a line, 
we are led to ask 'what moves?' and are disposed to answer, like 
Husserl, 'Events keep moving into the past' and forget that 'move' 
is being used metaphorically, that events cannot literally move or 
change....Those who spatialize time, conceiving of it as an order in 
which events occupy different places, are hypostasizing events. 
45· An investigation of how concept-clusters are organized by the spatial and 
measur ing metaphors should give an insight into how time influences thought 
and its organization — an interesting discussion we unfortunately cannot go 
into here. 
^6. To help better place in the history of thought what is meant by each of these 
"isms", it would perhaps be useful to mention other works that try to treat 
each of these kinds of tune-awareness more or less philosophically. There 
can be found how the concept-clusters are organized better than in any brief 
presentation that could be given here. (1) M. Eliade, Cosmos and History: The 
Myth of the bternal Heturn (Hew York, 1959); (2) H. Reichenbach, The Direction 
of Time (Berkeley, 1957); (3) N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (London, 
^1970); (Ό The yuga theory in Brahmanism. Cf. e.g. the Maltrï Upaniçad; (5) 
L'Evolution Creatrice (Pans, ^1923); (6) 0. Cullmann, Christus und die Zeit 
(Zürich, ¿1963); (7) C.F. von Weizsäcker, Zum Weltbild der PhysikTstuttgart. 
7l958);·(8) H. Bergson, Essai sur les Données ImmédiaTes de la Conscience 
(Paris, 19itó); (9) L. Humford, Technics and Civilization TÏÏew York, 193^). 
k7. Interstingly enough, there has been no vocabulary developed for this level, 
beyond such expressions as "time warp" and "synchromcity". These are neo-
logistic concepts rather than linguistic devices deriving from ordinary 
language use. 
4β. For an overview of this situation, cf. A.N. Prior, art. "Negation", EPhil 
V, k5&-k63. 
49. PhP, 128. 
50. PhP, I29. But putting "true" and "false" in quotation marks would seem to 
indicate that Austin is not interested in outlawing truth and falsity from 
language entirely, but merely the special usage of these words by analytic 
philosophers who want all àanguage to be in the form of a statement. 
51. E. Kliraa, "Negation in English," in J. Fodor and J. Katz (ed.), The Structure 
of Language (Englewood Cliffs, 1964), 246-323 gives an exhaustive linguistic 
account of the use of negation in English (negation not identifiable linguistically 
is not treated). He notes too that, when all is said and done, the important 
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question 16 the extent of negation within sentences. 
52. SA, 32. 
53. Cf. Prior, op. cit., 458-^59; Я. Hare, "Heaning and Speech Acts," PhHev 79(1970) 
3-2lf. 
54. However, the difficulty of the illoctuionnry force device and proposition 
distinction Searle proposes is not dissolved by the unproblematic character 
of propositional"negation. The problem of external and internal negation does 
not require this distinction; it could be made clear without it. And as we 
have seen above, there are lots of unanswered questions surrounding this dis­
tinction — the answers to which may prove fatal for the distinction. 
55. SA, 32. 
56. A. Sloman, "Transformations of Illocutionary Acts," Analysis 30(1969-70)56-59. 
57. Austin makes a similar point in PhP, 152: "To tell us that 1229 is not a Τ is 
not to tell us what it is, nor to identify it." 
58. PhP, 191f. 
59· Я· Garner, "Some Doubts about Illocutionary Negation," Analysis 31(1970-71) 
107f., does not think that illocutionary negation should be elevated from 
sentences to speech acts unless "an adequate treatment of language necessitates 
such a move. I do not believe it does." The counterexamples which follow call 
his position Into question. 
60. Cf. e.g.. Prior, op. cit., ^59. 
61. In a novel approach to the problem of the via negativa, T. Tomasic, "Negative 
Theology and Subjectivity. An Approach to the Tradition of the Pseudo-Diony-
sius," International Philosophical Quarterly 9(1969)'t06-it30, says (on page 
427) ' "The serious depth of the via negativa, via remotioms, or apophatikë, 
is seen in the fact that it is the destruction of the last illusion of reason 
and objectivity. The way of negation is essential a purgation, an asceticism, 
inifcpeneible for attaining subjectivity." An important question for the use of 
this kind of negation in theological utterances will be whether the negation 
is actually aiming at a notion beyond the negation (infinite or incomprehensible) 
or whether it is simply a means to still the attempts of rational thought to reach 
understanding. 
62. I. Ramsey, Religious Language (London, 1957), 90ff. gives two of the three 
functions of Christian language as evocation of a religiou situation and evoca-
tion of discernment; A. Jeffner, The Study of Religious Language (London, 1972), 
68-87, discusses this kind of language in detail. 
63. HID, ІОІ-ІЗІ. 
64. In both S&M and SA, perlocutionary acts are mentioned. S&M contents itself 
with a sammary of Austin (S&M, 108-III) and further comments in the postscript 
on non-natural meaning and perlocution. SA notes that Once confuses Я^в under­
standing of ¿'s intention with the perlocutionary effect (SA, 'féff.). "other-
wise, only solitary references to perlocutionaries can be found in the litera-
ture, beyond one article, T. Cohen, "Illocutiona and Perlocutions," FL 9(1973) 
492-503. 
65. HTD, 101. 
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66. HTD, 108. 
67. HTD, 102, l\k. 
6o. HTD, lOof. 
69· The illocutionary effect of waming is H's understanding ¿'s intention to 
warn him. Cf. SA, 46. 
70. HTD, 103. 
71. HTD, US. 
7?. HTD, 117. 
77. HTD, 117. 
7h. HTD, 109. 
75· HTD, 129f. Austin also gives as a condition that a "double convention" does not 
take place, i.e., when one performative is used to perform another, non-perform-
ative, act. 
76. HTD, 122, IZO. 
77. HTD, 115f. 
78. HTD, II7-II9. The quote is from p. Il8f. 
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ι. sm, 58; 70-60. 
2. S&M, 220f. 
3. SA, ІЗб-І1*!. The speech act fallacy is an extension of the fallacy of atomistic 
neaning ("one word - one neaning"). It maintains that one word will always be 
used to perform one kind of speech act. An example of speech act fallacy would 
be saymc that the word "promise" ali ays commits one to a future state of affairs. 
But as we saw in Chapter Three, the word "promise'1 occurs in other speech acts 
as well (predicting, threatening, swearing, reporting, etc.). 
4. Cf. sections 2.I.3.3. and 2.2.%.; also P. Strawson, "Intention and Convention 
in Illocutionary Acts," Symp, esp. 38І-З86. 
5. НТО, l8f. 
6. HTD, 26. 
7. HTD, 19, 69. 
8. HTD, 80. 
9. HTD, &h. 
10. HTD, 102, 120. 
11. HTD, 121. 
12. HTD, IO?. 
13· However, Strawson, op. cit., 383: "Ve must refer, Austin would say, to linguistic 
conventions to determine what locutionary act has been performed in the making 
of an utterance.,.." Thus Strawson believes (and rightly so) that had Austin 
thought about linguistic convert ions, they would have obtained in the locutionary 
act. 
Ik. We would not want to give the impression that Furberg has overstepped completely 
the bounds of speech act theory with his distinction of four kinds of linguistic 
convention. It is true that Austin does not take this clatter up in HID, but 
essays like "How to Talk" in PhP give the impression that Austin would certainly 
have not considered such a discussion as Furberg's irrelevant. 
15. SA, 37. 
16. SA, 40. 
17. SA, to. 
18. SA, 39. 
19. SA, 51. 
20. SA, Chapters 4 and 5. 
21. Cf. above, his enigmatic utterance of convert ion "in the sense that at least 
it could be made explicit by the performative formula" (ИГО, 103). 
22. The reviewer of Eaaays In Tiaea Literary Supplegent no. Э?1»! (16 Noveeber 1973) 
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1396, notes rather sarcastically how much Austin's way of doing philosophy de­
pended upon cleverness and his legendary sharp tongue rather than on a clear 
method. 
23· For an account of this history, ranging from onomatopoeia to what linguistics 
calls "motivated meaning", cf. S. Ulimann, The Principles of Semantics (Oxford, 
21957), 83-93; idem, Semantics (Oxford, ідбгУТ 80-115. 
2h. B. Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London, 1921), 190. 
25. W. Quine, "Truth by Convention," in H. Feigl and W. Sellers (ed.), Readings in 
Philosophical Analysis (New York, Ι9Ί9), 250-273; idem, "Two Dogmas of Qnpin-
cism," From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass., I96I), 20-46; M. White, 
"The Analytic and the Synthetic: An untenable Dualism," in S. Hook (ed.), John 
Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom (New York, 1950)1 316-330· 
26. This is, of course, a principal point in the linguistics developed by the early 
Chomsky and one of the points he has argued most hotly with behavioral psycholo­
gists. Cf. his Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 3-9, 
esp. 6; and his review of B.F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior in Language 35(1959) 
26-38. 
27. Augustine, Confessions I, 8, cited at the beginning of PI; W. Quine, Word and 
Object (Cambridge, Mass., i960), lOf. 
28. Cf. Chomsky's rationalism in his Cartesian Linguistics (New York, I966); and 
his Language and hind (New York, I968). 
29. Hobbes' theory of social contract is to be found in his Leviathan, I, 14. Locke's 
less pessimistic notion of contract can be found in the beginning sections of 
Part II of his Two Treatises on Civil Government. 
30. SA, 40. 
31. SA, 11. 
32. Cf. Quine's discussion of synonymy and analyticity in "Two Dogmas of Qnpincism," 
op. cit.; and in "Carnap and Logical Truth," in P. Schlipp (ed.). The Philosophy 
of Rudolf Carnap (La Salle, 1964), 305-406. Cf. also D. Lewis, Convention 
TCambridge, Mass., I969), 173-202; L. Cohen, The Diversity of Meaning (London, 
21966), sections 20-21; D. Hamlyn, art. "Analytic and Synthetic Statements," 
EPhil I, 106. 
33· K. Godei, "über formal untentscheidbare Satze der Principia Mathematica und 
verwandter Systeme," Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 38(1931)173-198. 
G. Hadnitzky, Contemporary Schools of Metascience (Goteborg, 21970), I, 42f., 
discusses the implications of GOdel's theorem. 
34. One is reminded of Descartes' God in his Third Meditation. 
« 
35· The research interest can even take the methodological leap from establishing 
necessary and sufficient conditions and try to establish why there are phenomena 
at all. (This is of course different from the question of why precisely these 
phenomena.) This leap will fall outside our discussion here. 
36. Except notably in Saussure's discussion of the nature of the sign: "Le lien 
unissant le signifiant au signifié est arbitraire, ou encore, puisque nous 
entendons par signe le total résultant de l'association d'un signifiant à un 
signifié, nous pouvons dire plus simplement: le signe linguistique est arbitraire." 
F. de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique Générale (Paris, 31964), 100. But beyond 
this point, made by Saussure against the "motivated" theories of his day, little 
more is heard of arbitrariness. 
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37· Whereas the semantics of the philosophers of language may be poor, as L. Cohen, 
"Spoken and Unspoken Meanings," Times literary Supplement no. 3735 (5 October 
1973)1161, notes, it has had until recently little competition from contemporary 
linguistics. This, however, is changing, notably in later work by Chomsky and 
espcially studies by Jerrold Katz. 
38. D. Lewis, op. cit., esp. Chapter 3· His final definition of convention is given 
on p. 78. 
39· ibid., 88-96. 
ko. As was seen in note 36, Saussure is willing to extend arbitrariness as far as 
the sign, i.e., the relation between signifier and signified. Semiotics has 
followed him on this point. 
Ίΐ. Semiotics as a potentially unified science of signs and communications is a 
young, burgeoning science. One introduction to one of its major forms can be 
had in R. Berthes, Elements of Semiology (London, I969). 
h2. Closure (French "clBture") refers to that point in a system of signs where the 
number of permutations and combinations possible within a system reaches its 
limit, thus "closing" the openness of the system. 
43. For the various schools of continental linguistics, cf. G. Lepschy, A Survey 
of Structural Linguistics (London, 1972); for the structuralists and the 
structuralist-inspired semioticians, cf. the second half of F. Jameson, The 
Pnson-House of Language (Princeton, 1972). 
Ά . Besides those works of Chomsky listed above, cf. also his Topics in the Theory 
of Generative Grammar (The Hague, 1966); also J. Lyons, Introduction to Theoret­
ical Linguistics (Cambridge, 1968)5 H. Verkuyl et al., Transformationele Taal­
kunde (Utrecht, 1974). 
45. It may seem strange that we have not mentioned Ideal Language Philosophy at this 
point. To the extent that these philosophers have contnbued to fermai logic, 
they deserve maition here. However, as Kadnitzky, op. cit., I, passim, devasta-
tingly shows, it has contributed precious little to any understanding of language 
outside its own coterie; at least, no one has bothered to take up its suggestions. 
46. Jameson, op. cit., viiif., particularly deplores application of the linguistic 
metaphor to the whole of society: 
The deeper justification for the use of the linguistic model or 
metaphor....lies in the concrete character of the social life of 
the so-called advanced countries today, which offer the spectacle 
of a world form in which nature as such has been eliminated, a 
world saturated with messages and information, whose intricate 
commodity network may be seen as the very prototype of a system 
of signs. 
Whether one accepts Jameson's complaint or not, one must recognize that such 
a model is a step forward over the alleged model of natural science foisted 
upon Bloomfieldian linguistics by Ideal language Philosophy. 
•»7. Becent developments worth mentioning are N. Chomsky, Studies on Semantics in 
Generative Grammar (The Hague, 1972); J. Katz, Semantic Theory (London, 1972); 
Verkuyl, op. cit., 206-2Ί7. 
48. P. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (Englewood Cliffs, 1937-41; 4 vols.); 
T. Parsons, The Social System (London, 1951); P. Blau, Formal Organizations 
(London, І963); H. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (London, ¿1957). 
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hr. P. Bercer and T. Luckmann, Jhe Social Construction of Reality (London, 1967); 
L. Coser, art. "Knowledce, Sociology of," IbSS VIII, kZ'o-k}'}·, M. Scheler, Die 
mssensfornen und die Gesellschaft (Bern, I96I); K. Mannheim, Ideology and 
jtopia (Lonaon, 1936), idem, Essays on the SocrioRy of КпоЛеаде (New York, 
I052), G. Gurvitch, Froblènes de la SocioloKie de la Connaissance (Fans, 1960); 
Ь. Durkheim, Les Formes Elénentaires de la_ Vie HeliRieuse (Pans, 1912) ; and 
the extensive bibliography in К. LenkTed.) Ideologie (Neuwied, 5l971), М*3-1Й9, 
1»57_4бі»1 i»71. 
JO. fi. Berthes, L'Empire des Signes (Geneva, 1970); idem, Système de la hode (Pans, 
1967); ider, hythologies (Pans, 19ë7). Cf. also R. Jakobson's survey of 
semiotic developnents in the social sciences in his 11ain Trends in the Science 
of Language (London, 1973). 
51. Gf. the bibliography to T. Parsons, art. "Systems Analysis: Social Sjstens," 
IESS XV, Vtô-'t?}; L. von Bertalanffy, General System Theory (New York, 196P). 
52. Berger and Luckmann, op.cit., 117. 
53. ibid., 55, И З . 
'jh. С. Levi-Stnuss, Structural Anthropology (London, I963); A. Greimas, Sénantique 
Structurale (Pans, 19ί>6). 
55. A case could bt riade, however, that semotics as a theory of signs does this 
even more effectively than the symbolic universe conventions. But that can be 
the case only when semiotics has actually developed that far. 
η 
5'Î. C K . Ogden and I. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (London, 19^5), iSCif. 
57- W. Alston, Philosophy of Language (liiglewood Cliffs, 1964), 10. 
5E. L. Bloomfield, Language (London, 1935), esp. Chapter 9 where one finds such 
statements as: "The statement of meanings is therefore the weak point m 
language-study, and will remain so until human knowledge advances very far 
beyond its present state." 
59. A. Greimas, Du Sens (Pans, 1970), 7-17. 
60. L. Cohen, The Diversity of Meaning, op. cit., tries also to map a theory of 
meaning, aiming "not so much to describe how people of various kinds do actually 
think about meanings, but to evaluate what is gained or lost by their so think-
ing...." (p. 2 ) . He introduces a new terminology, distinguishing four kinds 
of words and sentences: language-, saying-, utterance-, and culture-words and 
-sentences. Such an approach has much to commend it, and Cohen's book makte 
interesting reading. Bat to my knowledge no one has followed the lead he has 
given. 
61. Among those accepting this sort of fourfold grouping are Alston, op. cit. (re-
peated also in his article "Meaning" in EPhil V, 233-2kl) ; N. Chnstensen, On 
the Ndure of Meanings (Copenhagen, 21965); and rn a similar fashion, C. Landeeman, 
Discourse ana Its Presuppositions. W. Pannenberg, Wissenschaftstheorie und 
Theologie (Frankfurt, 1973). 177-184. one of the few continental studies to take 
Anglo-American theories of meaning into account, reduced the four to two — 
referential and contextual meaning. 
62. Aldon, art. "Meaning," op. cit., г'ЮГ., provides a general bibliography covering 
the four theories. 
63. Figures as varying as Alston, Cohen and Chnstensen all maztain that they are 
primarily interested in lexical meaning. 
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Ch. Russell's calling a statement "nieaningless" or "nonsense" was untrue to his own 
self-avowed logical atomisn; for meaningless is not the syrarcctrical opposite 
of meaning in a referential sense. This point will be taken up below where it 
will be shown that that sort of cleaning has to refer to a coherence theory of 
neaning. 
65. B. Russell, "On Denoting," Logic and Knowledge (London, 1956), 59-56. 
66. Ogden and Richards, op. cit.; Saussure, op. cit., 97-105· 
6?. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III, ii; G. Berkeley, Alciphron, 
Dialogue VII; L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, op. cit., passir.i. 
68. Cf. section 5·5·2.2. on measuring and spatial metaphors above. 
69. Cf. section 2.2.5. above. 
70. C. Osgood et al., The Keasurenent of Meaning (Urbana, 1957)· 
71. Kot only (and especially) OLF draws its inspiration from Jittgenstein, but its 
influence is seen in Oxford Philosophy as well. 
72. As have Christensen, op. cit., l6fi¡ Alston, art. "Meaning", op. cit., 257, some-
what more cautiously. Both, however, would still give priority to operational 
theories of neaning. 
75. B. Richards, "Searle on Meaning and Speech Acts," FL 7(1971)519-553. 
74. ibid., 520« 558. Some questions to be asked about Richards' otherwise rigorously 
argued theory would center on his restricting his attention to Searle'ε Hypo­
thesis (SA, 57), Principle of Expressibility (SA, 20) and Corollary (SA, 20) in 
developing his argument, thus fairly well bypassing Searle's treatment of the 
problem of propositional content and force indicators. 
75· Alston, Philosophy of Language, op. cit., k2. 
76. Basically, because criteria for true synonymy are so hard to coae by. Can 
synonymy in one instance be considered adequate, or must the linguistic units 
be synonymous in nil cases? 
77· B. Harrison, Meaning and Structure (London, 1972), 254, who givœ a devastating 
critique of the empiricist theory of language (= referential theory) and also 
a highly insightful discussion of the function of rules in meaning and language. 
78. ibid., 62. 
79· Ogden and Richards, op. cit., I6O-I65. 
80. For a discussion of this distinction as well as a critique of Ogden and Richards' 
position, cf. W. Alston, art. "Emotive Meaning," IFhil II, 487-489. 
81. As in Alston, Philosophy of language, op. cit., 11. 
82. S. Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford, 1972), 50. The asterisk is his. It takes the form 
of к*яд£ = àf. "ί> and Д mutually know* that j>." Mutual knowledge* is a condition 
that lines not entail the regress series of lower order intentions along which 
a Gricean theory of non-natural meaning starts: S knows that A knows that S knovs 
that A knows that £ knows... Schiffer goes on to give a logical account of what 
mutual knowledge* is the case (52-35), hut what he provides is essential to the 
logical functioning of mutual knowledge* rather than any prof that such is the 
case. Indeed, the best one can hope for is to show that the regression, while 
infinite, is not a vicious one. 
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S3· HTD, 116. Securing uptake is an important idea with xllocutionary acte. 
S1*. As Cohen, The Diversity of Heaning, op. cit., has done. Cf. note 60. 
85. Christensen, op. cit., introduces the metaphor of meaning as office (in the sense 
of the latin "officium"), which is indeed suggestive, but he depends more on the 
emotive force of the metaphor to work its magic than on a thorough account of 
what he means by introducing it. 
86. Alston, Philosophy of Language, op. cit., lOf. 
8?. The "mean" of (1) and (2) derives from the Old Teutonic *gainaini-, meaning 
"common" (cf. Dutch "geneen"); the others from the Old English maenan, "to 
think" (cf. Dutch "menen"). 
88. SA, I1». 
89. Cf. Metaphysics 1011 26: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not 
that it is, is false; while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that 
it is note, is true." 
90. Kost notably m Thomas Aouinas, De Ventate, q. 1, a. 1. 
91. Almost all histories of contemporary philosophy relate this history in one or 
all its phases. For a succinct treatment of the various ideas and objections 
to them (without relating them directly to the various personalities who for­
warded them), cf. H. Ashby, art. "Venfiability Principle," EPhil VIII, г'Ю-г'*?. 
For the history in terms of the history of metascience, cf. Radnitzky, op. cit., 
I, 9З-І70, who concentrates on confirmation and its more nuanced forms. 
92. This is Hadntzky's conclusion. Cf. also H. Swinburne, "Confirmability and Factual 
Meaningfulness," Analysis 33(1972-73)71, who notes that the various forms of 
venficatiomsm "were quickly abandoned for·well known reasons". While still 
holding to a weak confirmationist principle, Swinburne says "So long as we can 
in general recognize intuitively when one statement confirms another (as of 
course we can) we can apply the principle." (p. 72) — a far cry from the 
verification (or even the confirmation) principle! 
93· The ancient problem of the relationship of falsehood to meaninglessness, present 
already in the Sophist and Theaetetus in the form of: if the truth has to do 
with what is, and falsehood with what is not, then to think of falsehood is to 
think of nothing. The basic question in the general history of the problem is 
whether falsehood is the seule as nonexistence, i.e., if the true is what is, 
then what can the false be? This plagues Russell's thecry of descriptions as well. 
91*. Ashby, op. cit., 2klî. 
95· Ashby, ibid., 2kk, goes into this problem in some detail and shows that the 
demolition of the verification principle Is not as facile as this quick move 
might imply. 
96. K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, 1959), 78-92. 
97. Hadnitzky, op. cit.. Ι, ΙΟΊ, 115. 
98. Ashby, op. cit., ZhZ, discusses these. 
99. С Hempel, art. "Confirmation: Qualtitative Aspects," iPhil II, I85-I87, discusses 
the development of confirmation theory. Hempel, along with Alonso Church, has 
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been a leading figure in its development. However, as Swinburne, op. cit., 
points out, confirnation has already seen its day as well. 
100. A recurring point of Radnitzky that almost reaches polemical proportions. Cf. 
e.g., 2hi., 57i 67
λ
 69. As an alternative he suggest, p. 107, the confirration 
hypothesis of H. Tornebohm — a theory about certain strategies of hypothesis 
checking. 
101. Ashby, op. cit., Zbjí. 
102. One must, of course, distinguish truth-value and meaningfulness; thus, particu-
larly in the ease of counterfactuals the notion of truth-value must be taken 
in the context of the discussion of its truth-value. 
ЮЗ. Notably the coherence theory (to be discussed below), the intuitionist theory 
(also to be discussed below), and the pragmatist theory. 
КЖ. Names coming to mind in the Anglo-American world would be F.H. Bradley, H.H. 
Joachim, Bernard Blanshard, and Josiah Hoyee. 
105. The last major work appearing in this idealist tradition in the Anglo-American 
sphere was Blanshard's The Nature of Thought (London, 1939)· Works appearing 
since then have been mainly critiques and evaluations of the tradition rather 
than contributions to it. 
106. (Oxford, 1973). 
107. ibid., Ά . The grouping is mine, not Hescher's. 
108. ibid., 53. 
109· ibid., Mff., where Eescner cites Sextus Qnpiricus. Our rebuttal of the charge 
does not correspond with Reseller's; he restricts himself to the part of the 
argument about the prior criteria as only a partial standard of the coherence. 
110. Bescher adds some other objections to these given here (Ά-52), but they do not 
become important in the argument later on. 
111. ibid., 53f. 
112. ibid., 56. 
113. ibid., 63. 
114. ibid., 82-88. 
11?, ibid., 83-88. 
116. ibid., 88. 
11?, ibid., I68-I72. Kescher reduces these four elements of the system to a simple 
logical statement. In a system Γ οΐ ρ-, ρ , ..., ρ , 
(1) if р ^ ρ2, ..., ρ η е-Г and ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρ η f~ q, then q €· Γ · 
(2) whenever HP, then Ρ e Γ" . 
(3) in "standard cases", if Р^ Γ~ then^ pe I - . 
(k) whenever Ρ e Γ . then с Р^ Г" ; and whenever ~ Ρ e Γ then ΐ $. Γ ι 
respectively. 
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118. i b i d . , 70. 
119. i b i d . , 1б?-1б5. 
120. As, е . Е . , 0. von Ileurath, "P ro toko l l s ä t ze , " Erkenntnis 3(1932)201>-214. 
121. lîeschfr, oii. c i t . , J lú f . 
12?. i b i d . 
12;.. i b i d . , 319. 
12h. This point is not nade by Rescher, though it seems to ne one of the central 
ones to be made in this context, as ιαΐΐ be clear below. 
125. For this theory, cf. Bertalanffy, op. cit. 
126. Kescher, op. cit., 32^. 
127. ibid., 333· 
I2C. ibid., 23, 209. 
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ΙιΟΤιώ TO CiUTTLií ÌIV^ 
1. i.C-i С. Lévi-Stra iss, "L'Analyse morpholofiqup des contes russes," International 
Journal of Slavic Poetics and Linguistics 3(19б0)11*2-11*б; iden, L'rionne I u 
(Fans, 1971), 562; idem, "The Structural Study of I yth," in Structural A-ttl ro-
polocy (London, 196;), 20G-2C<1, «. üreinas, Du Sens (Fans, 1 ο70), ICI, lij. 
2. Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropolopiy, op. cit., le"'*. 
3. To what extent ideologies, nytholoßies, etc., are second order actualizations, 
i.e., subject to a second set of laus of Generation beyo-d those for the pnnary 
actualizations cannot be gone into here, thouch it uill be touched upon below 
in section 5·2.2. 
^. One particularly sees important shifts between Greimas' systematic юік oénantique 
Structurale (Fans, I96C), and his collection of essays Du Sens (Pans, 1970), 
most of the latter havinc been written since Senantique Structurale. At times 
he even explicitly says that certain points are corrolete reformulations of Sé-
mantique Structurale (Du Sens, ІЗ1*, l6l). In the presentation here, the later 
formulations of Du Sens are given priority over those of Sémantique Structurale. 
5. F. de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique Générale (Paris, 1Q64), 97-100. 
G. Greimas, Sémantique Structurale, op. cit., lOf. 
7. Cf. E. KÖngas Haranda and P. Maranda, Structural Models in Folklore and Trans-
formational Essays (The Hague, 1971)1 21ff., for a discussion of these relations 
as operaticnal units. 
8. L. Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language (Madison, I96I); Lévi-Strauss, 
Structural AnthropoloRy, op. cit., IbOf.; idem, L'Homme Nu, op. cit., 6l2ff. 
9. In Sémantique Structurale, op. cit., IO6, he calls content (contenu) "une 
succession d'effets de sens". However, in Du Sens, he speaks of investing 
the signification structure with "content" which can only mean, it would seem, 
drawing upon the signifieds (l^Sf.), although he continues to consider the 
manifestation of the entire structure of signification as content. At any 
rate, it should be noted that content is not opposed to form; the arrelate of 
forra for Greinas is not content, but substance (ibid., 95)· 
10. Greimas distinguishes corpus ("ensemble de messages constitué en vue de la 
description d'une modèle linguistique") sémantique Structurale, op. cit., l'tS, 
and text ("l'ensemble des éléments de signification qui sont situés sur l'iso-
topie choisie et sont enfermés dans les limites du corpus"), ibid., 145. 
11. Greimas, Du Sens, op. cit., I60. 
12. Greimas, Sémantique Structurale, op. cit., 27; Du Sens, op. cit., I36. The 
following section is based on his essay, "Les jeux de contraintes sémiotiques," 
ibid., 135-156, his most lucid introduction to his work. 
13. The application of such a structure to meaning and signiication may seem almost 
cabbalistic, unless one remembers that such a structure is as old as Aristotle, 
who used something like it to explicate the notion of negation and quantifiers. 
On this point, and on relating it to a similar structure used by the logician 
Blanche, Cf. С. Galland, "Introduction à Greimas," Etudes théologiques et reli-
gieuses WKigTJ)1*^. Galland's is the only short introduction to Greimas of which 
I am aware, and should be read with caution in that she does not always stay 
with his terminology and jumbles some of his ideas. For the use of the box in 
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Tiodern loßic, cf. aleo P. Lai, "Production du sens par la foi," asR 61(1973) 
66f., note 7. 
Ih. Greimas, Du Sens, op. cit., l88. 
15· Greimas, Sémantique Structurale, op. cit., 69. 
16. Greimas, Du Sens, op. cit., Ih2il. 
I?. The notions "conjunctive" and "disjunctive" are central to Greimas' semiotic 
system and seem to be gaining ground with him in his reflections on narrative 
structures. 
18. C. Lévi-Strauss, Le Cru et le Cuit (Paris, Ι96Ό; Greimas provides his own analysis 
of Lévi-Strauss' reference myth in "Pour une théorie de l'interprétation du 
récit mythique," Du Sens, op. cit., 185-230. 
19. Greimas, Sémantique Structurale, op. cit., IOS. 
20. Greimas, Du Sens, op. cit., 142-150. 
21. Greimas provides an extended account of the episteme of Bernanos in Sémantique 
Structurale, op. cit., 222-256. The term "epistene" (episteme) is also used by 
hichel Foucault in basically the sarae sense, although Foucault would attempt to 
reduce the episteme to a particular, single idea that would influence an entire 
worldview. 
22. The book, Sémiotique Narrative, is in preparation. An extract from it has appeared 
in Іапкакев 8(1973) no. 31, 13-35· 
25. V. Propp, Korpholory of the Folktale (London, 1968); T. Todorov (ed.) Théorie 
de la Littérature (Paris, 1965)· Greimas does not mention any folklorists in 
particular beyond general references to the Jfinnish school. 
24. "Eléments d'une grammaire narrative," Du Sens, op. cit., 157-184. 
25. ibid., l62ff.; Sémantique Structurale, op. cit., 173-180. 
26. ibid., 181. 
27· Propp's structure has been applied to tales in other cultures as well. Cf. the 
application to certain African tales in D. Paulme, "Une conte des fées africain: 
le garçon travesti ou Joseph en Afrique," L'Homne 3(1963) no. 2, 5-21. Greimas 
continually admits his debt to Propp in this matter. 
28. Du Sens, op. cit., 187. It should be noted that Greimas sees this as one of the 
general formulas for all dramatic stories (myths, tales, plays, etc.). 
29. ibid., 179ff. 
30. ibid.. 11?. 
31. ibid., 118. 
32. Collected in Structural Anthropology, op. cit., 206-231· 
33· Kongäs Haranda and Maranda, op. cit., 24. 
34. ibid., 30. 
-?kq- ГОТг-З, Chapter 5. 
35· J· de Vries, ForschimESEeschichte der Mythologie (Freiburp, I96I), IX. DP Vries 
gives a Good history of the interpretations of nyth fron the Greeks onvards. 
36. ь.Е·, L'Homne Nu, op. cit., 552. 
37. Cf. Lévi-Strauss, L'Orinine des llanières de Table (Paris, lc68), 92-106; ider·,, 
"Comment neurent les mythes,'' in Science et Conscience de la Société (bans, 
1971), 129-ΐν% 
3?. "Introduction in P. î'aranda (ed.), Hytholor;y (Harriondsworth, 1972), f, 12f. 
39. J. Guiant, "Multiple Levels of heaninc in I'.yth," ibid., 111-123. 
to. Greimas, Du Sens, op. cit., Ilo. 
k\. Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropolorcy, op. cit., 210. 
hZ. Lévi-Strauss, L'Honne Nu, op. cit., 603. 
Ό . Greimas, Du Sens, op. cit., 187. 
kh. ib:.d., Iu8. 
k5. ibid., 215. 
Wi. Syntagnatic chains are created by the juxtaposition of diverse paradicnatic 
units (i.e., sißnifiers of the same signified) which in turn form the narrative. 
V?. Haranda (ed.), op. cit., 16. 
'fS. Lévi-Strauss, L'Homne Nu, op. cit., 603. 
49. Maranda (ed.), op. cit., 213. 
50. Lévi-Strauss, "Comment meurent les mythes," op. cit. 
51. In "La Quête de la Peur," Du Sens, op. cit., 231-247, esp. 237. 
52. Propp, op. cit., 82; cf. also his 19^5 volume, meant as a conpanion to his 
МогрЬоІоку of the Folktale (written in 1928), translated as Le Radici Storiche 
dei Bacconti di Fate (Turin, I9M3). 
53· Lévi-Strauss, "L'Analyse morphologique des contes russes," op. cit., ІЗЗ-З1*· 
5^. Lévi-Strauss, L'Homme Nu, op. cit., 600. 
55. ibid., 603; also his "Structure and Dialectics" in Structural Anthropolony, 
op. cit., 232-2^1. 
56. Greimas, Du Sene, op. cit., 101. 
57. ibid., 118. 
5δ. ibid., Ι85. 
59. ibid., 117. 
60. However, if Greimas is successful in fully linking up content and manifestation 
level structures, the problem of performance criteria could be then raised. 
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NOTLS TO CHAPTER SIX 
1. An exarple of this ιε D. Evane, The Logic of Self-Involvement (London, 1963). 
bvans' project is in many ways parallel to the project here: he starts with a 
reconstructed speech act theory (based more loosely on Austin than the study 
here) and applies it to the language of creation. Evans considers the "ordi­
nary language" of the Christian to be "biblical language" (p. 15ff.), i.e., 
the language of the bible as a biblical theologian understands it. He is aware 
of some of the assumptions of the biblical theologian (pp. I8-I9). On p. 20 
he says: 
Moreover, my philosophical analysis of biblical language m Part II pre-
euppoaee a particular biblical theology. like any other biblical theology, 
mine depende on the descriptive studies of historical scholars{ but like 
any other biblical theology it involves interpretative selections and 
prescriptions. I have tried to reflect some of the main trends of 
contemporary biblical theology. But I llave not hesitated to introduce 
some of my own interpretations, especially in Chapter 6. 
And in the footnote on the same page: "My own theology of Creation is a 'crea­
tion' in which I am conscious of having been influenced by Barth, Brunner, 
Bultmann, Bevan, Barr and Buber." The danger of ¿vans' position is that his 
analysis of performative, self-involving l.jiiguage may become a self-fulfillinR 
prophecy, especially when he goes so far as to "create" his own theology for 
the analysis. This should not be taken as slighting Evans' valuable work. It 
is a matter of choice of method; and what is proposed here should be able to 
avoid many of the hazards of Evans' approach. 
2. Examples of this can be found in A. Flew and A. Maclntyre (ed.) New Essays in 
Hiilosophical Theology (London, 1955). No* *11 «aeaye here are hostile to 
theologians and the impression snould not be given that the authors of the 
essays in this book have not contributed much to sobering the theological dis-
cussion. But very little concrete theology is discussed. 
3. A good example of a work that does this is Bejerholm and Hornig, Wort und Handlung 
(Gütersloh, I966). Here four studies are done on four aspects of religious 
lenguage, based on concrete texts. This study deserves being better known than 
it is. 
^. Hardly any theological journal has not had something appear about Holtmann and 
virtually every journal reviewed Theologie der Hoffnung. A collection of some 
of the critical reviews can be found in W.-D. Marsch (ed.), Diskussion über die 
'Theologie der Hoffnung' (München, 196?). TH has been translated into many 
languages and in the German edition alone, eight printings appeared within 
five years. 
5. One book appearing at almost the same tine was G. Sauter, Zukunft und Verheissung 
(Zurich, I965). Cf. also W. Kreek, Die Zukunft des Gekommenen (München, ¿1966). 
Q 
6. Besides Theologie der Hoffnung (München, 1962) (= TH); Der Gekreuzigte Gott 
(München, 1972; (= GG); Umkehr zur Zukunft (München, 1970) (= UZ), other collec-
tions of book-length will be included here: Perspektiven der Theologie (München, 
I968); Religion, Revolution und die Zukunft (München, I969); Die Sprache der 
Befreiung (MUnchen, 1972); plus other articles and references to his еэгііег 
work. 
7. TH, 3^. Cf. also TH, 97, ZOk; GG, I60. 
8. TH, 37, 91, 113, 117, 178. 
9. TH, 82, 95-100. 
10. Principally H. Berkhof, in his review of Holtnarm's TH in NThTs 19(19бб),+93-501, 
reprinted in Harsch, op. cit. Cf. there, especially l82f. 
11. D. Solle, Politische Theologie. Auseinandersetzunp; mit R. Bultmann (Stuttcart, 
1971), 6?. 
12. iJ. Pannenberg, in his foreword to his Grundfragen Systematischer Theologie 
(Göttingen, 196?)', 5f.5 and in "The Revelation of God m Jesus of Nazareth," 
and "Hesponse to the Discussion", in J. Robinson and J. Cobb (ed.), Theology 
as History (New York, I967), 120, 159. Also W.-D. harsch, in Karsch, op. cit., 
\22-12h. 
13. G. Sauter, in Marsch, op. cit., 110, calls Moltnaim'e "Theorie der Verheissung" 
an "abgeleiteten Korrelat", an "überbau" for his "Praxis der Hoffnung". 
1^. Moltmann repliée in his "Antwort auf die Kritik zur Theologie der Hoffnung," 
Marsch, op. cit., 201-233; and in GG, especially to Pannenberg and Solle. 
15. One way of judging the acceptance of promise as a central theological category 
is to check the nunber of lexica devoting articles to it. Only two do so: 
ThUNT and HThG. 
16. ΤΗ, 36-37. 
17. llore precisely, the notion promise itself does not owe much to Bloch, but the 
development of the logic of prmnise certainly does, particularly to the second 
part of his Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt, 1959), especially nos. 17 and 18. 
Moltnann himself discusses Bloch's influence on him in the Appendix to the third 
and following editions of TH, 313-33^, and in UZ, 9ff· holtmann's praise of 
Bloch is lofty: "Uie kaum keine andere Philosophie ist 'Das Prinzip Hoffnung' 
dazu geeignet, die christliche Hoffnungslehre zu ihrer eigenen Profilierung und 
Aktivierung zu verhelfen" ("Die Kategorie Hovum in der christlichen Theologie," 
Perspektiven der Theologie, op. cit., 17Ό. For critiques of Bloch's influence 
on holtmann, see Sauter in Marsch, op. cit., 115-121. Other articles where 
Moltmann discusses Bloch include his introduction to Religion in brbe (München, 
I967), 7-I8; "Messianismus und Marxismus," tfber Ernst Bloch ÇFrankfurt, I968), 
kZ-60. We will not go further into Bloch's influence upon Moltmann's notion 
of promise here. The logic of promise will likewise become evident via the 
application of speech act theory to the data in TH. Our own opinions on the 
Bloch-Moltmann relation were given in Hope: An Historical Overview (Kandidaats-
scriptie Nijmegen, 1971), 28-53. 
18. G. von Rad, Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament (München, 1958) and Theologie 
des Alten Testaments ("Mttnchen, 1957-60; 2 vols.); «Í. Ziranerli, "Verheissung und 
ErfTIllung, EvTh 12(1952)38ff. Also should be mentioned V. Kaag, "Malkut Jhwh," 
Supplements to Vetus Testamentum 7(1960)137ff. 
19. For an overview of the various opinions on eschatology among ОТ exegetes, cf. 
H.-P. Kuller, Ursprünge und Strukturen Alttestamentlicher Eschatologie (BZAW, 
IO9), 1-11. The variety of conceptions among NT exegetes and systematic theo-
logians was discussed in Chapter One. For a discussion of the confusion among 
ОТ exegetes, cf. G. Wanke, "'Eschatologie'. Ein Beispiel theologischer Sprach­
verwirrung," KuD 16(1970)300-312. 
20. J. Scharbert, art. "Verheissung," HThG IV, 320f. 
21. Cf., e.g., Müller, op. cit., Il1», Ilo; S. Herrmann, Die prophetischen Heüserwar-
tungen im Alten Testament (BWâHT, 85), 66, 101; von Rad, Theologie des AT, II, 
125ff. 
-?:>_- IIOT„C, Copter 6. 
Г". ^Г. _. Ho lincile-1 ^rd !.. ЗиЪег, extet? lil "Л, 115, "hon I oltriann rejects as far 
ε Б fils ^osj-tion is conceiiiPil. 
^ . Jh, ^ 0: "I nor \ if der zeigt rich in der tieschic'-te Israels, dass die Verheis-
зшіссі, denen Israel seme r.xj stpiiz vurdai.kt, sich uboi die geschichtlichen 
ы bruche αιη 'eg als ein Kontimiur erviesen, m dei Israel die Treue seines 
Gottts erkennen Itomite." And TU, llj: "In der Tat ist die Ver^ecenvarticimg 
des iLiü-ünfti^ en in Cierichts?iidrohim3 und Heilsverheissmiß nicht ein Soezifilmn 
de»- rropheten der klassiochen beyt, sondern nar konnte es eher unßekehrt sacen, 
üass die klassische Prophétie ein Spezifikir1 des Israelitischen Verheissungs-
fla ibens ist." SuTTOortinc tnas 'losition he cites ri. Dach, Die Aufforderunp 
zur j."1! rnt und zu* Kar η f li alt tes tarnen tlichen Pruphetenansprucn (Л'АЛТ, 9); 
h. jiendtorff, "Erwäguncer zur rrUhceschicnte des Prophetenturns in Israel," 
¿ТЫ. 59(19('2)lk5îî. 
2h. и. Kutsch, Verneissunf: urd Gesetz. Untersuch mgen ζ LÌ sogenannten "Bund" im 
Alten Testane, t (ΒΖΑί, 1 71); ide-i, art. "bent", TIIAT I, ЗЗ^-ГгЗ. These studies 
have а-^леагеи since the publication of TH, but there aie older studies stressine 
ист tne caro -joint, rotabl/ J. Be^rich, "bent. Lin Beitrac zur Lrfassung einer 
alttestar entliehen Denkform," ZA.Í С (19^)1-11. 
25- Kutsch, Verheissunp, ujid Gesetz, op. cit., 203f. : 
Der hrbniscne Dccnff bent innt in Alten Terta.ient zunächst una ur-
sprünglich die Vfrnflichtunc -- die Veipflicl'tunc die ich selbst liber-
nch. e (von id aus könnt es zu den Sinn 'Zusicherunc, 'Zusace'), und die 
Verpriichtunet, die ich eimii anderen auferlege (etin in einem Vasallen-
vertr^c) · ,^rst in zweiter Linie steht Ejent auch fur die gegenseitige 
Verpflichtunf;, rnoint dann also das, was wir als 'Bund' bezeichnen 
können. Der theologische Bereich kennt nur die einaeit^ge Verpflichtung, 
deren oubjekt (fast) ι liner Gott ist: aie Selbstverpflichtunr; Gottes, 
reine Zusage, und die Verpflichtunp der Iienschen durch Gott.... 
lie then draus the conclusions for thoolo<-y from this, 206: 
In Bereich alttestamentlicho*· — und auch neutestanentlicher — 
Theolocie ist zudem im Hinblick auf das heute übliche Verstandnis von 
'Bund' dieser Begriff fur das Gegenüber von Gott und Kensch nicht 
anwendbor, sein Heiterer Gebrauch also irreführend, ¿s ist deshalb 
auch sachlich geboten, dass wir hier 'Bund' aus unseren Uortschatz 
streichen. 
Cf. also li. Jeinfeld, art. "bent", Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament, 
I, l'uh: "Die ursprüngliche Bedeutung des hebr. bent (wie des akk. nksu und 
des heth. ishiul) ist nicht ein Vertrag oder eine Vereinbarung zwischen zwei 
Parteien. Berit enthält vor allem die Idee des Auferlegens oder die Verpflichtung 
wie auch aus der oben gebotenen Etymologie hervorgeht." 
26. Cf. e.g., Herrmann, op. cit. The point here is that if Moltniann is not con-
necting the notion of promise with the covenants in the pre-prophetic tines, 
where is he getting it fron then? 
?7. A recent example of how not to do biblical theology is H. Preuss, Jahweglaube 
und Zukunftserjartung (B'./ANT, 87). Preuss wishes to "synthesize" in a "pheno-
menological fashion" recent work in ОТ exegesis to show that the typically 
future-oriented character of ОТ thought was due to the peculiar belief in Jahweh. 
What results is a very uncritical work where authors are cited mainly to corro­
borate his opinion (includirg such ОТ exegetes as Holtmann and Sauter!). The 
work borders on a begging of the question, methodologically speaking. Tn his 
conclusions, he even can offer such daring statements as that only Israel in 
the entire Middle East developed an eschatologyl On the other hand, works such 
as Huiler, op. cit., have tried to grapple with the epistemologica! questions 
involved in understanding and are able to come to much more tangible — and 
-253- NOTES, Chapter 6. 
tenable — conclusions. Only on the question of ОТ time does he drop his 
methodological guard. 
28. rfA 56, 'tj, 15 (on Hm k, 14). The only exhaustive treatment of the young Luther'e 
promissio idea is 0. Bayer, Promssio. Geschichte der reformatorischen Wende 
in Luthers Theologie (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Zh). 
Bayer defines Luther's promissio thus: 
In diesem Sinne — als rechtskräftige Zusage mit sofortiger Wirkung — 
versteht Luther die 'promissio'. Sie meint fur ihn also nicht 'Ver-
heissung': sie ist keine heilsgeschichtsphilosophische Offenbarungs-
kategorie, sondern der Inbegriff der Verkündigung (nämlich des 'Todes 
des Herrn'). Damit ist ein ganz bestimmte Sicht des Alten Testamentes 
gegeben: Die Einheit Gottes gewinnt sich nicht erst in der Totalität 
einer jeweils noch unabgeechlossenen Geschichte, sondern schenkt sich 
ganz in der Eindeutigkeit seiner Zusage und wird in deren Speziellen 
Glauben bekannt, (р. З1»?) 
From this one can see the Ъаы.в of promissio for Wortttheologie. While Molt-
mann clearly chooses for promissio "in der Totalitat einer jeweils noch unab­
geechlossenen Oesehichte" as such, on« still wonders how mich the structure 
of the appearance and functioning of promissio in Luther's sense continued to 
form his notion of promise. This would explain some of the seemingly odd 
characteristics of his development of promise m ОТ thought. 
29. Cf. J. Preus, From Shadow to Promise. Old Testament Interpretation from 
Augustine to the Young Luther (Cambridge, Mass., 19Ь9). 
30. ΤΗ, 13. 
31. TH, 75. 
32. TH, 92. 
33. тн, i8if. 
3^. TH, 75: "'Verheissung' ist grundsätzlich etvwe anderes ale ein 'Wortgeschehen', 
das den Menschen und seine ihn angehende Wirklichkeit zur Wahrheit und Ein-
stimmigkeit bringt." 
35· TH, 81. 
36. TH, 92-95-
37· TH, 92: "Handelt es sich um eine göttliche Verheiseung, so ist damit angezeigt, 
dass die erwartete Zukunft sich nicht aus dem Rahmen der Möglichkeiten ent-
wickeln muss, die in der Gegenwart angelegt sind, sondern aus dem entspringt, 
was dem Gott der Verheissung möglich ist." The definition of divine promise 
here is circular — divine promise is what the God of promise promises! 
38. TH, 113: "...solche Verheissungen und Erwartungen sind eschatologisch, die sich 
auf ein Geschichtlich-Zukünftiges richten ілі Sinne des letzten Horizontes." 
39. TH, 12, 37, 75, 89, 93, 133, 139, 204. 
40. TH, 12, 18, 83, 149, 202. 
41. TH, 29, 75, 92, 184. 
42. TH, 14, 15, 28, 37, 82. 
43. TH, 14, 78, 79, 81, 82, 91, ISO, 206. 
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hh. VII, 75, S2, ?:-, 130, ?n'.. 
4;.. TH, 7f., 9;·, 95, 9Ε, ICI, 110, Ί.',3. 
h-í. Til, "? , 92-101, ІЗО-іг1*, Chapter k pasal.T. 
47. Til, IO6: "Tat\;orte zu ervartender ïreugeschehnisse Gottes." It should be 
Mentioned m passine that bolt, ¿imi ¿Б not unauare of Austin. He cites IITD once 
(in "J_6 Zukunft als Neues larad^"^ der 'Jraiiszendenz," Internationale Dialoi; 
Zeitschrift 2(1969)2-1^), and it. Lie ùprarhe- der Befreiune, op. cit., l^ .'!, he 
uses the ter.i "perfornative'' (perfor. .ativj m a genuinely Austiman sense. 
Ì oreover, he often Makes the distinction between lan^iHO of facts and larifuace 
of pror.iifie. Of. o.e., ü<j, iCiO. Cn the whole, hov/ever, his theory of lanpiace 
owes much more to Heidpj;cer tlian to Anc"! o-ArierjCan phiilosophy. Besides Die 
Sprache der Befг eiung, 1J9-15^, boltmann also discusses his understandinc of 
laiißja^e m ''.(ort Glttes und Spracne," 1 ers^ektiven der Theologie, op. cit., 
93-112, and ir. "Theology as ¿sellatotEJ," in F. Herzog (ed.), The juture of 
Цоіе (;ie\. York, 1970), I-C. 
ΊΓ. ΤΗ, 107. 
k 3 . ΪΙΙ, 176. 
50. Cf. note 37. 
51. ΤΗ, 93. 
52. ΤΗ, 107: "Doch bliebe diese Begründung abstrakt und wurde dem Charakter der 
Verhej.ssung als des '.iortes, irn den Gott sich selbst verspricht und als Ich-
Jahwe den Iienschen gegenubertritt, nicht gerecht, wenn davon abgesehen würde, 
dass Verheissungen effektiv auf ein reales, futurisches Erfullungsgeschehen 
aus sind." 
53· TH, 89: "...dass die Horcr der Verheissung deckungsungleich werden mit der sie 
umgebenden Wirklichkeit...." 
51*· TH, 92: "Die Verheissung bindet den Menschen an die Zukunft und öffnet ihm den 
Sinn fur Geschichte." 
55· TH, 109: "Verheissung ist die eine Seite des Bundes, in welchem die Gemeinschaft 
Gottes mit dem Volk seiner '.7ahl gestiftet wird." 
56· TH, 111. While Moltmann partially disagrees with this statement, he neverthe-
less says: "Solche Reflexionen sind auch im Alten Testament nicht fremd." (ibid.) 
57. TH, Ю З , where he speaks of the oath (Eidschwur) of Jahweh. 
5o. yith God as both Σϊ and H, one could explain the development of history and the 
•.Mrld following a Whitehaadian scheme, with God as S being the primordial 
nature of God, and God as Д the consequent nature of God. The consequent nature 
of God includes the world as well, according to Whitehead: "The conjtetion of 
God's nature into a fulness of physical feeling is derived from the objectifica-
tion of the world in God." (Process and Reality, Hew York, ^1960, 523). The 
concretion of the world is the consequent nature of God. The panentheism of 
./hitehead has been futher worked out by Charles Hartshorne and others. Moltmann 
is aware of Process and Reality; he quotes from it in GG, and even from Part V 
where Whitehead speaks of God. But he chooses there other ideas about the 
development of the philosophical notion of God since the Middle Ages. The point 
ia that the idea of Ood proaialng himself could be developed along procesa 
philosophy lines and could even add something to the process discussion. Molt­
mann speaks against process philosophy in ΠΖ, 157, though he seems to be 
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referí ine te soné nopularization of n-ocess phil osonhj and not to il itehead. 
54. uf. esp. lüller, on. ci t . , llUf., ιΊιο treats this 111 his discussion of the 
search for a definitive promse "uo seine Lndcultif-i-eit nicht nehr der Hela-
tivierune verfallt...." Ίο achieve this, tne jrophets turned to an absoljte 
fut re, then "Hicht die ijidcultigl'Pit eines Geschehens als solche ist also fur 
semen eschatolocischen Charakter konstitutiv, sonc'ern die Lul unftigkeit des 
bndgultigon." (ibid.) 
60. ÏH, 9?: "Ihre (sc. Verheissuiic) ist nicht das leere /ohm reiflicher Verand^rwic· · . · " 
61. ΪΗ, ΙηΊ. 
62. TH, IÚ5. 
f-iZ· ÏH, 76. "hese are spoken of explicitly as syiibols in CG, 156; UZ, 1Ά, 157. 
61». TH, 1^7. Cf. also TH, 2C5, \,here tioltnann talks of tne consecuences of all 
three IT promises. 
f5· TH, o7: "Die Verheissunc weist diesen Zeitrau d und steht offensic'tlich 11. 
Korresiondenz zu den, was dann geschieht, ùss unterscheidet, wit . Sinpcili 
einleuchtend sapt, die Verhoissunc von Kassai draweissa^unsen und die von irr 
Ceöffnete Geschichtser\ artunc von Schicksalsclauben." And in U¿, 157: '-:i]ie 
Verheissunc kundift eine liirkliclikeit an, die noch nicht do ist. Inder sie 
diese Zukunft abei- ankündigt, wird die^e Zukunft v,ortcrasent. Das unte-sciirtet 
eine Verheissunc von der blosser Voraussage." Our о'л discussion of tie aibtinc-
tion betv/een Tiroiiise and prediction, civen 111 section 3-2.?.!., ^ ould sound 
differently, of course. The point here, hm ever, is that Nolti am feels a neca 
to distincuish nromise and prediction. His definition is created iti in t'e 
particular tine-awareness he develops. 
CG. Cf. note kl. 
6?. One thing innediately clear is that evocative language, a favorite term among 
theologians, has consequences not ali ays foreseen. One important consequence 
is that "evocative language" will be empty language, i.e., whatever is said is 
not of ргішагу significance, vhat is important is the effect achieved. .Vnether 
the theologian is prepared to consign large amounts of Christian doctrine to the 
no-man's-land of empty, "evocative" language remains to be seen. This point 
will be taken up again m the following chapter. 
5G. TH, 76. 
J9. ТЫ, 29, 7?, 107, 17k·, Die Sprache der Befreiung, op. cit., 1^3. 
70. Cf. note k2. 
71. UZ, 10. 
72. Moltmann speaks explicitly of the problem of eschatological verification in 
TH, 72, IA5, 156', GG, 16, Ilk, ICO; "Gottesoffenbarung und tfahrheitsfrage," 
Perspektiven der Theologie, op. cit., 13-35i ыЧ less explicitly in the pro­
blem of the faithfulness of Ood and the future of truth, recurring themes In IB. 
73. TH, 93. 
7k. TH, 11«». 
75. ibid. 
76. uz, 156. 
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77. Particularly Berkhof, op. cit., who considers the type of future Moltmann is 
discussing as apocalyptic and thus to be discarded. Berkhof himself uses a 
nodel which corresponds to the futurura model of extrapolation discussed below. 
God's entry into history is in the past and we witness now the unfoldinc of 
the meaning of this entry would be a brief statement of Berkhof's position. 
And within Berkhof's time model, what Holtmaim is doing is apocalyptic. Molt-
mann' s explanation of his time-awareness in writings since TH has helped to 
clarify to what extent his time-awareness is different. 
78. Moltmann, "Antwort auf die Kritik," op. cit., 209. He discusses his futurum 
and adventus distinction also in "Theology as Eschatology," op. cit., 11-18; 
"Probleme der neueren evangelischen Eschatologie," VuF 11(1966)100-12^. 
79. "Antwort auf die Kritik," op. cit., 210. 
80. ibid., 211. 
3l. Words such as anticipation, dream and Vorschein Koltmann has borrowed from the 
philosophy of hope of Ernst Bloch. It is precisely in this area, of how the 
future makes itself known in the present, that Moltmann owes much to Bloch. 
82. Moltmann, "Antwort auf die Kritik," op. cit., 213. In terms of our time-aware-
ness study made in section 3.3·, what Moltmann is describing here is simply 
another type of time-awareness like the other ones we mapped out there. It 
owes something to other kinds of time-awareness, particularly to types 3, ^, 
and 6. If we were to add it to the map, its data would look something like this: 
Spatial Metaphor: Coming of a person or event. 
Measuring Metaphor: The level of contradiction between the prtsent in 
light of the coming event and in light of the present 
determined by the past. 
Concept Cluster: Christian eschatology (and apocalyptic). 
Social Form: Radical Christianity (i.e., "religioniess"). 
Asymmetries: Absolute future y absolute past or present; 
present ) future and past. 
Lincuistic Evidence: "not yet", "new". 
"3. TH, lUOff. The poGsitfl-ity of explaining the enthusiasm of the first disciples 
given here is mine, based on the structure of tûne-awareness as Moltmann devel-
ops it·. Moltaaon himself osad · sobering eechatologia crucis to gain the вам 
effect. The advantage of his approach is the symbolic richness of the cross; 
of mine, analytical explanation. 
84. TH, l'i. 
85. TH, 91. The discussion of truth in section h.'}. will help clarify why truth as 
an inadequatio is not simply a flight into idealism. That discussion showed how 
truth, too, is a constructed reality, and one can see Moltmann's inadaequatio in 
terms of choosing different truth-candidates fron the res than those preferred 
by the giren reality. Tram these, different m.c.s. eaerge. Bie problem of the 
coexistence of these two truth concepts is central to eschatology, as will 
become evident in the following chapter, espcially in section 7.5» 
86. Quoted without reference in UZ, 122. Bloch'β citation is not exact. 
87. From a conversation with Ernst Bloch in which he was asked to sum up his philo­
sophy of hope. His answer was "S ist nech nicht Ρ". It is quoted in the intro­
duction to the Bloch Festschrift Ernst Bloch zu Ehren (Frankfurt, I965)· 
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8S. One will recognize in this presentation the notion of asymrietry developed in 
Chapters Two and Three. The contradiction provides the cleft in the otherwise 
smooth surface of reality. The notion of contradiction has been developed nore 
fully elsewhere for eschatology. Cf. especially E. Schillebeeckx, Geloofs-
verstaan (Bloemendaal, 1972), І3І-ІЗ6, 152-155; idem, "Haar een 'definitieve 
toekomst': belofte en menselijke bemddelinc," Toekomst van de Relirçie: lieliRie 
van de Toekomst (Utrecht, 1972), h^-ltb. 
C9. GG, ЗО-ЗЗ. 
90. TH, 127; "Theology as Eschatology,' ij. cit., 9f. 
91. GG, 138ff. 
92. TH, Chapter k. This idea Koltnaim shares with other theologians, notably the 
Pannenberg group of Offenbarung als Geschichte. 
93. "Antwort auf die Kritik," op. cit., 217. 
9^. ibid., 216. 
95. "Ohne diese Zukunftsorientierung lässt sich die Erfahrung der Wirklichkeit 
der Geschichte schwer durchhalten." GG, 97· 
96. "Antwort auf die Kritik," op. cit., 219, speaks of "manche kritischen Leser 
die 'Theologie der Hoffnung' als ein Plädoyer fur die Zukunft gegen die Gegen-
wart verstanden haben." One can say that practiaally every critic has made 
this point in one way or another. 
97. ibid., 218. 
98. ibid., 219. 
99.Cf. e.g., Berkhof, in Harsch, op. cit., I78: "Die Eschatologie ist ja im posi-
tivsten Sinn des Wortes Pro-jektion: Projektion ins Grosse auf der Bildwand 
der Ewigkeit aufgrund dessen, was uns von Gott her bereits heute geschenkt 
ist." In 179f·> he tries to safeguard the discontinuity element in eschatology, 
but to my mind with little success. Koltmann says of this position, ibid., 
203: "H. Berkhof hat sogar umgekehrt das bis heute mangelnde Interesse an der 
Zukunft mit dem positivistischen Denkklima des deutschen Uirtschaftswunders 
kombiniert. Keine Expenmentei" 
100. ibid., 220. 
101. GG, 150, referring particulary to the effect of the resurrection upon the cruci-
fixion, but this should then be seen as paradigmatic for the entire structure 
of time-awareness to come. 
102. Moltmann, following Metz, takes up the memory question in his writings on poli-
tical theology. Cf. e.g., ÏÏZ, I56-I87; GG, 293-315; essays in Perspektiven der 
Theologie and in Bebgion, Revolution und die Zuioinft; and with J. Iietz and 
W. Oelmtlller in Kirche im Prozess der Aufklärung (Mflnchen, 1970). 
103· Moltmann does not draw this obvious conclusicn from his adventus-futurun distinc-
tion. Instead, he preserves the ambiguity of the word Zukunft (cf. "Antwort auf 
die Kritik," op. cit., 212), though in other works (e.g., "Hoffnung und Planung," 
Religion, Revolution und die Zukunft) he does separate then to his advantage. 
In "Antwort auf die Kritik," he diagrans has tine-awareness as "Zukunft -> Ver-
gangenheit -> Gegenwart" (2l5), which would indicate that he knows no other 
future than the grounding Zukunft. But given the adventus-futuiun distinction 
and his discussion of it in "Antwort auf die Kritik", this latter move of mine 
would seem to follow. 
¡•Ш С, Chapter С. 
"ΙΟΊ. Thîit the r,\ ."le pre.-àent lirs priority over tue future "ay see:i strange; but it 
ij.-.t Ъе kc;>t in · lud that fie futiu-e леге ir. fut'irm, not adventus, and this 
fiiv.i'-un receives consta it redefinition in the encroachiiiG front of the present 
oii its way tj adventos· 
TD?. Thur I.oltna'iii, ibid., 217. 
TOÓ. A tern of Sloch's for the r'ost co 'plet« of his four kinds of possibility. The 
use here ic adnittcdly soi ewhat difÍTont fron that of Bloch's; the point is 
to eimhasize the resi.less of the possibility. For Bloch'.-, notion of the four 
levels of possibility, cf. Jas Irinzir Hoffnung, op. cit., 25^—?CG. 
-07. 'ГЦ, 117; cf. also "TheoT oçy as Lsc>iatolo|jy," op. cit., lu. i;o]t..ann is in 
afroeient \n t!; ОТ exegeten 'nere even thourh he still is prepared to sacrifice 
eschatolocy for his iiotion of pro7 ise. 
" C . TT-I, 17';. 
105. 'ΓΗ, 16?.. 
110. LS, 12?. 
111. ' Ánt'Ort auf die Kritik," op. cit., 221. 
112. 'ΓΗ, 117; cf. also his essay, "Die Zukunft als Heues l'aradipna der Transeendenz," 
ОТ). Cit. 
11'. The irip] ications of the Пен are uorked out nost conpletely in "Die Katecorie Ho-
vu-i in der christlichen Theologie," Perspektiven der Theologie, op. cit., l?1*-
188. The notion of the Novum Holtmann borrows from Bloch. Cf. his Daa Prinzip 
Hoffnung, op. cit., 22k-2t>Ci·, and his ïübin^er ¿iinleitun^ in die Philosophie 
(Frankfurt, lOCk), II, I5I-I7O. и. Schillebeeclcx has related the notion of the 
Hew quite well to the theological tradition by describing the shift fron the 
"geheel andere" to the "geheel nieuvje", in his "inkele hermeneutische beschouw­
ingen over de eschatologi,," Conciliun 50969) nr. 1, hZ. 
ll'i. Iioltnann's discussion of Kant's Das £nde Aller Ріпке begins in TH, 39ff· His 
principal угоЫсті vjith transcendental eschatology, as it is taken up by Barth, 
Bultnami and others, is that "das Wozu ist das Woher, das Ziri ist identisch 
nit den Ursprung der Offenbarung." (TH, 39) When the proton and eschaton are 
one and the same, tine becomes an eternal recurring cycle of always the same. 
This S> r Koltnaim is the time of the epiphany of the eternal present with the 
pattern of "Epiphanie - Vorstellune'· instead of the Judaeo-Christian "Verheissung 
- ¿rfüllunc". 
H J . Besides those passages discussed here, cf. also TH, 21-30, ЗС-^З, C5-92. 
116. For the discussion of the exodus church, TH, Chapter 5t passirj; for the challenge 
to "Götzendienst" and the call to a Christian atheism, cf. e.g., GG, Chapters i, 
6, <i passin. His theology of missionary activity owes much to A.A. van Ruler. 
Cf. esp. TH, 250-279. Further, his political theological essays, op. cit. (note 
102). 
117. Cf. his essay "Die Sprache der Befreiung und das befreiende Speechen," in Die 
Sprache der Befreiung, op.cit., 139-156; futher., GG, 77. 
IIS. С Graaf land, "Dl· neologie der Hoffmmg," Theologia Reformata 10(1967)2'» сове· 
to the sane cnnrliiirloo, though admittedly in a différant wayi 
-?59- i:OT£ó, Ciia-^ ter б. 
Geen uoridei- dat ionand ale di·· de ¿олс» die zect so seueldic door 
lloltíiann c6^'6?0-1 '· zijn, vrijwel geen '..ocra over de toekorct 
spreekt in absolute zin, ni. als vervul]ine яп do beloften van God, 
:iaar wel spreekt over een іііелш ctlios voor liet hedeii, dat door de 
hoop wordt г;е2сЬопкегі. 
Graafland has с]early perceived the difference betreen і]1ocutionary and per-
locutionary effects here. 
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NOTES ТО CHAPTER SEVIH 
1. TH, 173. 
2. ibid. 
3. TH, 178. 
^. "Theology as Eschatology," op. cit., 35· 
5. TH, 113. 
6. In speakins of the eschatological horizon of the resurrection of Jesus, in TH, 
173, he says: "Erst in diesem Zusammenhanc,...tauchen jene Fragen auf, die sich 
auf die Zukunft der Weltgeschichte beziehen." And a little further on: "Erst in 
diesem Zueannenhang taucUtauch die Frage nach dem 'wahren Kenechsein' auf, 
nach dem, was den Menschen zum Menschen macht...." Thus both the cosmologica! 
and anthropological consequences of a true horizon are well understood by Holt-
mann. The cosmic character of eschatology is also referred to in GG, 65. 
7. "Theology as Eschatology," op. cit., kZ. 
С ibid. Moltmann's interpretation of Marx, however, is highly dubious. That Marx 
was interested in putting religion back on its feet (ibid., Ίΐ) is, to say the 
least, nost unlikelyj 
9. Despite Moltmann's increasingly positive view of the needfor philoeophy in theo­
logy, the Barthian prejudice against religion remains. One should keep in mind 
as well the influence of Bonhoeffer, whose Widerstand und Ergebung did much to 
popularize the notion of a "religionless Christianity." Moltmann, besides having 
edited work of the early dialectical theologians, Die Anfänge der dialektischen 
Theologie (München, I96O-62; 2 vols.), also published some things on Bonhoeffer 
during the same period: Herrschaft Christi und Soziale Wirklichkeit nach Dietrich 
Bjohoeffer (München, 1959); "Die Wirklichkeit der Welt und Gottes konkretes 
Gebot nach Dietrich Bonhoeffer," Die Mündige Welt 3(1960)lf2ff. 
10. TH, 162. 
11. TH, 17З. Cf. note б. 
12. ΤΗ, 178f. 
13. UZ, lik. 
ih. "Die Kategorie Novum in der christlichen Theologie," op. cit., I80. 
15. uz, 115. 
16. "Die Kategorie Novum in der christlichen Theologie," op. cit., I81. 
I?. Some critics have noted that Moltmann does not quote Jn in TH, a source of a 
more "realized eschatology" upon which those preferring such an eschatology 
base themselves. 
18. TH, 171. 
19. The subtitle of TH. 
20. One could, of course, break down the formation process into the агіош social 
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ГЮТЫЗ, Chapter 7. 
systems and conrnunities that formulated the various parts of the NT canon. But 
that is not relevant to our purpose here. For the fact that succeeding generations 
of Christians have recognized these parts of the process as the canon indicates 
that these have been perceived as a single myth-making process. In light of this, 
\ie will not consider contemporary works not included in the canon (e.g, the 
Didachè or the Letter of Clenent), nor those later works imitating the genres 
of the NT canon that have had marginal effects on the production of meaning in 
Christian communities (the apocrypha). 
21. i-, Haulotte, "Lisibilité des 'iiCritures'," LanEages 6(1971)no. 22, esp. 99-102. 
22. L. Karin, "¡Ln guise de conclusion," ibid., 119-127. 
23. Ξ. Guttgeinanns, "Linguistische Analyse von Kk IG, 1-"," Linguistica Biblica 
3(1972) Heft 11/12, IJ-S?. 
2h. S. Schulz, £. Die Spruchquelle der Evangelisten (Zürich, 1972), 5^1f., discusses 
how ipsissima verba sometimes came fron the nouths of prophets, through uhon 
the exalted Lord spoke. 
25. Notably, Guttgenanns, op. cit., 1*1-29; idem, Offene Fragen zur Forr'gcschichte 
des ¿vangeliuns (ílünchen, ^ідуі). 
26. С. Lévi-Strauss, Le Cru et le Cuit (Paris, 1961*), 11. 
27. GÌìttgenanns, "Linguistische Analyse von № 16, 1-8," op. cit., has an extremely 
good discussion of the problem of relating the needs of deep structure granmar 
to histonographical exigencies. He goes on in the sane article to apply this 
to tlk l6, 1.3.7.δ, the result of which only confir s his point. 
2G. Thus, reference to appearances of the risen Jesus directed purely toward legi­
timation of apostleship (as Acts 1, 22; I Cor 9, D , as well as references not 
concerned with recounting the raising of Jesus (as Hm 't, Ζ1*; δ, 11; 10, 9; I Cor 
6, Ih; E Cor k, Ih; 13, h; Gal 1, 1; Eph 1, 20; I Thess 1, 10; I Pet 1, 21) will 
not be considered. 
29· On lint Guttgemarms, op. cit.; L. Marin, "Les femmes au tombeau," Langages 6(1971) 
no. 22, 39-50. On l'g: P. Lai, "Production du sens par la foi," RSR 61(1973)65-96. 
30. L. Marin, "Essai d'analyse structurale d'Actes 10, 1—11, 18," HSH 58(1970)39-62; 
E. Haulotte, "Fondation d'une communauté de type universel: Actes 10, 1 — 1 1 , ΐδ," 
HSR 58(1970)63-100. 
31. Re-eetablishment of the initial situation is a misnomer. Propp, upon whom Greimas 
bases his actantial structure, notes that after victory over the inverted situa­
tion, the final situation has the hero attaining new, higher status. Cf. Propp, 
Morphology of the Folktale (London, 21968), 63· 
32. Cf. note 29 above. 
33. Marin, "Les femmes au tombeau," op. c i t . , hjî. 
"¡h. GUttgemanns, op. c i t . , 3 9 - Ά · 
35. ib id. , Ί?. 
36. Lai, op. c i t . 
37. ibid., 79f. 
38. ibid., 95. 
.-чг-
1·. I t s 1 ' i 1 ' ! I«, i otee" I ' .at ' ! -ч r i i c f p T t o е і^ toil ouiano]." doe^ .1 t ocoi.r i r e l l 
'->". 'li G ri icst ion i s lost Г' rcu 'u i t l ; T i sed ocsiiict s t r icti iral is i i in cenerai and 
Lávi-ot . , _4 p a r t i c u l a r . /hat i t coies do -^n to i s t h i s : > ttat ·4Γ6 the c r i t e r i a 
for с i'jicí оГ s v i i l f i e r s a t t'ao vleep st.-'-ctui о li ve l , jai t i c v l a r l y ЬРГ. they ar 
ι ι ie •>; (v ident η t i l t for i a t the sui f^rt leve] of tue tex t 2'ic suspicion 
i.r¡.iiic be I ' d t i l s qjciy ic t a t s i~ iif I ' T S i r e chosen tha t ' i l l verify the 
t'iLory rpt ' ie! t ' j n »« ovi'ic any t c ì t fo1" i t . See in t h i s regard >/. lìendricì.Si 
Ί etlioriûTory of i .a r r^ t ivr o t r t c tu j чі rtnlysis," oe l o t i r a 7( l 0" , ) l tv- l ' 'C>¡ " · ^ e -
beok, "Structural and Content Analysis In Folklore Research," Studies in Cheremis: 
J с о i i r r n a t i r a i ( с" ior 1 , 1cì5ó), 2 ') - i -r ' j ' ; i. лг istronc, 'content a n a l y s i s in 
r o l k l o n s t i c s , " in P. la ianda ( o d . ) , hytnology (Ilarnonds o r t h , 1072), 17rif. 
' t l . As ^ . KÖncns Iiiraiidn and P. Iara,ida, Gti " c t u i a l I odels in Folklore aid Trans-
for a t i o r a l -issays (Tie Hnjue, 1 ? 7 J - ) , "?, . oui t out, one te i τ i s usual ly f a i r l y 
univucal, \ j.th the ot ' iers bein^ nore arbicuous. ï h i s c o e s аіоіщ n t h the 
basii idea of OIIP ter ' i géné râ tш ^ the otnei three tor s . 
1*2. ϊ ι [ , l"!*. 
U~. :o~ a study of the siynfjcition nossibilibes, cf. G. mckelsberc, Resurrection, 
Irrni'tality and ^ trr'ial Life η Intel tc-.tanental Jjdaisn (Canbridce, Lass., 
1¡(. Cf. note kO above. In this case it vould mean that content invested in the 
siy ificntion .structure would have to be relatablc accordine to the interrela-
tions of fio sei no structure — thus s^ — sp \Ould represent the paradox; s, 
its mediator; and s-, the nrecordition for its nediation. This will hold at 
""east for those strscturos articulating a conunication isotopy and s ould 
obtain as id] in isotopies of strucclo (the tost). 
'(5· for a ι ist of other troncfornations in narratives, cf. KÖncäs Haranda and 
I.eranda, op. cit., Г>3. Tnese transfornatiors should not be confuj«d with 
linguistic transfer mtions as understood by Chonsky and American linguistics. 
TransornatiOnc there have to do either with the actualization of (jrammatical 
foras (the nove fron deep to surface structure) or with equivalent changes in 
Cra'inatical co'ictrvction at the surface level (as from active to passive voice). 
hG. This often occurs in nyths and folktales. Cf. such chanpes in the reference 
nyth in Lévi-btrauss' Le Cru et le Cuxt, op. cit., investigated in Greinas, 
"Pour une théorie de l'interprétation du récit mythque," Du Sens (Pans, 1970), 
1С5-27Л. 
h7. For a study of dialectic fron Socrates to bao, cf. art."Dialektik," Historisches 
yörterbuch der Philosophie II, 165-226. 
HZ. For Scotus' position, cf. his In III Sent., dist. 8, q. 3. (ed. Uadding) VII/1, 
199-205. 
Vj. For Aquinas' position, see SUIIHÌB Theologica III, q. 1, a. 3· (ed. Leonis XIII) 
XI, 1>1'». 
50. In IV Sent., diet. 1, a. 2, q. 2; as cited in A-. Hichel, art. "Incarnation," 
MXTfaTTTjOZ. 
51. H. North, "The Scotist Cosmic Christ," in De doctrina loannis Duns Scoti (Ноше, 
1960), III, 169-217· For a history of the medieval controversy, cf. A. Michel, 
art. "Incarnation," UTC VII, 1495-1506. 
-?'';·>- ¡.ХС^", Clirpter 7. 
5 2 . P. Schoonenberg, Hij ie een God van Heneen ('e-Hertogenboech, 1969)i further 
Г. van Davel, ''God absorbeert ri-t: de c'ï]'istolo;;ic vnr. ^ciioorri'br.rg,'1 Jvï 
11(1<571);Г.5-4П. 
5J. >·'. ü'Flaherty, Ascctieis". end orotic is", ir. the LytiioloCT 0^ Siva (Oxford, -17^), 
deals \'ith the problen of the virgin birth and the Ciild-boarinE of ione;·. 
beyond the ac< of fertility in Irido] осу and in tl-c oiva-Inrvati ι elationohi^. 
'i'lic applicability of the structjial Model developed there extends far beyond the 
ге1і
ь
іопб of the subcontinent. 
•54. DS 125, 130, 150, 301, 302. 
35. This is the arçurient rij*.tly broucht acainst any futurisn — it car. only '.еічі 
an ethical paralysis of the present. 
56. Lather says that the ti:ie bct"cen death and the end-ti...e nay seen to be ji'st 
a monent. Cf. Г. Althai's, art. "Auferstehung,l- ivGG-^  I, 69.". 
57. H. Sclir.iid, "Schopfimç, Gereclitigkeit, Keil, 'orhöpfuncsthcolocie' als üesar.t-
horizont biblisclier Theolocie," ZThK 70(1973)1-19. 
5o. ibid., 3ff. 
59. The problem of the cosnolof;ical arcuiient, in its arcument Гічігі order, is thrt it 
can be turned on its head and be equally effective. This is precisely rhat Γι. 
Hogar, The Lord of the Absurd (Hew York, I966) does: a conno]ogical arfjuiiient 
based on the chaos in nature. 
60. GG, 40. 
b\» £. Schillebeeckx's notion of a "lijdensgeschiedenis" is a pouerful corrective 
here. Cf. also J. Hetz, "Lrlosimc und liiinnciOation," Ctirinen der Leit Ю З 
(1973)171-lC4. 
62. It is spoken of often in church pronouncenents: DS 72, 7c, 212, τ42, Ά", 436, 
576, 596, 630, 7Co, COI, 839. 
63. К. Rahner, art. "Hollé," ai II, 732, reflects sono of this. Cf. also tl. Sein aus, 
Der Glaube der Kirche (München, 1970), II, 797, who presents the traditional 
pro's and con's on this subject. 
64. Greimas, Du Sens, op. cit., IO3-II5. 
65. ibid., 104. 
66. ibid., 109. 
6?. ibid., И З . 
68. ibid., 117. 
69. Cf. the apologetic pericope Mt 28, 11-15. 
70. H. de Certeau, "Culture and Spiritual Erperience," Conellium 2(1966) no. 9, 
3-16. Cf. ideo G. Bachelard'a notion of a "coupure épiatemologique". 
71. On the question of the proportional norm, ef. E. Schillebeeckx, "Het 'rechte 
gelooft zijn onzekerheden en zijn criteria," TvT 9(19б9)13б-і40. 
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1. Theology ів more in need of a remythologization procesa thsn any crude sort 
of denythologization. 
2. The developoent of an analytic philoaophy of language capable of illuoinating 
the atructurea of religious language will require a much more thorough inveatiga-
tion of the role of the hearer in the speech situation than has been nade to date. 
3· The further use of atructural semantics in exegesis could lead to an important 
re-appropriation of patristic and medieval exegesia for contemporary theology. 
k. Current theology has mora need of inTestigations into the language of concrete 
theological texts than a fürther proliferation of theories about what religious 
language might possibly be. 
5· The tern "eTocative" as applied to religious language needs further precision, 
to distinguish poetic froa perlocutionary uses. 
6. How the presence та absence problem is approached and articulated plays a 
central, if not the central, role in the generation of eachatological theology. 
7. Theology of creation needs to take into account our perception of the world as 
a socially constructed reality. 
8. The speech act analysis of Moltoann's use of promise would seem to indicate 
that the liberal use of this term in contemporary theology needs to be radically 
rethought. 
9. It would seem that personal prejudices rather than lack of textual support 
plays the dominant role in the consistent underestimation of the influence of 
Iranian religions on the deTelopaent of Old Testament theologies. 
10. A pastoral psychology operating wholly on the widely accepted homeostatic 
model of "normality", i.e., that the normal person is one who lives without serious 
conflict between himself and his society, cannot be considered as representative 
of Christian morality. 
11. Current discussions of a critical theology, i.e. those trying to relate 
theology's role to the other faculties of the university, should take caution lest 
their real guiding research interest become getting their share of the university 
budget. 
12. Піе fact that the person of Jesus continues to be remade in our own image and 
likeness, over and over again, is a heartening sign that he has not lost his rele­
vance for contemporary culture. 
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13· The «cclealologlcal iapllcatione of the reeolution of the three trends in 
current Catholiciaa — the rise of pentecoatalism, the end of the poet-Vatican 
II euphoria with its dieenchantaent of the Catholic intelllgentaia, and a growth 
toward a new Catholic ghetto — hare not been adequately explored. 
Ik. Althougi political theology rightfully maintains that it doea not restrict 
itself to politics in the sense of statecraft, more positire action and a little 
less nondirectiTe theorizing will douhtlessly prore more emancipating to the 
Christian consciousness than political theology's efforts to date. 
15. Despite all the difficulties of applying philosophy of language to the pro-
blems of theology, one of Austin's sayings makes for imediate application to 
those of us who try to bring the two areas together: "On these matters, dogmatists 
acquire prodding1 although history indeed suggests that it may scoetimes be better 
to let sleeping dogmatists lie." 


